Tag Archives: president

Slovakia – Relations between the President and Prime Minister reach a low point

The surprising victory of Andrej Kiska in the March 2014 presidential elections in Slovakia has, until recently, not had any major negative impact on the stability of intra-executive relations in the country. The main executive authority rests with the government headed by the Prime Minister, who is backed by a parliamentary majority. The directly elected president has important but limited powers, especially in the realm of appointing public officials, including the Prime Minister and government ministers. Nevertheless, his room for maneuver is restricted by the party composition of the parliament. As a result, President Kiska has kept a low profile, respected the agreements of political parties, and appointed (as well as dismissed) all the ministers as proposed by the Prime Minister Robert Fico, whom he defeated in the presidential elections. Following the March 2016 parliamentary elections, Kiska promptly appointed the new four-party coalition government led by Fico’s Direction-Social Democracy (Smer-SD), and publicly supported its goals of fighting extremism and deepening European integration.

The president has more leeway when it comes to the judiciary. During the first weeks of his presidency, he rejected five out of six candidates proposed by parliament for Judges of the Constitutional Court, thus filling just one out of three vacancies at the Court. Moreover, another spot at the Court became vacant in February 2016. Although the parliament proposed, in line with the Constitution, two new candidates for the post, Kiska again refused to choose either of them, citing their lack of adequate qualifications. The Constitutional Court accepted the constitutional complaints of five unsuccessful candidates for further deliberation but so far has not ruled on the matter.

The conflict over the Constitutional Court has been the most visible exercise of formal presidential powers vis-a-vis the government and the parliament. The president has, on several occasions, invited individual ministers to voice them his concerns over the development of their portfolios. However, he normally uses more traditional tools available to ceremonial heads of states: media statements and speeches at various public events. Since his election, President Kiska has become a vocal proponent of increased transparency and anti-corruption; he regularly criticizes what he perceives to be the systematic failure of the state to take care of its socially deprived citizens. Kiska recently ruled out setting up a new party or joining an existing one in order to run in the 2020 parliamentary elections. Despite some suggestions that he may not seek reelection, he stated he would announce his decision in September next year. By and large, the relations between government and president seemed cooperative and respectful. In recent weeks, however, tensions between the Prime Minister and President have emerged.

In September, several media outlets anonymously received reports of a 2015 tax inspection in the KTAG firm, which is owned by the President and his brother. As it turned out, the tax authorities concluded in 2016 that the KTAG had violated the law, since it paid some €27,000 less than it should done on taxes. The company did not object to the findings and paid the sum as well as the penalty. In a series of brief statements, President rejected any personal wrongdoing but did not offer any detailed account, thus ignoring allegations that the company may have used the money to finance his 2014 presidential campaign. The head of the tax authority later apologized for the information leak and claimed an “individual failure” was behind it. However, Kiska implicitly accused the government, stating: “If a head of state can be attacked in such a way, no single person in Slovakia can be sure that such gangland-style blackmailing practices will not be used against him or her.”

The Interior Minister Robert Kaliňák called the president “a tax fraudster” and the Prime Minister even accused Kiska of trying to influence the investigation by approaching the Prosecutor General. In response, the Prosecutor General stated he had talked to the President back in 2015 on a whole range of issues but strongly denied the Prime Minister’s allegation that President had intended to influence the investigation or discussed his firm’s problems with him.

the Interior Minister’s remarks, however, should be viewed in a broader context of Kiska’s anti-corruption agenda. Minister Kaliňák has faced a series of allegations for his business with Ladislav Bašternák, an entrepreneur who was recently accused by the police of tax fraud. Kaliňák himself has benefited from business with Bašternák but the police did not start an investigation due to the lack of evidence. In addition, Prime Minister Fico rents a flat from Bašternák himself, for which he has been heavily criticized by the opposition. The opposition parties organized a series of demonstrations throughout 2016 and President Kiska also suggested Kaliňák should step down to give the police free rein to properly investigate the case. In 2017, several anti-corruption marches organized by students took place. One of their key demands was the resignation of the Interior Minister and the Police Corps President.

In November, the Prime Minister attacked the President again, claiming the government was “ready to send the President an invoice” for €1.000.000 to pay for using the government’s plane to fly to his hometown Poprad (where the president’s family lives). The statement came as a surprise, since the President, following an unbinding parliamentary resolution issued in April, stopped using the plane and uses his car instead. When faced with the “airplane problem”, Kiska has always explained that he was using the plane at the Interior Minister’s suggestion. Kaliňák, according to President, asked him to use the plane because the pilots had logged too few flying hours. In April, Kiska effectively accused Interior Minister of plotting against him and suggested the Minister should deal with his suspicious business links instead. In November, when PM Fico re-opened the case against him, Kiska retaliated by saying that he understood the Prime Minister’s frustration over growing tensions within his party and falling public support for his policies.

Why have the relations between President and Prime Minister become so tense? There are several possible interpretations. Firstly, they may be pre-emptive steps to damage Kiska’s chances in the 2019 presidential elections, should he decide to run again. The President’s approval ratings are unmatched by other active politicians, and Prime Minister Fico may feel that a negative campaign against President Kiska will improve the chances of his party’s future candidate. Secondly, following a poor performance of Fico’s party in the November 2017 regional elections, when four out of six Smer-SD-backed regional governors lost to opposition candidates, media attention has focused on how the largest Slovak party will react. Several prominent party members suggested personnel changes at the top should follow, including a possible departure of the increasingly unpopular but powerful Interior Minister Kaliňák. Fico, after a week of silence, claimed that his party, in fact, won the election, gaining a plurality of regional deputies. Reopening Kiska’s “airplane problem” may be an attempt to change the main subject of the public debate. Moreover, Kiska’s past problem with the tax authorities has been a welcome development for Smer-SD, since both Kaliňák and Fico can use it to divert public attention from themselves to the President. Thirdly, it may be a simple tit-for-tat tactic, a reaction to Kiska’s recent criticism of how the Smer-SD-led government has handled several high-profile social policy issues. These include the occurrence of serious flaws in the management of resocialization facilities, leading, among other things, to the unnecessary detention of children, and under-age sex between staff and children. Kiska stated that Slovakia was not a functioning welfare state, by which he effectively questioned the policy record of left-leaning Smer-SD, the party that has been in power for over a decade.

Whatever the true reasons, government and president are entering uncharted waters of open political confrontation. However, any escalation to the levels reached in the mid-1990s between the then President Kováč and Prime Minister Mečiar seems unlikely.

Ukraine – EuroMaidan: 4 years on

On the night of November 21st, 2013, the citizens of Ukraine came to the streets to protest the policies of then government of Viktor Yanukovych. The wave of demonstrations and civil unrest now commonly referred to as EuroMaidan ultimately forced the president and many high political officials to flee the country. Although the demonstrations were sparked by the decision to suspend the signing of the association agreement with the European Union, the protests were also against corruption at the highest levels of the Ukrainian society. Yesterday marked 4 years since the beginning of EuroMaidan, what progress has been made since then?

Last week, the President of the World Bank, Jim Young Kim, visited Ukraine to discuss the reforms in the country. The President of the World Bank affirmed “we applaud the remarkable reforms Ukraine has implemented, which have helped the economy return to growth.” However, Jim Young Kim called for establishment of an independent corruption court as “a critical step to tackle corruption.”

Chatham House also issued a report on the state of the Ukrainian reforms in October 2017, praising “the remarkable progress in laying the foundations for reducing corruption in public life.” Nonetheless, the report also noted that, despite numerous achievements, from the standpoint of the Ukrainian population there has been little to show for the reforms [1]. Thus, it is not surprising that last month Ukraine was engulfed in yet another wave of anti-graft protests. Over 4,000 people gathered outside of the parliament demanding to lift parliamentary immunity, change electoral system to an open-party list, and create a National Anticorruption Court.

President Petro Poroshenko took immediate steps to speed up the legislative process to address the three demands raised by the protestors. As a result, the legislators agreed to fast-rack a bill stripping members of parliament of immunity from persecution possibly as early as next year. Parliament also started discussing the possibility of changing the electoral system. Finally, President Poroshenko promised to sign a law launching the anti-corruption court by the end of the year.

However, it is important to note that scholars still know very little about corruption, why some countries succumb to it, and most importantly how to eradicate it. Certainly, more research is needed on the topic, especially since Ukraine is definitely not the only country struggling with corruption. This year alone, on these pages we have reported on the corruption scandals at the highest levels of government in Brazil, Romania, South Korea and Guatemala, among others.

Although protestors in many countries in the world, including Ukraine, rightly demand the enactment of anti-corruption reforms and the elimination of corruption, these do take time. Unfortunately, Ukraine does not have that much time. In their 2015 article, Rosas and Manzatti found that victims of corruption are more likely to punish presidents and governments that condone or engage in corruption. Furthermore, “those that suffer corruption and find themselves in a situation of poor economic performance are even more likely to offer pessimistic assessments of the siting president” [2]. Only 18 months are left before the next presidential elections in Ukraine. Given the levels of inflation and struggling unemployment figures, Ukrainian citizens are likely to hold the president accountable for failing to curb corruption in the next elections. Therefore, to improve his chances of winning the re-election, President Poroshenko will need to show progress in reducing corruption in the country or at least to take significant steps toward it.

Notes

[1] Lough, John. 2017. “Anti-corruption Reforms” in Ash, Timothy et al. Chatham House Report: The Struggle for Ukraine.

[2] Rosas, Guillermo and Luigi Manzatti. 2015. “Reassessing the trade-off hypothesis: How misery drives the corruption effect on presidential approval,” Electoral Studies 39: 26-38.

Azerbaijan – Economic crisis and international attitude

Ilham Aliyev, the president of Azerbaijan, seems increasingly concerned about international criticism of his country. In Aliyve’s words: [International circles] are trying to present Azerbaijan as a totalitarian and authoritarian country where rights and freedoms are violated. This trend started the day I was elected President” [1].Despite the aggressive tone, this reveals that Azerbaijan is worried about its reputation. This is a change from before and results from the global drop in energy prices, which has severely hit the Azerbaijani economy and, more broadly, the Azerbaijani sense of self-reliance.

On August 24, Mehman Aliyev, head of the independent news agency ‘Turan’, was arrested by the Azerbaijani authorities. However, on September 11, he was released from pretrial custody. According to the analyst Liz Fuller, various developments may have influenced this outcome. One is pressure from international organizations, such as the ‘Council of Europe’ and ‘Reporters without Boarders’, as well as powerful countries. Notably, the US State department called for the immediate release of Mr. Aliyev. Concern was also voiced by the UK and France, while the Norwegian Foreign ministry Tweeted: “We are deeply concerned about the situation around the news agency and, in general, freedom of the press in Azerbaijan[2]“. This apparent responsiveness to international pressures represents a clear departure from the past. For instance, during the ‘European Games’ hosted by Baku in 2015, the Azerbaijani political establishment ignored international pledges to free political prisoners, and dismissed negative press reports as merely the expression of a global anti-Azerbaijani bias.

This departure does not result from a weakening of the ruling authorities. On the contrary, as analyzed in this blog, in 2016 a constitutional reform led to the massive empowerment of the presidency. The presidential mandate was extended from five to seven years, and the president acquired the right to dissolve the Parliament under certain circumstances, and to appoint a vice-President (who is, de facto, an unelected second-in-command). With reference to this latter point, in February 2016 President Aliyev chose his wife, Mrs Mehriban Aliyeva, as the vice president of Azerbaijan[3]. This move can be interpreted as an attempt to further consolidate the continuity in power of the whole Aliyev family. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the current president, Ilham Aliyev, is the son of late president Heydar Aliyev, who ruled the country from 1993 to 2003[4].

A more convincing interpretation suggests that this more conciliatory attitude on human rights issues could be related to the unfortunate effects of the drop of energy prices. In the past decade, lucrative oil exports fuelled the economic growth of Azerbaijan. For years, the profitability of the energy sector provided few incentives to the systematic promotion of other industries. Thus, despite the president’s emphasis on the importance of the non-oil sector, actual investments in that direction remained modest. In November 2016, the Turan information agency complained about the lack of a coherent strategy to support small and medium-sized business[5]. However, the economic crisis required some proper moves in that direction, such as the promotion of tourism.  At the beginning of September 2017, President Aliyev attended the inauguration of the Khazar Palace hotel complex in the coastal city of Lankaran, which is located relatively near the Iranian border. The complex, equipped with all modern comforts, is openly targeting foreign tourists[6].

In addition, Azerbaijan has also relaxed its visa policy. In mid-2015 President Aliyev declared that: “Everyone who wants to come to Baku should be able to receive an e-visa and not have to go to the embassy or elsewhere”. The introduction of e-visas, effective as of summer 2017, is a minor revolution for a country that “was a stalwart on the ‘Hardest-visa-to-get’ list”[7]. The simplification was welcomed with enthusiasm by Arab visitors, especially from the Gulf, and contributed to the enhancement of the tourism sector. Their increasing presence is starting a debate about the appropriateness of building hotels that are compliant with Halal requirements, as a way of further attracting Muslim visitors. Additionally, the quick increase of affordable travel options is a crucial component of the national strategy of tourism promotion[8]. Since the summer of 2017, low-cost flights have operated between Baku and Moscow three times per week. Furthermore, since the end of October 2017, an equivalent air-link has been in place between Saint Petersburg and Baku.

In brief, whether these mechanisms are effective or not[9], the drop in energy prices is posing a remarkable challenge to Azerbaijan. Other than being a crucial economic issue, this situation affects the way Baku perceives itself and its relative weight in the international system. “There can be no talk of political independence without economic independence. (…) [Our guiding principles are] non-interference in each other’s affairs and mutual respect”. These words, pronounced by President Aliyev in his last inauguration speech  (October 2013), seemed to imply that, by virtue of its oil-related wealth, Azerbaijan deserved immunity from international criticism. Since then, things have dramatically changed. The recent receptiveness of Baku to international pressures can be interpreted as the acknowledgement, for the time being, of the inappropriateness of a daring international attitude.

Notes

[1] Turan Information Agency. 2017. ‘Azerbaijan Not to Lose Anything from Leaving Council of Europe – Ilham Aliyev’, October 5 (Retrieved through LexisNexis).

[2] Turan Information Agency. 2017.‘Foreign Ministry of Norway Concerned about Situation around Turan News Agency’, August 30 (Retrieved through LexisNexis).

[3] Notwithstanding the empowerment of the presidential figure, journalistic investigations shed light on the presidential family offshore investments.

[4] President Ilham Aliyev was elected a few weeks after the death of his father.

[5] Turan Information Agency considers that over-dependency from the oil sector is the main feature of Azerbaijan’s macro-economic structure. That makes extremely difficult to bring about radical changes in the short-run [Turan Information Agency. 2016. ‘Unjustified tariffs and rates’, November 30 (Retrieved through LexisNexis)].

[6] BBC Monitoring Trans Caucasus Unit. 2017. ‘Azerbaijan: Southern region media highlights 28 Aug – 10 Sep 17’, October 3 (Retrieved through LexisNexis).

[7] MENA English (Middle East and North Africa Financial Network). 2017. ‘Time for obtaining evisas to Azerbaijan reduced to three hours’, September 4 (Retrieved through LexisNexis).

[8] Global English (Middle East and North Africa Financial Network). 2017. ‘Land of Fire to take new steps for tourism development’, October 25 (Retrieved through LexisNexis).

[9] Turan Information Agency. 2017. ‘Economy Does Not Come Out of Crisis’, October 14 (Retrieved through LexiNexis).

Czech Republic – Between parliamentary and presidential elections

A couple of weeks ago parliamentary elections were held in the Czech Republic. The country is also awaiting another electoral contest, the presidential election, which will be held in January 2018. To be sure, by far the most important elections are the parliamentary elections, because the president does not have enough power to affect major policies in the country (neither in terms of formal constitutional competencies, nor in terms of real power as Czech presidents have traditionally lacked a strong partisan background, which would allow them to gain additional leverage in the Czech politics). Yet, presidential elections can hardly be labelled as second-order, because the office is highly prestigious and presidential activities have traditionally been closely followed by media and general public. In addition, the president plays a very important role in the government formation process, which is currently a key political issue in the Czech politics.

The two elections are intertwined: the parliamentary elections will lead to a new government, but central to the government formation process, which is under way, is the president, who has the power to appoint the prime minister and on his proposal further government members. At the moment, there is no clear parliamentary majority – one that would back a new government in future a vote of confidence. Thus, it is clear that the president’s preferences and involvement in negotiations are of crucial importance. Moreover, the current president, Miloš Zeman, is seeking re-election. His participation in the government formation process might influence whether or not parliamentary parties will decide to support him in the presidential elections.

Before turning to the issue of the upcoming presidential election, it is useful to briefly summarise the major outcomes of the parliamentary elections:

1.) The Czech Republic has now a highly fragmented parliament with nine parties.

2.) The clear victor was ANO 2011, a populist movement led by a wealthy entrepreneur and former vice-prime minister and minister of finance (2014-2017), Andrej Babiš. His movement scored almost 30% of the vote.

3.) There are three parliamentary newcomers: the Pirate Party with 10.8%, the radical right-wing populists in the Party of Direct Democracy (SPD) with 10.6% and the liberal pro-European “Mayors and Independents” (STAN) with 5.2%.

4.) A relative success for the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), which received about 11% of the vote and which recovered from its 2013 defeat, when it suffered its lowest ever electoral result (7.7%). The liberal-conservative ODS was the main ruling party from 1992-1997 and 2006-2013.

5.) Electoral disaster for the traditional left-wing parties: the Social Democrats (ČSSD), who won the 2013 elections and who led the previous government coalition cabinet, ended up with 7.3% in 2017. The Communists (KSČM) dropped from 14.9% in 2013 to 7.8 % in 2017.

Although in mathematical terms various government coalitions are conceivable, ANO 2011 has so far been unable to negotiate an agreement with any of the parliamentary parties to support either a government coalition, or an ANO 2011-led minority cabinet. The key to understanding ANO 2011’s failure to find supporters in the Chamber of Deputies does not lie in the party’s program or policies. ANO 2011 is a centrist movement that does not display any strongly anti-European, far-right or far left elements. Instead, it lies in the person of Andrej Babiš. He is currently under investigation by the Czech Police as well as by the European Anti Fraud Office (OLAF) due to allegations that his company unlawfully gained EU subsidies of about two million EUR in 2008. Most parliamentary parties have refused to cooperate with Babiš, given the allegations and the police investigation. At the same time, Andrej Babiš can take most of the credit for the success of his movement, which approximates the concept of the business-firm party. Although ANO 2011 has several other remarkable members, it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that it is a one-man party. However, Babiš’ problems or even scandals (e.g. evidence that Babiš was an agent of the former Communist Secret Police; allegations about the controversial methods through which he became billionaire in the 1990s) were well-known and were discussed in the media even before he entered parliament in 2013. In 2017 Babiš won the highest share of preferential votes of all other politicians. In other words, a significant part of the electorate tolerates Babiš’ problems as exemplified by the ANO 2011’s election victory and his personal popularity.

Moreover, Babiš gained another powerful supporter – the Czech president Miloš Zeman, who authorized Babiš to form a new government cabinet in early November and who disregarded all the controversies connected to Andrej Babiš. The media have speculated that Babiš and Zeman have struck an informal deal: Zeman will not block Babiš to become the Prime Minister and Babiš’s ANO 2011 will not propose its own candidate for the 2018 presidential election, thus clearing the way for Zeman’s victory in the January contest. Although Babiš may not be able to command a parliamentary majority, the Czech constitution allows the president to appoint Babiš’ cabinet in a way that allows it to take office immediately after the appointment and start carrying out its functions. The newly appointed cabinet is obliged to ask the Chamber of Deputies for a confidence vote within 30 days of the appointment, but even if it fails to receive the confidence of the legislature, the president may authorize this cabinet to execute its functions until a new cabinet is formed. This will be again the president’s task. Thus, there is a possibility that the Czech Republic might have a government lacking parliamentary confidence for several weeks or months, a scenario President Zeman conceded.

Miloš Zeman is the first popularly elected president. His presidency has been marked by a number of controversies, such as his openly pro-Russian and pro-Chinese orientation; breaking several constitutional conventions and even constitutional provisions; and his relatively frequent use of vulgar terms in public. Yet, Miloš Zeman has been able to remain relatively popular among the general public, as he constantly travelled across the Czech Republic throughout  his term of office, visiting all Czech regions, meeting citizens of all occupations, age and social class, deliberately building an image of a popular and friendly president, who is able to talk and listen to any citizen. As a result, Miloš Zeman, enjoying an incumbency advantage, is currently the most likely winner of the first round of the 2018 presidential elections as a recent poll indicated. In order to get elected, the successful candidate has to receive more than 50% of votes. If none of the candidates fulfills this condition, a second round of the elections is held in two weeks after the first round. Only the two most successful candidates from the first round are allowed to participate in the second round. The candidate with highest number of votes is elected president.

Zeman is challenged by about a dozen other presidential candidates, but polls indicate that only two of them have a real chance of beating Zeman: the former director of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Jiří Drahoš, and an musician, producer and entrepreneur, Michal Horáček. Zeman, though, struggles with yet another challenger – his health. Zeman’s ability to walk has visibly deteriorated recently and the media have been speculating about his other health troubles.

It is worth noting that none of the parliamentary parties nominated its own party candidate for the presidential contest. Three factors may explain this unusual pattern. First, there has been a tradition of non-partisan presidents in the Czech Republic. Voters prefer politically neutral presidents. Although the last two Czech presidents, Václav Klaus and Miloš Zeman, had originally been the leaders of the largest parliamentary parties, they entered the presidential office as neutral persons who did not side with any political party. Thus, a strictly partisan appeal may be detrimental to a candidate’s chance. Second, traditional political parties in the Czech Republic are on the defensive, as they are not trusted as exemplified by the 2017 election results. They are reluctant to put up their own candidates out of fear that they may completely fail in the presidential elections, which was the case of partisan candidates in the 2013 presidential elections. The far-right or far-left parties are well aware of the fact that their candidates have only a theoretical chance of winning. Third, some parties simply act tactically – by pushing their own presidential candidates, parties might hinder the chances of a candidate, who is politically inclined towards them. This was the case with the Communists in the 2013 presidential election, because their voters preferred Miloš Zeman. In principal the same tactics can be now seen with ANO 2011.

The presidential campaign has already started, but on 7th November the list of candidates for the presidential office was closed. This was the deadline for official candidate submissions. They must be supported by one of the following ways:  50,000 signatures of voters, 10 signatures from the Senate, or 20 members of the Chamber of Deputies.

At the moment it seems that a minority ANO 2011 cabinet and Miloš Zeman’s re-election are the most likely scenarios in 2018, although other alternatives remain open too.

Ketil Fred Hansen – Chad’s President Déby was perfectly safe a year ago: Not so today

This is a guest post by Ketil Fred Hansen, IGIS, University of Stavanger (ketil.f.hansen@uis.no)

Chad’s President, Idriss Déby Itno, is perfectly safe and no-one can challenge his position, I would have argued a year ago. Déby won his fifth presidential election on 10 April 2016 with 60% of the votes, five times more than his closest competitor Saleh Kebzabo (12,8 %). To strengthen the political opposition, the leaders of 31 political parties founded a new coalition “Front de l’Opposition Nouvelle pour l’Alternance et le Changement” (FONAC), on 26 July 2016, selecting Kebzabo as front-runner. However, many Chadians questioned FONAC’s real commitment to alternation. The opposition party leaders were accused of taking personal advantage of their position rather than being actually interested in political change. In fact, very few opposition parties had ever altered their own leader. Thus, both President Déby and the leaders of the opposition shared the same longevity in their functions to the frustration of younger generations.

These frustrated younger generations organized regular rallies in Ndjamena during 2016. Protests against the regime started when “untouchables”, sons of high-ranking civil servants and ministers, gang-raped a 17 year-old schoolgirl in February 2016. The protests gained force as Déby prepared for his fifth presidential re-election in April 2016, and continued when President Déby introduced his “austerity measures” on 31 August. In fact, 2016 was the year of social protest in Chad.

Still, I would have argued that president Déby was perfectly safe and at the height of his power at the end of 2016. Why?

Both the US and France saw President Déby as one of their closest collaborators in the fight against Boko Haram and other terror threats in the Sahel. N’Djamena was the home of France’s Operation Barkham, containing some 3500 troops, at least 3 drones, 20 helicopters and more than 200 armored vehicles. Chad was also the home of the American Special Forces anti-terror training Operation Flintstone in February 2017, as it had been in 2015. Since the close-to-successful coup d’état in February 2008, Déby had re-equipped and re-organized his army, significantly increasing military expenditure from an already high level. In 2013, the Chadian army gained international acclaim after its rapid deployment and brave operational courage against the Islamist insurgents in Mali. Indeed, by 2016 Chad held one of the best-equipped and best-trained armies in Africa. One of Déby’s sons, Mahamat Idriss Déby, headed the presidential guard that contained at least as many well-equipped and well-trained soldiers as the regular army. A year ago, then, neither civilian protests nor any military threat from inside (mutiny) or outside (insurgents), seemed possible.

In addition, President Déby enjoyed a high standing among his peers in Africa. He chaired the the regional G5 Sahel group and was elected Chairman of the African Union for 2016. As a sign of respect and importance, 14 African heads of state were present in N’Djamena when Déby was sworn in as president on 8 August 2016. However, his African peers were not the only ones to count on him. Germany ‘s Chancellor Angela Merkel invited President Déby to Berlin in October last year, promising Chad close to 9 million Euro in humanitarian aid. President Hollande received Déby numerous times in Paris to discuss both military collaboration and humanitarian aid.

No wonder, then, that I would have said that president Déby was perfectly safe a year ago. Not so today.

Several signs can be interpreted as a weakening of Déby’s power grip during 2017.

In January, France granted Hinda Déby, Déby’s favorite wife and Chad’s first lady, and their 5 children French nationality. Why, this sudden demand for French nationality? Rumors about President Déby’s untreatable cancer flourishes in the Chadian capital. Speculations about who would take power in the case of Déby’s death rocketed in N’Djamena, without anyone being able to give a clear answer. Together with Chad’s post-independence history of continuous power struggles, the uncertainty surrounding a presidential power transfer leads to thoughts of a new civil war.

Increasing activities of Chadian rebel movements in Southern Libya/Northern Chad also indicate that Déby’s position is fading. The Front pour l’Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad (FACT) headed by the 53 year-old-always-rebel Mahamat Mahdi Ali, contains some 1500 armed civilians under training. Other Chadian military movements, one headed by former minister now rebel-leader General Mahamat Nouri and another headed by one of President Déby’s nephews, Qatar-based Timan Erdimi, are also training in the same region. The formal closing of the frontier between Chad and Libya, undertaken sometimes by Libya, sometimes by Chad, has not stopped the rebels’ movements. Islamic State, apparently, backs Chadian rebel movements with money and weapons. Believing that Qatar also funds the rebels, on 23 August 2017 President Déby ordered the Qatari embassy in N’Djamena to close down and staff to leave Chad within ten days. A few weeks later, on 24 September, US President Trump included Chad on the list of terror states, banning the arrival of all Chadians on US soil from 1 October. While Chad is, officially, still a US partner in the fight against terror in the Sahel, Washington no longer has confidence in Chadian intelligence. Neither the quality of the information from Chad nor the sincerity of the collaboration are judged satisfactory by the US. Incomprehensible to most Chadians, both among the opposition and Déby’s entourage, the US travel ban has caused rage in N’Djamena; how come Chad, an acclaimed terror fighter, can be punished so severely by its prime benefactor? Both France and the G5 Sahel were puzzled with the US decision. Officially, no one understands the US travel ban. However, one may speculate that the US intelligence has reason to believe the rumors circulating in N’Djamena: President Déby secretly supports Boko Haram because when Boko Haram is still strong and frightening, Déby can act as an acclaimed fighter of terror and only then does the international community need him and will support him diplomatically, militarily and monetarily. No Boko Haram would mean no president Déby, according to these rumors.

Yet, Boko Haram is still active and the rebels in the north not strong enough to pose a serious threat to Déby alone. For the US and the EU, Chad and president Déby represent a stable spot in the midst of a troubled region. Déby has skilfully managed to stay in power for 27 years already. As long as his personal health is good enough and as long as the West needs him in the fight against terror, Déby will stay president in Chad. However, the day when either of these is no longer the case, Chad will turn into a nightmare of violent power struggles.

Haiti – An abrupt end to a brief presidential honeymoon

Since his inauguration, 8 months ago, as the constitutional President of Haiti, Jovenel Moise has had a relatively peaceful honeymoon period. The natural sense of wait-and-see that comes with a new administration and the additional “help” of tropical storms and hurricanes contributed to some months of political calm. But, since the beginning of July an apparently harmless string of protests for an increase in the minimum wage has led to many actors taking off the gloves. Now daily protests including some very violent ones have become routine in the streets in Port-au-Prince.

Jovenel Moise began his mandate as a very active president. Fulfilling the campaign pledge to act primarily in the interests of the peasants, he proposed initiatives such as the electrification of localities in the countryside or and the boosting of farm production. These actions have contributed to a relatively well regarded president in the provinces, but with less to show to the residents of the cities. With frequent visits to and many projects in rural areas, Jovenel has converted himself into an omnipresent President. In the process, he has entirely eclipsed his Primer Minister and the government. Litle is known about the government and, if it was not for some corruption scandals that have been revealed by the press, many ministers would have gone unnoticed. With full control over parliament (the president’s party controls both chambers) the president operates as the de facto head of the government, negotiating directly with the legislators.

The reality of a president who operates without any check from the legislative branch is playing for now at least in his favor. For the first time since 1986, a president was able to obtain the ratification of his first choice as Prime Minister. Also, for the first time in many years, he was able to present a budget and have it approved on time. But, in an unstable political context as is usually the case in Haiti, this situation can be harmful in the long run for Jovenel Moise. If the opposition succeeds in convincing the public that the government is ineffective, then since the president is seen as the main actor of the government, the departure of the Prime Minister will not be perceived as a genuine solution to the problem. The practice of using the Prime Minister as a scapegoat to deflect political pressure from the president will be less likely.

With the violent protests that have been under way lately, the opposition has begun to test the popularity of the government. Unsurprisingly, the movement began in Port-au-Prince, in the slum cities where the president is less active. The pretext was the publication by the president of the budget for the next fiscal year. The protesters argue that the spending plans do not tackle the social conditions of the country and that they do not allocate enough resources to important areas as health care, education and judicial system. In this context, parliament also approved a scandalous increase in its allocation, a 74% increase compared to the previous fiscal exercise (102% for deputies and, the senate 55%).

There is no doubt that the budget does not address the many difficulties that the country is facing. But, it also evident that the protests can’t be explain solely by the shortcomings of the budget. The protests should be read as the new opening of the political drama. After last year’s elections that Jovenel and his PHTK won without appeal, the opposition needed desperately an opportunity to become relevant. The budget gives them that opportunity. How the situation evolves will depend on the capacity of the government to deactivate the mobilization of other sectors that are hoping to extract some concessions from the government and on the ability of the opposition to convince others of the inefficacy of the government.

Latvia – The President’s legislative initiative on granting citizenship to new-borns is rejected by the Saeima

Latvia is a parliamentary republic with a 100-member unicameral parliament (Saeima), which is elected under a proportional system for a four-year period.

The Saeima elects the President by a secret ballot. To be elected, candidates must win at least fifty-one votes. The President serves for a term of four years and is limited to two consecutive terms. A presidential candidate must be a citizen of Latvia and must be at least forty years old. A person with dual citizenship may not be elected President. The functions of the President are determined by the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia.

The main role of the President is to promote the prosperity of Latvia and its inhabitants.

The President is the Head of State, nominating the Prime Minister, representing Latvia internationally, appointing the diplomatic representatives of Latvia, and receiving foreign representatives to Latvia. The President has the right to convene, to preside over extraordinary meetings of the Cabinet of Ministers, and to determine the agenda of such meetings.

The Head of State is also the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

In the event that the President is sick, on vacation or resigns from office, the Chairperson of the Saeima assumes the duties of the President.

The current President of the Republic of Latvia is H.E. Mr Raimonds Vējonis. The President took office on July 8, 2015. President Vējonis used to be a member of the Green Party, which is part of the Union of Greens and Farmers. The President has suspended his party membership.

Legislative Power

One of the most powerful functions of the President is the right to initiate legislation, proclaim or veto laws passed by the Saeima and grant clemency. The President proclaims bills passed by the Saeima no earlier than the tenth day after the bill has been adopted and no later than the twenty-first day. A law comes into force fourteen days after its proclamation unless a different term has been specified in the law. The President may use the suspended veto power within ten days of the adoption of a law by the Saeima by means of a written and reasoned request to the Chairperson of the Saeima, requiring the law to be reconsidered. If the Saeima overrides the law, the President then may not raise objections a second time. The President has the right to suspend the proclamation of a law for a period of two months if so requested by not less than one-third of the members of the Saeima. This right may be exercised by the President, or by one-third of the members of the Saeima, within ten days of the adoption of the law by the Saeima. The law thus suspended shall be put to a national referendum if so requested by not less than one-tenth of the electorate. If no such request is received during the two-month period, the law shall then be proclaimed after the expiration of such period. A national referendum shall not take place, however, if the Saeima again votes on the law and not less than three-quarters of all members of the Saeima vote for the adoption of the law. Should the Saeima, by not less than a two-thirds majority vote, determine a law to be urgent, the President may not use suspended veto rights and request reconsideration of such law, it may not be submitted to national referendum, and the adopted law shall be proclaimed no later than the third day after the President has received it.

The President is not politically responsible[1]. The President can propose the dissolution of the Saeima. Following this proposal, a national referendum shall be held. In such case, the President shall determine the agenda of the Saeima. However, if in the referendum more than half of the votes are cast against the dissolution of the Saeima, then the President shall be deemed to be removed from office.

The President’s legislative initiative on granting citizenship to new-borns

In this post, I would like to focus on a latest legislative initiative and political leadership of the President to grant citizenship to all new-borns in Latvia regardless of whether their parents are ‘non-citizens’.

In November 2016, the President initiated the idea, which received a cautious reaction from parties in the coalition government. For a year the President, using a form of network governance, discussed the issue with experts, representatives of different groups in politics and society, such as the Ombudsman, the Ministry of Interior, marketing and public opinion research centres, and academics.

The President’s decision is based on the fact, that granting non-citizens status to new-borns is an inheritance left by the former USSR and should not be maintained for more than 25 years after the restoration of independence. The President emphasizes that Latvia is a modern and democratic European country which needs to do everything to strengthen and consolidate its people. In mid-September the President submitted the legislative initiative to the Saeima, stating that it is a symbolic step which weakens the cleavage between different groups of Latvian society. The President points out that this regulation would apply to approximately 50 to 80 new-borns a year and that in 2016 non-citizen status was granted to 52 children. According to the data from the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs, up to October 2017 non-citizen status had been granted to 30 children. According to the report of Arnis Kaktiņš, the executive director of public opinion centre SKDS, in May 76% of the public support the idea that children from non-citizens born in Latvia would automatically become citizens of Latvia at the time of their birth unless the parents of the child chose the citizenship of another country. The draft law complies with Latvia’s international commitments under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. If the parents fail to ensure the right on behalf of their children, it should be done by the state.

However, due to the coalition agreement, and after the cursory debates with two speakers at the end of September, the Saeima rejected the President’s proposal. A total of 39 of the 100 members of the Saeima voted to move the proposal forward, 38 voted against and 14 chose to abstain. The opposition supported the initiative, but it was not sufficient to move the legislative process forward, which requires support from half of the Saeima.

The President expressed the hope that the Saeima’s vote would only postpone the decision for a while and that there will be another opportunity to vote on the topic in the future.

Reference:

[1] Dišlers K. Latvijas valsts varas orgāni un viņu funkcijas. Rīga: TNA, 2004., page 137.

France – President Macron: From Jupiter to Janus?

French President Emmanuel Macron has openly declared himself to be an adept of ‘vertical’ relations at the summit of the State. In the Macron presidency, there is little room for doubt: the President determines the main orientations and sets out a roadmap for others to follow and implement. The metaphor of Macron as Jupiter, the god of gods in Roman mythology, is intended to renew with the figure of the Republican monarch, fallen into disuse since Chirac (the absent President), Sarkozy (the fast President) and Hollande (the normal President). Jupiter is above common mortals, and determines the fate even of the most powerful gods. The President is cast as a supra-partisan republican monarch, who symbolizes the State and borrows the trappings of prestige from the pre-Revolutionary monarchy (his victory speech at the Louvre, his reception of Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Versailles Palace, where he convoked the Congress a few weeks later) and whose rare parole gives meaning and direction to the Nation. This construction is in obvious contrast with Hollande and his ‘normal’ Presidency. Macron’s positioning is intended not only to signify a return to sources of the Fifth Republic, but equally to impose an image, rather than allow a critical media to dictate a negative image, as in the case of Hollande and Flanby. Jupiter also confers the image of a President above the fray, above the routine competition of parties, suspicious of parliament, alone vested with supreme decision-making authority. Finally, it is a ‘performative’ metaphor: to remind electors that President Macron has renewed with the noble expression of State authority, with the expectation that Saying is equivalent to Doing.

The positive framing of Jupiter was intended to celebrate a return to authority and leadership at the heart of the State, a posture deliberately contrasted with the perceived failings of his three immediate predecessors: Chirac, Sarkozy and Hollande. There is no room for a diarchy at the top. The order of protocol and priorities was clearly demonstrated in early July, with Macron addressing the two houses of parliament united in the Congress at Versailles on July 4th , followed by Philippe presenting the governmental programme to the National Assembly in Paris one day later. A rather classical division of authority between the visionary President and the implementation of the presidential programme by the premier. There are several novel features, however: not only did Macron intervene very closely in the selection of ministerial staffs, down to the offices of individual ministers, but the President and Prime Minister share many advisors, in the main selected by Macron and controlled from the Elysée. A similar concern for control is demonstrated in the attempts to reform the operation of the French parliament, perceived more in terms of a body for scrutiny and control of (presidentially determined) objectives than a site for legislation and deliberation.

Quite apart from the natural bombast involved in comparisons with Roman gods, the Jupiterian phase of the Macron presidency was intended to give a new sense of purpose to political choices, in the register of transformative political leadership. The Jupiter metaphor allowed Macron to announce clearly the reforms that would be undertaken during the course of the quinquennat, to guide the way. After a shaky start (the sacking of the chief in staff of the Army, the poor reception of cuts announced across governmental budgets without prior negotiation [and specifically of the housing benefits], the obvious inexperience of several new ministers and members of the governing LREM party), the early months of the presidency have followed, fairly clearly, the roadmap announced by the President. The law on the moralisation of French politics forbids the practice of employing family members as staffers , and places limits on expense claims. The decrees reforming the Labour Code (enhancing firm-level bargaining, limiting severance pay, reforming the operation of trade unions, especially in the smallest firms, simplifying and unifying staff representative committees in the workplace) are intended to modernize France’s system of industrial relations and encourage investment. The 2018 budget is characterized above all by the powerful symbolic reform of the Wealth Tax (impôt de solidarité sur la fortune) into a tax on property (impôt sur la fortune immobilière), along with the adoption of a 30% ‘flat tax’ to encourage investment in the ‘real’ economy and risk taking. The first budget of the Macron presidency has announced education, defense and culture as spending priorities, with housing, transport and sport the main losers. The main novelty is to move towards a five-year budgetary logic. Announcing spending priorities and commitments across the five year period (2018-2022) is intended to modify the meaning of the annual budget cycle, with a view to ensuring fiscal and policy stability over the medium term and encouraging investment. Forthcoming reforms of the pension sector and of professional training will likely reserve surprises and mobilise opposition. But it would be an act as bad faith to accuse Macron of not putting into operation his campaign promises.

Thus far, Macron has been carried by the favorable winds of change. He represents generational and political renewal and is boosted by a higher than expected rate of economic growth. Nowhere has Macron sought to seize the opportunity more than in the field of European integration. Macron was the only candidate explicitly endorsing enhanced European integration during the 2017 campaign. The drive to reform internally is in part a function of restoring France’s good name: demonstrating the capacity to reform, to withstand the Street, to overcome the usual veto players. His European vision was central to his speech at the Sorbonne (September 26th 2017). Macron called for the elaboration of a new democratic bargain and argued for a renewal of democratic dialogue across Europe in relation to the European project. His vision of Europe and its future renews with a repertory not really seen since Mitterrand in the 1980s and early 1990s. Moving beyond process, and the centrality of the Franco-German relationship, the real questions lies in the substance of the new European grand bargain. It is difficult to see the Germans allowing further mutualisation of euro-debts, or agreeing to enhanced fiscal transfers within the Euro-zone. Macron’s proposal for a super minister for the Eurozone budget has thus far been received politely, but its fate will also be determined in part by the Germans and allies? Will the function of such a minister be to tax and spend? Or to ensure conformity with a strict application of rules, in the German ordo-liberal tradition? Even in the latter case, it is unclear that such a proposal would get German support. And what about creating a euro-zone parliament? Here the main obstacle will come from the European Commission, inter alia, for whom the European parliament already provides a democratic oversight of EU institutions. What about new security and defense cooperation? The post-BREXIT scenario certainly makes such co-operation more likely to materialize, but central and eastern European States, as well as more Atlanticist minded ones, remain attached to the primacy of NATO. And what about new taxes on the GAFA (Google, Facebook, Apple, Amazon)? There might be a political will to move in this direction amongst many EU states, but there are also determined opponents. The commitment to reform the posted workers directive, finally, will be difficult to achieve. After the German elections, the FPD and the CSU are likely to oppose at least some aspects of Macron’s grand bargain.

In the schema of J.-M. Burns, the style of the Jupiteran president is a transformational one, but the hard transactions are only now beginning. Rather than Juperiterian, Macron is likely to adopt a Janus-style approach, looking both ways, twin-faced, integrating contradictory pressures, conscious of past legacies while attempting to provide leadership and direction. Even the best laid plans can go astray. Has Macron decided on too many objectives? On precise timetables that lay too many hostages to fortune? Or, quite simply, is there too much hyperbole? When the tide turns, the Jupiter metaphor might also give rise to ridicule. But one ought not to under-estimate the transformative potential of Macron: he benefits from a favorable constellation of stars, both domestically and in terms of the post-Brexit EU. Drawing on past presidential legacies is a core part of Macron’s message: especially those of Giscard d’Estaing (1974-1981) and Mitterrand (1981-1995) who provide rather different templates for a leadership vision in the field of European integration. The success of Macron’s presidency will depend in part on whether this vision is performative, whether its guides the actions of others and produces transformation. The jury is still out.

How Do Minority Presidents Manage Multiparty Coalitions?

This is a blog post by Svitlana Chernykh based on her recent article with Paul Chaisty published in Political Research Quarterly (Online First). The full article can be found here.

Although the concept of coalitional presidentialism is not new, until recently, the question of how presidents form and manage their coalitions has been explored primarily in the context of Latin American presidential democracies. However, we know little about how and whether these theories travel outside Latin America. In “How Do Minority Presidents Manage Multiparty Coalitions? Identifying and Analyzing the Payoffs to Coalition Parties in Presidential Systems” we use original quantitative and qualitative data to analyse how minority presidents manage their multiparty coalitions to achieve legislative support in Ukraine.

Why Ukraine? With few exceptions, the country has been governed by multiparty cabinet coalitions since 1996 and thus offers rich macro-level data. Ukraine is also a difficult case with which to test institutional hypotheses. Many scholars of Ukrainian politics have questioned the applicability of notions of coalitional behavior to the country and have suggested that coalitional solutions to the problems of limited legislative support are difficult to operate in the Ukrainian context. Finally, presidential coalitions in Ukraine frequently contain cabinet parties as well as parties that do not have cabinet representation. This allowed us to explore the non-cabinet strategies that presidents used to manage the support of coalition parties.

Portfolio Allocation and Cabinet Coalition Discipline in Ukraine

In the first part of the paper, we test a now well-established hypothesis in Latin American literature that cabinet portfolio payoffs to coalition allies raise the level of legislative support for presidents. Our dependent variable is coalition discipline. It is measured as the percentage of legislators belonging to cabinet parties who voted in favour of bills introduced by the executive branch. Our main independent variable is the level of cabinet coalescence or the level of fairness in the distribution of cabinet posts among coalition members [1].

We find that cabinet coalescence has a positive and statistically significant effect on cabinet coalition discipline in Ukraine. To put it in substantive terms, an increase in cabinet coalescence by 10 percent increases cabinet coalition discipline by 2.4 percent. Thus, the dynamics of coalitional presidentialism in Ukraine are similar to those that we find in Latin America. The presidents who compose their cabinets more proportionally can expect a higher degree of satisfaction from allied parties and thus higher levels of discipline.

Managing Parties Outside of the Cabinet 

However, Ukrainian presidents also rely on the support of parties that do not receive portfolio payoffs. As the figure below shows, the number of non-cabinet coalition parties is significant in the Ukrainian case. In fact, the inclusion of non-cabinet parties was crucial in giving each president minimum winning majorities or near majorities.

Figure 1. The number of Ukrainian parties in cabinet and floor coalitions, 1996–2011.

 

How did the presidents in Ukraine secure their support? What were the motivations behind these parties’ decision to join the coalitions? To answer these questions, we interviewed 50 legislators, of whom 60 per cent were members of the coalition in 2012. We designed an interview sample and a number of structured and semi-structured questions to help us explore whether the perceived benefits of coalition membership differed significantly between members of coalition parties that had and did not have cabinet representation.

As figures 2 and 3 show, that the motivation to support the president differed between coalition parties that were members of the cabinet and those that were not. Non-cabinet coalition parties were significantly likely to identify extra-cabinet strategies such as patronage, budget payoffs, and informal favours when asked about strategies that the president used to form the coalition (figure2).

Figure 2. Percentage of non-cabinet and cabinet coalition party members who identified the importance of extra- cabinet benefits (patronage, budget resources, and informal favours) in the formation of coalitions.

We find a similar pattern when analysing the responses to a structural question, which asked legislators to choose the first and second most important reason why a political party would decide to join a presidential coalition from a list of options (figire 3). Members of the cabinet party were significantly more likely to identify policy influence and cabinet positions than the members of non-cabinet parties within the floor coalition. In contract, members of non-cabinet parties were more likely to mention budget influence and especially the informal exchange of favours than members of cabinet parties.

Figure 3. Percentage of non-cabinet and cabinet coalition party members who selected as the first or second most important reason why a political party might choose to join a presidential coalition.

Therefore, on the one hand, the Ukraine case validates extant analysis on the effects of cabinet management on legislative behaviour. This suggests that coalitional presidentialism is not simply a unique Latin American phenomenon and gives us good reasons to expect similar dynamics in other regions of the world. Given the increasing preponderance of minority presidents in new democracies, this presents the opportunity to compare a diverse range of presidential cases across other parts of Europe as well as other regions including Africa and Asia.

On the other hand, the Ukrainian case also highlights the multivariate nature of the strategies that presidents deploy to maintain their legislative support. This adds a new dimension to the extant literature, which has mainly focused on the tools deployed by presidents at the cabinet level. By distinguishing between cabinet and floor coalitions, it is possible to identify parties that are motivated to join presidential coalitions by reasons other than cabinet portfolios. This finding highlights the need to consider the entire “toolbox” of resources that presidents can use to maintain their coalitional support [2]. 

 

[1] Amorim Neto, Octavio. 2002. “Presidential Cabinets, Electoral Cycles, and Coalition Discipline in Brazil”, in: Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif (eds), Legislative Politics in Latin America, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 48–78.

[2] Chaisty, Paul, Nic Cheeseman, and Timothy J. Power. 2014. “Rethinking the ‘Presidentialism Debate’: Coalitional Politics in Cross-Regional Perspective.” Democratization 21: 72–94.

Matthew Laing and Brendan McCaffrie – The Impossible Leadership Situation: Succeeding as a President of Disjunction

This is a guest post by Matthew Laing of Monash University and Brendan McCaffrie of the University of Canberra. It is based on their recent article in Presidential Studies Quarterly.

American Presidents are often ranked and compared, with a handful of Presidents regularly judged as “great” (eg George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and sometimes Ronald Reagan). However, a wealth of political scholarship now acknowledges that different US Presidents are granted different circumstances that both demand different actions, and grant different opportunities. While these presidents’ greatness does result from their successful actions, it also reflects their circumstances. This blog post, and the article it is based on [1], argues that it is more useful to examine presidents who share a similar political and historical context, and to examine their success in a way that is sensitive to the opportunities and constraints of that context. Furthermore, this allows us to avoid encouraging presidents to follow the expansive styles of these “great” presidents in situations where such actions may be detrimental [2].

This research uses the political time approach to the presidency, developed by Stephen Skowronek [3]. The political time approach defines four types of president, based on their political and historical context. In this research, we examine what success is for Skowronek’s most constrained category of president: the president of disjunction, whose situation Skowronek described as “the impossible leadership situation”. These presidents (John Adams, John Quincy Adams, Franklin Pierce, James Buchanan, Herbert Hoover, and Jimmy Carter) are typically beset by national problems for which the orthodox political and policy thinking has no solutions. Our research argues that while some aspects of success are not available to these presidents, they can succeed by fulfilling a normative need to experiment and find new approaches to solve these problems.

Political Time and Disjunction

Skowronek describes four types of president, defined by their distinct historical contexts and opportunities. Presidents of disjunction take office when the “regime” that has dominated American politics over previous decades is weak. The regime is composed of three main parts, (i) ideas that define political action over a number of decades, such as the ideas of Keynesian economics that defined post-New Deal America, (ii) a coalition of political and societal actors, particularly those in Congress, and interests that together represent a broad range of societal groups such as organised Labor, organisations, business groups, and other elements of civil society, and (iii) institutions of government that act to maintain the regime’s direction. For a president of disjunction, the regime’s weakness is evident in these three characteristics, but especially in the first two: the dominant ideas are failing to solve current problems, but they owe their election to the coalition of politicians and societal actors that have supported those ideas. That coalition is weakening and fracturing as new problems emerge that affect different elements of the coalition in different ways.

These presidents have limited authority to act, as the failure of orthodox ideas divides their coalition of supporters. Disjunctive presidents’ best efforts to solve the nation’s problems often depart from orthodox ideas, upsetting coalition members who have maintained faith in those ideas. Alternatively, these presidents maintain orthodox ideas, upsetting those who no longer believe that orthodox ideas can work in the present circumstances.

Presidents of disjunction usually are publicly perceived as failures, and are replaced by reconstructive presidents such as Franklin D. Roosevelt, who followed the disjunctive Hoover, and instituted the New Deal, and the Keynesian economics that dominated American politics for decades, and Reagan, who followed Jimmy Carter, and whose small government and pro-free market politics endured as Roosevelt’s politics had before. Despite perceptions of their failure, in many ways the presidents of disjunction play an important role within the course of political time, and if they play it effectively they can smooth the transition to the next regime.

Presidential Success and Context

Normative Success

For presidents, success comes in three main forms – normative success, personal success, and partisan regime success. The contention that presidents of disjunction have an important role to play implies that there is a normative aspect to success for presidents, that is, there is a best role for them to play in order to advance the nation. We contend that the most important aspect of the normative role for presidents of disjunction is policy experimentation. When orthodox ideas and policies no longer work, as with the economic situation Hoover faced in the Great Depression, or the stagflation crisis Carter contended with, these presidents face great uncertainty, and need to work pragmatically to discover new policy avenues. Normative success also encompasses the need to maintain the constitution and uphold the ethical requirements of the office.

To differing degrees, both Carter and Hoover experimented with new economic approaches designed to reverse the crises that they faced. Hoover’s creation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) in 1932 was a clear example of how experimentation during disjunction can help the subsequent reconstruction. The RFC made major loans to states, municipalities, and corporations and provided an injection of much needed funds to the failing economy. Hoover attempted a middle-of-the-road approach between orthodoxy and innovation of the type Roosevelt would later pursue. He limited the RFC’s operations, for example, insisting that its funds be for self-liquidating projects. As a result, in 1932 the RFC was not as effective as it might have been as an institution for stimulating the economy. But, Hoover expanded its authority in his last days in office in January 1933 and in its early years it provided much-needed capital to troubled economic sectors. Roosevelt further expanded the RFC, giving it greater funding and a wider scope to issue loans, and it became a key institution of the New Deal. Similar patterns could be observed in Hoover’s creation of, and Roosevelt’s extension of, a range of other measures aimed at defeating the Great Depression. For example, the Relief and Construction Act, Federal Farm Board, and Agricultural Marketing Act all became pillars of the New Deal’s approach to agriculture.

Similarly, Carter displayed greater awareness of the danger of inflation than most Democrats in Congress. In his last two years, he clearly prioritized inflation over unemployment. He felt he was acting pragmatically, and publicly admitted that his administration was trying several anti-inflation measures with no certainty that any would work. Carter’s anti-inflation program emphasized wage restraint to aggressively tackle inflationary pressures, but was hindered by a lack of support from organized labor. Unable to authoritatively suppress wage inflation without further fracturing its coalition, the Carter administration pursued an accord with unions over wages. Although novel, its measures were regularly subverted or ineffective. This situation underscores the conflict between the normative requirement to experiment and its tendency to hasten the demise of the coalition.

Perhaps Carter’s boldest experiment was the appointment of Paul Volcker as chair of the Federal Reserve in 1979. Carter pursued the appointment despite counsel from close advisors that Volcker’s doctrinaire anti-inflation plan would undoubtedly cause a rise in unemployment and seriously jeopardize Carter’s chances of re-election. Volcker’s actions began to ease the stagflation crisis and began the reform and strengthening of the Federal Reserve’s role in the U.S. economy, advancing the monetarist policy agenda without requiring legislative backing. However, this anti-inflationary shift did accelerate Carter’s political demise.

Personal Success

Conversely, presidents of disjunction will likely not receive credit for their successes during their terms. With a divided coalition and an increasingly emboldened opposition, they face a major contest to have each of their actions judged as personally successful by media and the public. Presidents of disjunction are also presented with a trade-off. Actions that fulfil the normative requirement that they experiment with new policy directions are also likely to exacerbate the divisions within the coalition, and end the dominance of the ideas that the coalition has supported.

Furthermore, given the uncertainty of the outcomes of experimental policies, these may fail. Those that do succeed are often seized upon and expanded by a reconstructive successor, who typically receives the popular credit for the new approach. As such disjunctive presidents are rarely credited with great personal success, even though they may have extensive legislative achievements. In fact, both Hoover and Carter compiled impressive lists of legislative achievements, far out-stripping perceptions of their effectiveness. Hoover especially found himself unfairly criticised for adhering to laissez-faire economic practices in the face of the Great Depression, despite many major departures from orthodox economic policy.

Partisan Regime Success

Partisan regime success refers to how presidents interact with the regime, either strengthening or weakening it to situate their parties and ideological coalitions for future achievement. Such success is harder to observe than personal success, but can be more enduring. It usually leads to future success for the president’s party, but as presidents’ actions influence the strength and longevity of the regime, it also has a considerable effect beyond the party and on the nation’s future. Depending on their agreement with, or opposition to, the regime, presidents must advance and update, or attack and discredit regime ideas and institutions, as well as strengthening or weakening the coalition that supports them.

This form of success is very limited for presidents of disjunction. The regime is collapsing during their tenure and this creates societal disruption. As leaders affiliated with the regime, they often have an ideological preference to see it endure, but cannot ensure its survival. However, presidential action is not meaningless within this arena, and the way presidents respond to the crisis of their partisan regime can affect the timeline of the affiliated party’s decline and recovery.

Partisan regime success offers an internal contradiction for presidents of disjunction. By defending the regime, and retaining orthodox approaches to national problems, disjunctive presidents may maintain party authority in the short term. However, they risk marginalizing their party even further as regime ideas are sidelined, exacerbating the severity of electoral defeat and the length of recovery. More experimental presidents are better placed to prepare their partisan coalition for change and prepare the nation for the process of reconstruction, but risk their own authority in the process as regime adherents revolt. The better strategy may in part be dictated by the strength of competing factions and groupings within the coalition. However, there is also an opportunity for presidents to persuade their coalitions of different approaches, acclimatize their coalitions to new ideas, and better position them to adopt a role within the future regime, rather than leaving them entirely outside that regime.

The Three Forms of Success

These three forms are interrelated, but the way they interact varies for the different types of president. For a reconstructive president, each can be mutually reinforcing. These presidents take power at a time when there is general consensus that major change is required, as a result, reconstructive presidents can press for sweeping reforms that act to bolster perceptions of their personal success, while satisfying their newly formed coalitions, and fulfilling a normative need for action. For presidents of disjunction, choosing to pursue either personal or partisan regime success may lead to normative failure; but normative success can also hasten the demise of the regime, and diminish presidents’ personal authority, making personal success less available. We argue that the normative need to experiment offers the opportunity for most success, but that the chances of a disjunctive president receiving personal credit for their achievements are small.

Conclusion

Understanding presidential success differently in different contexts is important not only for analytical purposes. All presidents wish to be considered successful, so public expectations can influence presidential actions. If we judge all presidents by standards appropriate to reconstructive presidents, we encourage them to act in a way that will frequently contribute to their failure and, in doing so, contribute to the popular conception of a heroic presidency, which is near impossible for most presidents to meet. Presidents of disjunction are part of the essential fabric of political time, and in better understanding the ways in which they can succeed, we are engaging in a project that is essential to our understanding of presidents’ capacity to further the public good. Among the greatest challenges this understanding of the presidency presents is the need for presidents to discern their place in political time, and accept that in certain situations they must follow a more constrained path, and limit the scope of their ambitions.

Notes

[1] Matthew Laing and Brendan McCaffrie (2017) ‘The Impossible Leadership Situation? Analyzing Success for Disjunctive Presidents’, Presidential Studies Quarterly, 47 (2): 255-276.

[2] David A. Crockett (2002) The Opposition Presidency, College Station: Texas A&M University Press.

[3] Stephen Skowronek (1997) The Politics Presidents Make, Cambridge Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.