Monthly Archives: April 2019

Estonia – Analysing party strategies and their determinants in indirect presidential elections, 1996-2016

I have written about the potential future for indirect presidential elections in Estonia on the pages of this blog several times over the last years. After the minor constitutional crisis in 2016, when both parliament and electoral college failed to elect a president in five rounds of voting, it appeared as though a reform of the system was imminent. Although plans for the introduction of popular election were quickly shelved in favour of a reformed indirect system, no changes were decided until the end of the Riigikogu’s (parliament) legislative period in March. Two weeks ago, a new coalition took office that included the introduction of more direct democracy – including the popular election of the president – in its coalition agreement. Although it is unclear whether there will (ever) be a constitutional majority in favour of popular presidential elections, it is timely to look back at Estonian presidential elections to date and analyse what factors shaped party strategies and electoral outcomes. This blog post summarises some of the key findings from my article “The effects of majority requirements, selectorate composition and uncertainty in indirect presidential elections: The case of Estonia” published in East European Politics.

Since 1996 Estonian presidents have been elected indirectly in either parliament or an electoral college that acts as a (frequently used) failsafe if parliamentary parties cannot muster the required 2/3-majority over three rounds of voting. Nevertheless, the electoral college – consisting of members of parliament and local councilors – does also not stipulate a plurality runoff or other safeguard against cyclical preferences. Furthermore, as the partisan composition and control of the selectorate differs greatly between parliament and electoral college, parties face various uncertainties and cannot always predict if their candidate will be successful. Consequently, the varying majority requirements, selectorate composition, and uncertainty have been the key factors influencing party strategies in Estonian presidential elections.

Only once since 1996 has a president been elected during the first round of voting in parliament (re-election of Toomas Hendrik Ilves in 2011); in 1996, 2001, and 2006 presidents were elected in the respective last round in the electoral college (usually with razor-thin majorities), and in 2016 in a sixth round in parliament after no candidate received the required absolute majority in the college and the election was handed back to the Riigikogu. Throughout this process, it is clear that the requirement of (super)majorities provided a major obstacle for parties. In particular, it minimized incentives to make serious attempts at electing a president in parliament. Rather, parties chose to face the uncertainty of the electoral college. However, in the electoral college local electors who did not belong to any of the parliamentary parties dominated, so that parties had less control over the result. Even those electors belonging to the larger parties often felt torn between voting in line with local or national-level interests (and usually chose the former).

To assess the degree of uncertainty faced by parties in the electoral college through shifts in selectorate composition I gathered data on all 500+ MPs and over 1,000 local council electors that took part in the elections. Interestingly, I found that although overall indicators suggested that shifts in selectorate composition became less dramatic – in part thanks to national parties’ attempts to bring local politics under their control – this proliferated rather than reduced uncertainty over the electoral outcome. The more equal distribution of parties’ strength in parliament and electoral college reduced their capability to present candidates with a credible chance of capturing the presidency – the electoral college merely mirrored the deadlocks and problems of national politics. Paradoxically, the greater permeation of local politics by national parties meant greater power in the hands of electors representing local lists and alliances who subsequently acted in accordance with a different set of preferences and proposed their own candidates.

Although the overall design of the Estonian system may be somewhat unique, it still combines a number of common characteristics that can be found across other parliamentary republics. Unfortunately, there is as of yet very little comparative research on indirect presidential elections (Csaba Nikolenyi’s study is a notable exception here) that would allow us to reliably gauge the wider applicability of the findings from this study or make informed recommendations to policy-makers as they seek to reform the Estonian system. Nevertheless, what appears to be clear it appears likely that if parties fail to instate any type of run-off / simple majority, deadlocks and cyclical preferences are likely to return.

This blog post is based on a recently published article: Köker, Philipp. 2019. The effects of majority requirements, selectorate composition and uncertainty in indirect presidential elections: The case of Estonia. East European Politics [Online First: DOI:10.1080/21599165.2019.1604339]

Senegal – Back to presidentialism?

Newly reelected President Macky Sall has given his prime minister, Mahammed Boun Abdallah Dionne, the unenviable task of eliminating his own position. This will entail changing Senegal’s constitution — once again — and reintroduce a presidential system.

Despite Senegal’s history of relative political stability, the country’s constitutional history has been far from stable. Senegal is at its fourth constitution, since 1959, and has changed government system several times already. In between constitutions, there have been numerous constitutional amendments, most of which have been passed by a legislative vote without resorting to a referendum.

In August 1960, Senegal adopted its second constitution — and its first as an independent, separate republic — after abandoning the short-lived Mali Federation created by the first 1959 constitution. The 1960 constitution was modeled on the 1958 French example with a dual executive: with an indirectly elected president as head of state and a prime minister (“cabinet president”) appointed by the president, but accountable to the National Assembly. Léopold Sédar Senghor was elected Senegal’s first president and his close political ally Mamadou Moustapha Dia became the country’s first prime minister.

This two-headed executive system did not survive a rapidly mounting power struggle between Senghor and Dia that culminated in a constitutional crisis in 1962. Legislators were about to take a no confidence vote in Dia, when the prime minister ordered the army to hinder access to the National Assembly building. Senghor accused Dia of a constitutional coup attempt and had him arrested. The military remained loyal to the president and Dia spent the next 12 years in jail. Senghor promptly took steps to avoid a similar situation in the future and initiated a new, presidential constitution that was approved by referendum in March 1963 (the country’s third constitution in four years). Senghor was reelected in December of that year by popular vote for a four-year presidential term, without term limits. In 1967, in the first of what was to be a be a total of 20 revisions to the 1963 constitution, the presidential term was increased to five years.

Senegal returned to a dual executive system in 1970 with the reintroduction of the prime minister position, in an effort to defuse tensions in a context of social unrest with student demonstration and labor strikes. Senghor initiated a referendum on a constitutional change that this time resulted in a fully fledged semi-presidential government system, providing for a directly elected president and a prime minister accountable to parliament (modeled on the 1962 revised French constitution). This revision also introduced a two-term presidential term limit. This limit was, however, removed again in the fifth constitutional revision of April 1976.

Before finishing his fourth elected term, Senghor resigned on December 31, 1980. Prime Minister Abdou Diouf became president and served out the rest of the term. Shortly after being elected president on his own account in 1983, Diouf initiated a constitutional change to return Senegal to presidentialism. The argumentation presented for the revision included the need for greater efficiency and effectiveness of government action and the expressed desire for a more direct contact between the president and the population. This time, presidentialism survived for eight years, till 1991. With the return to semi-presidentialism in 1991, as the third wave of democratization swept across Africa, Senegal also reintroduced presidential term limits. The term limits were, however, removed again in 1998, in the 19th revision to the 1963 constitution.

When Abdoulaye Wade won the presidency in 2000, marking the first time that executive power transitioned from one party to another in Senegal’s history, the new president initiated the elaboration of a new constitution. The country thus got its fourth and current constitution adopted by referendum in 2001. Senegal retained a semi-presidential system of government, and reintroduced presidential term limits. This new constitution has not fared much better than the old one, however, in terms of amendments. By 2010, the constitutional text had already been revised 15 times, according to Robert Elgie.

Senegal – Changes in government system and presidential term limits

1960Dual executive system, no presidential term limits
1963Presidentialism
1970Semi-presidentialism, term limits introduced [removed again in 1976]
1983Presidentialism
1991Semi-presidentialism, term limits reintroduced [removed again in 1998, reintroduced in 2001]
2019??Presidentialism??

President Macky Sall, shortly after being elected in 2012, initiated a constitutional revision to remove the senate from Senegal’s democratic architecture, but has overall had a less piecemeal approach to constitutional reform. In 2016, the government introduced a series of amendments that touched 20 articles of the constitution and were passed by referendum. Chief among these was the reduction of the length of presidential terms to five years, from the seven years it had been increased to under Wade. Sall’s second term, after his reelection in February of this year, will thus be reduced to five years.  

Sall is now following in the footsteps of Diouf, moving to return Senegal to presidentialism. Perhaps it is his shortened presidential term that provides Sall with a sense of urgency and the desire to streamline decision-making processes. His arguments for returning to presidentialism echo those of Diouf, saying that eliminating the prime minister position will help “reduce administrative bottlenecks” and “bring the administration closer to the people.” His critics allege it is a power grab. It is striking that Sall did not mention his plans to change government system during his campaign for reelection. The first indication of his intentions came in an announcement on April 6, by Mahammed Dionne whom he had just reappointed prime minister. The government thereafter moved quickly and on April 17 adopted a constitutional amendment removing the prime minister position.

The proposed constitutional amendment was on April 24 sent to the National Assembly that will now review and debate the proposed changes. A vote is set for May 4th. It will require a three fifth majority to pass the amendment by legislative vote, a likely outcome in a legislature where the presidential coalition controls a 75 percent majority (125 out of 165 seats). Should the legislative vote pass with less than 60 percent, a referendum is required. The text of the constitutional amendment has not yet been made public, but an alleged copy is circulating online. Reportedly, besides transferring responsibilities as head of government to the president, the revised text also foresees a clearer separation of powers between the legislature and the executive: on the one hand the legislature can no longer topple the cabinet through a no confidence vote, on the other hand, the president cannot dissolve the legislature as is currently the case.

There is no indication that the proposed constitutional amendment will touch on presidential term limits. Hopefully Sall will not follow in the steps of another previous president – Wade – who stood for a third term despite term limit provisions. Wade argued in 2012 that he should be allowed to run again because presidential term limits had been reintroduced in 2001, after he was elected, and could not be considered retroactively. Elsewhere on the continent, Côte  d’Ivoire’s President Alassane Ouattara has argued that the adoption of a new constitution in 2016 reset the term limit counter and that he could therefore run again in 2020, if he wanted to. In Senegal, the difference is that if the amendment passes, the country will have a new government system, but not a new constitution. It remains to be seen whether this is a sure bulwark in a country and region where term limits have proven fickle in the past. In neighboring Guinea, President Alpha Conde and his supporters seem increasingly intent on initiating a constitutional referendum that would lift term limits before Conde’s second and last term comes to an end next year. Despite significant democratic progress in West Africa over the past decade, the notion of presidential term limits does not yet appear to be firmly entrenched.

Indonesia: Presidential and General Elections, 2019

April 17, 2019, witnessed the first simultaneous election of the presidency and the legislature in Indonesia since democratization in 1998, and the institutionalization of direct presidential elections in the country in 2002. Some 809,000 polling stations in the country were open from 7:00am to 1:00pm for the 192 million eligible voters to cast their votes on election day, a public holiday. Voter turnout was estimated at 80 percent or higher. Official results are not expected for a month, due to the size of the elections: 575 seats of the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR), 136 seats for the People’s Representatives Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD), 2207 seats in provincial elections, and 17,610 district elections. The following recounts polling results and also describes some challenging developments since election day.

Quickcount results show President Joko (Jokowi) Widodo and his running mate, Ma’ruf Amin, chairman of the Indonesian Ulema council, have won the country’s highest offices. Quickcount results have also reported the president’s legislative coalition with a majority of the legislative seats. 10 parties constitute the President’s coalition and initial results show the president’s Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) leading with the largest number of votes, Golkar in third place, and with the National Awakening Party (PKB), and NasDem Party also doing well. Meanwhile, the opposition coalition supporting presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto, the Gerindra Party and its coalition partners, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), the National Mandate Party (PAN), are also successful at the legislative elections, with polls showing that Gerindra poised to become the second largest party in the legislature.

That’s the good news. In particular, the President’s legislative majority contrasts against the aftermath of the 2014 elections where the opposition coalition coalesced into a majority that hindered the President’s agenda for a year before falling away to the President’s camp.  

The problematic news: Prabowo Subianto has rejected the quickcount results, in a replay of events immediately following the 2014 election quickcount outcome. In particular, in 2014, Prabowo refused to concede defeat and called to question of the objectivity of the quickcount polls. This time around, it’s even more dramatic: Prabowo has declared himself victorious in the election, making claims that quickcount results are biased, of irregularities and wrong-doing at the polls, and that “other” polls show he has clinched the presidency.

These claims are seen as provocative and escalating post-election tensions in the country; several leaders, including former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and chairman of Rabithah Alawiyah, an organization for habib, or Islamic scholars from the Sayyid community, have called for national unity and calm. Indeed, the former president, whose Democratic Party supports Prabowo’s candidacy, has gone so far as to urge party officials to withdraw temporarily from the Gerindra campaign team. Meanwhile, the chiefs of military and police have issued warnings against anyone engaged in “unconstitutional act that can damage our democracy.”

In perhaps the slightest hint of concession, Prabowo has urged his supporters to refrain from “overreacting” to his declarations, although the former lieutenant-General has not refrained from issuing the declarations. Results are expected to be announced on May 22, 2019, 35 days from election day. There is a lot of hope that the world’s third largest democracy, and a country with the largest Muslim population in the world, will see the elections peacefully through to the end.

Finland – modest but important gains for the political left in parliamentary elections

The Finnish parliamentary elections held last Sunday (14 April) received international media attention primarily on account of the anti-immigration and nationalist The Finns Party finishing second, winning just one MP less than the Social Democrats that emerged as the largest party for the first time in the 21st century. Overall, all three leftist parties – the Social Democrats, the Green League, and the Left Alliance – won more votes and seats than in the Eduskunta elections held four years earlier, while particularly the Centre Party suffered a major defeat.

Finland had been governed since the 2015 elections by a centre-right coalition that brought together the Centre, the National Coalition (conservatives), and the Finns Party. The top priority of the cabinet had been the reorganization of health and social services, which would have brought about both a larger role for the private sector in delivering such services (a key objective for the National Coalition) and the introduction of directly-elected regional councils (a key objective for the Centre that wins most of its vote in the rural provinces). The project had run into serious trouble in the Eduskunta, with also some backbench MPs of the governing parties voicing strong criticism and indicating that they might not support the bill. Finally, the project was buried on 8 March, with PM Juha Sipilä of the Centre Party immediately announcing the resignation of his government.

With just over a month to go before the Eduskunta elections, many speculated that Sipilä had resigned in order to focus on the campaign, especially as the Centre was doing so badly in the polls. Sipilä seemed concerned about the Centre losing its core supporters in the rural areas, and hence he defended strongly the increasing use of logging and ‘sustainable use of forest resources’. In fact, climate change and the need to address global warming became arguably the leading topic of the elections, with particularly the left-wing parties advocating bolder measures that were criticized by the political right, not least by the Finns Party. However, apart from climate change the campaign themes ranged from the state of economy and employment (with the governing parties defending their good track record) to immigration, equality, and social security. European integration and foreign and security policy did not feature at all in the debates. Surprisingly the failed social and health care reform package was also by and large missing from the debates.

The Finnish party system is very fragmented, with the largest party normally getting at most 20-25 % of the votes. This time the Social Democrats captured only 17,7 % of the votes (+1,2 % compared with the 2015 elections, the worst performance of the party after the Second World War) and 40 seats (+6 compared with the situation after the 2015 elections), the lowest-ever share won by the largest party in Eduskunta elections. While the polls had predicted a bigger victory for the Social Democrats, finishing first means a lot to the party and more broadly to the political left in Finland. The last time the Social Democrats won the elections was back in 1999, and hence Finland has not had a social democratic prime minister after the era of the ‘rainbow coalitions’ headed by Paavo Lipponen between 1995 and 2003. The inclusion of Social Democrats in the government is also crucial for the trade unions that received wide-spread criticism during the Sipilä government. Antti Rinne, the party leader and thus also the likely next prime minister, has a trade union background, and this no doubt strengthens the links between the new government and the corporatist actors. Rinne himself has been quite heavily criticized, and again there are question marks over his leadership as still between January and early April the support of the Social Democrats was according to polls around and even above 20 %.

The Green League recorded its best-ever performance, winning 11,5 % of the vote (+3,0 %) and 20 seats (+5). However, the celebrations were nonetheless quite muted, especially as the polls had predicted a larger vote share for the Greens and many party activists surely hoped that the party would achieve the next step of joining the group of large parties in Finnish politics. Pekka Haavisto, a senior party figure with long experience from both national politics and international organisations, had been appointed as the interim party chair in November when Touko Aalto was forced to resign as party chair due to health issues. Haavisto, who was also the Greens’ candidate in the 2012 and 2018 presidential elections, intends to step down in June when the Greens have their next party congress. The Greens are in many ways close allies with the Social Democrats, and would thus be a logical coalition partner in a Social Democratic-led cabinet. The Left Alliance also achieved an election victory, winning 8,2 % of the vote (+1,0 %) and 16 seats (+4). Hence the combined seat share of the left-wing parties increased from 61 seats after the 2015 elections to 76 seats (38 %).

International media coverage focused strongly on the Finns Party which finished second with 17,5 % of the vote (-0,2 %) and 39 seats (+1). When interpreting the results, we must pay close attention to the recent history of the party. The ‘new’ version of the Finns Party was established in summer 2017 when Jussi Halla-aho was elected as the party chair. Halla-aho, who has been convicted in court for hate speech, and the entire new party leadership focuses strongly on immigration issues and the new leadership also advocates more pro-market solutions than the ‘old’ Finns Party chaired by Timo Soini between 1997 and 2017. The support of Halla-aho’s party increased in the months leading to the elections, but the final result nevertheless took most observers by surprise. Halla-aho himself was the vote king of the elections, winning 30596 votes in the Helsinki constituency. Also many other leading anti-immigration figures, such as Laura Huhtasaari, Juho Eerola, and Ville Tavio performed strongly in their respective electoral districts.

The election was at the same time a catastrophe for the Blue Reform, the ‘losing side’ of the Finns Party’s 2017 party congress. The Blue Reform was essentially put together by the more populist or moderate senior party figures that also were cabinet ministers, and hence many felt that they were just protecting their own ministerial positions. The Blue Reform thus continued in the cabinet and in the elections tried to defend the achievements of the Sipilä government. It managed to win only 1,0 % of the vote and failed to achieve representation in the Eduskunta, meaning also that the ministers of the party (Soini was not seeking re-election), including the party chair Sampo Terho, were not re-elected.

The two main governing parties, the Centre and the National Coalition, did their best to defend the track record of the cabinet, particularly regarding employment rate. The National Coalition managed considerably better, finishing third with 17,0 % of the vote (-1,2 %) and 38 seats (+1). While party chair Petteri Orpo and the party faithful appeared jubilant, one could also sense disappointment as the National Coalition had won the 2017 municipal elections with 20,7 % of the vote and for a long time it had seemed that Orpo might become the next PM. The National Coalition and the Social Democrats have experience from governing together (1987-1991, 1995-2003, and 2011-2015), and the current prediction is that the new cabinet would be constructed around these two large parties.

The Centre Party in turn captured only 13,8 % of the vote (-7,3 %) and 31 seats (-18), its worst performance in elections held after the Second World War. This was essentially a repeat of the 2011 elections. Back then the Centre had held the position of the prime minister for eight years, and also now the burden of governing took its toll. The market-friendly policies of PM Sipilä clearly alienated parts of the party’s electorate, many of whom lean more towards cooperation with the Social Democrats. If the Centre is not part of the next government (as appears likely), Finland may remain without directly-elected regional councils. Sipilä announced his resignation as the party chair after the elections.

Of the smaller parties, the Swedish People’s Party received 4,5 % of the vote (-0,3 %) and held to its 10 seats (including the sole representative of the Åland Islands) while the Christian Democrats won 3,9 % of the vote (+0,4 %) and also retained its 5 seats. The final MP is Harry Harkimo, the leader of Liike Nyt (Movement Now) that very much ran an ‘anti-party’ campaign and advertised itself as a new way of making politics.

At this stage it appears most likely that the new coalition will be formed between the Social Democrats and the National Coalition, and that it will include also smaller parties such as the Greens and the Swedish People’s Party. While Halla-aho has indicated willingness to make compromises and to take part in government formation talks, it is more likely that the Finns Party will continue in the opposition. In terms of the overall direction of domestic or European and foreign policy, the election result will probably not result in any significant changes. The political left is stronger now than four years ago, and this is probably good news for those defending the welfare state and the role of the trade unions. However, concerns about the state of the economy, including reducing public debt, act as a constraint on the new Finnish government regardless of its party-political composition.

Turnout was 72,1 %, or 68,7 % when including enfranchised citizens living abroad. 94/200 (47 %) of the elected MPs are women.

Tanzania – The politics of being Auditor General

Tanzania’s Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG), Prof. Mussa Assad, is by turns the most celebrated and vilified man in the country right now. His predicament, far from a matter of personality, speaks to broader questions of accountability, institutional oversight and economic strategy under President Magufuli.   

The current tensions began in early January. Speaker of Parliament Job Ndugai accused Prof. Assad of “contempt of Parliament” after the CAG referred to parliament’s oversight performance as “weak” during an interview. The Speaker summoned Assad before a parliamentary disciplinary committee to explain himself, meanwhile briefly suspending the work of parliament’s oversight committees.  

Fast forward to April and the disciplinary committee tabled its report in Parliament, recommending that Parliament suspend work with the CAG, a recommendation that was then voted through by the ruling party majority.

This move elicited a prompt reply from Prof. Assad, warning of a potential constitutional violation. The decision to stop working with Assad came at a sensitive time, just as Parliament was due to debate the CAG’s audit report for the financial year 2017/2018. Assad pointed out, “My office has already submitted the audit report to the President, and it must be submitted to parliament in seven days,” adding, “If this is not done, it will mean breach of the constitution.”

A campaign quickly picked up on social media with many activists praising the CAG and demanding Parliament honour its constitutional duties. Ndugai responded by clarifying that Parliament would review the CAG’s reports, but that it would work with his office and not with the man himself, that is, with Prof. Assad. The Speaker went on to suggest that Assad should in fact resign. This latest move has elicited a response in kind as an online petition calling for Ndugai’s ouster is now fast gaining signatures.

The immediate concern raised by Ndugai’s critics is that he is effectively undermining the independence of the CAG, threatening Prof. Assad to discourage proper oversight of public finances. Relatedly, many see the Speaker’s intervention as part of a cover-up, the main aim being to stop revelations of money “missing and misappropriated under the government of President Magufuli.” While Magufuli has himself remained silent on the CAG issue, Ndugai has developed a reputation as the President’s right-hand-man in Parliament, adding to the impression of executive interference in key oversight institutions, first Parliament and now the CAG. Ndugai’s latest intervention, moreover, is not the first one to come at a sensitive and seemingly strategic moment. When the Speaker challenged the CAG back in January, it was just as a special audit report, critical of government’s financial management, was due to be debated in Parliament.

Whatever the reality of the situation, Ndugai’s heavy-handed interventions certainly reinforce the impression that the government has something to hide. But this raises the question, what does the CAG’s latest audit report actually tell us?

On certain points, it paints a fairly good picture of government’s financial management. For instance, 97 percent of the 241 government bodies audited by the CAG had their accounts in perfect order, a percentage that compares well with the previous administration of President Jakaya Kikwete.

Yet on other points, the CAG’s report does raise significant concerns, not only about government accountability but also about the viability of its current development strategy.

Critics have been quick to note several anomalies, for instance, poor reconciliation of reported funds released by the treasury and received by relevant government bodies. Another worry is the decision to transfer the vastly expanded budget of the state-owned Air Tanzania Company Ltd. (ATCL) to the State House budget, i.e. the President’s office, which the CAG does not audit.  As opposition MP Zitto Kabwe affirmed, “This issue is very important because past experience shows that anything that has a stench of corruption or doubtful expenditure Government moves it to the State House budget because it knows it is not openly audited” (my translation).

Leaving aside accountability, the CAG report highlights several issues regarding government performance. These include delays in development projects due to government’s failure to pay, underperformance of state-owned enterprises (including ATCL), losses at state-owned banks like the Tanzania Agricultural Development Bank (TADB), and unpaid debts owed to various pension funds.

Magufuli has built his no-nonsense, “only work”, “bulldozer” brand, in part, on claims to rapidly implement big infrastructure projects and with a preference for public enterprise in the name of efficiency and cost-cutting. He has also relied on funding from pensions and banks like TADB, which among other things, played a central role financing the government’s ill-fated cashew-buying operation. It is thus not insignificant that these are the precise areas where the CAG has identified shortcomings in government performance.

Arguably, the CAG’s report is most damning not where it points to potential financial mismanagement; rather, the truly concerning take-away is that central pillars of the government’s current development approach are resting on shaky foundations [i]. Ndugai’s criticism of the CAG seemingly only draws more attention to these findings. And in any case, as the IMF revises down Tanzania’s growth forecast from 6-7 percent to a mere 4 percent, the real-world results will be all too plain to see.

[i] As I will elaborate in a follow-up piece, I do not mean to draw a crude contrast between market- v. state-led development strategy, perhaps leaving readers with the impression that I think Magufuli is simply too statist. To the contrary, there is good reason to think public development banks, state-owned enterprise and the like can and should play a more central role in the government’s development strategy. Indeed, a consensus on this issue began to emerge already under Kikwete. But just as there are many “varieties of capitalism”, i.e. many ways of managing a market-led economy, there are also various ways of integrating a more state-led development strategy. The approach Magufuli is currently pursuing, not least privileging public enterprises like the highly costly ATCL, is neither economically nor politically the most desirable.

Post-Communist Countries: Policy Diffusion relating to Immunity from Prosecution for Ex-Presidents

Immunity from criminal prosecution for sitting presidents is a common feature of democratic as well as authoritarian regimes.[i]    Shielding presidents from indictment and prosecution is designed to prevent members of the political opposition from weaponizing the criminal process and adding unduly to the already considerable burdens of political leadership.  Besides, in most countries, there is a political remedy for presidential corruption or malfeasance—impeachment—which places the responsibility for the fate of an errant president in the hands of elected representatives rather than prosecutors or judges. 

Less common in presidential or semi-presidential systems is immunity from criminal prosecution for ex-presidents.[ii]  Here the logic is different and more likely to apply in places where democracy has yet to be consolidated.  In these circumstances, immunity for ex-presidents can encourage leaders to leave office at the end of their constitutionally-mandated term without fear of losing their property, their freedom, or their lives.  In a word, immunity lessens the incentive for incumbent presidents to use constitutional[iii] or unconstitutional means to hold on to power.   

In the post-communist world, Russia was the first country to grant broad immunity protection to ex-presidents.  The measure came in the form of a decree issued by Vladimir Putin on December 31, 1999, hours after Boris Yeltsin ceded the presidency to Putin, who had been prime minister.   This decree was part of a package of concessions to Yeltsin that facilitated the departure of the aging Russian president.[iv]  Among the decree’s provisions were expansive protections against criminal liability for acts committed while in office as well as protections against being “detained, arrested, searched, interrogated, or personally inspected [lichnyi osmotr].”  Moreover, the decree extended the immunity to a former president’s “residential and office premises, vehicles used by him, means of communication, other documents, luggage, and correspondence.”  However, a subsequent parliamentary statute, adopted in January 2001, eroded immunity guarantees for ex-presidents in Russia by subjecting former leaders to criminal prosecution if both houses of parliament first conclude that the president committed “grave crimes” [tiazhkie prestupleniia] while in office.[v]

In a striking example of legal diffusion and the neighborhood effect, the Russian legislation inspired subsequent laws protecting ex-presidents in 7 of the other 14 post-Soviet states.  In some respects, it was a throwback to the practices of the Soviet era, when Moscow would first develop a piece of model legislation [maket] and then the 15 union republics would adopt local codes with only minor variations from the model.  In the case of the follow-on laws on immunity for ex-presidents in post-communist states, the legislative language was often lifted word-for-word from the Russian model.  In these cases, according to the literature on policy diffusion, what was at stake was not authoritarian learning, competition, or coercion but authoritarian imitation.[vi] 

Because this demonstration effect radiated out to the immediate neighborhood and no further, the post-communist example fits into a pattern of “proximity diffusion” found in other parts of the world, and in at least one region on this very issue.  Many African countries, for example, have adopted common guarantees of immunity for sitting presidents and, in some cases, ex-presidents.  In these African cases, however, the protections may be removed when charges of “high treason” are at issue.[vii] 


As the accompanying chart illustrates, there are some significant variations in the provisions set out in national laws.  In the cases of Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, for example, immunity guarantees apply only to the first post-communist president during his lifetime.  In Kazakhstan that is Nursultan Nazarbaev, who since 2010 has had the official title of Yelbasy, or Leader of the Nation; in Tajikistan it is Emomali Rahmon, who sports the even grander-sounding moniker of The Founder of Peace and National Unity—The Leader of the Nation.[viii]  Given Nazarbaev’s unexpected decision last month to resign after 30 years at the helm of Soviet and post-Soviet Kazakhstan, he is now in a position to enjoy the ad hominem immunity that he helped to put in place over the last two decades, an immunity that protects not only Nazarbaev’s person but the property and bank accounts of himself and members of his family living with him.  For his part, Tajikistani President Rahmon enjoys similar guarantees, except that the law covers all family members and not just those living with him, a provision that would seem to protect his grown children, including his oldest son, Rustam, who many view as the likely successor to his father as president of Tajikistan.

Given their traditional positions as the most authoritarian regimes in former Soviet Central Asia, one might have expected Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to have introduced versions of the Russian law on immunity that offered the broadest possible guarantees to an ex-president.  However, in important respects, ex-presidents of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are more vulnerable to criminal prosecution than their peers in neighboring countries, at least according to the formal rules.  First, in both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan immunity protections extend only to those actions “taken in connection with the execution of the powers” of president, and thus would arguably not cover all of the actions of a president while in office.  Second, by allowing the authorities to deprive an ex-president “of immunity if a criminal case is instituted in connection with the commission of a grave crime,” Turkmenistan grants considerable discretion to prosecutorial and judicial authorities.  Finally, the Uzbekistani law on immunity for ex-presidents makes no mention of protections for property.

Because many countries in the former Soviet Union’s southern tier do not have ex-presidents—they either die in office or have their titles stripped from them in the wake of popular rebellions —one might argue that parsing the legislation on immunity is a fruitless exercise.  Yet as we noted earlier, Kazakhstan now has its first ex-president; Kyrgyzstan has two, Roza Otunbaeva and Almazbek Atambaev; a former president of Azerbaijan returned to his country after many years in exile, in part because of the extension of immunity to ex-presidents; and courts in Armenia are this week trying to decide whether its constitution’s immunity provisions will protect former President Robert Kacharian.[ix] 

Finally, in Kyrgyzstan there have been attempts over the last year to revise, or eliminate altogether, immunity protections for ex-presidents, an effort prompted by the ongoing feud between former President Atambaev and his hand-picked successor, Sooronbai Jeenbekov.  Thus, while a country in the throes of authoritarian consolidation like Tajikistan has recently strengthened protections for ex-presidents, Kyrgyzstan is threatening to break with the Russian-inspired model of immunity for former leaders.  The denouement of the year-long campaign in Kyrgyzstan to weaken immunity for ex-presidents will be the subject of my next post for this blog. 


[i] My thanks to Kelly B. Smith of Stetson University and Alexei Trochev of Nazarbaev University for bibliographic assistance on this post.

[ii] In France, for example, two of the three most recent ex-presidents, Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy, have been charged with crimes.  Chirac was convicted and Sarkozy has been fighting a five-year long judicial battle to avoid a conviction.  Thomas Prouteau, “Affaire des ‘écoutes’: Nicolas Sarkozy sera-t-il jugé un jour?” RTL, April 9, 2019.  https://www.rtl.fr/actu/politique/affaire-des-ecoutes-nicolas-sarkozy-sera-t-il-juge-un-jour-7797391350

[iii] By constitutional means I have in mind extending or adding terms of office.

[iv] О гарантиях Президенту Российской Федерации, прекратившему исполнение своих полномочий, и членам его семьи, Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 31.12.1999 г. № 1763. http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/14857

[v] Федеральный закон от 12 февраля 2001 г. N 12-ФЗ “О гарантиях Президенту Российской Федерации, прекратившему исполнение своих полномочий, и членам его семьи” (с изменениями и дополнениями). http://constitution.garant.ru/act/president/182948/  See

[vi] See Charles R. Shipan and Craig Volden, “The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion,” American Journal of Political Science, vol. 52, no. 4 (October 2008), pp. 840-857.      

[vii] The countries referencing high treason as an exception are Burundi, Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Guinea, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Sudan, and Togo.  These countries are among the 32 jurisdictions where ex-presidents enjoy some form of immunity; these cases are catalogued in the very useful compendium prepared by the Law Library of the Library of Congress. Immunity from Prosecution for Former Presidents in Selected Jurisdictions (Washington, DC: Law Library of the Library of Congress, October 2017).  For a perceptive analysis of immunity for presidents and ex-presidents in African states, see Charles Manga Fombad and Enyinna Nwauche, “Africa’s Imperial Presidents: Immunity, Impunity and Accountability,” African Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 5, no. 2 (2012), pp. 91-118.

[viii] Vladimir Putin has been referred to at times in some Russian media outlets as the leader of the nation, though as yet that is only an informal label. 

[ix] “Armenian court extends ex-president Kocharyan’s arrest for another two months,” ARKA News Agency, March 13, 2019.  http://arka.am/en/news/politics/armenian_court_extends_ex_president_kocharyan_s_arrest_for_another_two_months_/

During the Rose Revolution in Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili reportedly promised President Eduard Shevardnadze immunity from prosecution in order to encourage him to leave office, but I can find no record of legislation enacted that makes good on that promise.  See “Georgia’s Shevardnadze to be given immunity,” rferl.com, February 20, 2004.  https://www.rferl.org/a/1051611.html

Turkey – The Beginning of an End to Turkey’s Competitive Authoritarian Regime

Authoritarian and liberalization appear to alternate regularly in Ottoman–Turkish constitutional history. Moves towards authoritarianism were often motivated by intense power struggles between conservative forces opposing westernization/modernization and favoring political Islam, while reformist/revolutionary forces favoring secularization, democratization motivated changes towards the other end. Authoritarian turns were instigated by one of the three following coalitions: civil forces that came to power in a relatively democratic environment but were not willing to hand over political power through free and fair elections; revolutionary civil forces aiming to design a new society, regime, and state based on their revolutionary ideas; or military forces that had no intention of establishing a long military rule, but wanted to design a constitution reflecting their vision of the state. Liberalization turns, on the other hand, come with an alternation in political power (removal and replacement of government by a civil competitor), and are characterized by a return to relatively free and fair political competition.

The Justice and Development Party (AKP)-led government is consistent with a civil competitive authoritarian regime, i.e., coming to power in a democratic environment but not willing to hand over political power through free and fair elections and turning increasingly autocratic since the Gezi protests in 2013. However it seems that this regime has run its course and the cycle may turn in favor of liberalization once again, if the local elections on 31st of March are any indication.

Specifically, even though President Erdoğan’s alliance (the AKP and MHP) won %51.6 of the votes, they suffered a loss of 8-9 percent in comparison to previous local elections; more importantly they lost major cities including the capital Ankara. The biggest blow came from Istanbul, the economic centre of the country. According to the first official results the opposition candidate Ekrem İmamoğlu won the election with a slim margin of 0.28 despite heavy pro-government media that showcased the polarising rhetoric of President Erdoğan, directly targeted opposition candidates, and systematically pressured the opposition that typified neo-patrimonial award-punishment processes. On April 9, the AKP leader Erdoğan and his alliance have demanded a recount to challenge the outcome, clearly unwilling to accept this loss.

On election night, the Supreme Election Council (the YSK) and Anatolian Agency (official news agency) stopped declaring results for 11 hours at 98.8 percent. The AKP candidate Binali Yıldırım declared his victory with a difference of  3000 votes meanwhile the opposition candidate İmamoğlu announced that he is leading the race according to the official ballot records  and pleaded the Supreme Election Council (the YSK) to carry on with the counting. He had 11 news conferences on the same night and in the end declared his victory, too.  On the following day, the YSK’s official results showed that İmamoğlu won the race with a slim difference. The AKP contested the counting and demanded recounting. Many of the invalid votes and some valid votes have been counted for 10 days, and the result did not change. Now the ruling alliance has demanded a re-election, based on voting irregularities. These claims of voting irregularities were made only when the results of recounting became obvious; perhaps interestingly, the opposition is accused of stealing the metropolitan city but not the smaller municipal divisions and city assembly, the majority of which won by the AKP. It seems highly improbable to cheat in one vote but not the other two as all three votes were cast in a single envelope. The YSK is expected to reach a decision regarding the AKP’s challenge in the coming days

Regardless of the result of this challenge, it seems clear that the AKP and its leader Erdoğan is losing influence on the people in big cities. The economic crisis is eroding support from the working class, and it seems that his polarising rhetoric is no longer effective. Erdoğan made the election a vote of confidence for himself and his regime; it seems that the people of major cities have turned in a vote of no-confidence. Rejecting the ballot results for Istanbul, then, may lead to the loss of the only legitimising factor in Turkey, given that performance legitimacy has completely eroded due to the economic recession. Such a move may shorten the remainder of the Erdoğan rule.

Equally important, economic crisis and end of privatizatio have eroded Erdoğan’s ability to use the neo-patrimonial reward-punishment processes that has maintained the AKP’s hegemony. Offices of mayors, especially the Istanbul metropolitan Mayor, have been chief beneficiaries of such rewards, and they have benefited notwithstanding rife allegations of corruption in the 25 years of AKP rule in Istanbul metropolitan city. Loss of big cities ends any additional resources for patromonial rewards and, instead, bring new evidence of corruption.


Christopher Carothers contends four major factors leading to regime breakdown in a recent article on competitive authoritarian regimes.[i] One factor cited is the loss of mayoral elections, where an electorate seeking an alternative to the ruling party may hasten the process when it sees some success at mayoral level, notwithstanding the heavy pressure from the government. Opposition mayors in Turkey, then, share a responsibility of creating an alternative for Erdoğan’s long lasting rule.

Henry Hale in his book on patronal politics explains client organisation, resources and expectations of clients are critical to maintaining a patronal network.[ii] Clients (state elites including judiciary, media networks etc., party elite) monitor and deliver rewards for the patron, and follow patrons when they expect other clients to do so. Problems with organisation and resources influence expectations and expectations determine obedience and follow-through. Patronal relations breakdown when clients see or believe that a patron is no longer able to control the patronal network. Deteriorating political support, emergence of political alternatives, and shortage of reward resources have already fanned impressions that President Erdoğan is unchallengeable. The results of recent elections seems to signal the beginning of an end, even if only a slow end, for the patronal rule of President Erdoğan.


[i] Christopher Carothers, “The Surprising Instability of Competitive Authoritarianism”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 29, number 4, October 2018.

[ii] Henry E. Hale, Patronal Politics Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective,  (New York: Cambridge Uni. Press, 2015), 31-35.




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Ukraine Holds a Presidential Election

On March 31, 2019 Ukraine held the first round of the presidential election. With 100% of the votes counted, the Central Election Commission announced that Volodymyr Zelensky won the first round with 30.24% of the votes. The current President, Petro Poroshenko, came second with 15.95%. The second round of election is scheduled for April 21, where the political outsider and famous comedian Zelensky will face the incumbent.

Volodymyr Zelensky is a new face in Ukrainian politics. He is a comedian, who is currently starring in a TV show entitled “Servant of the People.” In the show, Zelensky plays a high school teacher who becomes president after fighting corruption. The show is available on Netflix.

The election results were not surprising to the political observers. The pre-election polls have consistently projected a victory for Zelensky in the first round with 25-30% of the votes. Both the incumbent president and Yulia Tymoshenko, former Prime Minister, have been consistently trailing in the polls behind the comedian.

Zelensky came to the race using primarily social media outlets. One of his campaign members openly admitted that they had only one platform – the internet. Zelensky could be frequently seen on his Facebook page speaking to the voters directly. In one of the videos, he even tries to crowd source his election program. Openly criticizing other candidates and political parties for their lack of distinct programmatic appeals as well as pledge fulfillment, he asks citizens to submit their own suggestions for the policies they would like to pursue and problems that they would like to address.

Zelensky’s lack of political experience or even political program has not fazed the Ukrainian voters. Tired of old-school politicians, the voters seem to want something new and different. Experts have argued that the trend is not unique to Ukraine. Zelensky’s popularity and victory in the first round have been compared to other political outsides who won the executive office in the past couple of years. The list is long and includes US President Donald Trump, Zuzana Čaputová, recently elected president of Slovakia, as well as French President Emmanuel Macron.

Before the second round of elections on April 21, the top two candidates will face off in the presidential debate in front of a 70,000-seat stadium in Kyiv.

In Slovakia, voters elect Zuzana Čaputová the first female president in Central Europe

A novice to national politics, environmental and anti-corruption activist Zuzana Čaputová defeated the Vice-President of the European Commission for Energy Union Maroš Šefčovič, in a runoff of the Slovak presidential elections. Her victory reflected growing dissatisfaction with the current government, especially with the Smer-Social democracy (Smer), the senior coalition member. The overall results signal a possible realignment on the political scene ahead of the parliamentary elections scheduled for March 2020.

Three events in 2018 strongly impacted the political atmosphere in Slovakia and directly influenced the presidential election and its outcome: Firstly, the country was shocked by the murder of an investigative journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée Martina Kušnírová in February 2018. Kuciak’s work focused on the possible corruption involving elected politicians, high public officials, and the criminal underworld. The country experienced a wave of anti-government mass protests, the largest demonstrations since the fall of the communist regime in 1989. Secondly, amidst the protests, Prime Minister Robert Fico of Smer resigned, paving the way for a reconstruction of the three-party government under the Smer-nominated prime minister Peter Pellegrini. Thirdly, president Kiska officially announced in May 2018 that he would not seek re-election. Though Kiska hinted on his continued involvement in Slovak politics, at the time he refused to provide any details, citing the need to complete his mandate as the president above day-to-day party politics.

With Kiska’s announced departure, the presidential contest had no clear favorite. Early opinion polls suggested a host of potential candidates polled just about 10% support, with Miroslav Lajčák, a Smer-nominated Foreign Minister being a front-runner, should he decide to run. Robert Mistrík, a nominee of the opposition Freedom and Solidarity (SaS), aspiring to become the preferred candidate of the democratic opposition, polled neck to neck with the leader of the extreme-right Peoples’ Party Our Slovakia (ĽSNS) Marian Kotleba, a controversial Supreme Court Justice Štefan Harabin, the leader of the governing Slovak-Hungarian Most-Híd party Béla Bugár and Veronika Remišová,  the leading parliamentarian of the opposition Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OĽaNO) grouping. Zuzana Čaputová, nominated by extra-parliamentary Progressive Slovakia, seemed to stand no chance.

However, Lajčák repeatedly refused to enter the presidential race, citing his desire to continue his career in diplomatic service. Smer leader Robert Fico ruled out his presidential ambitions and instead announced his bid in January for one of the nine vacancies at the Constitutional Court. Nevertheless, the issue became an important issue of the campaign: the outgoing president Kiska declared he would not appoint Fico to the top court; the prospective presidential candidates also had to take a stance concerning the matter.

To maximize chances of a pro-democratic candidate to reach the runoff, OĽaNO and the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) did not field any candidate. Also, they attempted to facilitate an agreement among Mistrík, Čaputová and František Mikloško (formerly of the KDH) that whoever of the three had the strongest popular support should get the endorsement of all the others before the first round of the election. Eventually, Mistrík and Čaputová agreed, while Mikloško decided to stay in the race. 

Smer eventually nominated Maroš Šefčovič, the Vice President of the European Commission, who led the Smer party list in the 2014 European Parliament elections. Šefčovič, nominally a non-party independent, received substantial financial support from, and public endorsement of, Smer party and its leaders. Even though he has had a relatively liberal and pro-European social democratic record, his campaign had to rely on the more socially conservative support base of Smer. During the party rallies, Fico likened him to an 18-century Slovak folk hero; Šefčovič himself declined to take a clear stance on issues critical of Smer and its leader, and eventually even profiled himself as a champion of traditional Christian values.

The critical phase of the campaign – and Čaputová’s rapid increase of popularity – came with the first televised debates among presidential contenders. She presented herself as a thoughtful, calm and firm voice of social justice, criticizing defects in the rule of law, yet refraining from negative campaign and ad hominem attacks. Her performance seemed to resonate well with the public expectations and the general mood in the country. Robert Mistrík eventually honored their agreement, withdrew from the race, and unequivocally supported her before the first round. As a consequence, Čaputová’s approval ratings quickly reached 40-50%.

Her main opponents concentrated on getting to the second round: Maroš Šefčovič presented himself as an experienced politician, respected at the European scene, ready to lead the country and defend its national interests. Štefan Harabin appealed to disillusioned voters with his outright dismissal of the established political elites: He promised to exercise the presidential powers to the fullest extent, taking an active role in foreign policy to protect the country against what he called the dangers of Islamization and the loss of national sovereignty in the EU. Marian Kotleba of the extreme-right ĽSNS echoed his rhetoric, pointing out that Harabin himself contributed to the erosion of Slovak sovereignty by being a Justice Minister of the government that agreed with the EU Lisbon Treaty.

Čaputova won the first round held on March 16, gaining 40.6%, followed by Šefčovič, who received 18.7%. Harabin and Kotleba gained 14.4% and 10.4%, respectively, followed by Mikloško (5.7%) and the other minor candidates. With two weeks to the runoff, Šefčovič attempted to close the gap by aggressively addressing the supporters of Harabin and Kotleba: The day after the first round he portrayed himself as the champion of traditional Christian conservative values, criticizing Čaputová for her openness to LBGT agenda. He even claimed that he, as the member of the European Commission, actively opposed the Commission-sponsored proposal that would enable the relocation of asylum seekers across the EU countries. Later on, he returned to his previous agenda, stressing his experience and credentials in international politics. Čaputová, on the other hand, stood on her original message. As the favorite, she concentrated on mobilizing her support base from the first round, underlining the result of the contest were open. Her support reached 58.4%; her opponent gained 41.6%. Compared to 48.7% in the first round, turnout dropped to 41.8%, reflecting the fact that many supporters of Harabin and Kotleba did not take part in the runoff. Those who did mostly voted for Šefčovič. Čaputová managed to win over younger, and better-educated voters. Šefčovič’s support base contained mostly older, less educated voters who tend to support Smer.

Čaputová’s victory has significant consequences for the overall political development. Following the 2016 parliamentary elections, the presidential elections was a second nationwide contest that signaled a transformation of Slovak politics towards a tripolar configuration with a significant role played by the anti-establishment, anti-EU and extreme right parties. Even though two pro-European and democratic candidates succeeded, the proportional electoral system to the national parliament will probably ensure an increased parliamentary presence of antisystem, populist and radical parliamentarians. Presidential executive powers are limited. Nevertheless, President Čaputová will be appointing the next prime minister. Given an increasing fragmentation of the parliament and the likelihood that the next coalition government will consist of several parties, the influence of the president in the process will grow.  

A transformation of the Slovak party scene is likely to be further deepened by the announcement of outgoing president Kiska that he will set up a new political party after his departure from the presidential palace. A recent poll indicated some 9% of voters would “definitely” vote for his party and an additional 31% was “likely” to vote for it. Furthermore, a post-election poll also indicated the rise of Čaputová’s party, approaching double-digit numbers. It is still too early to come to definitive conclusions. Nevertheless, the 2019 presidential elections seem to be a prelude to a far-reaching transformation of the Slovak political scene.

Nigeria: President Buhari hits the ground walking

There were good reasons for President Muhammadu Buhari to seek to make a big impact in the days following his re-election. Having been accused of not having the energy needed to run one of the world’s most complex countries, he has a strong incentive to cultivate a new dynamic reputation. The controversial nature of the elections, which were rejected by the opposition despite his comfortable victory – with Buhari’s main rival calling the polls a return to “military dictatorship” – provide another reason to grasp the political mantle.

The country’s poor economic condition, complete with continuing local resistance to central state authority in parts of the north and also the east of the country, also suggests that urgency is required. One might also expect Buhari, for whom this represents an important opportunity to supplement his existing reputation as a stoical military leader with a degree of democratic legitimacy, to be determined to make the most of his final term in office – Nigeria employs a two-term limit on the presidency, and this has so far been respected by all multi-party leaders in the current political dispensation.

Despite this, the first few weeks of the President’s second term have been anything but dynamic. There have been no fresh initiatives to rebuild bridges with disgruntled members of the Igbo community, some of whom speak of the need to return to the days of Biafra – bringing back memories of the hundreds of thousands of deaths and the widespread suffering that occurred following the attempted secession of the Eastern region in 1967.

The pace of economic reform is also closer to a crawl than a sprint. While the government will increase the national minimum wage from Naira 18,000 to N30,000, after this was approved by the Senate in mid March, it is not yet clear how this will be funded. One option – supported by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank – is to bolster revenues by increasing and effectively collecting Value Added Tax (VAT). However, while the Chairman of the Federal Inland Revenue Service, Babatunde Fowler, has stated that the government intends to raise greater revenue VAT – potentially from 5 to 7.5% – this plan has been in the background for some time and there seems to be no urgency about implementing it now.

The slow start of the new government appears to be rooted in three main factors.

The first is that the electoral cycle continued after the presidential election, with a further round of sub-national elections, including for local representatives and the influential position of Governors, held in 29 of the country’s 36 states. These contests have been particularly hotly contested, with considerable evidence of electoral manipulation and no little political unrest. As a result, Buhari’s government has invested more effort in consolidating its hold on power than in governing the country.

The second is that Nigeria is stuck in a rut because the most effective policy options available to the government are unpalatable and have been for some time. Many of the policies that might actually generate revenue and so create new possibilities for government investment are unattractive precisely because they would be politically unpopular. Increasing and implementing VAT, for example, would mean asking citizens who feel that their government is failing to provide for them to pay more for the privilege. The response could be similar to that which greeted an increase in the removal of fuel subsidies in 2012 – popular protests and the emergence of a growing sense that the government is part of the problem rather than part of the solution.

The third factor is that President Buhari himself seems to have run out of ideas. Despite the vast amount of money invested in his re-election, there is no evidence that he has the vision or energy required to effectively lead the country. Back during the chaotic reign of President Goodluck Jonathan, Buhari’s focus on order and discipline appealed to ordinary Nigerians fearful of the spread of Boko Haram and unrestricted corruption. Now that the memory of Jonathan is starting to fade, and the country desperately requires a more creative and inclusive development strategy, the former military ruler’s limitations risk being painfully exposed.

Time will tell whether the more reformist elements around the president will be able to impress on him the need to respond more effectively to the popular thirst for change. If not, it could be a long and painful second term for one of Africa’s most powerful leaders.