Tag Archives: Daniel Ortega

Nicaragua – Daniel Ortega Cements Power with Landslide Electoral Victory

Just over two weeks ago, Nicaragua held presidential elections. The incumbent, Daniel Ortega, who ran with his wife, Rosario Murillo as vice-President, dominated the election, winning with approximately 72 per cent of the popular vote. Nicaragua has experienced steady economic growth in recent years and has not experienced the same level of violence and homicides that have plagued many of their Central American neighbors. Additionally, the opposition are currently weak and fragmented, with Ortega’s nearest challenger, Maximino Rodríguez of the Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC), gaining only 14 per cent of the vote.

Daniel Ortega, previously President of Nicaragua from 1985 to 1990 and a former member of the leftist revolutionary Junta Provisional de Reconstucción Ncaional that overthrew the Somaza dictatorship in 1979, re-gained office in 2006 and has adopted both a more socially conservative and business friendly stance. In 2009, he also sought to alter the constitution to allow him run for a third term. At the time, Ortega and the Sandinistas lacked the necessary 60 per cent majority in the Assembly and so were forced to turn to the Supreme Court, which overturned the constitutional ban on consecutive re-election, thereby enabling him to return to power in 2011.

In 2013, Ortega sought reform of 39 articles in the constitution, the most significant of which abolished presidential term limits; altered the election of the president; and increased presidential power. Specifically, the proposal changed article 147, and removed the prohibition on consecutive presidential terms and the previous, two-term limit. The reform also awarded presidential decrees the status of legislation (article 150), and allowed the appointment of military officers to the cabinet. The other major change involved the abolition of the current 35 per cent minimum electoral threshold for candidates in presidential elections, which was replaced with a requirement for a simple 5 per cent lead over the next nearest rival.

What is more, the opposition is weak and fragmented partly because of the actions of the incumbent. Critics allege that the Ortega government has actively manipulated the political playing field to undermine the electoral chances of his competitors. For example, with just five months to go before the election, the Supreme Court ruled that Eduardo Montealegre, the leader of one of the main opposition parties, the Partido Liberal Independiente, was no longer allowed to remain in that role. Additionally, opposition parties have claimed that the recent presidential election was in fact rigged and called for their supporters to boycott the vote.

Clearly, part of Ortega’s electoral success lies in the economic success of Nicaragua, its relative stability and a reduction in poverty since 2006 of nearly 13 per cent. But part of Ortega’s success lies in the increasing electoral authoritarianism of the regime. We have written before on this blog, notably with reference to Venezuela, about electoral or competitive authoritarianism, a coin termed by Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way in a seminal paper back in 2002.[1] These are regimes that they describe as a ‘diminished form of authoritarianism’ and involve the reform of political institutions to centralize power and distort the electoral arena in order to stack the deck in favor of the incumbent. They are often accompanied by judicial reform and media manipulation. Nicaragua, as well as Venezuela, ticks many of these boxes, and indeed the recent electoral victory of Ortega with 72 per cent of the vote, exceeds the 70 per cent threshold that Levitsky and Way suggest in order to classify non-competitive elections. Echoes of electoral authoritarianism have also been heard in the Andes. Democracy remains, particularly the façade of procedural democracy, but it is of a much weakened variety.

[1] Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. 2001. The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism. Journal of Democracy., Vo. 13(2), pp. 51-65.

Nicaragua – Daniel Ortega Seeks Major Constitutional Reform

Last Wednesday, Daniel Ortega, the President of Nicaragua, and his Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN or Sandinista) party, sent a proposal to the national assembly to reform the constitution. The proposal is to go before a seven-person Constitutional Commission, which has 60-days to determine the viability and legality of the proposal, before it returns to the legislature for final deliberations.

Ortega is seeking reform of 39 articles in the constitution, the most significant of which would abolish presidential term limits; alter the election of the president; and increase presidential power. Specifically, the proposal would change article 147, and remove the prohibition on consecutive presidential terms and the current, two-term limit. The reform would also award presidential decrees the status of legislation (article 150), and allow the appointment of military officers to the cabinet. The other major change includes the abolition of the current 35 per cent minimum electoral threshold for candidates in presidential elections, which would be replaced with a requirement for a simple 5 per cent lead over the next nearest rival.

Daniel Ortega, previously President of Nicaragua from 1985 to 1990 and a former member of the revolutionary Junta Provisional de Reconstucción Ncaional that overthrew the Somaza dictatorship in 1979, re-gained office in 2006 and in 2009, sought to alter the constitution to allow him run for a third term. At the time, Ortega and the Sandinistas lacked the necessary 60 per cent majority in the Assembly, and so were forced to turn to the Supreme Court, which overturned the constitutional ban on consecutive re-election, thereby enabling him to return to power in 2011.

Given that the Sandinistas currently control 63 of the 92 assembly seats, this time around, the requisite majority should not prove a problem. However, as the Supreme Court has already overturned the constitutional ban on consecutive terms, the proposed reform has largely been interpreted as an attempt to bolster legitimacy for Ortega’s re-election. Opponents of Ortega have also alleged that the reforms will provide undue leverage in national politics for groups, such as the Catholic Church and domestic business, whom the Sandinistas now court.

Of course, in Latin America, Ortega is not alone in his desire to reform his country’s constitution. Initially, most Latin American constitutions, to avoid the perils of presidentialism, limited presidents to one term in office. Beginning with Carlos Menem in 1993 however, Latin American presidents have sought to alter their constitutions with alarming frequency in order to allow for their re-election and to increase their presidential power. So common has this trend become, that Latin Americanists now speak of the judicialisation or constitutionalisation of politics across the region.[1] Even in the last few years, we have witnessed a swathe of presidents, from Alvaro Uribe in Colombia, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia and Rafael Correa in Ecuador, alter and re-write their constitutions to allow for multiple presidential terms.


[1] See for example, Sieder, Rachel, Line Schjolden, and Alan Angell (eds.). 2005. The Judicialization of Politics in Latin America, Palgrave MacMillan.