Tag Archives: Africa

Giovanni Carbone – Introducing the new Africa Leadership Change (ALC) Project

This is a guest post by Giovanni Carbone, ISPI & Università degli Studi di Milano

Political leaders – the way they rule and how they come to power – can tell a lot about a country’s present and future. This is especially true for Africa, a continent in which personalistic rule, authoritarianism, and underdevelopment have historically gone hand in hand. Not surprisingly, leadership handovers in Africa often catalyse extraordinary attention. Just consider the past twelve months or so, during which the region witnessed some dramatic leadership transfers. In Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, one of the continent’s most despised power-holders, was replaced by his former vice president after years of increasingly authoritarian rule and disappointing development performances. South Africa’s Jacob Zuma, who had been accused of 783 counts of corruption, was forced to step down by his own party, the ruling African National Congress, handing power to Cyril Ramaphosa. In Ethiopia, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn voluntarily resigned to smooth the path for a new political opening, leading to the surprise rise of the first ethnic Oromo leader in the country’s modern history. José Eduardo Dos Santos left office in Angola after almost four decades in power, having become one of the continent’s longest-serving presidents. Are these heralds of democratic progress? Will they trigger more meaningful political, social and economic developments?

The Africa Leadership Change (ALC) Project is a truly unique interactive data visualization tool offering answers to these questions and insights on many of Africa’s past and present political dynamics, with a particular focus on national leaders. Hosted on the website of the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), and conceived by Giovanni Carbone (ISPI and Università degli Studi di Milano) and Alessandro Pellegata (Università degli Studi di Milano), the ALC Project is based on an original collection of data covering all leadership changes that have taken place on the continent from 1960 to the present day. The ALC dataset tracks the political history of each individual African country through the lenses of leadership transfers, with complete information on their timing, frequencies and types. It records whether such handovers occurred through violent transitions, coups d’état or armed insurgencies, or rather through elections, and whether electoral changeovers took place in a framework of party continuity or else they marked the advent to power of opposition forces.

One added value of the ALC Project rests in its interactive design, which makes it easily accessible to both scholars and a wider audience of journalists, policy-makers and stakeholders with an interest in African affairs. The different types of information featured by ALC can be visually represented through four main interactive tabs. Interacting with the map of the African continent located in the first tab (“Current African Leaders”), the user can look up which leader is currently in office and the level of democracy for each of Africa’s 54 sovereign states. A chart on African leaders’ duration in office also reveals who are today’s longest-serving leaders and who are the newcomers. The evolution of these and other political dynamics, for all the countries of the region, can be visualized in a second screen, called “Dynamic Map”.

Besides data on leadership changes, the ALC project provides time-series recording a country’s progress in a wider range of political and socioeconomic indicators, from economic growth to human development, from demographic expansion to average life expectancy. These can be visualized in the “Dynamic Map” tab. Most importantly, through the “Charts” tools, the user can create personalized line graphs which complement information on leadership changes with information on a country’s economic and social trends over time. Countries can be compared with each other, or contrasted with regional average values. Finally, using the “How Leaders Change” tab, those interested in how leadership transitions have taken place in African countries and in how modes of leadership change have evolved through history can easily track the relative or absolute numbers of violent, peaceful but non-electoral, or electoral changes, and the different forms each of these can take.


Leaders and leadership transfers shaped Africa’s modern political history and will contribute to shaping the continent’s future. We shall follow these and related developments with regular updates of the ALC dataset.

Yonatan L. Morse – Presidential Power and Democratization by Elections in Africa

This is a post by contributor Yonatan L. Morse, based on his article ‘Presidential Power and Democratization by Elections in Africa’ that will be published in the journal Democratization

In traditional studies of democratization, elections are generally the end phase of a prolonged process of liberalization and political opening. However, in recent years political scientists have also entertained the idea that elections might actually be the starting point of a process of democratization. In foundational work on Africa by Staffan Lindberg, he contended that repeated consecutive elections could create self-reinforcing mechanisms that deepened democracy over time. This approach is intuitively appealing for an era in which elections are commonplace, yet many countries still fail to live up to democratic standards. And expectedly, this thesis has been subject to quite widespread replication, scrutiny, and criticism.

In new research, now published online by the journal Democratization, I engage with the democratization by elections thesis in Africa, and argue that repeated elections can induce some forms of democratic behavior but face real limitations when formal presidential powers are strong. This is because under certain conditions strong presidentialism reinforces incentives for elections to become opportunities for clientelistic exchange, rather than moments of self-expression. Powerful presidents that control legislative agendas, access to political appointments, and the purse strings, might lead certain actors to behave more democratically during elections, but not necessarily to develop more robust notions of citizenship. This holds true in Africa because levels of economic development and inequality reinforce the role of clientelism as a central way elites and citizens access their government.

A caveat is in order here first. If the democratization by elections thesis has been so heavily scrutinized (in Africa and elsewhere), what is there to add to the debate? Other studies have generated, at best, mixed results. For instance, in Latin America democracy was restored in the 1980s after periodic interludes of authoritarianism. Therefore, many of the indicators of democracy simply jumped back to their prior levels, and have in fact declined since in many countries. Most importantly, in many countries repeated elections seemed to reinforce rather than undermine authoritarianism. Referred to as electoral or competitive authoritarian regimes, in these cases repeated elections appear to offer incumbents the ability to reshuffle their coalitions, gather information about their levels of support, and generate international legitimacy. In one study of Africa, the authors found that democratization by elections could only truly be found in a handful of cases.

The problem with previous studies is that they often mischaracterize what the democratization by elections thesis is actually about. Lindberg makes a crucial distinction between the “process of democratization” and a “transition to democracy.” Regimes can show improvements in specific indicators of democracy, while not necessarily transitioning to a new regime. Indeed, autocratic regimes can exhibit more or less democratic behavior. For instance, when actors participate more, compete more effectively, or appear to accept the legitimacy of the election process, this is a sign of democratic progress. Specifically, for Lindberg this is evidence of how elections create self-fulfilling expectations. Elections might also lead to improvements in other realms of democratic life like the protection of civil liberties. This indicates some form of socialization by elections, whereby citizens learn from election experience to demand voice in other realms of life. Using this more limited definition of democratization yields quite different results from previous studies.

My contribution is therefore to stress which factors condition the impact of repeated elections on much more specific democratic outcomes. I gathered information on 679 African elections since 1990, and combined this information with data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) and Presidential Power (PRESPOW) datasets. These data offer new ways to explore both numerous democratic outcomes, and to compare and contrast the extent of formal presidential power across Africa. The V-DEM data includes measures of electoral participation, competition, and legitimacy. But, it also includes indexes of many non-electoral elements of democracy like the protection of civil and private liberties, civil society participation, and equal protection under the law. I controlled for numerous other factors like executive years in office, levels of economic growth and development, foreign aid, ethnic heterogeneity, religion, and historic experiences with democracy.

A key utility of this study is its use of formal measures of presidential power in Africa. In many studies of African politics the focus has often been on the various ways in which presidents violate constitutions and operate through parallel informal institutions. This approach is mistaken for a number of reasons. First, it is equally clear that African presidents routinely amend constitutions, which means that the formal powers of presidents are not trivial. Second, using formal measures of presidential powers limits the risk of endogeneity in a study. For example, if a president unconstitutionally repeals legislation, this is often coded as both a violation of the democratic process and stronger informal presidential power. It is difficult to know what factor is influencing what factor. By focusing on the formal attributes of presidents, this risk of conflation is mitigated.

The analysis shows that improvements in the election process do not depend on levels of presidential power. Using Lindberg’s criteria, with more experience African elections become more participatory, competitive, and legitimate. This validates the notion that elections reinforce actors’ expectations and conditions them to accede by the rules of the game if they want to get ahead. On the other hand, presidential power significantly conditions the impact of repeated election on civil and private liberties, civil society participation, and equal protection under the law. When presidents are formally strong, repeated and consecutive elections limit the ability of elections to socialize more participatory and democratic behavior. These results hold up to various statistical models, and even the inclusion of a measure of the unfairness of the election.

This corresponds with expectations regarding the intersection of presidential power and clientelism in Africa. When levels of access to a system of spoils define the political game, and when presidents control that access, elections become devoid of deeper civic meaning. Rather, actors decide to accept electoral processes because fighting the system keeps them excluded. These results do not reject the democratization by elections thesis, but rather shed light on its limitations. Moreover, it also corroborates that the problem of democratic progress is not only due to the fact that elections themselves are unfair. In many cases the playing field remains heavily tilted toward incumbents, but clientelism and powerful presidents exist in diverse settings and exert an independent impact on democratic outcomes. It is not enough to just get the elections right, the disproportionate formal powers of presidents need to be tempered too.

Nigeria – Buhari’s second term ambitions, the Atiku challenge, and the limits of incumbency

President Muhammadu Buhari will, in all likelihood, seek a second term in office. For starters, this is a prospect that is buttressed by much political tradition and precedent; no Nigerian president who lived through a first term has ever walked away from the possibility of a second (at least not willingly).[i] But the president’s desire to retain his office has also been implied by more recent events. Among these are the fact that next year’s budget, which Buhari proposed in November, promises to be Nigeria’s biggest ever, an expansion in spending which analysts have interpreted as designed to shore up his government’s reputation in advance of the 2019 polls.[ii] Along with this has come his de facto endorsement by the state governor’s forum, easily the most influential elite caucused within Buhari’s All Progressive’s Congress (APC) party. With this decisive announcement already secured, an official declaration of Buhari’s intention to contest is almost a formality.

However, taking all of this to mean that Buhari’s second term bid will be a cakewalk would be imprudent. Least of all because a general election is likely to pit him against easily his toughest opponent on Nigeria’s current political stage; namely Alhaji Atiku Abubaker.

There are a number of important details to bear in mind which hint at why Alhaji Atiku might represent a most formidable challenger. Foremost is the fact that he is (in)famously wealthy. This is an especially meaningful quality in a context wherein electoral races are increasingly becoming prohibitively expensive. But aside from (though not unrelated to) his wealth, he has also been a regular fixture on Nigeria’s political stage having both served as Nigeria’s second elected vice-president from 1999 – 2007 and unsuccessfully run for president on three separate occasions (1992, 2007, and 2011).

Atiku’s ubiquity in Nigerian politics has certainly come with its costs. His proximity to an unpopular Nigerian state over such an extended period of time has tainted his reputation and raised numerous question marks about the propriety of his wealth. Critics also point to his having frequently switched party allegiances or, in Nigerian parlance, ‘decamped’ (most recently last month) as evidence of his being conniving or dishonest.

However, his supporters parry accusations of his dishonesty by pointing out that most Nigerian politicians have, at one point or another, decamped and that party switching has effectively become a norm of political behavior in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, as Nigerian academics have also argued.[ii] Moreover, Atiku’s continuity in Nigerian politics –even if in the form of unsuccessful presidential bids– has allowed him to reinforce a strong base of supporters over time. This formula was put to fruitful use by none other than Buhari himself who, identically, also lost three presidential elections before his victory in 2015 suggesting, perhaps, that in Nigeria’s presidential politics, the fourth time might be the charm.

Atiku has also recently thrown his support behind a number of issues, which are backed by growing constituencies. Of note among these is his fervent support for constitutional reforms to restructure Nigeria’s federal system and allow for a more widely accepted balance between central and local governments. Proponents of these reforms include both national civil society and communities in the oil producing regions of Nigeria, both of which could be important electoral constituencies. Atiku has also recently come out in favor of #EndSARS, a protest movement which has been aimed at disbanding an unpopular police unit known as the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), and which has largely taken place on Twitter. Weighing-in in favor of proponents of #EndSARS, has shown Atiku to be responsive to the public outcry of a young urban constituency which is increasingly recognized to be an influential ally of opposition candidates in African elections [iii].

But beyond (and perhaps more important than) these personal traits however, there are also important structural factors that make Atiku’s possible bid against Buhari a distinctly viable one. Chief among these factors is the peculiar matter of zoning. Zoning refers to an informal arrangement amongst Nigeria’s political parties which requires that after a president from either the northern or southern half (or ‘zone’) of the country has served two consecutive terms in office, his successor must come from the opposite ‘zone’. This issue partially accounted for northern support in 2015 for Buhari against the re-election bid of former president Goodluck Jonathan, a southerner who, having completed the term of his successor who died in office, was widely castigated by northern politicians for seeking to stay in office beyond the ‘turn’ of his zone. [iv]

The fact that the presidency will remain zoned to the north in the upcoming election means that Atiku will face much less of a challenge from other presidential hopefuls from the south who might otherwise have made threatening incursions into the race. Additionally, Buhari’s heavy handed response to militancy in Nigeria’s oil delta and to the pro-Biafran successions movement in the past two years have not won him very many new supporters in the south, a region which already voted heavily against him in 2015. Taken together, these factors will mean that, in a race against Atiku, Buhari will face a viable challenger in his core base in the north while fighting an uphill battle in much of the south (particularly the south east) where, given Buhari’s unpopularity, Atiku might be deemed a much more palatable choice. An assessment of the above factors, as well as the fact that no similarly viable northern challenger has emerged in the opposition People’s Democratic Party, probably account for Atiku’s decision to jump ship from the APC to the PDP late last month.

In Nigeria’s immediate context, these factors raise the possibility that the 2019 general election could be a hotly contested race that pits two former allies against each other. Politics, of course, makes strange bedfellows but there is no reason to expect that such cohabitation will endure through thick and thin. In more general terms however, the forgoing analyses has also brought to the fore some of the challenges which sometimes make the fact of being an incumbent a double edged sword in increasingly competitive electoral contexts.

[i] Siollun, M. (2009). Oil, politics and violence: Nigeria’s military coup culture (1966-1976). Algora Publishing.

[ii] Omilusi, O., P. (2015). “The Nuances and Nuisances of Party Defection in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic.” International Journal of Multidisciplinary Academic Research, Vol. 3, No. 4.

[iii] Resnick, D. (2012). Opposition parties and the urban poor in African democracies. Comparative Political Studies, 45(11), 1351-1378.

[iv] Owen, Olly, and Zainab Usman. “Briefing: Why Goodluck Jonathan lost the Nigerian presidential election of 2015.” African Affairs 114.456 (2015): 455-471.

Cameroon – Exploring the Anglophone Crisis: A Conversation with Felix Agbor-Balla

A political crisis continues to grip English-speaking regions of Cameroon, with no real solution on the horizon. A year ago strikes by various legal associations quickly expanded into a full-blown protest movement that encompassed teachers, students, and local trade unions. Underlying the movement are longstanding grievances and feelings of discrimination. These sentiments have been exacerbated by perceptions of misallocation of state resources and uneven representation in the highest levels of government. The government has heavily resisted this movement and responded with violence. During the most recent round of protests a reported 17 people were killed in clashes with security forces.

The solution to the crisis is not clear. Dialogue with the government has been limited, and there is no consensus on what an endpoint would look like. The Anglophone crisis involves the resolution of many longstanding issues regarding the region’s British heritage. However, fundamentally the crisis also implies some restructuring of the Cameroonian state. At one extreme are violent groups like the Ambazonia Movement, which advocate for secession. Others like the now-banned Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) seem to want a return to federalism, while the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC) wavers between calls for federalism and decentralization.

With these tensions in mind I spoke with Nkongho Felix Agbor-Balla. Agbor-Balla is a human rights lawyer and the president of the CACSC and the Fako Lawyers Association (FAKLA). On January 18, 2017 he was arrested and airlifted to Yaoundé. A 2014 anti-terror law allowed the government to try him in a military tribunal, and he remained in military detention without bail until he was released by presidential decree on August 31st. I spoke to him from London over Skype on October 23. Our conversation, which I excerpt below, revolved primarily around the roots of the Anglophone crisis and the difficulty of resolving it within the context of the Cameroonian political system.

The Roots of the Current Anglophone Crisis

The “Anglophone Problem” has historical roots in the country’s brief experiment with federalism that united former British and French territories. The specifics of unification have been covered extensively, but the federal arrangement left significant authority in the hands of the presidency. The president could appoint critical administrative figures, direct the flow of resources, and use emergency powers to curtail political expression. By 1972, both multipartyism and federalism were abolished. Since Anglophones have seen themselves as the main losers of this arrangement. This was true under first president Ahamadou Ahidjo and his successor Paul Biya.

At one level Anglophones are responding to a specific set of discriminatory government policies. For instance, Anglophone lawyers oppose the imposition of French magistrates in English-speaking areas and the absence of sufficient recognition of Common Law. Similarly, teachers and students have protested the lack of English-speaking educational and career opportunities. The issue of language and belonging looms large for Anglophones. As Agbor-Balla noted, “French is the language of oppression for many. And they [the Francophone] do not care about the Anglophone problem because they think that French is the only language you need to speak if you want to have your way.”

At another level the crisis is over the perception that Anglophones have not had an adequate seat at the political table. This is reflected in the distribution of senior appointments and economic resources. For instance, after 1972 many local economic functions were transplanted to Yaoundé, and the government invested in the Douala port rather than Limbe. Most importantly, political exclusion has instilled fear of permanent political alienation from the highest offices of power, namely the presidency. Under Ahidjo the sense was the politics tilted toward the north, while under Biya it is to the south.

The hierarchy of state positions was evident from my conversation. Most clearly, I pushed Agbor-Balla to consider whether a more empowered Prime Minister would be satisfactory. The position was reinstated in 1992 and has informally always gone to an Anglophone. Agbor-Balla claims this concession is meaningless: “Having a Prime Minister without any power! The power resides in the Presidency. What powers does the Prime Minister actually hold? We used to have a Vice President and Speaker who were second in command, but now we have a Prime Minister that does not really matter. Why can’t we have a President? Why not a Vice President?”

Resolving the Anglophone Crisis

The government has not conceded much ground. An ad hoc committee led by the Prime Minister was largely maligned by Anglophones, including Agbor-Balla: “These are the same people who are ministers, the prime minster, members of government, parliamentarians. These are people who do not recognize a problem, who have not accounted for previous government atrocities.” Similarly, a National Commission for Bilingualism and Multiculturalism was seen as cosmetic and a way to demonstrate progress to the international community.

The most significant government concessions emerged out of the March legislative session. While nothing has been implemented, there are new laws that call for the creation of a Common Law bench on the Supreme Court, reforms to the National School of Administration and Magistracy, and the recruitment of additional Anglophone magistrates. For Agbor-Balla “the Common Law bench is a step in the right direction,” but he also claims that “we have passed the stage where we say it is just the legal and education based issues to a stage where we tackle fundamental problems with the form of the state.”

And it is here that significant tensions emerge. Simply addressing questions of discrimination might not be agreeable to the movement. Agbor-Balla advocates for an inclusive constitutional conference, but his position on the outcome shifts. He maintains that decentralization and some form of truth and reconciliation can work. But, he also noted that anything short of a return to federalism would likely not satisfy Anglophones: “The CACSC believes that that federalism is a midpoint between the unionists and the independence movement. It is a win-win situation.” This involves rotating the presidency between an Anglophone and Francophone, restoring the office of the Vice Presidency, and explicit protections for minority rights.

But, this type of change is improbable given the incentives that underlie the Cameroonian political system. The presidency holds together a tenuous multiethnic coalition of entrenched elites who view the question of distribution and political control quite starkly. As Agbor-Balla notes, “They do not have the political will and do not want to lose their control over power. It is a patronage system where you have to have allegiance to them so they can manipulate you.” Indeed, Biya amended the constitution in 2008 to extend his term limits, and is likely to run again in 2018 to prevent a divisive succession crisis.

This implies that many of the underlying issues that propel the Anglophone crisis will persist. Absent a clear political strategy that changes the calculus in the presidency, it is difficult to imagine the government embarking on true reform. Biya has demonstrated a willingness to use violence and curtail discussion of federalism and even decentralization. This leaves Anglophones in a precarious situation as different voices pull the movement in various directions, some potentially violent.

Jo-Ansie van Wyk – The First Ladies of Southern Africa: Trophies or Trailblazers?

This is a guest post by Jo-Ansie van Wyk, Department of Political Sciences, University of South Africa (Unisa), Pretoria, South Africa. It is based on her forthcoming article in Politikon.

No longer simply trophy wives, First Ladies (i.e. the spouse of the President or Prime Minister, excluding monarchs) in Southern Africa are an increasingly influential political force in the inner circle of presidents and politics. From peace missions to summits, First Ladies play a leadership role in the sustainable development and politics of the sub-region. In Africa, studies on political leadership and presidential studies predominantly focus   on, amongst others, the role of so-called Big Men, Presidents, electoral authoritarianism, and coup d’états. The region’s First Ladies have always wielded political power due to their proximity to, and membership of the inner circle of the Executive in their country. Therefore, the study of First Ladies offers valuable insights into presidential leadership, democratic accountability, and the role and status of women in Southern Africa.

The First Lady is more than often the symbolic representation of women’s role in a particular society. Closely related to this is her relation with the media, and vice versa. The representation of the First Lady in the media (often reinforcing certain gender stereotypes), and her involvement in her spouse’s political agenda contributes to her role as a political symbol. Therefore, her task, like that of her counterparts elsewhere, has developed from mere a State House hostess or beauty queen to a spokesperson of her husband’s political agenda. Despite this, the media often, perhaps due to gender stereotyping in a society, downplays the First Lady’s importance.

Several First Ladies are or have been married to liberation leaders-turned-Presidents; often bestowing on these women the title, Mother of the Nation, Mama or Founding First Lady. In several cases, the first post-independence First Lady was also referred to as the Mother of the Nation; thus acting as the symbol of the nation. This title was bestowed on, for example, Winnie Mandela (South Africa), Kovambo Theopoldine Katjimune, wife of Sam Nujoma (Namibia), Janet Museveni (Uganda), and Sally Mugabe of Zimbabwe whose political activism prior to entering State House and subsequent to it was indicative of the influence of her person. Some former First Ladies made a political comeback as either elected Members of Parliament (MPs) or presidential candidates. Miria Obote, widow of the late President Milton Obote of Uganda was a candidate for her husband’s political party, the Uganda People’s Congress, which ran the country from 1962 to 1971, and again from 1980 to 1985. President Obote was ousted in a coup by Yoweri Museveni. In 2014, after the death of her husband, Michael Sata (Zambia), while still in office, Christine Kaseba, Sata’s wife, joined the elections as a presidential candidate.

Apart from her influence derived from her close intimate relations with the President, two other factors determine the political and policy potency of a First Lady in a particular state, namely political institutions (the constitution and constitutional powers of the President; presidential campaigns and practices related to political parties and the media; legal and constitutional provisions related to the First Lady and her Office; the physical location of the Office of the First Lady) and socio-cultural factors (the role of women, gender and family in a society history; and culture).

A further illustration of the political influence of a First Lady is Agathe Habyarimana, wife of the late Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana. A Hutu by birth, Agathe Habyarimana has been described as the power behind her husband’s tenure and one of the masterminds behind the Rwanda Genocide of 1994. Juvenal Habyarimana’s inner circle – akazu (Kinyarwanda for ‘small house’), sometimes referred to as Le Réseau Zéro (Network Zero) – was also referred to a le clan de Madame (the First Lady’s clique). The akazu consisted of Agathe Habyarimana, her three brothers and husband (the President) and established their own death squad to eliminate political opponents; and had representatives in embassies and local governments; basically an oligarchy that infiltrated all layers of Rwandan society. More recently, reports of G40’s (Generation 40), a ruling party faction led by Grace Mugabe (Zimbabwe), involvement in succession matters in Zimbabwe emerged.

The First Lady is typically not a democratically elected, and thus not a publically accountable public official. However, Winnie Madikazela-Mandela (South Africa), for example, was both a publicly-elected official (an MP) and a First Lady as the wife of Nelson Mandela. Another example is Janet Museveni (Uganda) who is also a member of her husband’s Cabinet. The First Lady is also important to her husband in other respects. Yoweri Museveni (Uganda), for example, appointed his wife, Janet, in 2009 as Minister of State for Karamoja in an effort to achieve national unity. The Karamojong saw this as a positive development as Museveni has shown affection by sending his own wife to live and work among them.

For Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, his wife, Grace’s entry into politics has been meteoric but also acting as his surrogate. Since her appointment as Secretary for Women Affairs of the ruling party, ZANU-PF, in December 2014, she is a member of ZANU’s Politburo, the party’s highest decision-making body.

First Ladies have developed a public policy agenda independent of and/or parallel to of that of her husband’s government, giving rise to the notion of the First Lady as the ‘Social worker-in-Chief’. Africa is by far one of the most under-developed continents. Evidence of First Ladies’ response to this is the number of social foundations (aiming to achieve the Millennium Development Goals established by several African First Ladies. Amongst others are Ether Lungu’s (wife of Zambian President) Esther Lungu Trust Foundation; Burundian First Lady Denise Nkurunziza’s Buntu Foundation, with established partnerships with the United Nations Population Fund, aims to ‘create and build various ways of helping, supporting, teaching and coaching vulnerable and helpless people in the Burundian society like widows, elderly people, the orphans of HIV/AIDS and war, the disabled and the poor’. HIV/AIDS seems to be a major social concern for some Southern African First Ladies, including Marie Olive Lembé Kabila (DRC), and Janet Museveni (Uganda) who founded the organization, Uganda Women’s Effort to Save Orphans (UWESO) that, amongst others, tend to HIV/AIDS affected orphans. Salma Kikwete (Tanzania) is another First Lady that has established a social foundation, the Wanawake Na Maendeleo (WAMA) Foundation that aims to improve the life standards of women, girls and children. Despite their low public profile, Mmes Zuma have also established various Foundations: Nompumelelo MaNtuli-Zuma Foundation and the Tobeka Madiba-Zuma Foundation. The former has, for example, provided assistance to women in the Eastern Cape, whereas the Madiba-Zuma Foundation focuses on health with First Lady Madiba-Zuma currently serving as the chairperson of the Forum of African First Ladies against Breast and Cervical Cancer.

Margaret Kenyatta (Kenya) is also leading several social campaigns in her country. The Kenyan Ministry of Health has published a Strategic Framework for the engagement of the First Lady in HIV Control and Promotion of Maternal, Newborn and Child Health in Kenya. Her Beyond Zero Campaign focuses on maternal and child health for which she was recognised by the United Nations. Breaking ranks with her counterparts, Margaret Kenyatta (Kenya) is the first African First Lady to focus on animal rights. She is the patron of Hands off our Elephants Campaign and is cooperating with the United Nations Development Programme to combat poaching in Kenya and promote the welfare of wildlife.

Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa define the role and purpose of the First Lady. Mozambique, for example, refers to ‘Primera Dama’ supported by the ‘Gabinete da Esposa do Presidente’ who has ‘official duties’ and a role in ‘achieving social and cultural initiatives she decides to develop’ Namibia defines the purpose of the Office of the First Lady as too effectively use the First Lady’s unique role to contribute to and compliment the efforts of the Government of Namibia. The Namibian government goes further and also identifies the relevant stakeholders engaging with the Office of the First Lady and includes, inter alia, the Office of the President; Government Ministries; the Namibian National Planning Commission; UN agencies and the World Bank; international organizations such as RAND Corporation and the African First Ladies’ Fellowship Programme; local NGOs and business communities; and the diplomatic community.

The Offices of First Ladies in Southern Africa are typically located in the Office of the President; thus centralizing the political affairs of the First Couple and allowing for the careful orchestration of the First Lady’s programme and image. A subservient First Lady implies a more traditional society in respect of the rights and status of women; implying Presidential preference in this regard. In contrast, a politically-ambitious First Lady such as Grace Mugabe and Janet Museveni has strengthened their husband’s position and power base. It should be noted, however, that First Ladies are more likely to play a number of these roles than to play one in particular.

So far, the emphasis here has been predominantly on the domestic role of the First Lady. For completeness’ sake and in the absence of scholarly work on the topic, the next section turn to one particularly externally-related function and role of the First Lady, namely diplomacy. The diplomatic role of First Ladies in Southern Africa is not limited to photo opportunities with foreign Heads of State and Government or state banquets contributing to a state’s foreign policy architecture; promoting the President’s image, agenda; and a state’s bi- and multilateral relations. Therefore, the First Lady intends not to embarrass her husband and his government; contravene diplomatic protocol; and contradict her country’s position on a particular issue. However, this diminishes, the agentic’ role of the First Lady, and entrenches male dominance in a state’s diplomatic relations and foreign policy-making.

Despite these diplomatic activities, the diplomatic role of First Ladies is constrained by several factors. She is, for example, not a publically elected or appointed foreign policy decision maker. A First Lady may also be constrained by cultural factors restricting the independence of women. A third factor is her husband’s political agenda and audience, and his intention to remain the single most important player in this arena.

The First Lady in a diplomatic context is typically her husband’s escort, fulfill an aesthetic role and act as a surrogate for her husband. Southern African First Ladies manage their husband’s credibility by ‘seducing’ foreign audiences and promoting their husbands’ political agenda. As an example of managing or contributing to her husband’s international credibility is the State House of Uganda’s report on the Global Decency Index that found Janet Museveni in 2014 as ‘the most decent African First Lady’.

The surrogate role of the Southern African First Lady is evident in Maria Guebuza’s (Mozambique) six day visit to India in 2011 on behalf of her husband and the Final Communique of the Seventh Roundtable of the Spouses of the COMESA Heads of State and Government. Herein, COMESA First Ladies referred to some of their husbands’ achievements and roles in the region.

Managing social issues and social advocacy are other rhetorical functions of First Lady Diplomacy. In May 2001, Jeanette Kagame (Rwanda), for example, hosted the first African First Ladies’ Summit on Children and HIV/AIDS Prevention in Kigali, Rwanda. Another example is the establishment of the Organisation of African First Ladies against HIV/AIDS (OFLA) in 2002 by 24 African First Ladies. With currently more than 40 members with each First Lady leading the national chapter of OFLA, the Organisation has established a Permanent Secretariat in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 2012 to coordinate their activities. By 2015, OFLA has not only made a commitment to eradicate polio on the continent, but is also in the process of signing a Memorandum of Understanding with the World Health Organisation (WHO) to cooperate on eradicating polio.

The First Ladies of regional economic communities (RECs) often meet parallel to the Heads of State and Government of these RECs such as the Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Francophonie to discuss matters of mutual social concern. Another example of African First Ladies’ social advocacy is their establishment of the African Network of Women Peace Negotiators, at the sixth conference of the African First Ladies Peace Mission in 1997 in Nigeria. First Ladies play a particular international role during their husbands’ tenure and are thus a considerable diplomatic asset to their husbands. Their involvement in bi- and multilateral diplomacy fulfil certain rhetoric functions advancing the national interests of their respective countries.

Generally, the accountability of a First Lady remains ambiguous as she is not a publicly-elected official and has no constitutionally-prescribed role. Yet, some First Ladies in the sub-region are perceived to be entrenching a culture of no accountability which undermines the socio-economic development of the countries. Serving as a formal or informal advisor to her husband has raised concerns about the accountability of First Ladies in respect of their husbands’ policy and political decisions. This is a particular concern in, for example, brutal regimes. Some First Ladies in Southern Africa such as Denise Nkurunziza (Burundi) and Grace Mugabe (Zimbabwe) have been accused of supporting their husbands’ uninterrupted and undemocratic regimes. Southern African Presidents Sassou Nguesso (1979-1992, and since 1997), Robert Mugabe (since 1980), José dos Santos (since 1979), and Yoweri Museveni (since 1986) are among African longest serving presidents; a position the First Ladies have undoubtedly supported. Some African constitutions grant Executive immunity. Whether this is extended to the First Lady remains uncertain. The recent International Criminal Court’s (ICC) sentencing of Simone Ggagbo, former Ivorian First Lady, to a 20-year jail term for her role in the 2011 post-election crisis in Côte d’Ivoire – after her husband Laurent’s refusal to accept election defeat to the incumbent Alassane Ouattara in the 2010 elections triggered a transitory civil war that led to the death of 3 000 people – has renewed questions about the political ambitions and neutrality of First Ladies.

First Ladies in Southern Africa are influential political actors. Despite this, the region’s First Ladies are under-researched political actors; hence this exploratory study. I have shown that the Office of the First Lady is formally and informally institutionalized in the region by providing a new typology of the functions and role of Southern Africa’s First Ladies, as well as the implications thereof.

Besides focusing on the domestic arena, I have also focused on First Lady Diplomacy; another neglected academic area. Based on these, it is possible to deduce that First Ladies have personal, political and structural abilities to penetrate domestic, regional and international politics.  These abilities empower her to regulate societal relations; extract resources such as political support, tenders and government funding; and to appropriate and use material (funds, tenders) and immaterial (influence, status, prestige) public and private resources; abilities that, amongst others, raise questions about First Ladies’ accountability in respect to several identified matters, and the transparency of her public duties and private interests.

Besides these empirical findings, I also contend that, despite their own political experience, ambitions and influence, Southern African First Ladies remain subordinate to the patriarchy in their societies. A gender bias is evident in the position of First Ladies as the region had predominantly had male Executives; a situation likely to remain for some time. A second gender bias is evident in each Southern African states’ Constitution as none refers to this position; an aspect which undermines democratic accountability. Third, a gender bias is evident in the expectations of the role of the First Lady, i.e. spouse; mother; care-giver and nurturer of the sick, young, elderly etc.). Another gender bias is evident in the fact that the Office of the First Lady is fully directed from within the President’s office that often controls media flows and information that portrays the First Lady in patriarchal terms as a national symbol; the Ideal Woman; a trophy; and a trailblazer for issues stereotyped and associated with women.

Jo-Ansie van Wyk is Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Sciences, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa. She has published on political leadership in Africa, and South Africa’s foreign policy, and diplomacy.

Mercedeh Momeni – Water Canons and Withdrawals: What is Really Driving ICC Departures?

This is a guest post by Mercedeh Momeni.

Gambia, Burundi and South Africa have all announced their intent to withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC) recently, and Kenya also threatened to do the same last week. Indeed, in the past few years, a number of African leaders have been railing against the ICC for its prosecution of crimes committed on the continent. They claim the court is biased even though, in many instances, their own governments referred cases to the court, where the chief prosecutor and several judges are Africans. Further, the court has started preliminary examinations in Africa, Asia, the Middle-East (with the UK nationals as one of the possible targets) and South America. While not without its own difficulties, the ICC is reviled by the elites because it indicted two sitting presidents, Sudan’s Omar al Bashir and Kenya’s Uhuru Kenyatta.

In its formal Instrument of Withdrawal to the United Nations, the South African government asserted it had “found that its obligations with respect to the peaceful resolution of conflicts at times are incompatible with the interpretation given by the ICC of obligations” under the Rome Statute, its founding treaty. In other words, the government invoked the old peace-versus-justice argument, which, incidentally, has been debunked by scholars. This pronouncement was, no doubt, in reference to the government’s refusal to arrest President al Bashir—which it was legally obliged to do as a state party to the Rome Statute—when he attended a high-level African Union meeting in South Africa last year. South African lawyers and activists were outraged and its supreme court recently ruled the government’s omission violated both domestic law and its international obligations.

Finally, Justice Minister Michael Masutha argued the requirement to arrest indicted heads of state would be tantamount “regime change” and contravenes legislation that grants them diplomatic immunity (without allowing that Bashir did not have to visit). But could there be a different reason behind the government’s controversial decision?

A Diversion from Domestic Difficulties?

The African National Congress (ANC) government is suffering from a series of high-level corruption scandals along with a faltering economy, chronic electricity, water shortages, and most significantly spiraling unemployment rates, especially among the youth. Of course, the long-standing disappointment with government promises of land reform and the Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment programs, both of which have failed to reach the vast majority of the populace, cannot go unmentioned.

During my August visit there, many cited these issues to explain the ruling ANC’s serious losses in this year’s municipal elections to the Democratic Alliance and the Economic Freedom Fighters (headed by a 36 and 34-year old, respectively). Unfortunately, approximately a dozen ANC candidates were murdered in the run-up to the elections, allegedly by members of their own party—further evidence of domestic problems for the ANC. As an additional challenge to the ANC, the opposition Democratic Alliance Tweeted: “We will today approach courts to have the notice of withdrawal to the #ICC set aside as unconstitutional, irrational & procedurally flawed.” They cited the ANC’s failure to consult other parties and alleged violation of the country’s Promotion of Administration of Justice Act.

Additional domestic challenges are as follows. Last month, the ANC’s Chief Whip called for the resignation of President Jacob Zuma (who continues to fight allegations of personal and professional misconduct) as well as the entire ANC leadership, including himself. As recently as two weeks ago, the police fired stun grenades and water cannons to disperse university students protesting outside parliament over tuition rates, a problem plaguing the government during the past several months. Clearly, the ANC is concerned about losing its long-held grip on power, before the next round of elections. So, at least by creating a media buzz and fodder for discussion for the more informed about its dealings with the ICC, the government could well be diverting some public attention from these challenges while it invokes a need to sue for peace.

South Africa is unlike other countries which have threatened to withdraw from the court’s jurisdiction in that it has long been a proponent of the court and never been under investigation by it. Burundi’s presidential-term-limit question led to election-related violence in 2015, leaving hundreds dead, and tens-of-thousands displaced. Its parliament voted to withdraw from the ICC in October, as its government is under investigation by the court for its role in these deaths and other human rights abuses. Gambia’s human rights record has frequently come under scrutiny, particularly the government’s decision this year to crack down on some political opponents. The ICC dismissed the indictments, without prejudice, against Kenya’s top two leaders for election related violence, because of the dwindling witness list. The court invited the prosecutor to present any evidence of witness tampering, which the prosecutor blamed for its inability to present full evidence, if/when it was able in order to reinstate the complaint. These three countries therefore, are dissimilar to South Africa. Although they too might benefit from an external distraction, they may appear more concerned about accountability issues in an international forum.

Furthermore, South Africa is a regional power carrying significant weight within the African Union. Its notice to withdraw from the Rome Statute comes at a time of improving relations between the court and African countries. So, why now? Will its impending departure have a domino effect? Analyst are speculating, and probably rightly so, that South Africa does not want to be seen as a late comer, if in fact there is going to be an exodus of African countries from the ICC. But this is only an ancillary benefit, while domestic issues seem to be the driver. It has been reported that the ICC—which must improve its ability to reach all human-rights-violating individuals, even in those situations traditionally protected by the UN Security Council permanent members—has asked both South Africa and Burundi to reconsider their withdrawal notices. In the case of South Africa the proverbial jury is still out on that question. We will have to wait and see.

Mercedeh Momeni is a former assistant United States attorney and an associate legal officer at the UN Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. She is currently engaged in development work with a focus on democracy and governance. The views expressed herein are not necessarily those of her current or former employers.

Africa – Presidential term limits and the third term tragedy

Africa is currently in the middle of a third term crisis. As presidents come up against the presidential term-limits included in many multi-party constitutions, a significant number are refusing to leave power gracefully. Instead, a number of leaders have sought to secure a third term. So far, this trend has taken in countries as otherwise diverse as Burkina Faso, Burundi, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and now, it seems, the Democratic Republic of Congo.

In most cases, they have tried to do so through official channels, in other words by changing the law or appealing to the judiciary, rather than simply suspending the constitution and ruling by fiat. One reason for this is that there is strong domestic and international support for presidential term limits. Afrobarometer data suggests that typically over two-thirds of Africans support term limits, although there is considerable variation, with a high of 90% in Benin and a low of 44% in Algeria. As a result, leaders feel compelled to tread carefully, and to legitimise their strategies by pursuing them through formal channels.

Yet despite this, attempts to secure a third term have often triggered political unrest and in some cases widespread civil conflict. In both Burkina Faso and Burundi, efforts by unpopular presidents to stay in power come what may triggered mass protests and ultimately (very different forms of) military intervention. At the time of going to press, a further crisis appears to be brewing in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where the President, Joseph Kabila, looks set to pursue an unconstitutional third term in office. On Thursday 5 May, the former Governor of Katanga, Moise Katumbi, announced that he would be contesting the presidency as the candidate of the three main opposition parties. Just hours later he tweeted that the president – his former ally – had sent the police force to surround his house and that he had appealed to the United Nations mission in the country to protect him. Unconfirmed local reports later suggested that it was only the intervention of UN soldiers that prevented Katumbi’s detention.

If so, the DRC has had a lucky escape. Opposition supporters have already been involved in violent clashes with the security forces in protest against the prospect of a prolonged Kabila presidency. The arrest of Katumbi would raise the political temperature yet further, increasing the prospects for conflict in the coming months. As allegations and rumours circulate unhindered, the threat of a broader political rupture becomes ever more likely.

The growing number of third term tragedies on the continent raises three important questions. First, when do presidents seek a third term and when do they not? Second, when are they successful? Third, when are a president’s attempts to serve a third term most likely to result in political conflict?

Should I stay or should I go

Despite the recent headlines it is important to remember that considerably more presidents have respected term limits than have broken them. For every Uganda there is a Zambia, for every Burundi there is a South Africa, for every Rwanda there is a Kenya. There are a number of factors that appear to encourage presidents to seek third terms. First, the quality of democracy matters. Presidents in less democratic states who face weaker institutional checks and balances are more likely to try and break – or at least change – the rules. Good recent examples include Congo-Brazzaville and Djibouti.

Second, it is more feasible for presidents who govern countries that are more politically and economically independent from western influence to ignore international protests. As a result, leaders who enjoy greater international leverage because their countries feature valuable natural resources or are of considerable geo-strategic importance, try to secure a third term much more frequently than those that are much more dependent on Western trade. This is one of the reasons that President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, a country that recently found large oil reserves and is a key ally of United States in the war-on-terror, is able to stay in power indefinitely.

Third, presidents who enjoy greater political control are more likely to judge that it is possible to secure a third term, and hence more likely to risk pursuing one. Political control comes through two main routes: the ruling party and the security forces. Presidents are far more likely to try and secure third terms in dominant-party states in which the ruling party secures over 60% of seats in the legislature, such as Namibia and Rwanda, and when they have tight control over the army and police, as in Djibouti and Uganda. Under these conditions, it is often possible to both change the constitution through the legislature and silence any opposition to this strategy.

You can’t always get what you want

Of course, presidents do not always get it right and a number of third term bids have been unsuccessful. In countries such as Nigeria and Zambia, presidents failed in part because they could not take their own parties with them. As a result, they struggled to pass the necessary legislation, and, facing strong opposition from civil society groups and other parties, abandoned their plans. Rather than undermining democracy, this process can actually give it a short in the arm, and deter future presidents from pursuing similar strategies.

However, unsuccessful attempts to stay in power can also have far more problematic consequences. In Burkina Faso and Burundi, leaders overestimated their political control and underestimated the strength of opposition. As a result, they struggled to push through their third term ambitions. In Burundi, for example, President Nkurunziza lost a critical vote in the legislature to change the law, which forced him to put pressure on the judiciary to interpret the constitution in a way that would allow him to stand again. Although the Supreme Court ultimately ruled in his favour, it was immediately apparent that it only did so as a result of high levels of intimidation, further undermining the president’s credibility. As a result, the verdict did little to dampen opposition protests against his actions.

Limited political control undermined the position of President Nkurudiza in a second way. In the midst of the public protests in May 2015, a group of army officers launched a coup attempt. Although it appears to have been a poorly coordinated effort and was eventually put down, the mutiny demonstrated the lack of unity within the armed forces, and the potential for the president’s limited control over the security forces to contribute to political instability.

The bigger they are the harder they fall

To date, presidential term limits have not tended to be the source of major political conflict when presidents have either a) been willing to give up on their ambitions in the face of widespread opposition (Nigeria, Zambia) or b) have enjoyed the political control needed to be able to force through their will with relatively little resistance (Uganda, Rwanda). The “problem category”, for want of a better term, is those cases in which conditions are not favourable to a third term bid but leaders try and force one through regardless.

In turn, this is most likely to happen in states in which presidents have most to gain from staying in office, and most to lose by giving up power. Good proxies for the benefits of office are the level of corruption and the presence of valuable natural resources, the combination of which can make a leader extremely wealthy. A decent proxy for the costs of leaving power is whether a country has a history of political violence, which tends to decrease the level of trust between rival leaders, and increase the potential that the head of state will be prosecuted for human rights violations when they step down.

This is not great news for the DRC, which is a highly corrupt resource rich state with a history of political conflict. Unless President Kabila bucks the continental pattern, he is unlikely to step down voluntarily. And if he proves to be willing to risk everything to stay in power, sending the police to surround Katumbi’s house is likely to be only the tip of the iceberg.

@fromagehomme

President Museveni unlikely to leave power any time soon in Uganda

President Yoweri Museveni has been in power for thirty years, and his determination to stay in office shows no signs of dissipating.  Having removed presidential term-limits, rumours abound that if he wins the presidential elections – schedule for 18 February – he will look to remove the age limit the constitution sets for presidents, which currently stands at 75 years. Museveni is currently 71, so any effort to remove the limit would be clear evidence that he intends to stand in the next but one election, scheduled for 2012.

That, of course, all depends on Museveni defeating his long time rival Kizza Besigye of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) and his newest rival, Amama Mbabazi of the Go Forward movement. Initially the candidacy of Mbabazi looked like it might generate a fresh challenge for the incumbent. Having been Museveni’s right hand man up until very recently, Mbabazi was said to have vast financial resources, and to have lined up a number of heavyweights within the ruling party who were waiting for the fight moment to defect.

But the Mbabazi effect has yet to materialise.  The anticipated flood of defections turned out to only be a trickle, and even that has now dried up. Go Forward has also struggled to match the expenditure of other parties. According to the Alliance for Campaign Finance and Monitoring, the NRM was responsible for 88% of all campaign related expenditure in November and December; by contrast, only 1.1% was attributable to the Mbabazi campaign. Given this, it is perhaps unsurprising that a number of opinion polls have found that he is trailing well behind the other two candidates, on somewhere between 5 and 15% – although all such surveys are controversial in Uganda.

Significantly, the evidence of campaign spending collected by ACFIM suggests that, despite his protestations, Mbabazi may be aware that his race is over and have decided to keep some of his resources back for another day. In contrast to the NRM, whose expenditure increased by 72% between November and December, and the FDC, which ramped up its outlay by 25%, Go Forward reduced its monthly spend by 23%.

Of course, this does not mean that President Museveni is assured of victory. Besigye remains a formidable opponent and has been mobilizing vast rallies across the country, particularly in urban areas. Moreover, turning established practice on its head, Besigye’s supporters have started to give him money at rallies. Although the sums involved are fairly small, their symbolic importance is considerable.

However, despite Besigye’s broad popularity, Museveni remains the favourite. He controls the security forces and has a reasonably effective state apparatus at his disposal, including the “Crime Preventers”, a volunteer force recruited and managed by the police that Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have argued should be suspended for the elections to allow for a free and fair poll. The NRM can also afford to outspend the other parties 9 to 1. And, of course, Museveni appoints the electoral commission.

In the absence of a level playing field, it seems likely that Museveni will “win” another commanding victory. Whether this is fairly earned or not, the margin of victory is likely to play an important role in shaping the presidents attitude to his future, and that of his country. If he is seen to have comfortably defeated not only his old rival but also his newest challenger, the president is more likely to feel that he can force through another term in office. However, this would not be a popular move with many Ugandans. According to the Afrobarometer, 85% of Ugandans want president term-limits to be reintroduced.

Kenya – President seeks to manage inter-branch conflict

The new Kenyan political system, introduced under the 2010 constitution, paved the way for a complex web of checks and balances between newly created branches of government. On the one hand, 47 counties were created, complete with their own assemblies and directly elected Governors. These units have often seen themselves as being in conflict with the national government over resources and political power. On the other hand, the new constitution resurrected the Senate, transforming Kenya into a bi-cameral system for the first time since the 1960s. Almost immediately, Senators began to battle for supremacy and control over development funds with the Members of Parliament that populate the lower house – the National Assembly.

At times, this competition has worked to the advantage of the Jubilee Alliance government. Internecine struggles at the county level have served to deflect a range of political actors from the failings of the central government – for example over terrorism and the provision of national security. This has been a valuable distraction for the government, which has struggled to stem the flow of attacks by the radical Islamic movement al Shabaab. It has also taken other stories off the front pages, such as the allegations that police in the north-eastern county of Garissa flogged a group of young people with a rubber house and later posted the pictures on Facebook – not the best way to win hearts and minds in an increasingly divided society.

But in some cases the battles between Governors, Senators and MPs have also proved to be an embarrassing distraction. In a recent spat, the National Assembly supported the Division of Revenue Act, which effectively ‘hived off Sh 1 billion from the Senate’s oversight funds to give to counties’. As a result, the total allocation of government revenue to the counties in 2015/2016 is estimated to be Sh 207.84 billion, or 37%. Senators responded by criticising MPs and threatening to veto legislation of particular concern to the National Assembly. In the resulting debate the importance of key national priorities, such as infrastructure and security, were lost.

Similar tensions rose to the surface during a visit by President Uhuru Kenyatta to Nandi this week. In a speech delivered prior to the president’s own remarks, the Senate Majority Leader, Professor Kindiki, sought to impress on Kenyatta the need to restrain MPs, arguing that ‘The National Assembly should stop undermining the Senate by cutting its budget. We are not going to be frustrated and intimidated’. However, to Kindiki’s surprise, the president was not in the mood to humour his complaints. Instead, Kenyatta told those present to work more closely with rival leaders rather than issuing ‘meaningless threats’. Clearly frustrated by what he had heard, Kenyatta continued ‘The war of words between the Senate, governors and the National Assembly is uncalled for in the country. Leaders should stick to their mandate but not come here and issue threats to fellow elected leaders. The country must be governed through order.’

Kenyatta’s focus on order is nothing new. Kenya has long been governed by leaders who have bought into what Attieno Odhiambo called the ‘ideology of order’. The precise formulation of this set of ideas has changed over time, but is characterised by the tendency of leaders to legitimise their authority on the basis that they generate order, and the associated claim that to some extent it is appropriate to compromise human rights and civil liberties in the pursuit of this goal. However, while President Kenyatta has often referenced the importance of order, insecurity and political infighting have undermined the confidence of many Kenyans in his ability to provide political stability.

In response, the president has made a number of moves designed to foster domestic political unity, which he sees as a perquisite for stability. To this end, the Jubilee Alliance, which contested the 2013 elections as a coalition of two different parties, has been transformed into the Jubilee Alliance Party (JAP), and has pledged to run just one candidate for each elected position. This stands in stark contrast to previous practice, in which Kenyan coalition partners have frequently run candidates against each other for legislative positions, often dividing the vote. Along with Vice President William Ruto’s pledge not to support Kenyatta in the next presidential campaign, this move was designed to foster the impression that the government is rock solid.

However, there is a long way to go until the next election, and there are a number of issues around which the JAP may struggle to maintain unity, most notably a number of seats in which both wings of the party will claim that their candidates should be given priority. Already, efforts to run a common candidate in a legislative by-election, and to create a stronger political structure at the local level, have been hampered by in-fighting between members of Ruto’s United Republican Party (URP) and Kenyatta’s The National Alliance (TNA). Should the JAP fall apart, the president’s claim to be the provider of order and unity would become even harder to sustain.

#Togodecides: Faure Gnassingbé poised to lead family into fifth decade as Togo’s rulers

This is a guest post by Ulrike Rodgers, Senior Program Manager at the National Democratic Institute (NDI) 

Togo’s 3.5 million voters went to the polls on April 25 to elect their president for the third time since the death of long-term autocrat Gnassingbé Eyadéma in 2005. The principal opponents were incumbent Faure Gnassingbé, Eyadéma’s son, and Jean-Pierre Fabre of the National Alliance for Change (ANC). Voting proceeded peacefully on election day after months of political tensions running high. The National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) published provisional results on Tuesday evening showing a strong lead for the incumbent. Jean-Pierre Fabre filed an official complaint on Monday, citing irregularities, and has denounced the preliminary election results as a “crime against national sovereignty”.

Faure Gnassingbé’s father, Eyadéma, had governed the country with an iron fist for 38 years from 1967 to 2005. In 2002, he changed Togo’s constitution to eliminate presidential term limits and reduce the minimum age from 45 to 35 years. Faure Gnassingbé was 35 at the time. He was appointed president by the Togolese military after his father’s death in 2005.  The younger Gnassingbé’s accession to power was confirmed by the presidential election organized in April of the same year under heavy pressure from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The election, heavily criticized by the international community and Togolese democracy activists, ignited post-electoral violence that cost the lives of hundreds of protesters.

In 2010, Faure Gnassignbé won a second term under Togo’s one-round electoral system with just over 60 percent of the votes against his principal opponent, Jean-Pierre Fabre who gathered about one third of the votes. The other five contesters reached only single digits.  Although domestic and international observers noted irregularities in the organization of the polls, they were deemed overall credible and did not result in violence as in 2005. Nearly 3,278,000 voters had registered for that election; turnout was 64.7 percent.  For the first time since Togo’s independence in 1960, non-partisan domestic election observers followed the proceedings.

The legislative elections of July 2013 further consolidated Gnassingbé’s power. His party, the Union for the Republic (UNIR), won a majority of 62 seats in the 91-seat National Assembly, up from 50 in 2007. Togo’s voter registry had dipped to 3,044,332 voters for these elections; 66.06 percent participated.

This month, Togo organized its third presidential election since 2005. The race was originally scheduled to take place on April 15. Tensions between supporters of governing and opposition parties had again been mounting for months. The opposition accused the government of manipulating Togo’s voter roll and alleged that one third of the 3.5 million registered voters in 2015 were fictitious.  Faced with domestic and international pressure, Togo’s CENI heeded the recommendation of ECOWAS chairman, Ghanaian President John Dramani Mahama, in early March, to postpone the elections by 10 days to allow for an independent audit of the voter roll by the International Organization of la Francophonie (OIF). After three weeks of combing through Togo’s voter lists, the OIF published its report on April 8. It deemed the state of Togo’s voter registry “satisfactory” and gave its go-ahead for the elections to take place once some 300,000 entries were corrected. The OIF’s decision, publicly accepted by all parties, cleared the last obstacle for the contest to move forward.

Five candidates competed for the president’s chair on April 25, including the incumbent for a third term and his long-term rival Jean-Pierre Fabre. Although tensions had been running high in the pre-electoral period, voting proceeded peacefully on election day. ECOWAS and the African Union (AU) deployed international election observers. The domestic 35-member civil society consortium Citizen Synergy for Democratic Elections in Togo (SYCED-Togo) deployed a total of 1200 domestic election observers across the country. After the polls closed, the consortium commended voters and the Togolese authorities for organizing peaceful elections, and highlighted the contributions made by the CENI and Togo’s security forces for the presidential elections (FOSEP2015).  United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon also welcomed the peaceful conduct of the election and urged all candidates and their supporters to resolve any disputes that might arise in the election’s aftermath through legal procedures.

The CENI released provisional election results in the evening of April 28. They are subject to validation by Togo’s constitutional court. According to these results, the incumbent took nearly 59 percent of the votes while Jean-Pierre Fabre scored just under 35 per cent. Turnout appears to be significantly lower than in previous elections since 2005. If the court confirms the results, Gnassingbé will lead his family into its fifth decade in power. On Tuesday, following complaints by Jean-Pierre Fabre’s electoral coalition about widespread irregularities, ECOWAS chairman Mahamane traveled to Lomé, accompanied by Côte d’Ivoire’s President Ouattara, to mediate among the political parties while the country awaits the constitutional court’s decision. Thus far, the situation has remained calm, though Jean-Pierre Fabre has released an appeal to the public to mobilize against the election results.

The coming days will show whether the peace that characterized election day will continue after the constitutional court publishes its decision.  For the first time in Togo’s history, a consortium of non-partisan domestic election observers undertook a statistically driven monitoring exercise, collecting results from a representative sample of polling stations on election day. The publication of the results collected by SYCED could provide an independent check on the official CENI results. If SYCED’s results confirm the outcome announced by the CENI, it could reinforce citizen confidence in the validity of the official results and contribute to a more peaceful post-electoral environment.