Monthly Archives: June 2017

Vanuatu – nation mourns President Baldwin Lonsdale

The Pacific Island nation of Vanuatu is in mourning following the sudden death of President Baldwin Lonsdale from a suspected heart attack. Baldwin, a clergyman and the highest-ranking chief in Vanuatu’s Banks group of islands, was one of the most widely respected political figures in the country. His state funeral was attended by heads of state from Fiji, New Zealand and Australia. The Vanuatu Daily Post reported that while it was difficult to accurately estimate the number of people who lined the roughly 6-kilometre long route, there has been no similar public gathering in living memory.

Baldwin took over the largely ceremonial role in September 2014 but it was his handling of the 2015 corruption scandal (discussed previously on this blog) that elevated his standing in the eyes of the nation. The unprecedented case saw 15 MPs tried and convicted of bribery. But, when the convictions were handed down, President Lonsdale was out of the country. In his absence, the Speaker of the House – one of those convicted – was Acting Head of State, and used his powers to pardon himself and his co-defendants.

Returning to Vanuatu, a visibly shaken Lonsdale addressed the nation expressing “shame and sorrow” at what had occurred, stated that “no-one is above the law”, and promised to “clean the dirt from my backyard.” He subsequently revoked the pardons – a move that was then appealed, and upheld – and the MPs went to prison. He also dissolved Parliament and called a snap election. The case was a landmark event for Vanuatu. The convictions sent a clear message to political actors that the types of money politics that had been common in the post-independence era were no longer acceptable.

The election of the new President of the Republic of Vanuatu will be held on July 3, 2017. As outlined previously on the blog, the Electoral College that will vote a new President is made up of the 52 Members of Parliament, the Presidents of the Local Government Councils of the six provinces and mayors of the three municipalities of the country.

Panama – Ex-President Ricardo Martinelli Wanted in Panama on Charges of Spying

On Monday, as the current president of Panama, Juan Carlos Varela, was meeting with President Donald Trump in the White House, the former president of Panama, Ricardo Martinelli was fighting his extradition back to Panama in a court in Miami. Martinelli, who was president of Panama from 2009 until 2014, is accused of diverting and embezzling public funds in order to pay for a highly complex and sophisticated wire-tapping arrangement that allowed him to listen in on political opponents. He was arrested last week in Florida, where he has lived as a political refugee since the end of his presidency, claiming that President Juan Carlos Varela has pursued this corruption and spying case against him for political reasons.

Martinelli is accused of diverting approximately US$13.4 million that was set aside for targeted poverty relief, and using this money to instead illegally gain access to the phone calls and emails of 150 major political opponents. Martinilli’s defence in the face of extradition back to Panama is largely predicated on the argument that during his term in office, Martinelli fired the current president, Juan Carlos Varela, as his foreign minister, because it allegedly emerged that Varela was receiving illegal payments from foreign consulates. Varela’s actions, so Martinelli argues, are a type of payback for this.

Although not from the same party (Varela is from the Partido Panameñista and Martenelli is from Cambio Democrático), Varela and Martenelli established a coalition after the 2009 election, which saw Varela assume office as Martenelli’s vice-president and foreign minister. As relations became more acrimonious between the two men, Varela ran for, and won, the presidency in 2014, against the candidate of Cambio Democrático, José Domingo Arias. Shortly after he came to power, Varela launched an inquiry into the alleged illegal spying of former-president Martinelli, who then fled to the US.

Of course, this is not the first time that former president Martinelli, or former Panamanian presidents for that matter, have been embroiled in some form of corruption scandal. I have discussed the fallout from the Lavo Jato corruption scandal before on this blog, which was partly responsible for forcing Dilma Rousseff, the former president of Brazil, out of office last year. This scandal centers upon allegations of kickbacks from the Brazilian construction giant, Odebrecht, to former worker party president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2011), but as the scandal has rumbled on, it has also dragged other Latin American countries into its orbit.

One of these is Panama. Prosecutors have been seeking to detain the sons of Ricardo Martinelli, Ricardo Alberto and Luis Enrique Martinelli, both of whom are accused of depositing part of a US$22 million bribe that Odebrecht paid in return for lucrative state contracts in Panama. In fact, current Panamanian president, Juan Carlos Varela, has been accused by a former advisor of receiving political donations from Odebrecht.

The US and Panama do have an extradition treaty (although rather an old one) and the US judge will decide Ricardo Martinelli’s fate next week.

Karrin Vasby Anderson – The Female Presidentiality Paradox

This is a guest post by Karrin Vasby Anderson, Professor of Communication Studies at Colorado State University

When Donald Trump beat Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election, he presided over what some have termed the biggest political upset in U.S. history. With the advantage of hindsight, pundits and experts proffered myriad reasons for Clinton’s failure: economic insecurity, white backlash against the first black president, a generalized distrust in government, the dubious, eleventh-hour resurrection of the Clinton email story by the director of the FBI, and, of course, alleged failures of the Clinton campaign. Those who regarded the outcome as a strategic (rather than systemic) failure were quick to point out Clinton’s ostensible liabilities: a long, public career peppered by real and manufactured scandals, her contentious relationship with the press, her underwhelming presence on the stump, and—perhaps most damaging—her status as the quintessential political insider in a year of change.

Cognizant of the electoral mood in September of 2015, Clinton attempted to convince John Dickerson, host of the CBS News program Face the Nation, that her gender made her the outsider, saying, “I cannot imagine anyone being more of an outsider than the first woman president.” Dickerson demurred, and his response is emblematic of a broader reluctance to acknowledge the ways in which women presidential candidates are unique—and uniquely challenged—in presidential campaign culture. Shortly after Clinton’s defeat, lists of Democratic presidential prospects for 2020 named women such as Elizabeth Warren, Kirsten Gillibrand, and Kamala Harris as early favorites, indicating the widespread belief that gender doesn’t really hamper anyone’s bid for the U.S. presidency.

As a citizen and voter, I’d like to believe that, but as a scholar, I’ve come to another conclusion—not that Clinton was the wrong woman for the presidency in 2016, but that every woman is the wrong woman, and will be until cultural understanding of the presidency changes. Clinton was constrained by what I call the “female presidentiality paradox,” in which any electable woman presidential candidate is simultaneously unelectable in a “change” campaign. The effect is intensified when the change endorsed by electors is a reactionary, rather than a progressive, change. Consequently, although scholars and strategists seek to uncover the rhetorical formula which finally will propel a woman into the office of the U.S. presidency, the more urgent work is targeting the beliefs and behaviors of citizens rather than the strategies of candidates.

Clinton’s loss to Trump was a startling political defeat, but it wasn’t her first. After being the first woman to be the frontrunner for a major-party nomination in 2008, Clinton lost the Democratic presidential nomination to relative political newcomer Barack Obama. She responded by serving as his Secretary of State, a move that bolstered her foreign policy credentials and positioned her for a second presidential run in 2016. Although Clinton corrected many of the shortcomings of her 2008 primary campaign, raised a formidable campaign war chest, secured the support of the Democratic party elite, and was hailed by President Obama as the most qualified candidate ever to run for the office, she nearly came up short again, this time to Bernie Sanders—a dynamic but relatively ineffectual U.S. Senator who was not even a member of the Democratic party. Her victory in the primaries was short-lived, however, vanquished by a candidate who claimed the role of outsider despite his normative race, gender, sexual orientation, and personal wealth. In all three cases, Clinton was positioned as the elite political insider running against agents of change. Her defeats were read by many pundits and journalists not as repudiations of her gender but as a rejection of “politics as usual.”

What that narrative ignores is the paradox facing all female presidential candidates. In an examination of the 2016 Democratic primary, forthcoming in the journal Rhetoric & Public Affairs, I theorized the “first-timer/frontrunner double bind,” in which male presidential “first-timers” (such as Trump, Sanders, and Obama) can be viewed as both outsiders and credible leaders. Conversely, female “first-timers” historically have been viewed as pioneers with symbolic appeal rather than political strength. To be taken seriously as presidential candidates, women politicians must amass significant political experience, party support, and campaign funds. Once they do that, their political strength is portrayed as anti-democratic entitlement and their presidential aspirations as a manic desire for power.

The double bind that was a challenge for Clinton to overcome in the 2016 primary became a full-blown paradox during the general election, one that begins to explain why, according to Time, Clinton’s “campaign organization, the data, the polling, all the analytics—none of it worked on Election Day.” I contend that the factors that cast Clinton as a credible presidential candidate simultaneously disqualified her in a “change” campaign. Her electability made her unelectable.

At first glance, this does not seem like a particularly gendered phenomenon, but in the realm of U.S. presidentiality the dynamic is unique to women candidates. Although over ninety percent of U.S. voters report willingness to vote for a (hypothetical) qualified female presidential candidate, only Hillary Clinton has been able to garner a major party nomination, a feat she accomplished only after amassing an unprecedented breadth of political experience. Clinton’s two primary campaigns and one general election defeat illustrate the female presidentiality paradox quite plainly. To demonstrate your electability, you must become that which ultimately will make you unelectable in a “change” campaign: a well-connected political insider with decades of political experience.

In 2016, the effects of the female presidentiality paradox were exacerbated by the type of political change endorsed by the Trump voters. Although Trump’s victory was regarded by many pundits as evidence of the country’s anti-government mood, Trump also functioned as a personification of the reactionary backlash against the nation’s first black president and first female presidential frontrunner. The “change” sought by his supporters was a reinstatement of white, male hegemonic presidentiality rather than further challenge to that centuries-old standard. In that climate, the more credible a woman is as a presidential candidate, the more threatening she is.

Because the female presidentiality paradox will continue to be a feature of campaign culture whenever women launch significant bids for major-party nominations, scholars and strategists should acknowledge its existence and seek to understand its rhetorical dynamics. Clinton’s experiences in two campaign cycles suggest that this paradox is a constraint that cannot be overcome by candidate competence alone, since, for women, electability appears to breed contemp. When asked, as a political communication scholar, what women candidates can do to be received more favorably, I am increasingly convinced that the answer to that question is “Nothing. There is literally nothing that women have not tried in their 100+ year quest for the Oval Office.” The problem lies with the culture rather than with the candidates.

Karrin Vasby Anderson, PhD (@KVAnderson) is Professor of Communication Studies at Colorado State University and co-author of the book Woman President: Confronting Postfeminist Political Culture. This post contains excerpts from “Every Woman is the Wrong Woman: The Female Presidentiality Paradox,” published in Women’s Studies in Communication and “Presidential Pioneer or Campaign Queen?: Hillary Clinton and the First-Timer/Frontrunner Double Bind,” forthcoming in Rhetoric & Public Affairs.

Thomas Sedelius and Jonas Linde – Democracy and Government Performance: Parliamentarism, Premier-Presidentialism, President-Parliamentarism, and Presidentialism

This is a guest post by Thomas Sedelius, Dalarna University, and Jonas Linde, University of Bergen. It is a summary of their co-authored article that was recently published in Democratization. The full text article is free to download here.

Do semi-presidential regimes perform worse than other regime types? Following the classical argument once raised by Juan J. Linz (1990; 1994) that presidentialism and semi-presidentialism are less conducive to democracy than parliamentarism, a number of studies have empirically analysed the functioning and performance of semi-presidentialism. With the notable exception of Elgie (2011), however, there is a lack of large-N studies where democracy and government performance are actually measured across the two subtypes of semi-presidentialism (premier-presidential and president-parliamentary regimes). Robert Elgie’s systematic and comprehensive study offers several important findings on the performance of two types of semi-presidentialism, but it does so in isolation from parliamentary and presidential regimes. Our study is an attempt to address this gap in the literature.

By using indicators on regime performance and democracy from a dataset containing 173 countries, we examine the performance records of premier-presidential and president-parliamentary regimes in relation to parliamentarism and presidentialism.

Guided by Linz’s argument on the “perils of presidentialism”, and by Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey’s (1992) proposition that president-parliamentary regimes are more perilous to democracy than other regime types, we test three basic hypotheses.

H1: Parliamentarism performs better than other regime types in terms of democracy and government performance.

H2: Premier-presidentialism performs better than president-parliamentarism and presidentialism in terms of democracy and government performance.

H3: President-parliamentarism performs on a par with, or worse, than presidentialism in terms of democracy and government performance.

For measuring democracy, we select four frequently used indicators: Freedom House’s index of civil liberties and political rights and Polity IV combined, Polity IV on its own, The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy, and the Executive Constraints indicator from Polity IV, which refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives. For measuring government performance, we use the Government Effectiveness indicator from the Worldwide Governance Indicators, the Corruption Perceptions Index from Transparency International, the Empowerment Rights Index from CIRI Human Rights Data Project, and the Human Development Index from UNDP.

Following a series of descriptive reports, we run some basic multivariate analyses with a conventional set of controls including GDP/capita, population size, ethnic fractionalization, proportional representation, and different world regions.

Overall, our findings do not support the proposition that parliamentarism performs better than all other regime types in terms of democracy and government performance (H1). Rather we observed a pattern where premier-presidentialism performs almost as good – and on some measures even better – as parliamentary regimes. Neither the measures of democracy nor the measures of government performance show significantly better records for parliamentary regimes than for premier-presidential ones. This indicates that a parliamentary constitution with an indirectly elected president does not necessarily go along with better political performance than a premier-presidential one with a popularly elected but weak or medium weak president. Thus, to the extent that we think about semi-presidentialism in terms of premier-presidential regimes, we have reasons to question strong propositions about the “perils of semi-presidentialism”.

However, the picture certainly looks different with regard to president-parliamentary regimes. While premier-presidential regimes are closer to parliamentary regimes, president-parliamentary regimes display performance records more similar to pure presidentialism, and it performs even worse on most indicators (H2, H3). When it comes to the level of democracy, the only regime type to perform significantly worse than the parliamentary one – on four separate measures and with conventional controls – is the president-parliamentary regime type. The differences in terms of government performance are less pronounced. Although there is a tendency of slightly poorer performance by presidential-parliamentary regimes also in terms of government performance, and significantly so on one indicator, our results demonstrate that the type of constitutional system seems to affect democracy more strongly than government performance.

Shugart and Carey’s general recommendation to stay away from the president-parliamentary form of government certainly finds support in our data. In our study, we mostly refrain from making claims about causal mechanisms behind the observed pattern. However, we allow some general comments on the importance of presidential powers in relation to the four regime types. We show how variation in presidential powers follow closely the four regime types – weakest among the parliamentary regimes and strongest among the president-parliamentary regimes. We know that case studies on e.g. post-Soviet countries where the system has shifted from president-parliamentary to premier-presidential constitutions provide additional support to the negative impact of president-parliamentarism on democracy. For instance, Elgie and Moestrup (2016) show that reduced presidential powers and a shift to a more balanced semi-presidential system have been associated with better democracy records in e.g. Armenia, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan. A general trend among the post-Soviet countries is that the presidents have used their control over the administration to curb the opposition and thereby directing the trajectory of constitutional developments in their own favor. The outcome has been increased power of already powerful presidents – a straight road to the consolidation of autocracy.

Our study is limited to the extent that it draws on cross-sectional data only, and we acknowledge the need for more sophisticated analyses. In addition, the study can make no valid claims of having disentangled endogeneity challenges regarding institutions and political outcomes. Yet, we reveal a general pattern with regard to the four regime types on performance. Based on our findings, we claim that democratic performance is likely to be better with a parliamentary or premier-presidential form of government. If the most positive accounts about semi-presidentialism are relevant, such as executive flexibility, power-sharing, and a uniting president, those are most likely to be identified under the premier-presidential form of government. Our data give no support for general recommendations to avoid dual executives or popularly elected president with limited powers.

Finally, and well in line with more recent scholarship, we argue that discussions about the pros and cons of semi-presidentialism should include the distinction between its sub-categories as well as considering dimensions of presidential power.

References

Elgie, Robert. Semi-Presidentialism: Sub-Types and Democratic Performace. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Elgie and Sophia Moestrup (Eds.). Semi-Presidentialism in the Caucasus and Central Asia. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

Linz, Juan J. “The Perils of Presidentialism.” Journal of Democracy 1, no. 1 (1990): 51-69.

Linz, Juan J. “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it Make a Difference?” In: Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela. (Eds.) The Failure of Presidential Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, 3-87.

Shugart, Matthew S. and John M. Carey. Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Thomas Sedelius is Associate Professor in Political Science at Dalarna University, Sweden. His research covers semi-presidentialism, political institutions, transition, democratisation, and East European politics. His work on semi-presidentialism has appeared in journals such as Democratization, Government and Opposition, and East European Politics, and also include The Tug-of-War between Presidents and Prime Ministers: Semi-Presidentialism in Central and Eastern Europe (Örebro Studies, 2006). Thomas currently leads a research project (2015-2018) financed by the Swedish Research Council on semi-presidentialism and governability in transitional countries.

Jonas Linde is Professor of Political Science at the Department of Comparative Politics, University of Bergen, Norway. His research has dealt with different aspects of political support, perceptions of corruption, quality of government, e-government and post-communist democratization. Linde’s works have been published in journals such as Governance, European Journal of Political Research, International Political Science Review, Political Studies, Government Information Quarterly and Government and Opposition.

France – Honeymoon legislative election returns a huge majority for President Macron. Of course it does!

On Sunday 11th June, the first round of the French legislative election was held. On Sunday 18th the second round took place. Given the results of the previous week, Sunday’s election provided few surprises. There were some notable individual results: Marine Le Pen, the leader of the Front national (FN), was elected, even if her party did badly overall; Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the leader of the left party, La France Insoumise (LFI), was also returned and his party won enough seats to constitute a group in parliament, giving him speaking time; the former Socialist (PS) prime minister, Manuel Valls, was also returned, though only by a whisker and as a non-aligned candidate, indeed the Socialists had actively campaigned against him; Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet, who is a high-profile figure from the right-wing Les Républicains (LR) and who had been the victim of an attack in the street while campaigning during the week, an attack that left her unconscious for a while, was defeated. However, the main event was the huge majority won by President Macron’s La République en Marche (LREM) party. Winning just 28.2% of the votes cast in the first round seven days before, the party ended up with about 300 seats in the 577-seat legislature after the second round. With the support of its MoDem ally, which won about 4.2% of the vote at the first round, President Macron now has the support of over 350 deputies in the legislature. This nice figure from Laurent de Boissieu’s blog neatly captures the many different components of the new French Assembly, but also indicates the huge majority for LREM and MoDem.

How did this happen? After all, before the first round of the presidential campaign, between the two rounds, and immediately after Macron’s victory, there were fears or claims that his party would not win a legislative majority and that he would not be able to govern, dragging France back to the bad old days of the Fourth Republic. Worse still, there were those who thought that he would face a period of cohabitation.

This was not the worry of a few isolated individuals. After the first round of the legislative election, L’Express put up a nice montage of politicians who argued that cohabitation was inevitable. But it wasn’t just politicians. At a certain point, Twitter got in a total fuss about the likelihood of cohabitation, though that’s what Twitter does.

But not everyone was so worried. Matthew Shugart said that the idea there would be a period of cohabitation was “nonsense“. And modesty almost, but not quite, forbids me from noting that we adopted a similar argument here.

What we have witnessed is instructive from a political science point of view. There is a well developed literature on how the legislative party system is shaped by direct presidential elections. (Anyone wanting a copy of the article with the literature review should just e-mail me). To simplify only a little, this work shows that when legislative elections follow shortly after the direct election of a powerful president, they typically return a presidential majority. This is exactly what we saw in France in 2017. For sure, the general argument is probabilistic, not deterministic. But the association is strong. The probability is high. So, the academic work hasn’t just generated something amounting to a reasonable guess that a certain outcome would occur. It suggested that there was a very good chance that Macron would get at least a working majority. In the end, he won the support of a huge majority, bigger than most academics had expected. The literature, though, was basically right. Why?

Well, the academics who have investigated this topic have made their argument on the basis of a statistical relationship, but they have also identified certain causal mechanisms to explain why we should expect honeymoon legislative elections to return a presidential majority. These mechanisms are all very general. They don’t always easily apply to specific countries. That’s all we can expect in large-n studies. However, and at the risk of committing an egregious ecological fallacy, the France 2017 case illustrates how these causal mechanisms can play out under local-level conditions.

We know that presidential elections are often the catalyst for party system realignments. This has been true in France before, but the evidence that this was going to be a realigning election was present even before the presidential election had finished. The election was catastrophic for the PS. It was hopelessly split and faced a strong challenge to its left. Going into a honeymoon legislative election in such a weakened state did not bode well for the PS. The presidential election also generated splits within LR. There were those, like the former prime minister, Alain Juppé, who were willing to work with LREM in a future Assembly, whereas there were others who were not. Going into a honeymoon legislative election in such a divided state did not bode well for LR. The FN was also in trouble. Le Pen did well to get through to the second ballot of the presidential election, but she did not perform as well as expected. The party’s support had been slipping even prior to her disastrous presidential debate with Macron. In the end, she was decisively beaten at the second round. After the election, there were reports that Le Pen was exhausted; the party was demoralised; there were also splits within the FN, even though it had done historically well. So, going into a honeymoon legislative election in such a state did not bode well for the FN either. In other words, presidential elections upend party systems. We saw how this general idea played out specifically in France in 2017.

A similar point applies to abstention rates. We know that abstention rates are higher in honeymoon legislative elections relative to the presidential election. We also know that it is typically the voters of the parties that lost the presidential election who stay at home. So, even when the presidential election does not generate a party system realignment of the sort that we saw in France in 2017, we should still expect the new president’s party to be the biggest beneficiary of the higher abstention rate at the legislative election. Again, this is exactly what happened in France. But it’s what we would expect to have happened.

There was a further element too. Macron’s victory at the presidential victory was bigger than expected. Thus, he had momentum. Once in office, he also had some excellent photo opportunities, meeting European and world leaders, even upstaging Donald Trump in the handshake stakes. There were one or two relatively minor concerns with his government, but by and large he kept his presidential promises in terms of government formation. In other words, presidential elections give the victor the potential to act, well, presidentially. This presidential lustre can rub off on to the president’s party at the legislative election. This is exactly what happened. In other words, like other presidents in a similar context, Macron benefited at the legislative elections from being the newly-elected president.

Of course, there are always local, idiosyncratic conditions. The electoral system clearly exaggerated the gains for LREM. But LREM was particularly well placed to benefit from the system. As a centrist party, it could win the support of right-wing voters who wanted to keep out left-wing candidates in LREM/left second-round duels; it could win the support of left-wing voters who wanted to keep out LR candidates in LREM/LR duels; it could also win the support of pretty much everyone in LREM/FN duels. So, strategically, it was better placed than some parties in equivalent situations. This particularity helped to inflate its majority. Also, Macron was not a long-time incumbent who had just been re-elected. He was a new figure and for some he did generate an enthusiasm for a new form of politics. In France 2017, all these local conditions worked in favour of his party at the legislative election. In other cases, they might not be present, helping to ensure that the relationship between presidential elections and legislative elections is not deterministic.

We are encouraged to talk confidently about our work (that’s Twitter again!), even when we do not always have grounds to be as confident as all that. More than that, we only have to look at opinion polling to see that even in an area where there has been a huge amount of research, where the sample is very large, and where there is competition in the academic market, we can still get things wrong. So, we should be modest about what we claim and certainly what we predict. However, we were on strong grounds to claim that cohabitation was very unlikely in France in 2017. We have an idea about the general processes. The  local conditions were ripe. In short, politicians and Twitter didn’t need to get in such a fuss.

Ramadan (Dani) Ilazi – Kosovo’s snap parliamentary elections shake up the political landscape

This is a guest post by Ramadan (Dani) Ilazi, PhD candidate at Dublin City University

On June 11, Kosovo held early-parliamentary elections, the third since the country declared its independence in 2008. The snap elections were triggered by a vote on a motion of no-confidence in early May against the government of Prime Minister Isa Mustafa, who is also the leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). The motion was presented by three opposition parties, Nisma (Initiative), AAK (Alliance for Future of Kosovo) and VV-Vetëvendosje (Self-determination) and was supported by the governing coalition partner, PDK (Democratic Party of Kosovo). The failure to pass the Agreement on Border Demarcation with Montenegro, which is also a key condition for visa liberalization for citizens of Kosovo for the EU Schengen zone, is widely attributed as the main cause for the fall of the government. The break-up of the PDK/LDK coalition and support for the motion was justified by Prime Minister Mustafa’s inability to progress on key issues in the European integration process. PM Mustafa and the LDK blasted the PDK’s move as a political manoeuvre designed to create early elections.

Going into the elections, two major coalitions were formed: the first was between the LDK, the AKR (Alliance for New Kosovo) and the newly established political party ALTERNATIVA. The second was between PDK, AAK and Nisma. There were three major candidates for Prime Minister and the elections were largely focused on their CVs and programs: the candidate from the PDK coalition was Mr. Ramush Haradinaj, the candidate from the LDK coalition was Mr. Avdullah Hoti (out-going Minister of Finance), and the candidate from Vetëvendosje was Mr. Albin Kurti. Mr. Haradinaj and Mr. Hoti belong to the centre-right political parties while Mr. Kurti’s was the only candidate from the left party.

Kosovo uses a proportional system. The whole country serves as a one electoral district and there is a 5% threshold. Kosovo also applies an open-list policy, meaning that citizens vote for a party or a coalition of parties and also get to vote for five candidates from the party or coalition list. Kosovo’s Parliament has 120 seats, of which 20 seats are guaranteed for minority communities, while the remainder are distributed according to the percentage of votes the political party or the coalition has won in the elections. According to article 84 of the Constitution of Kosovo, the President of the Republic announces elections for the Parliament of Kosovo and convenes its first meeting. In the election of the government, according to article 95 of the Constitution, the President of the Republic proposes to the Parliament a “candidate for Prime Minister, in consultation with the political party or coalition that has won the majority in the Assembly necessary to establish the Government […] If the proposed composition of the Government does not receive the necessary majority of votes, the President of the Republic of Kosovo appoints another candidate with the same procedure within ten (10) days”

The organization of elections received praise from local and international monitors as free and fair and without any significant incident. Preliminary results from the Kosovo Central Election Commission (CEC) show that the voter turnout was over 40%, and the support for parties/coalitions was as follows: 34% voted for the PDK coalition (around 39 seats); 27% for Vetëvendosje (around 31 seats); and 26% for the LDK (around 30 seats).

These results showed that forming a government will be a challenge. The PDK has the right to try to form the government first. VV and LDK have, until now, fiercely opposed any idea of a coalition with PDK. The PDK-coalition could potentially form a coalition with the 20 members of the minority communities, but what complicates matters is that the Serbian President Vucic has openly spoke against Mr. Haradinaj becoming a Prime Minister, which means the Serbian members of the Kosovo Parliament would most likely refuse to enter into coalition with PDK-coalition provided that Mr. Haradinaj is the candidate for PM. Another potential scenario is that the second party gets a try at forming the government, which would be VV.

Context: winner takes it all  

To better understand the potential that the situation holds for institutional crisis or political stalemate, the 2014 election context is useful. On 7 May 2014 the Kosovo Parliament decided to dissolve itself and the next day the President of Kosovo decreed the early elections in June. The results showed PDK was the winner of the elections, with 30% of the votes, LDK was ranked second with 25%. A day after the election results were announced, other parties from Kosovo political landscape created a post-election coalition, called VLAN, which represented about 55% of the votes and claimed the right to form the government. VLAN refused to discuss any cooperation with PDK.

This situation created a political stalemate that lasted for six months during which time no new government could be formed. It took two decisions from the Constitutional Court of Kosovo to end the gridlock and the one dealing with the competencies of the President is of particular relevance in the context of this article and the blog. According to this decision (Case No. K0103/14) the President “proposes to the Assembly the candidate for Prime Minister nominated by the political party or coalition that has the highest number of seats in the Assembly” and “The President of the Republic does not have the discretion to refuse the appointment of the proposed candidate for Prime Minister”. However “In the event that the proposed candidate for Prime Minister does not receive the necessary votes, the President of the Republic, at his/her discretion […]  appoints another candidate for Prime Minister after consultation with the parties or coalitions […].” This decision gives the President a potentially key role to play in government formation and this role may be important in the formation of the next government.

The Constitutional Court subsequently ruled that the winning party or coalition has the exclusive rights to propose the candidate for the Speaker of Parliament. Following the 2014 elections, these decisions made the implementation of the VLAN coalition impossible and the LDK went on to form a coalition with the PDK, amid high tensions and fierce opposition, including from within the LDK members of Parliament, some of whom refused to vote for their own leader as Prime Minister.

What next?

The incoming government faces some very unpopular decisions, including the ratification of the agreement for the border demarcation with Montenegro (AAK, VV and Nisma strongly opposed this agreement), the establishment of the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities, which comes from the Brussels dialogue for normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia (VV strongly opposes this), and the beginning of the work and potential arrests from the Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office which can produce a situation that will be very difficult to manage for the next government and could could create instability. More importantly, Kosovo citizens are losing patience and are increasingly becoming frustrated with the lack of results especially when it comes to the European integration process as they remain the only citizens in the Balkans without visa liberalization with the EU Schengen zone. With this in mind the next government needs solid support in the Parliament and credibility and legitimacy in the public’s eyes.

In terms of procedure, political parties are awaiting the certification of results by the Central Election Commission (CEC) and the publication of the list of the next members of Parliament. Following this, the President will convene the first meeting of the Parliament and from that moment on a time timetable for government formation begins. Another election cannot be ruled out.

In conclusion

The election created a political earthquake that will change the political landscape for some time to come. The main change was the increase in support for the Vetëvendosje party, which rose from 13.59% of votes in 2014 elections to 27%. Vetëvendosje is a controversial political party, promoting the unification of Kosovo with Albania and using teargas in the Parliament as a method of protest. But, support for VV, especially from young voters, is a demand for a change and a sign of protest against the political establishment. So, unlike the onion of DW’s Adelheid Feilcke, that relies heavily on Kosovo stereotypes and argues that that nationalism won in the snap election, I believe that the results generally, as well as the votes for individuals candidates, show the potential of Kosovo’s democracy. So the winner, if we need to name one, is civil society.

Zambia – Authoritarian slide continues under President Lungu as opposition MPs are suspended

The Speaker of the Zambian National Assembly, Patrick Matibini, has suspended 48 opposition legislators for 30 days as a punishment for unauthorised absence from the parliament. Their offence? To have been missing for President Edgar Lungu’s state of the nation address in March.

The suspension of the MPs does not come as a great surprise. Hardliners from the ruling Patriotic Front have been pushing for something along these lines for some time. The ruling party was quick to try and disassociate itself from the Speaker’s actions. But, as Zambian commentators have pointed out, the action fits into a broader web of measures designed to intimidate those who question the president’s authority.

The most significant was the arrest of opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema, who remains in jail on trumped up treason charges.

While the latest development in Zambia’s growing political crisis doesn’t come as a shock, it will disappoint those who were hoping that Lungu would be persuaded to moderate his position. Instead, it appears that the International Monetary Fund’s decision to go ahead with a bail out package despite the government’s democratic failings has emboldened the president to pursue an authoritarian strategy.

As a result, a swift resolution to the current political standoff seems unlikely.

Roots of the crisis

For some time Zambia was considered to be one of the more competitive democracies in Africa. But a period of backsliding under Lungu has raised concerns that the country’s inclusive political culture is under threat. The current impasse stems from the controversial elections in 2016 when Lungu won a narrow victory that remains contested by the opposition United Party for National Development.

Hichilema, the leader of the United Party for National Development, has stated that his party will not recognise the legitimacy of Lungu’s victory until its electoral petition against the results is heard in court. The initial petition was rejected by the Constitutional Court. But its decision was made in a way that had all the hallmarks of a whitewash. The UPND subsequently appealed to the High Court. Hichilema’s decision to make his party’s recognition of the president conditional on the petition being heard was designed both as an act of defiance, and as a means to prevent the government from simply sweeping electoral complaints under the carpet.

Until the court case is resolved, the opposition is committed to publicly challenging the president’s mandate by doing things like boycotting his addresses to parliament. In response, members of the ruling party have accused the United Party for National Development of disrespect and failing to recognise the government’s authority. It is this that appears to lie behind Hichilema’s arrest on treason charges.

Punishing parliamentarians

The suspension of United Party for National Development legislators needs to be understood against this increasingly authoritarian backdrop. It is one of a number of steps taken by those aligned to the government that are clearly designed to intimidate people who don’t fall into line. Other strategies include public condemnation of the government’s critics and proposals to break-up the influential Law Society of Zambia.

Efforts by the president’s spokesman to disassociate the regime from the suspensions have been unpersuasive. The official line of the ruling party is that the speaker of parliament is an independent figure and that he made the decision on the basis of the official rules. It’s true that the speaker and the parliamentary committee on privileges, absences and support services have the right to reprimand legislators for being absent without permission.

Nonetheless the argument is disingenuous for two reasons. The speaker is known to be close to the ruling party, a fact that prompted Hichilema to call for his resignation earlier this year. And the committee’s decisions are clearly driven by the Patriotic Front because it has more members from it than any other party.

The claim that the suspension was not government-led lacks credibility. This is clear from the fact that Patriotic Front MPS have been the most vocal in calling for action to be taken against boycotting United Party for National Development MPs.

IMF lifeline for Lungu

There are different perspectives on the crisis in Zambia. Some people invoke the country’ history of more open government to argue that Lungu will moderate his position once the government feels that the opposition has been placed on the back foot. Others identify a worrying authoritarian trajectory that began under the presidency of the late Michael Sata. They conclude that things are likely to get worse before they get better.

One of the factors that opposition leaders hoped might persuade President Lungu to release Hichilema and move discussions back from the police cell to the negotiating chamber was the government’s desperate need for an economic bail out. Following a period of bad luck and bad governance, Zambia faces a debt crisis. Without the assistance of international partners, the government is likely to go bankrupt. This would increase public dissatisfaction with the Patriotic Front and undermine Lungu’s hopes of securing a third term.

But the willingness of the IMF to move towards the completion of a $1.2 billion rescue package suggests that authoritarian backsliding is no barrier to international economic assistance. In turn, IMF support appears to have emboldened the government to continue its efforts to intimidate its opponents.

IMF officials, of course, will point out that they are not supposed to take political conditions into account and that their aim is to create a stronger economy that will benefit all Zambians. This may be true, but the reality is that by saving the Lungu government financially the IMF is also aiding it politically. Whatever its motivation, the agreement will be interpreted by many on the ground as tacit support for the Patriotic Front regime, strengthening Lungu’s increasingly authoritarian position.

Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy, University of Birmingham

This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.

Jody C. Baumgartner – Public Opinion About The US Vice President: Still Flying Under The Radar

This is a guest post by Jody C. Baumgartner, Professor of Political Science at East Carolina University. It is based on his forthcoming article in Presidential Studies Quarterly

Since its inception the American vice presidency and vice presidents have been the subject of ridicule and scorn. Late night television talk show king Johnny Carson once quipped that “democracy means that anyone can grow up to be president, and anyone who doesn’t grow up can be vice president”. Many vice presidents took a dim view of the office as well. For example, Thomas Marshall, Woodrow Wilson’s vice president, told the joke of “two brothers. One ran away to sea; the other was elected vice president of the United States. And nothing was heard of either of them again.” This negative view of the office and its inhabitants was perhaps inevitable given that the institution was created largely as the by-product of the Electoral College system of selecting presidents. Moreover, throughout history many vice presidents seemed worthy of derision.

But scholars and observers of the U.S. presidency agree that this is no longer the case. The vice presidency has come of age, and vice presidents are important players in a president’s administration (see Baumgartner 2015; Goldstein 2016). While Vice President Pence may prove to be the exception, vice presidents are increasingly called on to perform any number of important ceremonial, political and policy-related tasks for their presidents. To call modern vice presidents “assistant presidents” may overstate their importance, it is nonetheless true that the institution a significant part of twenty-first century American government.

Does this reality match how the American public sees the office and its occupants? My own recent research, while not providing a definitive answer, suggests that in some respects it does not. In particular, analyses of both favorability and job approval ratings for the past four presidents and vice presidents suggest that citizens do not form their opinions of vice presidents independent of their opinions of presidents. In other words, “vice presidential favorability and job approval ratings are overwhelmingly influenced by opinion of the president” (Baumgartner 2017: 1).

ABOUT THE STUDY

Although presidential favorability and job approval has been regularly measured since at least the Truman administration, it has only been a couple of decades that the same can be said about ratings for vice presidents. This research take advantage of this, relying on both presidential and vice presidential favorability and job approval polling numbers for the George H.W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush and Obama administrations. I attempted to gather data for each question (favorability and job approval) for each president and  vice president, from both public (e.g., pollingreport.com) and subscription-based (Roper Center for Public Opinion Research) sources, for every month in office. Missing data (17.3% of the total number of months for each question, for president or vice president) points were interpolated using James Stimson’s “W-Calc,” which also allowed me to collapse the various questions used by different organizations to measure these concepts into a single measure (Stimson 1991).

The final dataset included favorability and job approval ratings for the following presidents and vice presidents:

Favorability (Months) Job Approval (Months)
Quayle/Bush n=38 n=38
Gore/Clinton n=94 n=44
Cheney/Bush n=95 n=148
Biden/Obama n=76 n=53

The first step in my analysis was to check bivariate relationships between both types of presidential and vice presidential ratings. At first blush, with the exception of Bush-Quayle, there appears to be a fair degree of congruence between presidential and vice presidential ratings. This can be seen in Figures 1-3, which simply charts rating scores by month, for each administration.

Next I constructed time-series models, with presidential ratings as the dependent variable, to test these relationships. Vice presidential ratings served as the primary independent variable in each, but I also included measures for term in office, whether the president’s party had a majority in either or both houses of Congress, public favorability toward the president’s party, and the percentage of negative news about the vice president. Results suggest that presidential favorability had a significant effect on vice presidential favorability in the cases of both Quayle (p < .001) and Gore (p < .01). Presidential job approval had a significant effect on vice presidential job approval for Gore (p < .01), Cheney (p < .001) and Biden (p < .05). When all four administrations were combined into a single model, presidential ratings for both favorability and job approval were significantly associated with vice presidential ratings (both random and fixed effects models, p < .001).

The understanding that the vice presidency has grown in importance over the recent past ought to be tempered by the reality that most people seem unaware of this change. Vice presidents still live in the shadow of their presidents. Of course it might be easy to dismiss these findings, asking why we should care about public opinion about the vice president. However it is important to remember that vice presidents are one of only two nationally elected public officials. The lack of independent public opinion associated with their tenures suggests that they may be less than fully accountable in a democratic sense.

SOURCES

Baumgartner, Jody C. 2015. The Vice Presidency: From the Shadow to the Spotlight. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Baumgartner, Jody C. 2017. “Under the Radar: Public Support for Vice Presidents.” Presidential Studies Quarterly (DOI: 10.1111/psq.12381).

Goldstein, Joel K. 2016. The White House Vice Presidency: The Path to Significance, Mondale to Biden. Lawrence KS: University Press of Kansas.

Stimson, James A. 1991. Public Opinion in America: Moods, Cycles, and Swings. Boulder, CO: Westview.

Jody C Baumgartner, Professor of Political Science
East Carolina University
Greenville NC 27834
e: jodyb@jodyb.net
p: 252-328-2843

Aníbal Pérez-Liñán and John Polga-Hecimovich – Getting Rid of the President

This is a guest post by Aníbal Pérez-Liñán of the Department of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh and John Polga-Hecimovich of the Political Science Department at the US Naval Academy at Annapolis. It is based on their paper in Democratization.

Are presidential impeachments modern functional equivalents of old-fashioned military coups? The impeachment of Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff in August 2016 led to an acrimonious debate on whether her removal from office constituted a “soft coup” against an elected leader. Similar concerns were voiced after the impeachment of Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo in 2012. As calls to impeach President Donald Trump multiply, this question appears to gain increasing relevance for US politics as well.For students of presidentialism, the idea of “functional equivalence” between military coups and legal ousters (impeachments, legislative declarations of presidential incapacity, or anticipated resignations of the executive) translates into very specific questions: Are there any historical factors able to explain military coups as well as impeachments? If so, why are some presidents removed following legal procedures while others are removed by force?

In a forthcoming paper in Democratization we develop a unified theory of presidential instability to explain why presidents are removed from office through military coups or through legal procedures.

We identify two sets of historical causes. First, some factors create conditions for presidential instability, irrespective of the mode of premature exit from office. Because they motivate a political opposition to conspire against the government, those factors explain why presidents are likely to fail, but not how they fail. Second, an alternative set of causes accounts for the specific institutional manifestations of presidential instability. Those factors map onto the relative capabilities of groups inclined to pursue a military coup or the legal removal of the president.

The distinction between general motivations to remove the president and the capabilities of specific opposition groups helps us identify the role of different causal explanations in the literature.

Among the common causes of legal removals and coups, we find:

  • Poor economic conditions. Recessions undermine the president and facilitate conspiracies. Studies on military coups argue that negative economic shocks increase the risk of military rebellions, while the literature on impeachments shows that weak economies undermined Latin American presidents in the 1990s.
  • Popular protests. Mass mobilization against the government signals that the president is weak and destabilizes any elected administration. Students of military intervention find that mass protests help elites coordinate in a coup. Students of impeachment emphasize that protests encourage reluctant legislators to act against the president.
  • Radicalization. Radical actors have intense and extreme preferences; they are reluctant to bargain and remain intransigent in defense of their policy goals. Radicalism is therefore a potential cause of military coups, but also an explanation for the role of social movements forcing the resignation of presidents in places like Bolivia and Ecuador.

Given the prior conditions for instability, several factors separate legal removals from coups:

  • The regional context. A long line of research has invoked international diffusion as an explanation for democratic instability – though not necessarily government instability. The regional context may strengthen the position of coup perpetrators or otherwise direct elites towards legal strategies against the president.
  • Legislative support for the president. Two causal mechanisms are discussed in the literature: Linz’s argument that presidentialism itself is a source of instability and the argument that a legislative majority “shields” the executive against impeachment.
  • Elite support for democracy. A strong normative preference for democracy among elites forecloses the possibility of a military coup and leaves legal removal as the only acceptable strategy for the opposition. The government’s normative preferences also matter: a president dismissive of democratic rules may be unwilling to recognize the legitimacy of an impeachment procedure, driving opponents to consider the option of a coup.

To test those expectations, we use discrete-time event history models with selection.  Our sample covers all democratic regimes in nineteen Latin American countries between 1945 and 2010 (N = 729). The dependent variable measures yearly outcomes for each president:  survival, exit via military coup, or exit via legal removal. Our sample includes 21 coups and 15 legal removals. The selection model estimates the risk of president being removed from office (in any way) in the selection stage, and the risk of being removed via coup (as opposed to a legal procedure) in the outcome stage.

The statistical models allow us to estimate the risk of coups and impeachments, plotted in Figures 1 and 2.

Figure 1 underscores the role of common motivations behind coups (in the bottom row) and impeachments (in the top row), as economic recession, demonstrations, and radicalization consistently expand the risk of both outcomes.

Figure 1: Common Causes of Legal Removals and Coups (Predicted Risk)

Figure 2, on the other hand, illustrates the differential impact of variables. The first column illustrates how a large number of coups in neighboring countries expands the risk of military intervention but reduces the probability of legal removal in the observed country.  The second column shows that the risk of military overthrow remains independent from the composition of congress, but impeachment is less likely when the executive controls the legislature.  The third column shows that a military coup is unlikely when political actors are more committed to democracy. By contrast, the risk of legal removal expands as groups operating within the constitution become empowered by the opposition’s reluctance to engage in military conspiracies.

Figure 2: Causes Separating Legal Removals and Coups (Predicted Risk)

Our findings underscore that common causes of presidential instability are not necessarily causes of democratic breakdown, yet crises of government may easily escalate into crises of the democratic regime when legal venues for the removal of the president are blocked.

These findings are increasingly relevant today.

In a global context in which presidents and their adversaries – in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Turkey, and even the U.S. – have displayed growing levels of radicalism, our findings raise concerns. Radical leaders engender polarization, encouraging their opponents to overthrow the government by any means possible. Combined with economic stagnation or social protest, radicalization is likely to trigger presidential instability.

Yet other factors ultimately tip a crisis towards a non-democratic resolution. A regional environment hostile to democracy and a lack of democratic commitment from domestic elites decrease the probability of a legal impeachment and increase the likelihood of a coup.

International policymakers would be wise to consider these findings: long-term efforts to build regional organizations that discourage military intervention and steady support for democratic leaders will prevent future presidential crises from escalating into full crises of democracy.

Of mechanics and engineering: institutional continuities and partisan realignment in Macron’s France

How time flies! Since the last blog entry, Emmanuel Macron has been elected President and the pro-Juppé former mayor of Le Havre, Edouard Philippe, named Prime Minister at the head of a broad-based government comprising heavyweights from the PS ( Jean- Yves Le Drian, Gérard Collomb), middleweights from LR (Gerard Darmintin and Bruno le Maire) and various members of ‘civil society’ with impeccable professional credentials, but who must be considered as lightweights in terms of their former political experience. On May 7, there was a mild controversy over whether Macron had been well-elected or not. His victory had been announced in advance (no opinion poll gave him less than 58% on the run-off), but it was more comfortable than initially imagined (in the proportion of two-thirds/one-third). The metropolises and sizeable cities overwhelmingly voted for Macron; 85% in Lyon, 83% in Marseilles, almost 90% in Paris, 78% in Lille (against just over 50% for the department of the Nord as a whole). The small towns and countryside voted for Marine Le Pen – in places, at least. The geographical fracture widely commented on the first round was repeated, though only 2 departments in mainland France gave Marine Le Pen a majority. Still, with over 10 million electors, Marine obtained the best score ever for the FN – and more than doubled the total number of votes by comparison to her father in 2002. Emmanuel Macron polled over 20,000,000, well ahead of Sarkozy in 2007 and Hollande in 2012. Only around 40% of Macron electors declared in post-election surveys that their vote was motivated by explicit support for the new President, and optimism for the programme or the candidate rather than a rejection of the Le Pen alternative. The record abstention rate (51.3%) on the first round of the parliamentary elections on June 11th confirmed the sense of unease.

The main argument in this blog entry moves on from attempts to define the meaning of Macron to consider one of the paradoxes thrown up by the 2017 contest. One of the core themes in post-electoral analyses has highlighted the crisis of party politics, with the governing parties of the Fifth Republics – Gaullist and Socialists – relegated to the second division, or at least not winning through to the second round. At the same time as the old world of left-right partisan politics has appeared to be crumbling at the edges, two key mechanisms of presidential power have reaffirmed their pertinence: the confirmation election and the presidential party.

The parliamentary elections are chiefly interesting in that they provide mechanisms of institutional continuity in the midst of great political uncertainty and change. The first of these mechanisms is the confirming election (election de confirmation). Since the 2000 constitutional reform and the inversion of the electoral calendar, there has been a powerful institutional incentive to provide the victorious President with the ‘means to govern’, by way of a large parliamentary majority. Of course, the presidential call for the ‘means of to govern’ precedes 2002; most notably, in 1981, when victorious Socialist President Mitterrand called on the people to ‘give me the means to govern’ and implement the 110 propositions, his presidential programme. But the relationship has become more mechanical since the 2000 reform changed the order of the electoral contests to ensure that the ‘decisive’ presidential election came before the ‘confirmatory’ parliamentary contest. Certainly, the figures have produced rather different variations of the presidential bonus since 2002, but on each occasion, a party with a plurality of votes on the first round achieved an absolute majority of seats after the second: the UMP in support of President Chirac in 2002, the UMP for Sarkozy in 2007 and the PS for Hollande in 2012. The first round of the 2017 parliamentary election spectacularly confirmed the trend: with 32.5% of first round votes, LREM is well on its way to obtaining the overall parliamentary majority called for by President Macron (estimates range from 390 to 430 seats after the second round). The flip side is that this Herculean majority, elected to support a Jupiterean President, was based on a record low turnout (48.7) for a parliament election. The confirming election is implicitly based on a lesser popular mandate (hence legitimacy) than the decisive presidential contest, though this distinction is nowhere formally recognised.

The second mechanic is the return of the presidential party, or the majority elected primarily to support an incumbent President. True, the presidential party is a contested concept, most notably on the left of French politics, where many Socialists never really bought into Mitterrand’s instrumental marriage of the incentive structure of the presidential institutions and the revival of party fortunes. And certainly, no presidential party was ever the same. De Gaulle’s UNR had facets of a personal rally to a leader vested with a particular historic legitimacy, but it collapsed once the General had gone. Valery Giscard d’Estaing’s attempts to build the Independent Republicans/Republican Party into the cornerstone of his Union for French Democracy (UDF) never really succeeded. In an earlier version of the irreconcilable forces on the French centre and right, the UDF managed to balance the Gaullist RPR for a while, but failed to provide the bedrock of parliamentary and political support required to underpin the Barre government (1976-81). Giscard d’Estaing’s failure to build a cohesive presidential majority undermined the cohesion of the 1974-81 mandate. And contrast the record of Mitterrand’s two terms. The election of a PS majority to back the President one of the core features of the 1981 elections. Though it was never easy with the Socialists, and though divisions within the party were also apparent in 1981-83 (especially over the aftermath of the u-turn of 1983), the political resource represented by an overall majority ensured that Mitterrand got his way – even in terms of a highly contested reform of the electoral system for the 1986 parliamentary election. Contrast this situation with that post-1988: victoriously re-elected President, Mitterrand failed fully to capitalize in the ensuing parliamentary elections. The period of minority Socialist government under Rocard relied heavily on the use of article 49, 3 to undertake a governmental programme and, quite simply – survive and govern without a real majority. The UMP (2002-2012) reverted to form: the party of the ‘right and the centre’ was largely ignored by the successive Presidents (Chirac, Sarkozy) who saw its main function as being to organize the President’s supporters in parliament.

Macron’s coronation is not complete without the presidential majority that he has called for – and that he looks supremely well placed to deliver after the second round of voting on June 18th. The confirmatory election will thus have contributed to the election of a presidential majority under the colours of LREM, to support President Macron. The third dimension takes the form of an unwritten rule, rather than a proper mechanism; the size of the presidential majority might shape the behavior of the pro-presidential majorities when elected. Recent evidence from the Hollande period illustrated the dangers of lacking a genuine majority; from the outset, the frondeurs made the President’s life a misery and undermined the effectiveness of his governments. One would not wish such a fate for Emmanuel Macron. On the other hand, a large majority, returning deputies will no parliamentary experience, will produce its own form of tension. The danger for Macron might lie in the return of an overwhelming majority. The newly elected President will be well advised to keep the MODEM on board and prolong the coalition with the Macron-compatible elements of the PS and LR whatever the final outcome on June 18th 2017.