Tag Archives: Lenín Moreno

Ecuador – Mid-Term Elections Send Ecuador Back to the Future

The results of Sunday’s mid-term elections indicate that Ecuador may be returning to the days of political fragmentation and instability, raising issues for the country’s democracy.

It was not supposed to be like this. A little over a year ago President Moreno received overwhelming support for his plebiscite, was riding high in the polls, and heading a largely unified political sector. Yet, as outlined previously in this blog, the point of unity was a shared opposition to former president Rafael Correa. As predicted, this proved a less-than-satisfactory basis for future governance.

Instead Ecuador’s economic and political future has begun to resemble its past. Moreno’s beleaguered administration bears an increasing resemblance to the chaotic governments that made Ecuador a byword for instability during the 1990s and early 2000s[i]

Beset by economic and political problems, Moreno’s approval rating has slumped to 30%; he has lost a second vice-president to a corruption scandal; and ruling party Alianza PAIS has been broken into “100 pieces”. The month of March witnessed the return of the “demonised” IMF to prop up the country’s ailing economy, evoking memories of former crises[ii].

Now the country’s politics is following a similar path. After a decade of near-hegemony by Alianza PAIS, Sunday’s elections for prefects, mayors, and councillors saw the resumption of what Simon Pachano dubbed the “provincialisation of representation”[iii]. The best that Moreno can say after failing to run candidates in the mid-terms is that no other party or movement has emerged obviously strengthened. 

An election that saw 11,069 posts contested by over 84,000 candidates from among seven political parties, nine national movements and 54 provincial movements, has left Ecuadorian politics atomised.  Localised, proto-populist movements have helped to elect mayors in four of the country’s five major cities, including the capital Quito.

The results have implications for some established political players. Correa’s Citizens’ Revolution Movement failed to  make any headway, although this can be largely attributed to the government prohibiting them from running candidates. Meanwhile the overwhelming ratification of Cynthia Viteri as mayor of Ecuador’s largest city, Guayaquil, may point to a return from the political wilderness of the conservative Social Christian Party.

But the overall picture is one of a “political vacuum” that has not been filled by any political force, mainly due to squabbling and division. This may be good news for Moreno in terms of political survival. 

Taking a broader view, however, the results bode ill for Ecuador’s democracy and economy. Having won elections as Correa’s former vice-president, Moreno has steadily moved away from his predecessor’s geopolitical and economic positions. Late last year Moreno introduced an ‘paquetazo’ of austerity measures, including layoffs in the public sector, and cuts to state subsidies. These moves paved the way for the formal approval of a $4.2 billion line of credit from the IMF, a highly controversial move.

Moreno has sought to blame the poor economic circumstances that he inherited from Correa. There is no doubt that levels of public debt were understated by Correa, and issues with salary payments for public sector workers pre-date the current president. But there is some evidence to suggest that Moreno is now overstating debt, perhaps to justify more cuts. Meanwhile, the Ecuadorian economy is continuing to contract.

While it is valid to argue that Moreno has largely continued the economic policies of Correa’s latter years – the former president reached an accord with the IMF for interim credit in 2016 –Moreno has significantly “accelerated” this process. As prior research shows, this kind of ‘switch’ can have a strongly negative impact on public faith in democracy[iv]. Recent survey data from Latinobarometro revealed that almost 20% of the public would favour an authoritarian government, providing some support for this thesis.

Accordingly, Moreno has been branded a “traitor” not only by Correa, but by many on the left. Justifying his break with the past by painting the Correa administration as corrupt, Moreno has overseen the conviction of his former vice-president and Correa loyalist Jorge Glas on corruption charges, and has sought Correa’s extradition from Belgium. 

But attempts to portray himself as the new broom of Ecuadorian politics have failed. Moreno’s second vice-president, María Alejandra Vicuña, was forced to resign following a corruption scandal, while rumours of offshore accounts and secret payments continue to swirl around the president. At a time when Ecuador is in dire need of political leadership, its president enjoys little credibility.

Instead of national unity, the mid-term results indicate a return to the days of high electoral volatility and moveable allegiances – referred to as “swapping jerseys” in Ecuador. Reduced policy coherence and enhanced instability appear the likely outcomes.

Geopolitically, Moreno has re-aligned Ecuador with the US, supporting Juan Guaido in Venezuela, and pulling out of the Unasur regional body. Economically, Moreno’s plan involves a combination of IMF-mandated cuts to the public sector, renewed privatisation, and a continuation of the extractivism that characterised the Correa era.

Yet the mid-term results point to issues for the president in this area also, with the election of indigenous anti-mining activist Yaku Perez Guartambel as Prefect of mineral-rich Azuay, and the rejection of the Quimsacocha mining project in a local popular plebiscite. Along with the protests that met Moreno’s austerity measures, these events may herald the return to political prominence of Ecuador’s social movements, so weakened under Correa[v]. Were that to occur, the echoes of the past would be undeniable.


[i]Pérez-Liñán, A. (2007), Presidential impeachment and the new political instability in Latin America. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

[ii]Aguirre, M. (2019), ‘Informe de Coyuntura: El Juego del Ahorcado’, CEP Informe de Coyuntura, Enero. Available at: http://www.cepecuador.org/images/PDFs/coyuntura_enero_2019_opt.pdf.

[iii]Pachano, S. (2006), ‘Ecuador: The provincialization of representation’, in S, Mainwaring, A.M. Bejarano, and E. Pizarro Leongómez (eds.), The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes. Stanford, Stanford University Press.

[iv]Stokes, S. C. (2001). Mandates and democracy: Neoliberalism by surprise in Latin America. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Johnson, G. B., & Ryu, S. R. (2010), ‘Repudiating or rewarding neoliberalism? How broken campaign promises condition economic voting in Latin America’, Latin American Politics and Society52(4), pp. 1-24.

[v]Becker, M. (2013), ‘The stormy relations between Rafael Correa and social movements in Ecuador’, Latin American Perspectives40(3),pp. 43-62.

Ecuador – President Lenín Moreno ousted as head of his party

Last week, the President of Ecuador, Lenín Moreno, was removed as head of his own party, Alianza PAIS, following a meeting of the party leadership in Quito. Moreno, who only won the presidential election as the Alianza PAIS candidate last April, by narrowly defeating the right-leaning banker Guillermo Lasso by just over two percent of votes, was ostensibly removed as leader of the party because Moreno had been absent from a number of the party’s meetings over the course of the last three months. Most commentators however, believe that Moreno was removed as head of the party because of his decision to shift his stance away from that of the former president, Rafael Correa. Ricardo Patiño, a former Foreign Minister and Minister of Defense was chosen by the party’s national directorate to replace Moreno, while the party also issued an invitation to Correa to lead a restructuring of Alianza PAIS.

Moreno, an experienced disability campaigner, who is in a wheelchair following a robbery in 1998 when he was shot in the car park of a supermarket, served as Correa’s vice-president between 2007 and 2013, before assuming a role as a UN Special Envoy for Disability and Accessibility. For most of his presidency, Rafael Correa managed to maintain very high approval ratings. He was re-elected for a third term in a veritable landslide victory in May 2013, and his approval rating remained consistently between 65 and 85 per cent. Back in April 2014, Correa began indicating support for a constitutional amendment that would largely abolish presidential term limits. Correa had already overseen a constitutional reform to allow him run for a third consecutive term, and with national assembly backing of his proposed amendment to term limits, it was widely expected that he would run in 2017. However,  by the end of his presidency, falling oil prices had badly hurt the oil-exporting economy and economic growth had begun to grind to a standstill. The stuttering economy and his declining approval ratings appear to have convinced Correa to step aside.

It was widely perceived that Moreno who succeeded Correa as head of the party, following Correa’s decision not to run again in 2017 (but who remained as honorary life president of Alianza PAIS), would become a puppet of Correa as the power behind the throne, thereby facilitating Correa’s return in 2021. However, this was not to be the case. During the presidential campaign, Moreno began distancing himself from Correa; he indicated support for a more centrist economic policy and a re-evaluation of Ecuador’s relations with other countries in the region. In fact, after only three months in office, Moreno made a number of comments that were clearly a veiled criticism of President Nicolás Maduro and his increasing authoritarianism in Venezuela, which was widely seen as a repudiation of the former Boliviarian foreign policy of Correa, which had seen Ecuador provide the Maduro government with unwavering support.

Domestically, Moreno began a more conciliatory policy towards the former enemies of Correa, and reached out to opposition parties, the media and indigenous groups. Moreno introduced reforms to media freedom, allowed the liberalisation of digital financial transactions and even cut some public sector salaries. In August, he also suspended, and instigated proceedings against, Jorge Glas, his vice-president, and a former minister in Correa’s government, due to allegations of Glas’ involvement with the Odebrecht corruption scandal.

Acrimony soon followed, and Correa and Moreno began a very public spat on Twitter and in the national media. Moreno’s removal is far from the end of the story. Moreno’s approval has jumped to nearly 77 per cent, according to a recent poll from September, and not all party deputies have accepted this decision; in fact, over  44 Alianza PAIS deputies have expressed unconditional support for Moreno. Expect things to only heat up.