Costa Rica – Centre-Left Candidate wins Presidency

In the second round of presidential elections held last Sunday, Carlos Alvarado Quesada, of the left-of-center, Partido Acción Ciudadana (PAC), convincingly won the Costa Rican presidential election with 60.66 per cent of the vote. His competitor, Fabricio Alvarado Muñoz, of the right-leaning Partido Restauración Nacional (PRN), received only 39.34 per cent of the popular vote as of the last count on Monday, April 2. With 97.47 per cent of all votes counted and processed and with a respectable 66.46 per cent turnout, Fabrico Alvarado quickly conceded defeat, leaving Carlos Alvarado with a healthy electoral mandate.

The first round of the election was held on February 4th and Fabricio Alvarado Muñoz and the PRN topped the poll with 24.9 per cent of the vote, leaving Carlos Alvarado and the PAC in second place with 21.6 per cent with the centrist Partido Liberación Nacional (PLN) and the center-right Partido Unidad Socialcristianai (PUSC) in third and fourth place respectively. As no candidate received over 40 per cent in the first round, the contest went to a second round run-off between the leading two.

At one point in the campaign, Carlos Alvarado, a former labor minister (and a rock musician and novelist) under the current president, Luis Guillermo Solís, was under pressure due to corruption allegations against the Solís government, involving kickbacks and Chinese imports. However, the campaign became dominated by social issues, particularly same-sex marriage, and the anti-gay marriage conservatism of Fabricio Alvarado, a former evangelical preacher, television journalist and member of the national assembly (elected in 2014), failed to resonate with the majority of voters.

Although the campaign touched upon other issues such as the national deficit, stubborn unemployment levels and the surprising recent rise in Costa Rica’s homicide rate, by the second round, the election had effectively become a ‘referendum on same-sex marriage.’ This became the central issue of the campaign due to a decision by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, based in San José and of which Costa Rica is a member, in January shortly before the first round contest. In response to a petition from the Solís administration, the Court ruled that couples in same-sex relationships should be entitled to the same family and financial rights as heterosexual couples and as such, all signatories to the Court must recognize same-sex marriage. The Court even recommended that in contexts where domestic opposition is particularly virulent, governments use temporary decree measures until the passage of statutory legislation. Currently in the Americas, same-sex marriage is legal in Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, the US, Uruguay, and some parts of Mexico. Ecuador currently legislates for same-sex civil unions.

The Solís administration, and Carlos Alvarado, embraced the decision, but it generated a backlash among Costa Rica’s growing evangelical Christian population, whom Fabricio Alvarado actively courted during the campaign. While this worked as a strategy in the first round, it did not appeal to the majority of Costa Ricans. Interestingly, this was the first time that neither of the two traditional parties had a candidate in the run-off election and is indicative of the increasing fragmentation of the Costa Rican political system.[1]

Carlos Alvarado will take office on May 8th for his four year term.

[1] See Roberts, Kenneth M. Changing Course in Latin America. Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Indonesia – Democratic Retrograde Ahead of Elections, 2019?

With local elections ahead in July, 2018, and general and the presidential elections slated for April 17, 2019, in Indonesia, a useful question to consider is: how are political conditions in the world’s third largest democracy? Among the reasons for raising the question is President “Jokowi” Widodo’s recent allusions to Indonesia’s assumption of the political leadership mantle for the ASEAN and Southeast Asia countries, if not the larger international community. If the country is to exemplify political progress and development, how well are political conditions operating in the country, particularly ahead of the essential democratic process of open and fair elections? The short answer is: not great. Political progress in Indonesia has suffered a number of set-backs in recent years, most notably with the passing of President Jokowi’s Perppu on mass organizations, the passing of the amendment to the Law on Representative Assemblies, popularly referred to as the MD3 Law, the proposed revisions to the criminal code, and the approval of the 20 percent threshold for the Presidential Election Law, all of which compromise political openness. Add to this list President Jokowi’s endorsement of tough measures against drug trafficking and use – including shooting drug dealers – that puts the country in step with President Duterte’s war on drugs in the Philippines, and any hand-wringing over Indonesia’s political conditions may be understandable.

President Jokowi’s Perppu 2/2017 on mass organizations was issued on July 12, 2017, to ban groups that did not support Indonesia’s ideology of Pancasila. The Perppu, presidential decree, or regulation in lieu of law in Indonesia, was approved by the House with 314 of 445 votes on October 24, 2017, and seven of the nine parties in the House. While the law has been used to disband extremist hard-line Islamist groups, such as the Hizbut Tahrir, critics point out that it may be used to deny due process to organizations.

Also troubling is the amendment to the Law on Representative Assemblies, popularly referred to as the MD3, that was passed by the House on February 21, 2018. The MD3 allows the legislative body’s ethics council (MKD) to press charges against those critical of the House and its members, including “disrespect” of the House. Article 245 of the law also states that an investigation concerning a member of the House must receive permission from the president and be reviewed by MKD. Critics point out that these regulations will largely restrict the roles of agencies such as the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and silence all criticisms. President Jokowi has announced that he will not sign the law; still, the law goes into effect automatically without his endorsement 30 days after the bill passes the House.

In addition, the House has made revisions of the criminal code one of the national legislative priorities in 2018. The criminal code is based on a penal code under Dutch colonisation in 1918, which was retained following Indonesia’s independence. While change is likely useful given that timing, a significant problem with the revisions lies with the retention of many of the old regulations, so that there is not much improvement. Further, the draft contains problematic provisions, including criminal codes that would take corruption investigation out of the KPK, criminalization of same-sex relations, extramarital sex and adultery, and codes that affect the civil liberties and rights of marginalized and vulnerable groups, and the poor. The draft also contains legislation that makes insulting the president a crime punishable by up to five years in jail. The draft is at the final stages in the House, and is expected to pass before the year ends to avoid running into the election year in 2019.

Minority parties and independents may not wield much impact to counter these political conditions: the House passed the 2017 Elections Law to maintain the presidential nomination threshold, where only parties or coalitions with at least 20 percent of the seats in the legislature or 25 percent of the popular vote based on the outcome of the 2014 legislative elections are able to nominate presidential candidates. The Law was challenged constitutionally, but the Constitutional Court rejected the challenge on January 11, 2018. With the threshold in place, small parties and independents are likely reduced to supporting roles to the larger, broad-based political parties.

These recent laws in Indonesia portend a democratic retrograde in the world’s third largest democracy. President Jokowi’s political rise was founded on his “man-of-the-people” persona that engaged voters across spectrums. Eyes are on how this man-of-the-people will structure the political road to the 2019 elections and beyond.

Egypt – The 2018 presidential election

This is a guest post by Jean-Francois Letourneau of the Department of Political Science, Université Laval, Canada

Between the 26th and the 28th of March, Egyptians were called to cast their ballots in a presidential election. The intentions of the regime, though, were very clear: all serious opposition candidates had been either arrested or pressured to quit the race. Only one candidate was to win, and the outcome could easily be predicted.

The context

The history of modern Egypt as a truly sovereign polity began with a military coup against the monarchy in 1952. The Free Officers, under the leadership of Nasser, redistributed much of the state’s infrastructure to loyalists, who were unprepared for and in some cases uninterested in the entrepreneurialism that had led Egypt to be one of the most advanced economies in the then “Third World”. Indeed, since the historic coup, capital accumulation and the capture of rents have been mostly limited to an elite close to (or members of) the three pillars of the Egyptian state: the presidency, the armed forces, and the security apparatus.

Presidential and parliamentary elections were introduced by President Sadat, Nasser’s successor, but from the beginning were intended only to give the regime a façade of democracy working in synergy with a increase in crony capitalism catalyzed by neo-liberal reforms. Under Sadat’s successor, President Mubarak, the regime very slowly descended into a “social-fiscal trap”: although elites increasingly benefited from more market-oriented policies, the state, which had lost its direct control over most of the economy, found itself less able to finance its immense public sector (which constitutes half of the country’s nominal GDP) or to maintain high subsidies for basic foodstuffs and essential commodities. Eventually, the regime collapsed, unable to bear the weight of its own contradictory nature, at which time the armed forces stepped in to pick up the pieces. The results are well know: free elections led to a Muslim Brotherhood government and presidency, which was later overthrown (with the support of a large segment of the population) by the armed forces.

The presidential elections held in 2014 led to the victory of Abdel Al-Sisi, the very man who, as head of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), had ordered the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood president, Mohamed Morsi.(1) Since the beginning of his first mandate as president, Al-Sisi has pursued policies quite similar to those of his predecessors (with the obvious exception of Morsi), albeit he has maintained closer ties to the military and allowed it to accumulate more economic and political power. It is perhaps a testimony to his political acumen that he has, up to now, successfully based his legitimacy on his role as a bulwark against terrorism.

The Constitution

In the last 6 years, Egypt has seen two new constitutions. The first of these was mostly written by members of the 2012 constituent assembly (CA) loyal to the Muslim Brotherhood and included controversial clauses, such as the creation of a non-elected “Shura council” and the granting of a legislative veto to Al-Ahzar University. The second constitution was drafted by a new CA formed after the overthrow of the Egyptian Brotherhood government. The draft was then approved by a referendum in early 2014 “in an atmosphere marred by street fighting, terrorist attacks, political apathy, and a large Islamist constituency boycotting the vote altogether”. This new constitution considerably bolstered the role of the military: no longer was there any pretense of accountability to the parliament or courts. Indeed, the armed forces now had a clear mandate to interfere in civilian affairs if its leading officers and the president felt it was needed. Moreover, the powers of the presidency were increased: the president now had the explicit capacity to call cabinet meetings and make policy without consulting the prime minister. As for the judiciary, the constitution admitted that its independence “should” be maintained, but that this would be accomplished through legislation.(2)

The candidates

A number of candidates entered the race in January 2018 (the official beginning of the presidential campaigns). However, one after the other were either arrested or pressured into rescinding their candidacy. One important threat to the incumbent was the candidacy of Sami Anan, a retired general and former chief of staff of the armed forces.(3) Having announced, on January 20th, that he represented a real alternative to president Sisi, he was later arrested on the rather dubious charges of having forged his release as a reserve officer in the armed forces. Another high-profile potential candidate, Mohamed Al-Sadat, the nephew of former president Sadat, announced in mid-January that he would not be participating in the campaign, explaining that it would “be like committing suicide running against someone like [Sisi]”(4). Perhaps most threatening to President Sisi was the candidacy of Ahmed Shafik, former commander in chief of the air force and presidential candidate in the 2012 election, which he lost by 48% to 52% in a runoff against Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohammed Morsi. Shafik was in the UAE when he declared his candidacy in the 2018 election. UAE police soon deported him and his whereabouts remained unknown to his family until a video of him appeared in the Egyptian media reminiscent of the Moscow trials: downtrodden and submissive, Shafik announced that he had reconsidered and was no longer running as he was “out of touch” with Egyptian politics.(5) With no candidates remaining, the regime appears to have hastily propped up a lone candidate to oppose Sisi: a obscure politician named Mostafa Moussa who, before registering himself as a candidate, was campaigning for the incumbent president. As could be expected, the “campaign” itself was mostly a matter of a variety of electoral posters and billboards exhorting Egyptians to vote for the incumbent president.

Conclusion

Although the victory of the incumbent president was almost certain, and there were little “campaign issues” outside the menace of violent jihadists, there are numerous pressing issues that the re-elected president will need to address. One is the effects of the austerity measures on the Egyptian people: lower subsidies, fewer public servant jobs and high inflation could easily lead to a storm of discontent, perhaps worse than what occurred during the so-called “bread riots” that followed an attempt to lower subsidies under president Sadat. Indeed, the very fact that two generals attempted to run as candidates could be a signal that some parts of the military are discontented with Sisi’s policies.(6) Moreover, the grandiose infrastructure programs announced by Sisi have yet to take off: the building of the “New Capital” on the east side of the Greater Cairo area has been plagued with delays and contract cancellations, and the plans to supply the new metropolis with water seem somewhat implausible considering the scarcity of the already available water supply and the very real possibility that water will become even scarcer as Ethiopia begins to fill the reservoir behind its newly constructed “Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam”.(7) Only time will tell if President Sisi will be able to successfully address these imminent crises.

Notes

[1]Robert Spingborg. Egypt, Polity, 2017

[2]EU Directorate-General for external polices. Egypt: in depth analysis of the main elements of the new constitution, 2014

[3]Madaonline [https://www.madamasr.com/en/2018/01/23/news/u/former-armed-forces-chief-of-staff-arrested-referred-to-military-prosecution-after-announcing-presidential-bid/]

[4]Ruth Michaelson. The Guardian,  Jan 15th 2018

[5]BBC world newsonline [http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42597803]

[6]Carnegie Middle East Center. Why Sisi seams worried[http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/75509]

[7]Carnegie Middle East Center. River of Discontent[http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/73491]

Semi-presidentialism, premier-presidentialism and president-parliamentarism – A new country-years dataset

This new dataset provides time-series, cross-sectional data for the presence of both semi-presidentialism and the two sub-types of semi-presidentialism – premier-presidentialism and president-parliamentarism – since 1900. The dataset uses the same country names, country years, and country ids. as the V-Dem data set, allowing them to be easily merged.

The dataset (v2.0) is available here.

There are two codings of semi-presidentialism in v2.0.

In sp1, semi-presidentialism is defined as the situation where a country’s constitution establishes both a directly (or popularly) elected president and a prime minister and cabinet that are collectively responsible to the legislature (Elgie 2011). This coding includes cases where a constitution requires a super-majority for the dismissal of the prime minister and cabinet by the legislature.

In sp2, semi-presidentialism is defined as the situation where a country’s constitution establishes both a directly (or popularly) elected president and a prime minister and cabinet that are collectively responsible to the legislature by no more than a vote of an absolute majority of one or more houses of the legislature. In other words, this coding excludes cases where the PM and government can be held collectively accountable only through a super-majority vote in the legislature.

In sp1, the following countries are classed as semi-presidential, whereas in sp2 they are not: Algeria (all years), Burkina Faso (1977-80), Burundi (1992-96), Cameroon (all years), Central African Republic (2016), Egypt (2007-11), Kyrgyzstan (1996-2007), Madagascar (all SP years since 1996), Mali (all years), Republic of Congo (2016), Rwanda (all years since 2003), Togo (all years), Tunisia (1989-2001), and Vietnam (all years).

The presence of semi-presidentialism (both sp1 and sp2) is coded as 1, its absence as 0. The start year is the year of the introduction of semi-presidentialism in the constitution if the date is on or before 30 June. If the start date is 1 July or later, then the following year is recorded as the first full year of semi-presidentialism. The end date is recorded for the year that the constitution ceased to be semi-presidential at whatever point in the year it ended. The end of semi-presidentialism is marked by a constitutional change. This can be a constitutional amendment introducing another type of system, or a suspension of the constitution.

This version also codes the premier-presidential and president-parliamentary sub-types of semi-presidentialism. The definitions are:

  • President-parliamentarism is a sub-type of semi-presidentialism where the prime minister and cabinet are collectively responsible to both the legislature and the president.
  • Premier-presidentialism is a sub-type of semi-presidentialism where the prime minister and cabinet are collectively responsible solely to the legislature.

These sub-types were first identified by Matthew Shugart and John Carey. The above definitions are consistent with Shugart and Carey (1992).

In the dataset, pp1 and pp2 code premier-presidenetialism as 1 and president-parliamentarism as 2. If a country is not semi-presidential, then the coding is 0. All pp1 codings are based on the definition of semi-presidentialism in sp1. All pp2 codings are based on the definition of semi-presidentialism in sp2.

If there are any mistakes, then please let me know (robert.elgie@dcu.ie). If there are any questions, please contact me at the same email.

Please cite the dataset as:

Robert Elgie (2018), Semi-presidentialism, premier-presidentialism and president-parliamentarism – A new country-years dataset [Blog post, 3 April]. Retrieved from http://presidential-power.com/?p=7869.

References

Elgie, R. (2011), Semi-presidentialism: Sub-Types and Democratic Performance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Shugart, M. S. and J. M. Carey (1992), Presidents and Assemblies. Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Trump’s White House Merry-Go-Round: Is Kelly The Next To Go?

Is White House Chief of Staff John Kelly about to be fired? Last week President Donald Trump removed his national security adviser H.R. McMaster, replacing him with former U.N. Ambassador John Bolton. McMaster’s firing is the latest in a series of changes to Trump’s inner circle, and it immediately prompted speculation that Kelly is the next to go. Rumors regarding Trump’s dissatisfaction with Kelly have circulated for months, with the president reportedly openly speculating about his replacement. However, the difficulties Kelly has faced as chief of staff are not solely a function of Trump’s mercurial temperament. They also reflect a more fundamental tension that inheres in his particular role running the White House on the president’s behalf. Most chiefs see their primary purpose as conserving the most precious asset a president possesses – his time. To do so, chiefs try to centralize managerial authority in their own hands. But this assertion of power can create a backlash. Under powerful chiefs, presidents frequently chafe at what they see as their increasing isolation, a lack of exposure to differing viewpoints, and a sense that the chief is usurping their prerogatives. Reportedly, Trump has repeatedly expressed exactly these sentiments.

The irony is that Kelly is doing exactly what Trump hired him to do last July in response to a series of policy fiascos, including a controversial travel ban mired in legal disputes, the failed Republican attempt to repeal Obamacare, reports of White House staff infighting, historically low approval ratings, and an overall sense that his presidency was failing. In the ensuing eight months, Kelly has asserted his administrative control through a major overhaul of White House staff people and processes. One result is the unprecedented rate of turnover among Trump’s White House aides, much of it purportedly with Kelly’s blessing. According to media reports, McMaster is but the latest victim of Kelly’s purge.

In addition to the staff housecleaning, Kelly has tried to impose greater discipline over White House decisionmaking and messaging. On this score, however, he has been less successful, in part because Trump seems unwilling, or incapable, of sticking to organizational routines or exercising self-discipline. Indeed, the President bristles at any perception that Kelly is “managing” him. The result is a recurring pattern of high profile disputes between the President and his chief of staff: Trump tweets or states a controversial position or belief, Kelly walks backs or clarifies Trump’s statement, and the President responds by implicitly or publicly rebuking his chief of staff. Two months ago, for example, Kelly reportedly told legislators on Capitol Hill that Trump’s campaign statements on immigration were “uninformed,” and described the President’s views on building a border wall as “evolving.” The next morning Trump responded by tweeting “The Wall is the Wall, it has never changed or evolved from the first day I conceived of it.” The exchange fueled rumors that Trump would replace Kelly. However, Trump then publicly reaffirmed his support for his chief of staff.

To be sure, some of Kelly’s wounds are self-inflicted, evidence that his years in the military left him ill-prepared to address the political dimension of his job. Examples abound, such as when he accused undocumented immigrants of being too lazy to sign up for protections afforded by the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program, and appeared to back Staff Secretary Rob Porter after accusations of abuse by Porter’s two ex-wives. As former Clinton Chief of Staff Leon Panetta remarked: “John is a great Marine . . . but he is not a politician, and one thing he lacks is the ability to look at the big political picture and understand what you should and shouldn’t say as chief of staff.”

However, the combustible relationship between Trump and Kelly is not simply a function of their personal idiosyncrasies. Barack Obama’s buttoned-down approach to the presidency was the antithesis of Trump’s in terms of impulse control and adherence to organizational routine. And yet Obama went through five chiefs during his two terms as president, including three during his first four years in office. George W. Bush is perhaps an exception to this pattern – his first chief, Andrew Card, served for six years before leaving of his own accord, and Card’s successor finished out Bush’s second term. But Bush’s predecessor Bill Clinton also had high turnover, with four chiefs across his eight years as president. Both George H. W. Bush and Ronald Reagan White House experienced similar rates of change.

In part this frequent turnover reflects a mismatched skill set. As Kathryn Dunn Tenpas and I show, presidents often initially choose their White House aides, including chief of staffs, from individuals who have proven their mettle on the campaign trail. However, the skills that prove so useful during campaigns tend not to translate well into the process of governing. Steve Bannon, the Trump campaign strategist who briefly reprised that function in Trump’s White House, exemplifies this tendency. After being appointed to the White House to insure that Trump’s campaign promises were fulfilled, Bannon was fired shortly after Kelly’s appointment as chief of staff. Bannon later conceded that “In many ways, I think I can be more effective fighting from the outside for the agenda President Trump ran on. ”

But while the mismatch in functions may explain White House staff turnover more generally, there is a more fundamental reason for the instability in the chief of staff’s position. As my Middlebury College colleague Amy Yuen and I demonstrate formally in our ongoing research program [gated], it is very difficult for a chief to organize the White House staff to simultaneously maximize efficiency and insure that the range of information and advice necessary for effective decisionmaking reaches the President’s desk. In the modern era, White House staffs have expanded in size and internal complexity, prompting chiefs to centralize power in order to achieve administrative efficiency. Carried too far, however, such efforts can isolate presidents from much needed input and advice. Moreover, presidents may worry that their decisionmaking authority is being usurped by their chief White House aide. This clash in expectations is what contributes to the high turnover among chiefs.

How might Kelly avoid the fate that so frequently ensnared his predecessors? It depends first and foremost on Trump properly understanding his organizational needs. The large size and internal complexity of the modern White House make it imperative to designate one individual to coordinate the flow of paper and people in and out of the Oval Office. However, this does not mean Trump should grant that individual primus inter pares status within the White House organization. Instead, as Yuen and I show, presidents gain informational advantages by allowing multiple White House power centers, and giving each equal access to the president. Ideally, this entails distributing White House staff authority across two or more political and policy advisers, and pitting them against each other in a competitive advising process, rather than placing specialists in distinct functional silos reporting separately to a dominant chief of staff. A competitive advising structure, we argue, forces policy and political disputes to the president, where they should be resolved, rather than allowing them to be settled by a chief of staff or worse, by lower-level aides.

This approach undoubtedly has costs. Most notably it requires a president who is comfortable dealing with dissent among his advisers, and who can tolerate the unavoidable negative media coverage that staff disagreements will produce, particularly when aides use the press to take on rivals and to pressure their boss to choose their side. For their part, chiefs must be willing to manage this open competition, rather than stifle it, even at the risk of creating the perception that they are not fully in charge of the White House structure. Eight months into his tenure, it is an open question whether Kelly is willing and able to manage this type of competitive advising structure. It is even less clear that his President will let him. But the fate of Trump’s presidency rests in large part on whether he, and Kelly, grasp the impact of organization on presidential success. If they cannot, Kelly’s days as chief of staff are likely numbered, and Trump will almost certainly experience a recurrence of the organizational dysfunction that has afflicted his presidency for much of his first year in office.

Uganda – On Presidents, policing and power

On 4 March, Uganda’s President Museveni made the surprise announcement that he was firing both his Inspector General Police (IGP), Gen. Kale Kayihura, and his Security Minister, Lt Gen. Henry Tumukunde. This came after months of infighting between the two men and their respective agencies, the Uganda Police Force (UPF) and the Internal Security Organization (ISO).

Despite initially dominating headlines, the two-man feud is not the sole reason—or perhaps even a particularly significant reason—for the shake-up. Other factors include the police’s increasing involvement with criminal organisations, public frustration with police incompetence, and perhaps most significant, Museveni’s apparent misgivings about Kayihura’s loyalty.

None of these concerns, even the last, can be remedied through a simple reshuffle. They thus invite further reflection, particularly regarding President Museveni’s past management of security in Uganda, the growing partisanship and impunity of the police force, and what new security strategy Museveni may now adopt.

The rise and decline of the Uganda’s police  

Professionalism in the Ugandan police declined as it became more of a partisan fighting force, a transformation that former IGP Kayihura largely oversaw.

Veteran journalist Charles Onyango-Obbo gives a particularly trenchant analysis of this process, although other observers also offer useful summaries.

In brief, the Ugandan Police Force first underwent a process of professionalization through the 1990s and into the early 2000s. The two IGPs during this period were both career police officers and succeeded in turning the Force from “a mess” into a “boring place”, run in as “technocratic” a manner as it has ever been.

Some analysts contest this reading, noting that the Force, even in the 1990s, was not without controversy. But this initial period of institutional consolidation and professionalization certainly contrasts with what followed.

The first key change came in 2001 with the transition to IGP Wamala who, rather than a professional police officer, was a military man. But it was Kayihura’s accession to the IGP position in 2005 that marked the real watershed. Under his leadership, the Force became increasingly politicized internally and more overtly partisan in its actual policing.

The reasons for the change were multiple. They included Museveni’s frustration with a police force know for voting “badly”.

But the change in policing came alongside a more fundamental shift in the NRM’s overall security strategy.

As Onyango-Obbo argues, by the early 2000s, Museveni was increasingly keen to distance the military from overt partisan activities, easing its metamorphosis into a seemingly more professional force worthy of taking a lead in regional peace-keeping efforts.

This withdrawal of the military left the police to handle partisan issues at home, and this even as the political threat posed by the opposition grew.

This threat, along with Museveni’s personal trust in Kayihura, helps explain why the annual budget for the police exploded under his watch, going from Shs58b (£11.2m) to Shs600b (£115.5m).

Flush with cash, the Police spent some of it on new equipment, thus becoming increasingly militarised. This trend only grew more pronounced following the unprecedented 2011 “walk to work” protests, which Kayihura was instrumental in suppressing.

Ahead of the 2016 elections, Kayihura invested in a new initiative, the build-up of the so-called “crime preventers”, a community policing force that supposedly numbers 12m (but undoubtedly far less). Made up of young, largely untrained recruits, the “crime preventers” have been used in partisan policing efforts, often more as a threat.

Where to from here?

With the transfer to a new IGP, Okola Ochola, some observers are hoping for reform in the police.

Ochola is the first career policeman to serve as IGP since 2001, and his early actions do appear aimed at restoring a degree of professionalism.

Only a few weeks in the job and Ochola has already redeployed seven officers, most of whom were previously deployed to the IGP’s office “as a punishment” due to Kayihura’s distrust of them.

He has also indicated his distaste for the “crime preventers” and declared that he will weed out police officers deemed unfit. These will presumably include many of the younger recruits Kayihura brought in to serve as his loyal base whilst undercutting older, more experienced officers.

Much more needs to be done, of course, to bring about a change in the Police. Some also doubt that this change is likely to occur.

They point, in particular, to Ochola’s new deputy, Brigadier Sabiiti Muzeyi, who they suggest could scupper reform efforts. Muzeyi previously commanded the Military Police and his rapid rise within the UPDF was aided by Museveni’s son, Gen. Muhoozi.

But even if Ochola were to professionalise the police, this would raise fresh questions. Would a more professional force retreat from partisan policing? If it did, who would take over the partisan dirty work?

While it is far too early to say, a more professional police under Ochola could make for a more overtly partisan military, reversing earlier efforts to limit the UPDF’s domestic political interventions.

Only this week, Museveni declared that the crime preventers will now serve under the military and that the new crime preventers team should meet the Chief of Defence Forces, Gen. Muhoozi.

Museveni went further, insisting that crime preventers was nothing new and had been part of the National Resistance Army going back to the 1980s.

Even as we contemplate the possibility of another shift in Museveni’s security strategy, one thing about which we can be sure is that security forces will continue to be used for partisan ends. The only change may be which kind of officer—military or police—holds the gun.

Semi-presidentialism – A new country-years dataset

This new dataset provides time-series, cross-sectional data for the presence of semi-presidentialism since 1900. The dataset uses the same country names, country years, and country ids. as the V-Dem data set, allowing them to be easily merged.

The dataset (v2.0) is available here.

Semi-presidentialism is defined as the situation where a country’s constitution establishes both a directly (or popularly) elected president and a prime minister and cabinet that are collectively responsible to the legislature (Elgie 2011). It includes cases where a constitution requires a super-majority for the dismissal of the prime minister and cabinet by the legislature. It also includes cases where the legislature’s motion of no-confidence in the prime minister and cabinet immediately triggers a legislative election. It does not include cases where there is only individual prime ministerial responsibility to the legislature (e.g. South Korea), or where the legislature can pass a motion of no-confidence in the prime minister and cabinet, but where the president can ignore it and either keep the prime minister in place or immediately reappoint the same person as prime minister.

The presence of semi-presidentialism (sp) is coded as 1, its absence as 0. The start year is the year of the introduction of semi-presidentialism in the constitution if the date is on or before 30 June. If the start date is 1 July or later, then the following year is recorded as the first full year of semi-presidentialism. The end date is recorded for the year that the constitution ceased to be semi-presidential at whatever point in the year it ended. The end of semi-presidentialism is marked by a constitutional change. This can be a constitutional amendment introducing another type of system, or a suspension of the constitution.

If there are any mistakes, then please let me know (robert.elgie@dcu.ie).

Please cite the dataset as:

Robert Elgie (2018), Semi-presidentialism – A new country-years dataset [Blog post, 29 March]. Retrieved from http://presidential-power.com/?p=7869.

Reference

Elgie, R. (2011), Semi-presidentialism: Sub-Types and Democratic Performance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Cynthia McClintock – The superiority of runoff to plurality election for democracy in Latin America

This is a guest post by Cynthia McClintock of George Washington University. It is based on her recent paper in Journal of Democracy

In the 1950s, the most common presidential-election rule world-wide was plurality (first-past-the-post).[i]  Now, however, the most common rule is majority runoff (a requirement for a second round between the top two candidates if no candidate wins 50 percent of the vote).  In 2016, among the countries classified as “electoral democracies” and that directly elected their presidents, 73 percent in Latin America, 88 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa, 86 percent in Europe, and 63 percent in the Asia-Pacific used majority runoff.[ii]

The vast majority of scholars have opposed runoff.[iii]  But, it is indeed superior. Runoff opens the electoral arena but at the same time enables presidential legitimacy and entices presidential candidates towards the political center.

PLURALITY, RUNOFF, AND DEMOCRACY: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

To assess the impact of plurality versus runoff rules on levels of democracy, I elaborated a dataset for Latin America between 1990 and 2016.[iv]  Thresholds for a first-round victory between 40 percent and 50 percent were classified as runoff but thresholds below 40 percent as plurality.  Bolivia was omitted because, until 2009, its rule was anomalous (if no candidate tallied 50%, the president was selected by the legislature from among the top two finishers (or, prior to 1990, the top three finishers).  Levels of democracy were measured through the addition of political rights and civil liberties scores by Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org) and by the Liberal Democracy scores in the Varieties of Democracy 7.1 dataset at www.v-dem.net.

Figure 1 shows that Freedom House scores were similar under runoff and plurality between 1990 and 1998 but subsequently improved under runoff and plummeted under plurality.  The trajectory of V-Dem Liberal Democracy scores was similar. In regression analysis (using a random effects linear model and conventional control variables), runoff was significant to superior Freedom House and V-Dem scores at the .05 level.

Figure 1 Presidential-election Rules and Freedom House Scores, 1990-2016

PLURALITY, RUNOFF, AND POLITICAL INCLUSION

Scholars’ primary concern about runoff is that it lowers barriers to entry to the electoral arena and, concomitantly, enables a larger number of parties.  Under plurality, a new party is usually a “spoiler” party; but, under runoff, citizens can vote sincerely in the first round for the candidate whom they prefer.

These scholars’ concerns are not unfounded.  In the most recent elections in Chile, Colombia, and Guatemala, the number of parties surpassed 6.0 and, in Brazil, 10.0.  Often, many parties are inchoate and, sometimes, executive-legislative conflict is severe.

However, lower barriers to entry are synonymous with greater openness of the electoral arena.  It is easier to defeat long-standing parties with authoritarian proclivities that have lost majority support but retain political bases.  Such parties endured for many years under plurality in the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, and Venezuela.

An open electoral arena was especially important in Latin America because, during the Cold War, Marxist parties had built considerable support but had usually been excluded; in the 1990s and 2000s, a key challenge was the incorporation of these parties into the democratic political arena.  Under runoff, a virtuous circle emerged.  With lower barriers to entry, leftist leaders gained respect for the democratic process and were likely to moderate.  For their part, long-standing parties knew that any new party would have to win 50 percent and, by definition, could not be “extreme;” they were less likely to resort to ugly tactics—again, increasing rivals’ respect for the democratic process.

By contrast, under plurality in the Dominican Republic (until 1994), Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, and Venezuela (until 1993), long-standing parties endured by means of dividing their opposition and applying ugly tactics—alienating the left and decreasing its respect for the democratic process.

Still, measures to reduce the number of parties under runoff would be advantageous.  The most promising reform would appear to be scheduling the legislative election at the time of the runoff or even after the runoff.   (Currently, in most Latin American countries, the legislative election is scheduled at the time of the first round.)  In France as of 2002, the legislative election has been scheduled after the runoff and, in France’s 2002, 2007, 2012, and 2017 elections, the expectation for momentum for the president’s party has been realized.

PLURALITY, RUNOFF, AND PRESIDENTIAL LEGITIMACY

Although legitimacy is a complex concept, it is clear what presidential legitimacy is not: it is not a president elected by a minority of voters and opposed by the majority—which can happen under plurality.  In 2006-2007 surveys that I carried out with legislators in Latin America, 84 percent of the 133 legislators who preferred runoff cited greater presidential legitimacy as their reason.[v]  These preferences were based in part on Latin America’s historical experience.  Although the causes of military coups in Argentina in 1963, Brazil in 1955, Chile in 1973, Ecuador in 1968, and Peru in 1962 were manifold, they occurred after elections in which the incoming president had won only 25 percent, 36 percent, 37 percent, 33 percent, and 28 percent respectively.

For the forty-five elections under plurality between 1978 and 2012, I determined that, under runoff, a “reversal” of the first-round result (victory for the first-round runner-up) would have been likely or virtually certain in seven (15 percent).[vi]  Also, between 1990 and 2016, elections were won with 41 percent or less in the Dominican Republic in 1990, Honduras in 2013, Mexico in 2006 and 2012, Nicaragua in 2006, Panama in 1994, Paraguay in 1993 and 2008, Uruguay in 1994, and Venezuela in 1993—often provoking legitimacy deficits even if the first-round runner-up would not have been likely to win.

Sometimes, legitimacy deficits were overcome–but sometimes not.

In various elections under runoff, the rule prevented victories by first-round winners that would have provoked widespread dismay.  Among the most problematic victories would have been Carlos Menem in 2003 in Argentina and Ollanta Humala in 2006 in Peru.   Further, presidents who prevailed in runoffs but whose parties were perceived to be leftist or populist gained legitimacy advantages through majorities in runoffs.  Among the most important examples are Jaime Roldós in 1978-1979 in Ecuador; Salvador Sánchez Cerén in 2014 in El Salvador; Vinicio Cerezo in 1985 and Álvaro Colom in 2007 in Guatemala; Ollanta Humala in 2011 in Peru; and José Mujica in 2009 in Uruguay.

PLURALITY, RUNOFF, AND PRESIDENTIAL IDEOLOGY

Under runoff, by definition, a candidate must appeal to the majority and be positioned not too far from the political center.   Recently, political leaders’ ideologies have been assessed by the country’s legislators in surveys by the Parliamentary Elites of Latin America Project at http://americo.usal.es.oir; political leaders’ ideologies are scored from 1.0 [the furthest left] to 10.0 [the furthest right].[vii]

Between 2000 and 2012, a president (or presidential candidate within 5.0 points of the winner) was classified at the “extreme left” (1.0 through 3.2) in four of the six plurality countries but only one of the eleven runoff countries.   Candidates at the “extreme right” (8.0-10.0) were elected in three of the six plurality countries but only three of the eleven runoff countries.

Further, presidents or top presidential candidates at the “moderate left” (3.21 through 4.99) were rare in plurality countries but common in runoff countries.  Often, these moderate leftists had previously been classified at the extreme left or had run for parties classified at the extreme left: Brazil’s Luiz Inácio (Lula) da Silva, Guatemala’s Álvaro Colom, Peru’s Ollanta Humala, and Uruguay’s Tabaré Vázquez.   Gradually, these leaders appeared to decide that, if they were to win, they would need to shift towards the center.

CONCLUSION

Although no electoral rule is a panacea, runoff has been successful in Latin America.  The greater openness of the electoral arena facilitated the defeat of long-standing parties with authoritarian proclivities that had lost majority support but retained political bases.  Presidents were enticed towards the political center and, with majorities of the vote, did not suffer legitimacy deficits.

Notes

[i] Nils-Christian Bormann and Matt Golder, “Democratic Electoral Systems around the world, 1946-2011,” Electoral Studies 32 (March 2013): 360-369.

[ii]Author’s calculation from www.electionguide.org and, if necessary, a country’s constitution.  The “electoral democracy” and regional classifications follow Freedom House at www.freedomhouse.org.  The figure for Latin America excludes several countries with a reduced threshold; the figure for Sub-Saharan Africa includes several countries in which runoff is combined with a territorial distribution requirement.

[iii]John M. Carey,  “Presidentialism and Representative Institutions,” in Jorge I. Domínguez and Michael Shifter, eds., Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 14-15;  Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, “Evaluating Presidential Runoff Elections,” Electoral Studies 25 (March 2006), 129; Juan J. Linz, “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?” in Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 21-22; Scott P. Mainwaring and Matthew  S. Shugart, “Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical Appraisal,” Comparative Politics 29 (July 1997), 467-468; Arturo Valenzuela, “Latin America: Presidentialism in Crisis,” Journal of Democracy 8 (October 1993), 8.

[iv] For more information, see Cynthia McClintock, Electoral Rules and Democracy in Latin America (Oxford University Press, 2018), Chapter 2.

[v] For more information, see Cynthia McClintock, Electoral Rules and Democracy in Latin America (Oxford University Press, 2018), Appendix 1.

[vi] For more information, see Cynthia McClintock, Electoral Rules and Democracy in Latin America (Oxford University Press, 2018), Appendix 6.

[vii] For more information, see Cynthia McClintock, Electoral Rules and Democracy in Latin America (Oxford University Press, 2018), Chapter 3.

Ignacio Arana Araya – The “personal” versus the “institutional” presidency: An artificial divide

This is a guest post by Ignacio Arana Araya, Institute for Politics and Strategy, Carnegie Mellon University

Mainstream media and political analysts seem obsessed covering the eccentricities and peculiarities of the occupant of the White House, adventuring how Trump’s limitations as a statesman may have undesired impacts on executive governance. Trump’s unpredictable behavior and decision-making style have stunned many observers, but both recent and historical presidents of the Americas also had flamboyant personalities (and performances). Idiosyncratic presidents, in fact, have always existed. Not so long ago, Presidents Hugo Chávez of Venezuela (1999-2013) and Abdalá Bucaram of Ecuador (1996-1997) used to hit international headlines for their extravagances. Bucaram, popularly nicknamed “El Loco,” was eventually impeached by Congress for – officially – being a madman. What these eccentric characters remind us is that those who hold the most important political offices in their countries bring their unique personalities to power with them, and such uniqueness has an impact on their performance. However, students of the presidency have generally failed to quantitatively measure how the personality traits of the leaders may impact executive governance.

Arguably, this failure occurs mainly because students of the presidency have failed to absorb research on differential psychology. This brand of psychological research studies the individual differences of humans, or how people differ from each other in how they feel, act, think and behave. Absorbing the theoretical, empirical, and methodological contributions of the differential psychology literature would also allow integrating the research of scholars who focus on the “personal” presidency and those who center on the “institutional” presidency.

Both research streams have run through parallel corridors, leading to conflicting views on how the presidency works. The president-centered (also called “personality-centered”) approach examines decision making in the executive branch based on presidential behavior. Scholars from this group examine the ability of presidents to persuade individuals and organizations to accommodate policy making to their preferences. They argue that the heads of government have plenty of room to act and decide at their own discretion. Since the individual attributes of the leaders influence policy outcomes, it is necessary to analyze the personal characteristics of the leaders to understand executive politics (Neustadt 1960; Barber 1972; Greenstein 2009).

In contrast, presidency-centered (also called “institutional presidency”) studies minimize the importance of presidents as individuals and center the explanation of policy outcomes on the institutional setting in which heads of government work (e.g., Moe 1993; Dickinson 2004; Lewis 2008). The central assumption in this approach is that different presidents will behave similarly in identical contexts. It regards the study of the characteristics of the leaders as unworthy because more explanatory leverage is -supposedly- gained when scholars analyze the effect of institutional factors on policy outcomes.

The opposing theoretical views have contributed to a divide of students of the presidency along two methodological lines with little interconnection. While presidency-centered researchers mainly conduct statistical or game-theoretic analyses, most president-centered studies are qualitative.

I argue that the division wall between presidency-centered and president-centered explanations of the presidency is built on unsound foundations. Presidency-centered scholars have assumed that the personal characteristics of presidents 1) are of little relevance to understand their behavior and that 2) such features cannot be systematically measured because they are idiosyncratic. Although president-centered researchers do not share these assumptions, they have also failed to recognize that 1) on differential psychology there is a broad consensus on what human personality is, and that 2) personalities tend to be stable over time.

These misconceptions have had profound consequences. Presidency-centered researchers claim that presidents cannot be used as units of analysis in quantitative studies (e.g., King 1993) and that analytically little is lost leaving the uniqueness of the heads of government aside. However, a vast corpus of psychological research contradicts the assumption that the specificity of presidents is irrelevant to understand their behavior. The literature on differential psychology has shown that all individuals have stable personality differences and that these differences strongly explain their behavior (Judge et al. 1999; Goldberg 1990; McCrae and Costa 1997; Costa and McCrae 1992). Since personality traits are stable, they can be systematically studied. Presidents can be treated as units of analysis in statistical analyses. Although president-centered scholars recognize the importance of the personal characteristics of the presidents, they have often discussed psychological attributes of the leaders arbitrarily, paying little attention to psychological research (e.g., Greenstein 2009).

I propose that to have a deeper understanding of the presidency, we need to start testing hypotheses that include presidency-centered and president-centered paradigms. To do so, it is necessary to reposition the individual differences of leaders as a central cause of political phenomena in quantitative research. And we cannot do that unless we absorb the knowledge produced from the discipline that has studied how humans differ from each for the last 130 years.

References

Barber, James D. 1972. The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Costa, Paul T. Jr., and Robert R. McCrae. 1992. “Normal personality assessment in clinical practice: The NEO Personality Inventory.” Psychological assessment 4(1): 5-13.

Dickinson, Matthew J. 2004. “Agendas, agencies and unilateral action: new insights on presidential power?” In Congress & the Presidency: A Journal of Capital Studies 31(1):99-109.

Goldberg, Lewis R. 1990. “An Alternative ‘Description of Personality’: The Big Five Factor Structure.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 59(6): 1216-1229.

Greenstein, Fred I. 2009. Inventing the job of president: leadership style from George Washington to Andrew Jackson. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Judge, Timothy A., Chad A. Higgins, Carl J. Thoresen, and Murray R. Barrick. 1999. “The Big Five Personality Traits, General Mental Ability, and Career Success across the Life Span.” Personnel Psychology 52: 621–652.

King, Gary. 1993. “The Methodology of Presidential Research,” in George Edwards, III, John H. Kessel, and Bert A. Rockman, eds., Researching the Presidency: Vital Questions, New Approaches. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh: 387–412.

Lewis, David E. 2008. The politics of presidential appointments: Political control and bureaucratic performance. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

McCrae Robert R., Paul T. Costa Jr. 1997. “Personality Trait Structure as a Human Universal.” American Psychologist 52(5): 509-516.

Moe, Terry M. 1993. “Presidents, Institutions, and Theory.” In George C. Edwards III, John H. Kessel and Bert A. Rockman, eds., Researching the Presidency: Vital Questions, New Approaches. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Neustadt, Richard. 1960. Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership. New York: Wiley and Sons.

Georgia – The 2018 presidential election: Political Parties and Candidates 

Presidential elections will be held in Georgia in October 2018. This will be the last election when the president will be directly elected and for 6 years. From 2020, the country is moving to a parliamentary system. the presidential election is a rehearsal for the 2020 parliamentary elections. Although the power of the president is significantly weakened as a result of constitutional reform, the president will still play an important role in the country’s politics. This was confirmed by President Margvelashvili’s activities. Margvelashvili with the right of the veto, public speeches, appointments, cooperation with opposition parties, civil sector and other mechanisms was able to influence the ruling Georgian Dream party, which provoked serious criticism from them. For the 2018 elections, the ruling majority will try to field a presidential candidate who will be loyal to the ruling party and will be able to fully manage the country’s move to the parliamentary system by 2024.

The presidential election is important for opposition political parties. The opposition, which has lost several elections since the change of government in 2012, will try to win the presidential election in 2018. If we look at the political landscape, the Georgian opposition is weak. Political parties can be divided mainly into two camps. The first are the pro-Western parties that support Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration. The second are Pro-Russian parties that openly support cooperation with Russia. Political parties are very fragmented on both sides, but these divisions also reflect the public attitudes.[1] There are also other small political groups. The vast majority of the population supports Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration. In general, though, trust in political parties is very low in Georgia.

Significant changes were made to political parties after the 2016 parliamentary elections. The ruling Georgian Dream coalition has been dissolved. There was a split in the United National Movement, which ruled the country until 2012. One part of this party supports former president, Mikheil Saakashvili, and the other created a new party, the “European Democrats”. In addition, one of the other pro-Western parties, the Free Democrats” also disintegrated when many leaders left the party, some of them moving to Georgian Dream, while others left politics altogether. In addition, another pro-Western party, the Republican Party, which is the oldest party, also disintegrated when the party leader and former parliamentary speaker, Davit Usupashvili, and his supporters left. They later formed a new party called the Development Movement.  The National Forum was also divided, with some leaders moving to Usupashvili’s movement and others joining Nino Burjanadze’s United Democratic Movement. After the 2016 parliamentary elections, Paata Burchuladze, another leader of the Movement for the People, which won 3rd place in the 2016 elections, also left the politics. Later a criminal case was started against Burchuladze in connection with financial violations regarding charitable activity. At the same time, new parties have been formed by the former members of the National Movement: there is New Georgia under the leadership of Giorgi Vashadze and Zurab Japaridze’s political union “Girchy”. The Labor Party of Georgia is also represented in the pro-Western wing under leadership of Shalva Natelashvili. The Labor Party often participates independently as a single party in the parliamentary elections. The party leader contested the presidential election twice and received  6,49% in 2008 and 2,88% in 2013. The Labor Party received 3.45% of local self-government elections in 2014. [2]

The most aggressive defender of cooperation with Russia is the United Democratic Movement led by former parliamentary speaker Nino Burjanadze. Burjanadze has twice carried out the duties of the President of Georgia. Once in 2003 during the Rose Revolution and again in 2008 when early presidential elections were held. He also participated in the 2013 presidential election and received 10.18% of the votes. In the same political space, there is also the Alliance of Patriots of Georgia. This party won 5,01% of the votes in the 2016 parliamentary elections just over the election threshold. The Alliance of Georgian Patriots is support by the ruling party in many aspects of domestic and foreign policy of the country.

The 2018 presidential election is interesting in many ways. First, how will the opposition will take part in the election? Theoretically, the opposition is in a competitive position. If we look at recent surveys, distrust to the government is increasing in society. According to the NDI survey, only 13% of respondents consider the government to be performing well. According to the survey, 27% will vote for the Georgian Dream, 10% for the UNM, and 3% for European Georgia. 24% said that they would not vote for any party, 15% did not know, and 13% refused to answer. [3]

The opposition has some well-known candidates. Labor Party leader, Shalva Natelashvili, first officially expressed his desire to participate in the elections in December 2017. According to the survey, Shalva Natelashvili’s rating is 39%. The leader of the Development Movement, Davit Usupashvili, has also not ruled out standing in the presidential election. According to the survey, his rating is 50%.[4]

Former president Mikheil Saakashvili, who currently does not have Georgian citizenship, called supporters from Amsterdam to prepare for the presidential campaign and the opposition parties have jointly selected one candidate for the primary election.[5]  It is also widely believed that Mikheil Saakashvili’s wife, Sandra Roelofs, who lives in Georgia, is running for the election from the National Movement, but her candidacy has been excluded from the party at this stage.[6]

The ruling party has not officially nominated a presidential candidate. However, some names have been widely discussed. Including former Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili. He was personally welcomed in 2016 by Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder of the Georgian Dream. The current Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili was also mentioned in the press, but he has not confirmed his participation in the election. Given the low rating of the government, Bidzina Ivanishvili himself may be the only successful candidate for Georgian Dream. For example, the Chairman of the Parliament said that Ivanishvili would be the best candidate for the election. [7] It should also be noted that after the amendment of the constitution there has been a lot of talk about a non-partisan president and it is possible that a well-known person in Georgian society may be nominated. The media have also covers talked about the nomination of a female candidate from the Georgian Dream, including the Minister of Justice, Tea Tsulukiani, and the independent MP Salome Zourabichvili.

Whether or not the current president, Giorgi Margvelashvili, decides to run again is also important. According to the survey, President Giorgi Margvelashvili is in top place with 65% trusting him. During his presidency, Margvelashvili has actively cooperated with the opposition parties on various issues and he may be jointly nominated by the opposition.

Apart from the political parties, there is discussion of other non-partisan candidates. In this regard, former Tbilisi mayoral candidate Aleko Elisashvili said that he might participate in the presidential election. Elisashvili received 17.48% in the local self-government elections in 2017 as an independent candidate, which was the best result after the ruling party. However, Elisashvili will not be able to win a presidential election without the support of a political team. It is true that he has promised to create a political movement, but it has not yet been established.

To sum up, the best way to defeat any candidate of the government is the unification of the opposition parties and the nomination of a joint candidate. This is not a simple task when the opposition is very fragmented. However, there is a 14-member council of leaders who say that they are discussing a common candidate. That said, the UNM thinks that the candidate must be chosen by primaries, and the European Democrats consider that parties should participate individually in the first round of the election and then all must unite around the common candidate in the second round. It is difficult to se how the opposition will be able to unite, and who will be able to defeat the ruling party, which is equipped with government resources and backed by a billionaire.

Notes

[1] Public attitudes in Georgia Results of December 2017 survey carried out for NDI by CRRC Georgia, https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI%20poll_December%202017_ISSUES_ENG_vf.pdf

[2] Results of the local self-government election 2017, Central Election Commission, https://results20171021.cec.gov.ge

[3] Public attitudes in Georgia Results of December 2017 survey carried out for NDI by CRRC Georgia, https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI%20poll_December_2017_POLITICAL_ENG_final.pdf

[4] Survey of Public Opinion in Georgia, Center for Insights in Survey Research, February 22 – March 8, 2017, http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/iri_poll_presentation_georgia_2017.03-general.pdf

[5] Mikheil Saakashvili – We should win presidential elections and dismantle Ivanishvili’s government, https://1tv.ge/news/mikheil-saakashvili-chven-unda-movigot-saprezidento-archevnebi-da-chamovshalot-ivanishvilis-mtavroba/

[6] By this time, I will rule out Sandra Roelof’s presidential candidate – Nika Melia, http://fortuna.ge/am-droistvis-sandra-rulovsis-saprezidento-kandidatobas-gamovrickhav-nika-melia/

[7] Kobakhidze at the presidential election: Bidzina Ivanishvili would be the best candidate for us, http://netgazeti.ge/news/259921/