Monthly Archives: June 2017

Zambia – Authoritarian slide continues under President Lungu as opposition MPs are suspended

The Speaker of the Zambian National Assembly, Patrick Matibini, has suspended 48 opposition legislators for 30 days as a punishment for unauthorised absence from the parliament. Their offence? To have been missing for President Edgar Lungu’s state of the nation address in March.

The suspension of the MPs does not come as a great surprise. Hardliners from the ruling Patriotic Front have been pushing for something along these lines for some time. The ruling party was quick to try and disassociate itself from the Speaker’s actions. But, as Zambian commentators have pointed out, the action fits into a broader web of measures designed to intimidate those who question the president’s authority.

The most significant was the arrest of opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema, who remains in jail on trumped up treason charges.

While the latest development in Zambia’s growing political crisis doesn’t come as a shock, it will disappoint those who were hoping that Lungu would be persuaded to moderate his position. Instead, it appears that the International Monetary Fund’s decision to go ahead with a bail out package despite the government’s democratic failings has emboldened the president to pursue an authoritarian strategy.

As a result, a swift resolution to the current political standoff seems unlikely.

Roots of the crisis

For some time Zambia was considered to be one of the more competitive democracies in Africa. But a period of backsliding under Lungu has raised concerns that the country’s inclusive political culture is under threat. The current impasse stems from the controversial elections in 2016 when Lungu won a narrow victory that remains contested by the opposition United Party for National Development.

Hichilema, the leader of the United Party for National Development, has stated that his party will not recognise the legitimacy of Lungu’s victory until its electoral petition against the results is heard in court. The initial petition was rejected by the Constitutional Court. But its decision was made in a way that had all the hallmarks of a whitewash. The UPND subsequently appealed to the High Court. Hichilema’s decision to make his party’s recognition of the president conditional on the petition being heard was designed both as an act of defiance, and as a means to prevent the government from simply sweeping electoral complaints under the carpet.

Until the court case is resolved, the opposition is committed to publicly challenging the president’s mandate by doing things like boycotting his addresses to parliament. In response, members of the ruling party have accused the United Party for National Development of disrespect and failing to recognise the government’s authority. It is this that appears to lie behind Hichilema’s arrest on treason charges.

Punishing parliamentarians

The suspension of United Party for National Development legislators needs to be understood against this increasingly authoritarian backdrop. It is one of a number of steps taken by those aligned to the government that are clearly designed to intimidate people who don’t fall into line. Other strategies include public condemnation of the government’s critics and proposals to break-up the influential Law Society of Zambia.

Efforts by the president’s spokesman to disassociate the regime from the suspensions have been unpersuasive. The official line of the ruling party is that the speaker of parliament is an independent figure and that he made the decision on the basis of the official rules. It’s true that the speaker and the parliamentary committee on privileges, absences and support services have the right to reprimand legislators for being absent without permission.

Nonetheless the argument is disingenuous for two reasons. The speaker is known to be close to the ruling party, a fact that prompted Hichilema to call for his resignation earlier this year. And the committee’s decisions are clearly driven by the Patriotic Front because it has more members from it than any other party.

The claim that the suspension was not government-led lacks credibility. This is clear from the fact that Patriotic Front MPS have been the most vocal in calling for action to be taken against boycotting United Party for National Development MPs.

IMF lifeline for Lungu

There are different perspectives on the crisis in Zambia. Some people invoke the country’ history of more open government to argue that Lungu will moderate his position once the government feels that the opposition has been placed on the back foot. Others identify a worrying authoritarian trajectory that began under the presidency of the late Michael Sata. They conclude that things are likely to get worse before they get better.

One of the factors that opposition leaders hoped might persuade President Lungu to release Hichilema and move discussions back from the police cell to the negotiating chamber was the government’s desperate need for an economic bail out. Following a period of bad luck and bad governance, Zambia faces a debt crisis. Without the assistance of international partners, the government is likely to go bankrupt. This would increase public dissatisfaction with the Patriotic Front and undermine Lungu’s hopes of securing a third term.

But the willingness of the IMF to move towards the completion of a $1.2 billion rescue package suggests that authoritarian backsliding is no barrier to international economic assistance. In turn, IMF support appears to have emboldened the government to continue its efforts to intimidate its opponents.

IMF officials, of course, will point out that they are not supposed to take political conditions into account and that their aim is to create a stronger economy that will benefit all Zambians. This may be true, but the reality is that by saving the Lungu government financially the IMF is also aiding it politically. Whatever its motivation, the agreement will be interpreted by many on the ground as tacit support for the Patriotic Front regime, strengthening Lungu’s increasingly authoritarian position.

Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of Birmingham

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

Jody C. Baumgartner – Public Opinion About The US Vice President: Still Flying Under The Radar

This is a guest post by Jody C. Baumgartner, Professor of Political Science at East Carolina University. It is based on his forthcoming article in Presidential Studies Quarterly

Since its inception the American vice presidency and vice presidents have been the subject of ridicule and scorn. Late night television talk show king Johnny Carson once quipped that “democracy means that anyone can grow up to be president, and anyone who doesn’t grow up can be vice president”. Many vice presidents took a dim view of the office as well. For example, Thomas Marshall, Woodrow Wilson’s vice president, told the joke of “two brothers. One ran away to sea; the other was elected vice president of the United States. And nothing was heard of either of them again.” This negative view of the office and its inhabitants was perhaps inevitable given that the institution was created largely as the by-product of the Electoral College system of selecting presidents. Moreover, throughout history many vice presidents seemed worthy of derision.

But scholars and observers of the U.S. presidency agree that this is no longer the case. The vice presidency has come of age, and vice presidents are important players in a president’s administration (see Baumgartner 2015; Goldstein 2016). While Vice President Pence may prove to be the exception, vice presidents are increasingly called on to perform any number of important ceremonial, political and policy-related tasks for their presidents. To call modern vice presidents “assistant presidents” may overstate their importance, it is nonetheless true that the institution a significant part of twenty-first century American government.

Does this reality match how the American public sees the office and its occupants? My own recent research, while not providing a definitive answer, suggests that in some respects it does not. In particular, analyses of both favorability and job approval ratings for the past four presidents and vice presidents suggest that citizens do not form their opinions of vice presidents independent of their opinions of presidents. In other words, “vice presidential favorability and job approval ratings are overwhelmingly influenced by opinion of the president” (Baumgartner 2017: 1).

ABOUT THE STUDY

Although presidential favorability and job approval has been regularly measured since at least the Truman administration, it has only been a couple of decades that the same can be said about ratings for vice presidents. This research take advantage of this, relying on both presidential and vice presidential favorability and job approval polling numbers for the George H.W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush and Obama administrations. I attempted to gather data for each question (favorability and job approval) for each president and  vice president, from both public (e.g., pollingreport.com) and subscription-based (Roper Center for Public Opinion Research) sources, for every month in office. Missing data (17.3% of the total number of months for each question, for president or vice president) points were interpolated using James Stimson’s “W-Calc,” which also allowed me to collapse the various questions used by different organizations to measure these concepts into a single measure (Stimson 1991).

The final dataset included favorability and job approval ratings for the following presidents and vice presidents:

Favorability (Months) Job Approval (Months)
Quayle/Bush n=38 n=38
Gore/Clinton n=94 n=44
Cheney/Bush n=95 n=148
Biden/Obama n=76 n=53

The first step in my analysis was to check bivariate relationships between both types of presidential and vice presidential ratings. At first blush, with the exception of Bush-Quayle, there appears to be a fair degree of congruence between presidential and vice presidential ratings. This can be seen in Figures 1-3, which simply charts rating scores by month, for each administration.

Next I constructed time-series models, with presidential ratings as the dependent variable, to test these relationships. Vice presidential ratings served as the primary independent variable in each, but I also included measures for term in office, whether the president’s party had a majority in either or both houses of Congress, public favorability toward the president’s party, and the percentage of negative news about the vice president. Results suggest that presidential favorability had a significant effect on vice presidential favorability in the cases of both Quayle (p < .001) and Gore (p < .01). Presidential job approval had a significant effect on vice presidential job approval for Gore (p < .01), Cheney (p < .001) and Biden (p < .05). When all four administrations were combined into a single model, presidential ratings for both favorability and job approval were significantly associated with vice presidential ratings (both random and fixed effects models, p < .001).

The understanding that the vice presidency has grown in importance over the recent past ought to be tempered by the reality that most people seem unaware of this change. Vice presidents still live in the shadow of their presidents. Of course it might be easy to dismiss these findings, asking why we should care about public opinion about the vice president. However it is important to remember that vice presidents are one of only two nationally elected public officials. The lack of independent public opinion associated with their tenures suggests that they may be less than fully accountable in a democratic sense.

SOURCES

Baumgartner, Jody C. 2015. The Vice Presidency: From the Shadow to the Spotlight. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Baumgartner, Jody C. 2017. “Under the Radar: Public Support for Vice Presidents.” Presidential Studies Quarterly (DOI: 10.1111/psq.12381).

Goldstein, Joel K. 2016. The White House Vice Presidency: The Path to Significance, Mondale to Biden. Lawrence KS: University Press of Kansas.

Stimson, James A. 1991. Public Opinion in America: Moods, Cycles, and Swings. Boulder, CO: Westview.

Jody C Baumgartner, Professor of Political Science
East Carolina University
Greenville NC 27834
e: jodyb@jodyb.net
p: 252-328-2843

Aníbal Pérez-Liñán and John Polga-Hecimovich – Getting Rid of the President

This is a guest post by Aníbal Pérez-Liñán of the Department of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh and John Polga-Hecimovich of the Political Science Department at the US Naval Academy at Annapolis. It is based on their paper in Democratization.

Are presidential impeachments modern functional equivalents of old-fashioned military coups? The impeachment of Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff in August 2016 led to an acrimonious debate on whether her removal from office constituted a “soft coup” against an elected leader. Similar concerns were voiced after the impeachment of Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo in 2012. As calls to impeach President Donald Trump multiply, this question appears to gain increasing relevance for US politics as well.For students of presidentialism, the idea of “functional equivalence” between military coups and legal ousters (impeachments, legislative declarations of presidential incapacity, or anticipated resignations of the executive) translates into very specific questions: Are there any historical factors able to explain military coups as well as impeachments? If so, why are some presidents removed following legal procedures while others are removed by force?

In a forthcoming paper in Democratization we develop a unified theory of presidential instability to explain why presidents are removed from office through military coups or through legal procedures.

We identify two sets of historical causes. First, some factors create conditions for presidential instability, irrespective of the mode of premature exit from office. Because they motivate a political opposition to conspire against the government, those factors explain why presidents are likely to fail, but not how they fail. Second, an alternative set of causes accounts for the specific institutional manifestations of presidential instability. Those factors map onto the relative capabilities of groups inclined to pursue a military coup or the legal removal of the president.

The distinction between general motivations to remove the president and the capabilities of specific opposition groups helps us identify the role of different causal explanations in the literature.

Among the common causes of legal removals and coups, we find:

  • Poor economic conditions. Recessions undermine the president and facilitate conspiracies. Studies on military coups argue that negative economic shocks increase the risk of military rebellions, while the literature on impeachments shows that weak economies undermined Latin American presidents in the 1990s.
  • Popular protests. Mass mobilization against the government signals that the president is weak and destabilizes any elected administration. Students of military intervention find that mass protests help elites coordinate in a coup. Students of impeachment emphasize that protests encourage reluctant legislators to act against the president.
  • Radicalization. Radical actors have intense and extreme preferences; they are reluctant to bargain and remain intransigent in defense of their policy goals. Radicalism is therefore a potential cause of military coups, but also an explanation for the role of social movements forcing the resignation of presidents in places like Bolivia and Ecuador.

Given the prior conditions for instability, several factors separate legal removals from coups:

  • The regional context. A long line of research has invoked international diffusion as an explanation for democratic instability – though not necessarily government instability. The regional context may strengthen the position of coup perpetrators or otherwise direct elites towards legal strategies against the president.
  • Legislative support for the president. Two causal mechanisms are discussed in the literature: Linz’s argument that presidentialism itself is a source of instability and the argument that a legislative majority “shields” the executive against impeachment.
  • Elite support for democracy. A strong normative preference for democracy among elites forecloses the possibility of a military coup and leaves legal removal as the only acceptable strategy for the opposition. The government’s normative preferences also matter: a president dismissive of democratic rules may be unwilling to recognize the legitimacy of an impeachment procedure, driving opponents to consider the option of a coup.

To test those expectations, we use discrete-time event history models with selection.  Our sample covers all democratic regimes in nineteen Latin American countries between 1945 and 2010 (N = 729). The dependent variable measures yearly outcomes for each president:  survival, exit via military coup, or exit via legal removal. Our sample includes 21 coups and 15 legal removals. The selection model estimates the risk of president being removed from office (in any way) in the selection stage, and the risk of being removed via coup (as opposed to a legal procedure) in the outcome stage.

The statistical models allow us to estimate the risk of coups and impeachments, plotted in Figures 1 and 2.

Figure 1 underscores the role of common motivations behind coups (in the bottom row) and impeachments (in the top row), as economic recession, demonstrations, and radicalization consistently expand the risk of both outcomes.

Figure 1: Common Causes of Legal Removals and Coups (Predicted Risk)

Figure 2, on the other hand, illustrates the differential impact of variables. The first column illustrates how a large number of coups in neighboring countries expands the risk of military intervention but reduces the probability of legal removal in the observed country.  The second column shows that the risk of military overthrow remains independent from the composition of congress, but impeachment is less likely when the executive controls the legislature.  The third column shows that a military coup is unlikely when political actors are more committed to democracy. By contrast, the risk of legal removal expands as groups operating within the constitution become empowered by the opposition’s reluctance to engage in military conspiracies.

Figure 2: Causes Separating Legal Removals and Coups (Predicted Risk)

Our findings underscore that common causes of presidential instability are not necessarily causes of democratic breakdown, yet crises of government may easily escalate into crises of the democratic regime when legal venues for the removal of the president are blocked.

These findings are increasingly relevant today.

In a global context in which presidents and their adversaries – in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Turkey, and even the U.S. – have displayed growing levels of radicalism, our findings raise concerns. Radical leaders engender polarization, encouraging their opponents to overthrow the government by any means possible. Combined with economic stagnation or social protest, radicalization is likely to trigger presidential instability.

Yet other factors ultimately tip a crisis towards a non-democratic resolution. A regional environment hostile to democracy and a lack of democratic commitment from domestic elites decrease the probability of a legal impeachment and increase the likelihood of a coup.

International policymakers would be wise to consider these findings: long-term efforts to build regional organizations that discourage military intervention and steady support for democratic leaders will prevent future presidential crises from escalating into full crises of democracy.

Of mechanics and engineering: institutional continuities and partisan realignment in Macron’s France

How time flies! Since the last blog entry, Emmanuel Macron has been elected President and the pro-Juppé former mayor of Le Havre, Edouard Philippe, named Prime Minister at the head of a broad-based government comprising heavyweights from the PS ( Jean- Yves Le Drian, Gérard Collomb), middleweights from LR (Gerard Darmintin and Bruno le Maire) and various members of ‘civil society’ with impeccable professional credentials, but who must be considered as lightweights in terms of their former political experience. On May 7, there was a mild controversy over whether Macron had been well-elected or not. His victory had been announced in advance (no opinion poll gave him less than 58% on the run-off), but it was more comfortable than initially imagined (in the proportion of two-thirds/one-third). The metropolises and sizeable cities overwhelmingly voted for Macron; 85% in Lyon, 83% in Marseilles, almost 90% in Paris, 78% in Lille (against just over 50% for the department of the Nord as a whole). The small towns and countryside voted for Marine Le Pen – in places, at least. The geographical fracture widely commented on the first round was repeated, though only 2 departments in mainland France gave Marine Le Pen a majority. Still, with over 10 million electors, Marine obtained the best score ever for the FN – and more than doubled the total number of votes by comparison to her father in 2002. Emmanuel Macron polled over 20,000,000, well ahead of Sarkozy in 2007 and Hollande in 2012. Only around 40% of Macron electors declared in post-election surveys that their vote was motivated by explicit support for the new President, and optimism for the programme or the candidate rather than a rejection of the Le Pen alternative. The record abstention rate (51.3%) on the first round of the parliamentary elections on June 11th confirmed the sense of unease.

The main argument in this blog entry moves on from attempts to define the meaning of Macron to consider one of the paradoxes thrown up by the 2017 contest. One of the core themes in post-electoral analyses has highlighted the crisis of party politics, with the governing parties of the Fifth Republics – Gaullist and Socialists – relegated to the second division, or at least not winning through to the second round. At the same time as the old world of left-right partisan politics has appeared to be crumbling at the edges, two key mechanisms of presidential power have reaffirmed their pertinence: the confirmation election and the presidential party.

The parliamentary elections are chiefly interesting in that they provide mechanisms of institutional continuity in the midst of great political uncertainty and change. The first of these mechanisms is the confirming election (election de confirmation). Since the 2000 constitutional reform and the inversion of the electoral calendar, there has been a powerful institutional incentive to provide the victorious President with the ‘means to govern’, by way of a large parliamentary majority. Of course, the presidential call for the ‘means of to govern’ precedes 2002; most notably, in 1981, when victorious Socialist President Mitterrand called on the people to ‘give me the means to govern’ and implement the 110 propositions, his presidential programme. But the relationship has become more mechanical since the 2000 reform changed the order of the electoral contests to ensure that the ‘decisive’ presidential election came before the ‘confirmatory’ parliamentary contest. Certainly, the figures have produced rather different variations of the presidential bonus since 2002, but on each occasion, a party with a plurality of votes on the first round achieved an absolute majority of seats after the second: the UMP in support of President Chirac in 2002, the UMP for Sarkozy in 2007 and the PS for Hollande in 2012. The first round of the 2017 parliamentary election spectacularly confirmed the trend: with 32.5% of first round votes, LREM is well on its way to obtaining the overall parliamentary majority called for by President Macron (estimates range from 390 to 430 seats after the second round). The flip side is that this Herculean majority, elected to support a Jupiterean President, was based on a record low turnout (48.7) for a parliament election. The confirming election is implicitly based on a lesser popular mandate (hence legitimacy) than the decisive presidential contest, though this distinction is nowhere formally recognised.

The second mechanic is the return of the presidential party, or the majority elected primarily to support an incumbent President. True, the presidential party is a contested concept, most notably on the left of French politics, where many Socialists never really bought into Mitterrand’s instrumental marriage of the incentive structure of the presidential institutions and the revival of party fortunes. And certainly, no presidential party was ever the same. De Gaulle’s UNR had facets of a personal rally to a leader vested with a particular historic legitimacy, but it collapsed once the General had gone. Valery Giscard d’Estaing’s attempts to build the Independent Republicans/Republican Party into the cornerstone of his Union for French Democracy (UDF) never really succeeded. In an earlier version of the irreconcilable forces on the French centre and right, the UDF managed to balance the Gaullist RPR for a while, but failed to provide the bedrock of parliamentary and political support required to underpin the Barre government (1976-81). Giscard d’Estaing’s failure to build a cohesive presidential majority undermined the cohesion of the 1974-81 mandate. And contrast the record of Mitterrand’s two terms. The election of a PS majority to back the President one of the core features of the 1981 elections. Though it was never easy with the Socialists, and though divisions within the party were also apparent in 1981-83 (especially over the aftermath of the u-turn of 1983), the political resource represented by an overall majority ensured that Mitterrand got his way – even in terms of a highly contested reform of the electoral system for the 1986 parliamentary election. Contrast this situation with that post-1988: victoriously re-elected President, Mitterrand failed fully to capitalize in the ensuing parliamentary elections. The period of minority Socialist government under Rocard relied heavily on the use of article 49, 3 to undertake a governmental programme and, quite simply – survive and govern without a real majority. The UMP (2002-2012) reverted to form: the party of the ‘right and the centre’ was largely ignored by the successive Presidents (Chirac, Sarkozy) who saw its main function as being to organize the President’s supporters in parliament.

Macron’s coronation is not complete without the presidential majority that he has called for – and that he looks supremely well placed to deliver after the second round of voting on June 18th. The confirmatory election will thus have contributed to the election of a presidential majority under the colours of LREM, to support President Macron. The third dimension takes the form of an unwritten rule, rather than a proper mechanism; the size of the presidential majority might shape the behavior of the pro-presidential majorities when elected. Recent evidence from the Hollande period illustrated the dangers of lacking a genuine majority; from the outset, the frondeurs made the President’s life a misery and undermined the effectiveness of his governments. One would not wish such a fate for Emmanuel Macron. On the other hand, a large majority, returning deputies will no parliamentary experience, will produce its own form of tension. The danger for Macron might lie in the return of an overwhelming majority. The newly elected President will be well advised to keep the MODEM on board and prolong the coalition with the Macron-compatible elements of the PS and LR whatever the final outcome on June 18th 2017.

Haiti – Jovenel Moise: A novel politician for a fluid political context

On February 7 Jovenel Moise was sworn in as the 47th president of Haiti. It was the beginning of 2015 when the word came out that Michel Joseph Martelly, then president of Haiti, had chosen Jovenel Moise as the candidate of his PHTK party in the presidential election that was scheduled to take place the same year. At least two things stood out with regard to this choice. First, Martelly left out other potential candidates from his own political organization and decided without consultation to enthrone Moise. The second element was the newness of the  chosen candidate. He had never participated in politics before.

Prior to his presidential candidacy, Jovenel Moise was an entrepreneur in the agroindustrial sector. He was known for his efforts to secure financial aid for his businesses and not for his political ambitions. But, in a political context where parties are weak and the president holds all the levers of power, Martelly was able to impose his protégé. Even though two elections were necessary to secure the triumph of Moise, the ex-president finally won his gamble. The question is now how will the new president govern, how will his political inexperience factor in with the structural problems he inherited and, how will he position himself in relation to his allies who are preparing the return of Michel Martelly.

Even though Jovenel Moise easily won the election in the first round, there are structural weaknesses to his presidency. First, only 15% of the electorate participated in the elections. Because the opposition was very weak, it has been was enable to use the results against the president. Despite efforts to mobilize against what they dubbed as a rigged elections, they were unable to convince the population that it was worth continuing with the protests in the street. But, any connoisseur of the Haitian situation would still point to the fact that this lack of support could be used against the president in the future.

The PHTK was founded by then president Michel Martelly. Many of the party’s legislators who now control both chambers of the parliament, through alliances with other parties, are considered to be loyal partners of Martelly. During his first months in office, Moise seems to have been able to reign in these politicians. He successfully resisted pressure from his political allies and appointed a prime minister, who parliament actually confirmed, who had no relationships with the political class. In order to boost his political capital, he has embarked in a national tour, which, according to his communication team, will present solutions suitable to each locality.

Meanwhile, many crises are looming and they have the potential to disrupt the new president. Beside persistent structural economic problems, the social situation has also been tense in the  first 5 months of the presidency. Members of several union organizations have mobilized, demanding a rise in their wage. So far, politicians have been kept out of the  protest movement. But, knowing the structural weaknesses of the president and political system in Haiti, it could only be a matter of time before things get ugly.

New publications

Cristina Bucur, ‘Cabinet Ministers under Competing Pressures: Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Political Parties in Semi-Presidential Systems,” Comparative European Politics, 2017, 15(2): 180-203.

Nic Cheeseman, ‘Patrons, Parties, Political Linkage, and the Birth of Competitive-Authoritarianism in Africa’, African Studies Review, Volume 59, Number 3, December 2016, pp. 181-200.

Aníbal Pérez-Liñán and John Polga-Hecimovich, ‘Explaining military coups and impeachments in Latin America’, Democratization, Volume 24, Issue 5, 2017, pp. 839-858.

Eduardo Alemán and Marisa Kellam, ‘The nationalization of presidential elections in the Americas’, Electoral Studies, Volume 47, June 2017, pp. 125-135.

Łukasz Jakubiak, ‘The systems of government of Senegal and Ivory Coast. Comparative analysis’, Politeja – Pismo Wydzialu Studiow Miedzynarodowych i Politycznych Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego, 2016, no. 42, pp. 247-261.

Piyadasa Edirisuriya, ‘The Rise and Grand Fall of Sri Lanka’s Mahinda Rajapaksa: The End of an Era?’, Asian Survey, Vol. 57 No. 2, March/April 2017, pp. 211-228.

Raymond Kuhn, ‘The mediatization of presidential leadership in France: The contrasting cases of Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande’, French Politics, April 2017, Volume 15, Issue 1, pp 57–74.

Matthew Laing and Brendan McCaffrie, ‘The Impossible Leadership Situation? Analyzing Success for Disjunctive Presidents’, Presidential Studies Quarterly, 2017, 47: 255-276.

Jonathan Lewallen, ‘The Issue Politics of Presidential Veto Threats’, Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 2, June 2017, 277-292.

Erdem Aytaç and Ali Çarkoğlu, A. ‘Presidents Shaping Public Opinion in Parliamentary Democracies: A Survey Experiment in Turkey’, Political Behavior (2017). doi:10.1007/s11109-017-9404-x.

Behar Selimi, ‘The President’s Role on National Security Policies – the Case of Kosovo’, International Journal of Social Science Studies, vol. 5, no. 4, URL: https://doi.org/10.11114/ijsss.v5i4.2261

Thiago Silva and Guy D. Whitten, ‘Clarity of Responsibility and Vote Choice’, in Kai Arzheimer, Jocelyn Evans, Michael S. Lewis-Beck (eds.), The SAGE Handbook of Electoral Behaviour, London, Sage, 2017, pp. 80-91.

Julia Macdonald, Jacquelyn Schneider, ‘Presidential Risk Orientation and Force Employment Decisions’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 61, Issue 3, 2017, pp. 511-536.

Steven J. Brams and D. Marc Kilgour, ‘Paths to victory in presidential elections: the setup power of noncompetitive states’, Public Choice, 2017, 170(1): 99-113.

Gi-Wook Shin, Rennie J. Moon, ‘South Korea in 2016: Political Leadership in Crisis’, Asian Survey, Vol. 57 No. 1, January/February 2017, pp. 103-110.

Dennis V. Hickey, Emerson M. S. Niou, ‘Taiwan in 2016: A New Era?’, Asian Survey, Vol. 57 No. 1, January/February 2017, pp. 111-118.

Carolina G. Hernandez, ‘The Philippines in 2016: The Year That Shook the World’, Asian Survey, Vol. 57 No. 1, January/February 2017, pp. 135-141.

Marcus Mietzner, ‘Indonesia in 2016: Jokowi’s Presidency between Elite Consolidation and Extra-Parliamentary Opposition’, Asian Survey, Vol. 57 No. 1, January/February 2017, pp. 165-172.

Aries A. Arugay, ‘The Philippines in 2016:The Electoral Earthquake and its Aftershocks’, Southeast Asian Affairs, Volume 2017, pp. 277-296.

Dennis Shoesmith, ‘Timor-Leste in 2016: Redefining Democracy’, Southeast Asian Affairs, Volume 2017, pp. 387-404.

Cyprus – Presidency, Parliament and Law Activism

The Zurich-London agreements that established the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) in 1960 and the Constitution of the RoC contain provisions for the establishment of a presidential regime with a Greek Cypriot president elected by Greek Cypriots and a Turkish Cypriot vice-president elected by Turkish Cypriots. The executive power was vested in the Greek Cypriot president and the Turkish Cypriot vice-president, both enjoying veto power in three particular policy areas: external relations, security, and defense. Veto was designed to create a balance between the two communities and to ensure that no community would enforce its position on the other. However, as early as in 1961 the balance was brought into question and led to repeated constitutional blockages. Each party used its right of veto to block the propositions of the other party.

Following numerous deadlocks and after increased intercommunal tension, in 1964 the Turkish Cypriots left their posts in the governing and state institutions. In order to keep the newborn Republic running, the House of Representatives – consisting only of Greek Cypriot members – enacted legislation (the law of necessity) that allowed the state and the government to continue their operation. In this way the President assumed all the powers of the vice president and has had very few checks on his authority ever since.

Beyond the full right to veto legislation on a range of issues, the Greek Cypriot president of the RoC has the right to return a bill back to the House for reconsideration and/or the right to refer legislation to the Supreme Constitutional Court. Given the peculiar political conditions of the RoC with the political problem still unresolved, all presidents have been very cautious in using the right of veto. In actual fact, veto power was never exercised by any president. This was mainly due to political reasons, in order to fence off criticism that they utilised powers designed and intended for other purposes and so that they could not be accused of abusing the powers vested in a bicommunal state.

Presidents have confined themselves to the other two tools provided by the Constitution, most often on occasions when the legislature interferes with executive responsibilities and when it inflicts added cost on the state budget. It is worth noting that the Supreme Court usually vindicates the President’s view of referred bills. Both of these tools have also been used with cautious, not least because the parliament rarely questioned the executive’s authority.

In view of recent developments in the Cypriot political system whereby the House of Representatives and the political parties have utilised certain powers that they have never used in the past, openly challenging the president’s authority could have significant consequences on the ability of the government to pass legislation. In response, the Presidents have also used their arsenal of powers and have resorted to the two tools provided by the Constitution.

In the last few months the President of RoC, N. Anastasiades, has returned to the House of Representatives or referred to the Supreme Court a number of legislative bills. For example, in May 2016 a total of 16 bills on a variety of issues that were passed by the House just a few days before its self-dissolution before the parliamentary elections were either referred to the Supreme Court or returned to the House; an indication of how politics is increasingly mediated by law activism.

Most recently, a bill regarding the commemoration of union with Greece (enosis) was also referred to the Supreme Court. This particular bill was earlier voted by the opposition parties except the left-wing AKEL (the governing right –wing DISY abstained) and provoked the immediate and intense reaction of the Turkish Cypriot leader leading to a two-month pause in the negotiations for the solution of the Cyprus problem. Reactions were also intense in the RoC by AKEL and various pro-solution activists. In trying to find a solution, the governing DISY proposed legislation that gave the Education minister the power to decide which historical or other events would be commemorated in public schools. The bill was voted by the AKEL MPs and was thus passed.

However, the president referred the bill to the Supreme Court. The government said that he did so on the advice of the attorney-general who said that it probably clashed with the provision on the separation of powers in the constitution. AKEL said the president’s decision to refer the law to the Supreme Court raised reasonable questions: for example, why did he not consult with his own party before the latter submitted the bill, pointing to a highly politicized decision in view of the forthcoming presidential elections in February 2018.

The decision to refer this particular bill to the Supreme Court highlights three important points which necessitate further analysis. First, issues of history continue to inform today’s political situation and thus affect the course of the negotiations re the Cyprus problem among others. Second, blocking the passage of governing bills by parliament could have long-term effects and ultimately change the balance of power between the executive and the legislature. Third, there is a current trend in Cypriot politics to increasingly involve the courts and the Attorney General in political decision-making processes, which begs questions about the nature and scope of politics.

Guinea-Bissau – Sanctions loom as president refuses to appoint new prime minister

Despite growing international pressure, president Vaz continues to refuse to appoint a new prime minister. The president has recently announced he will not dismiss sitting prime minister Embalo and has declared a “war against his enemies”. The United Nations Security Council is now threatening to take “necessary measures” if the situation deteriorates.

In a statement issued on 11 May, the members of the Security Council “expressed their deep concern over the protracted political and institutional crisis in Guinea-Bissau as a result of the inability of political stakeholders to reach a lasting and consensual solution, leading to the current gridlock”. The Security Council urged the president to appoint a prime minister whose selection respects the provisions of the Conakry Agreement.

According to the 2016 Conakry agreement, Vaz was required to appoint a new prime minister acceptable to all the various factions who would then name a new national unity government. Under the agreement, the new prime minister was to remain in office until the 2018 legislative elections. However, the president appointed Embalo without the approval of the PAIGC, the main party of the country which rejected the nomination and refused to participate in the government.

The root cause of the political crisis is the ongoing power struggle between president Vaz and former prime minister and party leader Pereira within the PAIGC. It transformed into an institutional crisis after Vaz fired prime minister Pereira in 2015. Since then, the country has had four prime ministers who were either supported by the president’s faction or by the one of Pereira. Despite international efforts, including the Conakry Agreement, the crisis is far from over.

The Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has set 25 May 2017 as a deadline for the president to appoint a new prime minister and threatened to impose sanctions against “those responsible for blocking the Conakry Accord”. ECOWAS did not give further details who might be targeted and what specific sanctions would be applied. The important question now is whether sanctions will force both men to the negotiating table.

On June 1st seven political parties, including the PAIGC signed a petition, urging ECOWAS to take “clear measures with immediate effect” to end the political crisis in the country. Guinea-Bissau’s second-largest party, the PRS has refused to sign the petition. Meanwhile, several mass demonstrations against the president have taken place in the capital Bissau. The protestors hold Vaz responsible for the ongoing crisis and demand his departure.

Vaz came to power in 2014 after winning a national election. Legislative and presidential elections are scheduled for 2018 and 2019, respectively.

Ukraine – Ex-president Viktor Yanukovych on Trial

On May 4, Ukraine began a high treason trial of its former president Viktor Yanukovych. According to the Ukrainian state prosecutor’s website, Yanukovych is accused of committing “treason by helping the Russian Federation and its representatives to violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.”

The so-called “trial of the century” has already held two sessions. The prosecution’s main evidence are copies of letters written by Yanukovych asking Russian President Vladimir Putin to send troops to Ukraine. In addition, the prosecutor says that it has witness testimonies, documents, and photo materials to support the case. The punishment for treason in Ukraine carries a sentence of 10 to 15 years.

However, in addition to the treason trial, Yanukovuch is also under criminal investigation in three other cases. First, the former president is accused of ordering the use of disproportionate force against the demonstrators during the so-called Europmaidan protests between November 2013 and February 2014. Second, Yunukovych is accused of having formed criminal groups. And finally, the Mezhyhirya case of illegal acquisition of property. The Mezhyhirya residence of the former president became famous when it was confiscated in 2014 after he fled the country. Later authorities discovered fleet of luxury cars and other luxury items that have stored in the the now infamous estate.

Currently leaving in exile in Russia, the president is being tried in absentia. To enable this, Ukrainian legislature had to pass a number of amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code. This, however, generated a number of controversies. Some argued that the bill is a case of selective justice and is politically motivated, drafted with a sole purpose of putting the former president on trial. Furthermore, the defence has argued that there is no legal basis for the treason trial as Yanukovych has not been presented with an official notification of the charges against him. Most importantly, however, the bill has been criticised for the potential impact it may have on regular citizens. Many argue that the amendment can lead to the dangerous abuse of power allowing the possibility of convicting a person in absentia, without them even knowing about being on trial.

In the last year alone, a number of other countries put their presidents on trail. The most high profile recent case is the impeachment and the corruption trial of the president of South Korea Park Geun-hye. Burkina Faso has also recently started a trial of its former president Blaise Compaore. He is also tried in absentia and is accused of using force against unarmed protesters in 2014, during the uprising that took him out of power. The presidents of Brazil and Argentina are also currently on trial for corruption. Thus, a quick look around the world shows that Ukraine is not the only country to have one of its former presidents on trial. However, it is one of the few countries to have a president tried for treason, in addition to corruption and excessive use of force.

The trial is an important test for the Ukrainian judiciary. There are serious grounds for bringing charges against the former president. However, it is crucial for the trial to be conducted in a fair and independent manner in order not to only avoid the verdict being challenged in an international court but also continue to further build and strengthen the judicial system in Ukraine.

Tanzania – President Magufuli versus the investors

In a single day last week, shares in the Tanzania-focused gold miner Acacia mining plummeted, falling 30 percent.

This collapse came after a special presidential probe committee issued a report alleging that containers of mineral concentrates currently being held at the Dar es Salaam port contain ten times more gold than previously declared by Acacia. The committee report also identifies significant amounts of silver, cooper, sulphur and other “strategic minerals”.

It recommends that the Tanzania government reinforce its ban on mineral concentrate exports—first imposed last March—until the right royalties are paid to the State. It further stipulates that the government should ensure the construction of smelters to process the mineral sands and allow the identification of all minerals present in the concentrates.

Following the report’s release, President Magufuli quickly responded by extending a ban on the export of mineral concentrates. He also sacked his Minister of Energy and Minerals.

The committee’s recommendations, as well as Magufuli’s swift response, are consistent with the President’s stated commitment to a form of resource nationalism, which through increased revenue generation, is meant to help finance ambitious infrastructure projects and industrial expansion.

The report was applauded by domestic observers and politicians of all political stripes. There was strong enthusiasm for disciplining investors who have long been accused of exploiting Tanzania’s resources, either through illicit mineral smuggling or as a result of the unfair contracts and legal framework adopted under World Bank supervision in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Indeed, the latest actions taken by the Magufuli administration are testament to the distance travelled since former President Mkapa (1995-2005) asserted, “I get complaints that we are being too generous in legislating for this foreign direct investment in the mining sector, but we provide very serious security.”

There is still ample room to question, though, whether the Magufuli administration will be able to proceed with its current agenda. For one, Acacia vehemently contests the committee report’s findings regarding the amount of minerals in the containers due for export. Domestically, some politicians, including the CCM stalwart and former Attorney General Andrew Chenge, question whether plans to construct a smelter are financially viable. The opposition Chief Whip and current President of the Tanzania Law Society has also argued that, while the government is right to highlight the iniquitous nature of contracts with companies including Acacia, there needs to be a more fundamental reform of the legal and fiscal regime governing the mining sector before government can pursue the policies currently being proposed. He advised that, “[I]f we don’t abandon [unfair laws and contracts] first”, then international investors “are going to come back and we will pay big time.”

Acacia has already signalled it plans to suspend production at its two mines in Tanzania with many observers projecting a long, drawn-out legal battle in international courts. Tanzania’s Prime Minister, meanwhile, has recently sought to quell mining investors’ fears, promising “no one will be oppressed as your rights will be protected.” While this may not be a particularly reassuring statement in light of the actions already taken by government, it nevertheless suggests the Magufuli administration may be looking to tread more carefully going forward. What is more, the government is still awaiting a report from a second presidential probe committee. Whereas the first committee, the one that has already reported, was made up of geologists and scientists, the second is composed of economists and lawyers. It is tasked with assessing the financial and legal constraints faced by government and is expected to make policy recommendations accordingly.

Magufuli has shown his ambition to renegotiate Tanzania’s relations with foreign investors and, in so doing, to free the country from an exploitative relationship. For that, he is rightly applauded. But as has proved the case with many of the President’s actions to date, his latest efforts to gain the upper hand over mining investors demonstrate more brash self-assertion than strategic nous.

As some of his critics suggest, there is a need for a long game, one that involves difficult negotiations and fundamental legal reforms. Otherwise, the fire driving a resurgent resource nationalism could fizzle fast.