Tag Archives: Iran

Paola Rivetti – The Politics of Iran’s Parliamentary Election

This is guest post by Paola Rivetti, Lecturer in Politics in the School of Law and Government at Dublin City University

On February 26th, Iranians went to polls to elect the tenth consultative assembly or Majles. As in several constituencies the candidates failed to obtain at least 25% of the votes, a second electoral round took place on April 29th. The Majles exerts legislative power in Iran, but its legislative functions are supervised by the Guardians’ Council, which, if any of the laws approved by the parliament is considered to be not Islamic enough, sends it back to the assembly for revision. Although its power is limited by the Guardians, the parliament has a crucial political role as it can facilitate the government or significantly reduce its executive power by impeaching ministers or blocking governmental proposed laws and policies. As Rouhani administration’s achievement in reaching a nuclear deal has been controversial in the country, with some political factions celebrating the deal while others fiercely criticised it as a bad deal, the latest parliamentary elections have a crucial role in revealing the people’s and political elite’s feelings about the direction that the Islamic Republic has been taking in the past few years. Despite the overall electoral result seems to confirm a landslide victory for Rouhani’s supporters, a closer look may reveal a slightly different reality.

The final composition of the current Majles, which contains 290 seats and will start its mandate on May 28th, is as follows. The List of Hope, which is supportive of Rouhani’s administration, obtained 121 seats. The Great Coalition, which reunites the conservative forces, obtained 83 seats. The People’s Voice Coalition, which is headed by Ali Motahari and is composed of moderate conservatives, namely those who have been very critical of other conservatives during Ahmadinejad’s government and the latest Majles but do not support Rouhani’s government, obtained 11 seats. Finally, independents got 65 seats. The remaining seats are divided between the representatives of the religious minorities and the candidates who were supported by both the List of Hope and the Great conservative Coalition. There also is a relevant gender aspect to this electoral result, as 17 women have been elected as MPs (the highest number ever) and they all are supportive of the government. The youngest is Seyedeh Fatemeh Hosseini, who campaigned denouncing female unemployment. As reported by Narges Bajoghli, Hosseini also spoke against the securitisation of education policies and university campuses since 2009, and focused much of her electoral promises on getting better employment conditions for the younger generation.

Despite several observers reporting an explosion of joy and relief amongst Iranians when the nuclear deal was reached last July, data from the parliamentary elections are less clear in suggesting a widespread support for the government. This is particularly relevant, as Rouhani’s administration and the future Majles will need to take positions, formulate or halt policies on the crucial issues that (will) follow the lifting of economic sanctions.

As argued by Arang Keshavarzian, the 2015 nuclear deal can be considered as a new social pact between the population and the regime. After the revolution, the process of legitimacy-seeking on the part of the newly established regime revolved very much around the instrumental legalisation of economic situations that were previously considered to be unlawful. Later, the war against Iraq further strengthened the regime and its legitimacy. The 2015 nuclear deal can be considered as a re-assertion of that old social pact, through which the regime confirms its capability of providing for the people.

However, despite the fact that candidates linked to the list supporting Rouhani’s administration won the majority of the seats in the parliament, Rouhani’s opponents also received significant support. In particular, this is true for independent candidates who will play a fundamental role in directing the government’s policies in the future. As noted by Ali Vaez and Fulvio Scaglione, the second electoral turn that took place in April has confirmed their political relevance. Ali Vaez points out that, although this is not a new phenomenon, independent MPs’ behaviour is difficult to predict. Independents could form their own parliamentary group, align with the two main blocs (the List of Hope and the Great conservative Coalition) heating up the confrontation over policies, or they could vote with no predictable patterns making the policy-making process more difficult for the government. According to Vaez, if such situation had to take place, most probably independent MPs would throw their weight behind the pro-Rouhani moderates/reformists on economic policies while siding with the anti-Rouhani conservatives on socio-political matters.

This prediction is strengthened by the fact that the ‘new social pact’ symbolised by the nuclear deal has received fierce criticism on the part of several political factions and personalities, who accused Rouhani and his administration of ‘selling out’ Iran and his nuclear programme in exchange for very little advantage. In particular, while economic benefit will pay off only in the future, the newly-elected Majles will be called on to vote on the economic direction of the next economic plans and budget laws elaborated by the government. While Rouhani’s administration favours the integration of Iran in the neo-liberal global market, the conservative are more cautious as they fear for the loss of the economic benefits that domestic actors (such as the pasdaran and the bonyads) have been able to enjoy thanks to partial economic isolation, as well as the penetration of anti-revolutionary influence from abroad. It follows that it can be expected that the debate around the next budget law will be very heated. Likewise, all issues linked to the 2015 nuclear deal will also be at the centre of a lively debate. In fact, the 2015 deal also poses limitations on the possession of some weapons, such as missiles, that military forces, whether the regular army or the pasdaran, can enjoy. It follows that all issues linked to military expenses will be at the core of contentious debates, adding to already extant contention around Rouhani’s preference for the regular army to the pasdaran.

Despite having a reasonably sympathetic Majles on his side reflecting a new, neo-liberal and pragmatic hegemony being established in Iran, Rouhani and his government may still face significant opposition. Much of the outcome of such a process will depend on the government’s ability to deliver the economic benefits promised by the deal, and to distribute them equally and without creating further discontent within both the elite and the population.

Armenia and post-sanctions Iran. Opportunities and constraints

The beginning of 2016 will be probably remembered for the lifting of international sanctions on Iran. This event has changed long-consolidated equilibria not only in the Middle East but also in the South Caucasian region. While oil-rich Azerbaijan has good reasons to fear the return of Teheran on the global energy market, apparently Armenia has only to gain from that. Even if the two bordering (and internationally isolated) countries have always somehow interacted, Yerevan knew that too much enthusiasm in this regard would have not only enraged the Russians, but also severely compromised its relations with the western word.  Departing from that, the recent international rehabilitation of Iran provides an interesting opportunity to Armenia, allowing it to have a normal relationship with another bordering country (in addition to Georgia). Currently, talks between the two countries are ongoing. Among other things, the possibility of Iranian gas transit through Armenia is being discussed. In spite of all these potential gains, the Armenian presidential office is remarkably silent on the issue. Remarkably President Sarkisian, who at the beginning of March found the time to congratulate the “Young land defender members”, did not make any public declarations about future forms of cooperation with Iran. Similarly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has actively worked to make talks happen, has not advertised these efforts loudly. This low profile can be put down to the fear of enraging Russia. However, even if this factor is absolutely crucial, it would be incorrect to explain the whole dynamic in light of the interaction with the Kremlin. Conversely, a deeper understanding can be gained first by looking at the relation of Yerevan with the West and second by looking at the domestic dimension.

Further cooperation with Iran would undoubtedly benefit Armenia. First, it would be a golden opportunity for Yerevan to break its “dual dependency” on Russia, as energy provider, and on Georgia, as a main transit route.  As result of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, Armenia’s borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan have been closed. This has led to a pattern of asymmetric relations with Russia. Second, better relations with Iran would indirectly advantage Armenia vis-à-vis Azerbaijan, which in turn has been experiencing some lingering tensions with the Shi’ite giant.  More specifically, even if both Baku and Teheran are Shi’ite energy-rich countries, cooperation is hampered not only by different ideas about the role of religion in public, life but also by the presence of a large Azeri minority (around 20 million people) in Iran. In spite of that, they have found some understanding, as exemplified by their decision to complete a railway link by the end of 2016. However, this project does not mean that Mr Rohani has ruled out the Armenian option. Remarkably, in February Armenian public TV announced that Iranian specialists would soon visit the country and assess the feasibility of a railway connection. In brief Armenia, over-dependent on Russia and structurally isolated from the rest of the region, seems on the paper a less-attractive partner than Azerbaijan. However, the tensions between Teheran and Baku may work in favour of Yerevan by promoting its inclusion in Iran’s long-term plans.

Despite all the aforementioned benefits, Iranian-Armenian cooperation is not obstacle-free. First, the Armenian potential for international actions is severely restricted by its pervasive ties with Russia. Looking specifically at energy and economic factors, two elements emerge: the role of Gazprom and the membership in the Eurasian Union. First, the Russian state-owned Gazprom gas company is in control of the whole Armenian gas market. More precisely in 2014 Gazprom, which was already the majority stakeholder in the Armenian gas company, bought the remaining shares and become its sole owner[1]. Additionally, in January 2015 Armenia joined the Russian-led Eurasian Union. Due to its membership, Yerevan is barred from setting its own custom duties and, consequently, restraints are placed on its free-trade policy. All these elements are indicative not only of the Kremlin’s influence over Armenian external relations but also its interest in keeping the “smaller brother” firmly in its orbit.

As already hinted, understanding the Russian factor is necessary but not sufficient to explain the Armenian-Iranian relationship. Remarkably, the willingness to keep good ties with the United States and the European Union is another important factor in the equation. When sanctions were in place there was a tacit understanding that the West, first and foremost the US, would not have tolerated blatant violations of the international embargo. Henceforth, interactions with Teheran had to been qualitatively discreet and quantitatively limited. Even if the lifting of the sanction regimes changes this state of things, the situation is still too fluid to allow excessive public expressions of enthusiasm. The same applies to Brussels. In a recent interview the EU representative for external affairs, Federica Mogherini, when asked if Yerevan could act as the “new Hong-Kong” and connect the EU to Iran, answered that Brussels, fully aware of the potential benefits, is closely observing the situation[2]. In a nutshell, given the “in-progress” nature of this geo-political shift, Armenia seems to consider it prudent to interact discretely with Teheran rather than to voice premature enthusiasm.

The final constraint to the enhancement of the Iranian vector has domestic rather than international origins. From a series of expert interviews in summer 2015, some concerns about making deals with Iran[3] emerged. Generally speaking, the Iranians were described as difficult partners to come to terms with. This view is not restricted only to the indigenous cultural elite, but is also shared by the population at large. Remarkably, from a Caucasus Barometer survey it emerges that only 52% of Armenians approve of doing business with Iranians[4]. This approval rating is significantly lower than the case of doing business with Russians, Americans, Europeans and Georgians. This analysis of grassroots perceptions suggests that deals with Iran, even if objectively convenient, may encounter a lukewarm domestic reaction. That might explain why Armenian political actors, first and foremost the president, are not eager to advertise the recent developments with Iran too much. In sum, while international considerations are important for understanding Armenia’s cautious approach to Iran, domestic implications should be further investigated.


[1] Even before, the contractual strength of Russia over Armenia successfully prevented any real energy diversification.

[2] BBC Monitoring Trans Caucasus Unit (2016), “EU foreign policy chief interviewed on relations with Armenia”, February 29 (Retried through LexisNexis).

[3] All conducted by the author in Yerevan, in English, as part of the fieldwork related to her PHD thesis.

[4]  46% disapprove and 2% do not know.

Siavush Randjbar-Daemi – The Presidency in the Islamic Republic of Iran

This is guest post by Siavush Randjbar-Daemi, Lecturer in Iranian History at the University of Manchester

Siavush Randjbar-Daemi

Since its inception during the turbulent constitution-writing process of 1979, the presidential institution has been one of the pivotal elements of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s congested state structure. Initially designed along the lines of the French Fifth Republic model, the Iranian implementation eventually became the only non-ceremonial presidency in the world which was not bestowed with the title of highest authority of the land, inferior as it has formally become to the Supreme Leadership position. Nevertheless, the presidency has retained an important and essential role throughout the Islamic Republic’s existence. Presidential elections have, since 1980, featured as key junctions in the relationship between state and society and have featured as important litmus tests for assessing the popularity of the various inner-regime factions and as a springboard for comebacks after a period on the fringes of political life. In lay and academic parlance alike, the current Iranian state system’s political history is periodised according to the various presidents’ mandates. As the most prominent figure who engages with the domestic and foreign media and travels abroad, the president is also a visible and much-scrutinised figure and is at times persistently cast under the spotlight of world media, as was the case with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad between 2005 and 2013.

Ever since the election of the first president, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, in January 1980, successive heads of the executive branch have had to come to terms with a continuous and recurrent quest to uphold their institutional authority and seek to augment their influence within their branch of reference and beyond. Bani-Sadr’s attempts to exercise control over the cabinet were hampered by the vague and unprecedented constitutional prescriptions which governed the relationship between the prime minister and the president, and better the latter and unique figures such as the Supreme Leader. As Bani-Sadr’s confrontation with the clerical supporters of the founding father, Ayatollah Khomeini, came to a head in the summer of 1981, the Parliament hurriedly passed several bills stripping the president of important powers, such as that of nominating top economic officials. When he finally assumed office following Bani-Sadr’s impeachment in June 1981 and a period of instability which followed, the first president to conclude a full term in office, Seyyed Ali Khamenei, found himself in an institution whose authority had been eroded by the previous struggle and by the rising fortunes of the ambitious prime minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi. During his re-election campaign in 1985, Khamenei complained bitterly about his lack of authority and pledged to shore up the powers of his institution soon after re-election. Similarly to Bani-Sadr, he frequently quoted article 113 of the constitution, which stated that the president was the highest authority of the land after the Supreme Leader and broadly attributed to the same the role of supervising the correct implementation of the constitution.

By 1989, the repeated crises caused by the growing factional divide and the unwillingness of both Mousavi and Khamenei to backtrack compelled Khomeini to single out “concentration of leadership” within the executive branch as a main goal of the 20-man council for the revision of the constitution he set up a few weeks before his death in 1989.

After the passing away of the irreplaceable founding father, the Council progressively came to be supportive of the view espoused by the main arbiter of the time, Hashemi Rafsanjani, and Khamenei, who pressed for a more powerful president on the grounds that ceremonial ones were a “waste of resources”. Mousavi, who unsuccessfully campaigned to retain the prime ministership on the grounds that the lack of parliamentary scrutiny over the president could be conducive to the emergence of “dictatorship” was defeated and forced into the political wilderness for two decades. The new president now took over the powers of the prime minister and became the sole titular of the executive branch, being therefore endowed with considerable political clout at the dawn of post-Khomeini Iran.

Despite his often fractious ties with the Parliament, Hashemi Rafsanjani succeeded in exercising his authority over the executive branch during his tenure in office (1989-1997).

The elections of 1997 suddenly revealed the importance assigned by society to the presidency, as a very high turnout delivered a stunning victory for Mohammad Khatami, a mild-mannered cleric who was the spearhead for a movement, later dubbed Eslahat, which sought to bring the left-leaning factions back from the fringes of political life, where they were confined since 1992. After being repeatedly hemmed in by both his supporters’ ambitions and the conservative opposition’s resolve to stymie the drive towards Eslahat, Khatami sought to redress the lack of power of the presidency in the last two years of his second mandate (2003-2005) by creating a body tasked with assisting him in the implementation of article 113 and accruing to himself the right to reprimand other institutions which deemed to be in contravention with the constitution. The move floundered, however, as Khatami, a somewhat idealist figure with little penchant for subverting the state order, backed down when the Guardian Council deemed his initiative illegal.

The rise to power of the arch-radical Mahmoud Ahmadinejad initially coincided with the termination of all initiatives linked to the Eslahat period, such as Khatami’s body for the upholding of article 113. As he fell pray, after his highly controversial 2009 re-election, to the same combination of factional infighting and encroachments on his institutional authority that befell on his predecessors, Ahmadinejad quixotically sought to revive Khatami’s body, but was once again rebuffed by the Guardian Council. Mindful of these unsuccessful initiatives, the current president, Hassan Rowhani – who has risen to power through a lively and unexpected electoral process in 2013 that was quickly dubbed as a “new 1997” by his supporters – has hitherto steered clear of making direct recourse to article 113 but has sought instead to seek new methods for fostering his own quest for authority and blunting political opposition to himself, such as that of seeking a referendum on his administration’s main policy decisions, such as the nuclear negotiations with the West. While such instruments are entirely out of the prerogatives of the president, Rowhani’s eagerness to explore such avenues indicates his attempt to find new solutions to a recurring challenge faced by successive Iranian presidents since 1980: that of stamping their authority and their mandate in a political system which is still in a largely experimental phase and in which the boundaries of the powers and duties of each institution have yet to find a durable and final shape.

Siavush Randjbar-Daemi joined Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Manchester in September 2012 and is currently Lecturer in Iranian History. His PhD thesis, which studies the institution of the presidency in the Islamic Republic of Iran, has been completed under the supervision of Professor Vanessa Martin at Royal Holloway, University of London. Prior to coming to Manchester, Siavush has taught Middle Eastern and Iranian history at Royal Holloway and at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. Starting from September 2015, he will offer the ony specialist course on the Iranian Revolution of 1979 in the UK.

Iran – Intraelite conflicts keep Rouhani’s government in check


The moderate president of Iran, Hassan Rouhani, has again come under attack from conservative political groups, in stark contrast to the beginning of his mandate more than one year ago. Conflicting positions over nuclear negotiations with the West, over the Internet-freedom and, more recently, the impeachment of Reza Faraji-Dana, Rouhani’s reformist Minister of Science, Research and Technology, seem to signal that Rouhani’s conservative rivals are gaining momentum.

Within the institutional system of the Islamic Republic, the President is a crucial office, but it is the Supreme Leader, namely Ali Khamenei, who enjoys massive power and extensive control over the policy-making process and pivotal institutions, such as the judiciary system, the media, security forces and, notably, the Sepah-e Pasdaran or Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) (all potential proxies to deploy in the Leader vs President opposition). Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic indeed, successive oppositions between these two offices have brought about numerous institutional crisis and stalemates, which experts have operationalised into the notions of ‘suspended equilibrium’ and ‘dual sovereignty.’

Currently, the Supreme Leader can not only count on his constitutional extensive power, but also on the conservative-led majority in the Parliament, which is very vocal in its opposition to Rouhani’s policies inspired by diplomatic and cultural easiness.

In June and July, after conflicts between Rouhani and the IRGC Commander Major General Ali Jafari, the conservative factions attacked Rouhani’s government-led diplomatic efforts in the context of the nuclear negotiations, with the purpose of condemning Rouhani’s rapprochement with the West, which they consider as dangerous for the revolutionary nature of the Islamic Republic. ‘Negotiations on behalf of the system of the Islamic Republic must follow the path of Islamic ideals,’ declared Karimi-Ghadoosi, an hardline MP, while accusing the incumbent Minister of Foreign Affairs, Javad Zarif, of ‘selling out Iranian interests.’ Fears of ‘cultural invasion’ on the part of the West, should conflicts with the US and the EU be resolved, seem to be the most pressing concern for conservatives, in particular after the boosting of regional turmoil during the summer which have secured Iran’s safety in the region. According to Payam Mohseni indeed, conservatives in Iran are ‘very confident about their rising power and regional standing, and there was no sense of urgency or need to compromise and resolve the nuclear standoff.  They believed to have gained much from the regional turmoil in Syria and recently in Iraq with the rise of ISIS.  Most elites also discussed the sanctions as an opportunity and divine gift for economic development and self-sufficiency – a threat that could be handled and overcome. The main difference between moderates and hardliners was that the latter were more skeptical of the utility of nuclear negotiations and the benefit of cooperating with the United States on regional matters.’

In addition to the nuclear program, conflicts between the moderates and the conservatives have also emerged over cultural freedom. A well-known case is the one of the Grand Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi, who declared that Iranian authorities should introduce measures that would prevent access to the ‘negative, un-Islamic features’ of high-speed Internet and 3G services, whose licenses have just been awarded to three mobile broadband companies, in order to prevent the spread of corruption. Rouhani responded by urging clerics not to oppose the Internet and not to ‘cut off’ Iran from the rest of the world. Noting that the internet is vital to the younger generation, he said: ‘If we do not move towards the new generation of mobile today and resist it, we will have to do it tomorrow. If not, the day after tomorrow.’ This is just the last chapter of an older struggle between the conservative establishment and the government over Internet freedom.

Along with conflicts over Internet freedom and nuclear negotiations, the President is also facing the conservative-led Parliament’s attacks over his government. After conflicts over cabinet appointments, on August 20th the Parliament successfully impeached the Minister of Science, Research and Technology Faraji-Dana. With this move, the most conservative elements in Parliament have had a significant political impact. Faraji-Dana was particularly popular among academics thanks to his efforts for de-securitising and revitalising Iran’s universities, in accord with Rouhani’s stance on academic freedom. Moreover, Faraji-Dana brought back to universities the so-called ‘starred’ students and professors, namely those who were expelled because of their political views expressed during and after the highly-contested 2009 presidential election. The Minister’s impeachment was criticised by relevant political personalities backing Rouhani’s administration. The factional conflict is however ongoing as the first vice-president declared that the government’s investigation over the handling of student scholarships will continue despite the Minister’s impeachment, in a bid of unveiling the politically motivated management of grants in favour of conservative students and to the detriment of reformist ones during Ahmadinejad’s mandates.

Despite the relevance of the ongoing struggle between the moderate administration and the conservative establishment, this is ‘politics as usual’ in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Indeed, neither impeachments of moderate ministers nor attacks on moderate presidents are breaking-news in the country. Not only is the conflict between moderate reformists and conservative not a novelty, but also the fact those factional groups are proxies of the President and the Supreme Leader does not constitute any surprise. Indeed the contraposition between Khamenei and Rouhani mirrors previous President vs Leader contrappositions, and therefore is in continuity with the political and historical trajectory since 1979.

Iran – Domestic reactions to the nuclear deal to boost presidential power?

The president of the Islamic Republic, Hassan Rouhani, returned to Tehran with an interim nuclear deal, sealed by an agreement with some of Iran’s historic enemies. The deal, which had been reached in Geneva on the 24th November, was signed by Iran, the United States, France, Germany, Great Britain, China and Russia. The Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, supported the negotiating team in Geneva, and, therefore, domestic forces were also  incredibly supportive. Aside from the debate about the legacy of the Green Movement in Rouhani’s cabinet, bitter factional competition and conflict over foreign policy, which characterised both the conservative Ahmadinejad and the reformist Khatami’s presidential terms, seems to be a memory of the past.

The Geneva deal, however, is a provisional six months agreement with various measures that have to be implemented: the curbing of the nuclear activity on the part of Tehran, a partial relief of trade and financial sanctions on the part of the Western governments and, of course, the Western recognition of the Iranian right to enrich uranium, probably the most important outcome of the whole process. The deal however is not a definitive one, and both parties can step back from it. In particular, it entails a significant reduction of Iran’s nuclear activities, an aspect that might trigger major criticism of the President, thus weakening his position. In fact, observers were waiting for hardliner and conservative reactions to the deal in order to measure the strength of the presidential office.

Thus it was not much of a surprise that the deal and Rouhani’s government was criticised by the hardline journalist Hossein Shariatmadari, who emphasised the limited lifting of sanctions by the West and denounced the strict limitation of enrichment activities Iran has to repect in return. However, a broader analysis of reactions on the part of conservative politicians shows that the support for the deal is in place and crosses the ideological line dividing radical hardline, conservative and pragmatist factions.

The Supreme Leader has the upper hand in foreign policy, and support for Rouhani’s administration is heavily influenced by the support that Khamenei himself gave to negotiations. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that such few critical voices have been raised, and this might signal an increase in the relevance of the executive, which may be helped by the harmony that so far is characterising the relationship between the Supreme Leader and the President.

Iran – President under pressure over cabinet appointments

Hasan Rouhani

The Iranian president, Hassan Rouhani, is having a hard time appointing his cabinet. On November 6th, 150 members of the Parliament (Majles) asked him to monitor the actions and decisions undertaken by Reza Faraji Dana, the Minister of Science, Research and Technology. The move against Faraji Dana is motivated by concerns over two of his appointees, the senior advisor Jafar Tofiqi and the deputy minister Mili Monfared, that Parliament members suspect of being involved in the 2009 electoral protests. This request follows the Parliament’s veto on October 27th of one of three proposed ministers, Reza Salehi Amiri, following the allegation that he was connected to some of the members of the 2009 Green Movement.

Since his election as President of the Republic last June, Hassan Rouhani has been struggling to form the cabinet, which needs to obtain a vote of confidence on the part of the Parliament to become operative. The popularly elected president indeed serves as Prime Minister too (the office was suppressed by the 1989 Constitutional reform), and therefore has the duty to nominate the ministers and defend his choice in front of the Parliament.

Despite being highly supportive of the President on issues related to nuclear negotiations and foreign policy, the Parliament is closely watching Rouhani’s moves when it comes to culture, education and freedom of speech. In particular, the Ministry of Science is a crucial position for all policies related to higher education. The Minister not only appoints the Chancellors of Iranian universities all over the country, he also has a significant influence when it comes to deciding university curricula and, crucially, the weight of humanities in them. This is a particularly sensitive policy area in Iran, and conflicts over higher education characterised for president Ahmadinejad’s presidential terms, for he was accused of carrying out a ‘cultural revolution’ and a ‘forced Islamization’ of campuses, social sciences and the humanities, well before and after the electoral crisis in 2009. In stark contrast to such an attitude, Rouhani recently called for ‘de-securitising’ higher education, thus increasing the concerns of the Parliament whose majority is composed of conservative groups and ‘hard-liners’. Rouhani’s moderate political orientation and his closeness to some of the political personalities connected to the Green Movement (nicknamed ‘the sedition’ by hard-liners and conservatives) have indeed been debated and, to some extent, criticised by the Parliament. The Assembly has often ‘warned’ the President not to appoint ‘seditionists’ as Ministers, and the recent conflict over Faraji Dana is a further evidence of the relevance of this debate in the country.

Although the Parliament is fully aligned with the Supreme Leader Khamenei’s support for Rouhani in foreign policy, this might not be the case for domestic and cultural policies, as the members of the legislative assembly have warned Rouhani not to disrupt the trust among the state’s bodies with inappropriate appointments.