Monthly Archives: December 2016

New publications

Robert Elgie, ‘Varieties of Presidentialism and Leadership Outcomes’, Daedalus, Volume 145, Number 3; Summer 2016, pp. 57-68.

Eugene Huskey, ‘Authoritarian Leadership in the Post-Communist World’, Daedalus, Volume 145, Number 3; Summer 2016, pp. 69-82.

Magna Inácio and Mariana Llanos, ‘The Institutional Presidency in Latin America.: A Comparative Analysis’, Presidential Studies Quarterly, online first.

Henry Hale, ‘Constitutional Performance after Communism: Implications for Ukraine’, in Henry Hale, Robert Orttung (eds.), Beyond the Euromaidan: Comparative Perspectives on Advancing Reform in Ukraine, Stanford University Press, 2016.

Łukasz Jakubiak, ‘The systems of government of Senegal and Ivory Coast. Comparative analysis’, Politeja – Pismo Wydzialu Studiow Miedzynarodowych i Politycznych Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego, 42, pp. 247-261.

Kristen A. Harkness, ‘Military loyalty and the failure of democratization in Africa: how ethnic armies shape the capacity of presidents to defy term limits’, Democratization, 2016, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2016.1241244

The struggle over term limits in Africa:
Brett L. Carter, ‘How international pressure can help’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 27 no. 3, 2016, pp. 36-50.
Janette Yarwood, ‘The power of protest’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 27 no. 3, 2016, pp. 51-60.
Filip Reyntjens, ‘A new look at the evidence’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 27 no. 3, 2016, pp. 61-68.

Karel Kouba, ‘Party Institutionalization and the removal of presidential term limits In Latin America’, Revista de Ciencia Política, Volume 36, No 2, 2016, pp. 433-457.

Javier Corrales, ‘Can Anyone Stop the President? Power Asymmetries and Term Limits in Latin America, 1984–2016’, Latin American Politics and Society, Volume 58, Issue 2, 2016, pp. 3–25.

Victor Araújo, Thiago Silva, and Marcelo Vieira, ‘Measuring Presidential Dominance over Cabinets in Presidential Systems: Constitutional Design and Power Sharing’, Brazilian Political Science Review, (2016) 10 (2), pp. 1-23.

Eric A. Posner, ‘Presidential Leadership & the Separation of Powers’, Daedalus, Volume 145, Number 3; Summer 2016, pp. 35-43.

João Paulo Madeira, ‘The semi-presidential system of Cape Verde: the relationship between the executive and the legislative powers’, Universitas Relações Internacionais, Brasília, v. 13, n. 2, p. 83-92, jul./dez. 2015

Patrick Chabal and Toby Green (eds.), Guinea-Bissau: Micro-State to ‘Narco-State’, London: Hurst 2016, inc. chapter by Joshua B. Forrest on Guinea-Bissau’s Colonial and Post-Colonial Political Institutions.

Marcus Mietzner, ‘Coercing Loyalty: Coalitional Presidentialism and Party Politics in Jokowi’s Indonesia’, Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Volume 38, Number 2, August 2016 , pp. 209-232.

Andrea Ceron, ‘Competing Principals 2.0? The impact of Facebook in the 2013 selection of the Italian Head of State’, Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, 46(3), 2016, pp. 313–333.

Palladino, ‘‘Presidentialisations’ in Italy: the battle for leadership between the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic’, Contemporary Italian Politics, 2015, Vol. 7, No. 2, 107-126.

Orçun Selçukm, ‘Strong presidents and weak institutions: populism in Turkey, Venezuela and Ecuador’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, pp. 1-19, Published online: 10 Oct 2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2016.1242893

Murat Jashari and Behar Selimi, ‘Kosovo – An Atypical Parliamentary Republic’, Academicus International Scientific Journal, 2016, Nr. 14, pp. 136-146, see http://www.academicus.edu.al/?subpage=volumes&nr=14

André Borges and Ryan Lloyd, ‘Presidential coattails and electoral coordination in multilevel elections: Comparative lessons from Brazil’, Electoral Studies, vol. 43 (2016), pp. 104-114.

Lisa P. Argyle, Marcus Arrajj, Skylar Covich, E. G. Garay, Julian Gottlieb, Heather E. Hodges, and Eric R. A. N. Smith, Economic performance and presidential trait evaluations: A longitudinal analysis’, Electoral Studies, vol. 43 (2016), pp. 52-62.

David Schultz, ‘(Un)Conventional Wisdom and Presidential Politics: The Myth of Convention Locations and Favorite-Son Vice Presidents’, PS: Political Science & Politics, Volume 49, Issue 3, July 2016, pp. 420-425.

Simona Kukovič and Marjan Brezovšek, ‘From Parliamentarisation Towards Presidentialisation: Institutional Aspects of Local Political Leadership in Slovenia’, World Political Science. Volume 12, Issue 1, Pages 69–85.

Jacobsen Dag Ingvar and Skollevold Ann Sherin, ‘Presidentialisation on the executive arena at the local level? The case of Norway 1992–2012’, Zarządzanie Publiczne, 2016, 1(35), pp. 7-19.

Ioannis N. Grigoriadis (2015), ‘The Turkish Presidential Elections of 10 August 2014’, Mediterranean Politics, 20:1, 105-110.

Ziya Öniş, ‘Turkey’s Two Elections: The AKP Comes Back’, Journal of Democracy, Volume 27, Number 2, April 2016, pp. 141-154.

Mario Gavenda and Resul Umit, ‘The 2016 Austrian Presidential Election: A Tale of Three Divides‘, Regional & Federal Studies, DOI: 10.1080/13597566.2016.1206528

C. Teehankee and M.R. Thompson, ‘Electing A Strongman’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 27 no. 4, 2016, pp. 125-134.

Boban Stojanović and Nikola Jović, ‘Personal or Party Election Campaigns in Serbia: Empirical Findings’, Comparative Balkan Politics, Volume 1, Issue 1, 2015, pp. 5-16. Available at: http://balkanelectoralstudies.org/images/documents/CBP_No.1.pdf

Youngmi Kim, The 2015 parliamentary and 2016 presidential elections in Myanmar’, Electoral Studies, vol. 44, 2016, pp. 419-422.

Radoslaw Markowski, ‘The Polish parliamentary election of 2015: a free and fair election that results in unfair political consequences’, West European Politics, Vol. 39, Iss. 6, 2016, pp. 1311-1322.

Obinna C.D. Anejionu, Precious-Ann N. Ahiarammunnah, Chinenyendo J. Nri-ezedi, ‘The 2015 presidential election in Nigeria: Gaining insights with spatial analysis’, Electoral Studies, vol. 44, 2016, pp. 455-460.

Veronica Anghel – In the making: A Romanian government with a potentially enhanced life-expectancy

This is a guest post by Veronica Anghel, University of Bucharest

The outcome of the December 11th parliamentary elections in Romania left little room for surprises in terms of composition of the future cabinet. The Social Democrat Party (PSD) won slightly over 45% of the popular vote, which translated into 221 seats out of 465, just short of 12 for an absolute majority. The main contender, the National Liberal Party (PNL) trailed at slightly over 20% of the votes, attaining 99 seats. Newcomer Save Romania Union (USR) won 43 seats, the Democrat Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) 30, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE) 29 and the Popular Movement Party (PMP) 26. An added 17 guaranteed seats for minority representatives bring the total number to 465 members of parliament.[i]

The most likely outcome of the government is a PSD and ALDE coalition with a PSD PM. President Klaus Iohannis, a formerly PNL supported candidate, has some institutional leverage in nominating the PM, but the final say rests with the parliamentary parties according to the constitutionally set investiture rules[ii]. The final decision for PM nomination of the president, as a rational participant in the government formation game, is expected to meet a plausibility criterion of acquiring parliamentary support. This reasoning excludes the nomination of a non-PSD + ALDE proposed candidate. While acknowledging PSD’s democratic win, Iohannis has also put forward his own integrity criteria for the PM which excluded PSD chairman Liviu Dragnea, who serves a suspended two year sentence for electoral fraud[iii]. The PSD nomination for PM was predictably a longstanding PSD member and working partner of his during former positions in central administration, Sevil Shhaideh.[iv]

The groundwork for a would be functional political marriage

While rhetorically the PSD/anti-PSD cleavage is kept alive, the Romanian party system overcame this polarization (and others that followed) and is no longer unidimensional. This outcome hinders the potential of looking at government formation from a “most valuable coalition” cooperative game approach. ALDE is a splinter of PNL which merged with another traditionally PSD political supporter, the Conservative Party (PC) in 2014. Although a scenario for an anti-PSD large coalition that should have comprised all other parliamentary parties kept commentators’ imagination alive following elections, the possibility of a shift of allegiance of ALDE from the side of the PSD to an ad–hoc heterogeneous coalition of “others” on pseudo-reasons of ideological proximity on the center – right was an improbable option.

The PSD – ALDE cabinet is a successful result of rational – choice calculations of balancing costs and benefits to reach a goal that maximizes each party’s advantage under given rules. Choosing to be a part of this coalition is the consequence of individually played optimal strategies.  While the PSD could, on paper, govern as a minority cabinet with the support of the 17 minority votes or some other form of negotiated legislative support and not share any of the governing cake, choosing to be on shaky grounds rather than forging a strong commitment with a longstanding loyal partner would not make for a good strategic move. A choice of a different partner for the PSD among the other parties that got over the threshold would increase costs for no benefits. Equally, the possibility of engaging in a cooperative game with all the others, as there is little reason to assume a superior individual gain as a part of a multi – member coalition with histories of dissent, should provide ALDE with little incentives for shifting.

These decisions would seem to be made based on office seeking assumptions, but the blend of motivations is more complex and also includes shared policies. Since there was little real distinction between the governing programs of all parties who stood elections, a suggestion of ideological closeness between PSD and ALDE in particular would be a stretch.  However, there is a match of agendas on key issues. For instance, both PSD and ALDE share a similar understanding that the judicial anti-corruption process has led not only to reforms but also to abuse.

Another reason why the PSD ALDE government stands as an option equal to none is their longstanding history of collaboration that dates back to the beginning of the 1990s. The current ALDE chairman, Calin Popescu – Tariceanu, was a founding member of a 1990 splinter of the then PNL, which signed the first Romanian coalition agreement with the National Salvation Front (FSN), the earliest incarnation of the PSD. As the PM of a PNL led minority coalition cabinet in 2007 – 2008, Tariceanu benefited from PSD legislative support on the basis of an informal arrangement and jointly worked to also impeach the president at that time, Traian Basescu. In 2009, PNL, of which Tariceanu was once more a prominent member although no longer president, stroke one of the most size successful political alliances in Romanian history, the Liberal – Socialist Union (USL). Once this alliance broke in 2013, Tariceanu and his supporters split once more from the PNL in early 2014 to support PSD political strategies, policies and a common presidential candidate. He was rewarded with the position of Speaker of the Senate and his then Reformist Liberal Party (PLR) entered the government at the end of the same year. He remained on the side of the PSD ever since while also merging with the Conservative Party (PC), which had served as the political arm of a powerful media trust owner who greatly supported the PSD and who now serves a ten year prison sentence.

Institutional conditionality and tamed cohabitation

In the making of the cabinet, bargaining happened less between parties, as the matter of who governs and who stays in the opposition was mostly intuitively settled. The absence of a pre-electoral coalition agreement between PSD and ALDE could have been a reason to assume some potential of a break, but this was not a strong enough alert. The pattern of signing coalition agreements in Romania between a dominant and a support party has more often than not only met a symbolic meaning, while informal ties between party leaders carried the actual weight of the commitment. Also, history has shown that such alliances could be broken under different conditions even in the eventuality of a written set of rules.[v]All suppositions have been cleared with a post – electoral coalition agreement between PSD and ALDE signed on December 19th[vi], at the beginning of the week of scheduled party consultations with the president.

The matter of the two established camps was further settled by a PNL announcement that they would not put forward a PM nomination during consultations with the president.[vii] This was confirmed on December 21st.

Nevertheless, a sort of public negotiating took place between the president and the winning PSD. As Iohannis placed as a sole conditionality the need for a PM with a clean judicial track, he required from PSD to consider well their choice so as to avoid unneeded conflict. Dragnea chose to step back for the time being by nominating a loyal representative who could serve the interest of the party just as well. The median voter thus benefits from this one policy accommodation as he would not witness a new process of negotiating with the law (there is a 2001 Law that prohibits convicts from being cabinet members) and the Constitution (there have been sparse voices which contested the constitutionality of this 2001 Law).

All things equal, there are some signs for a mutual consent for a tamed cohabitation. The president has little coalition potential as he has no strong enough political organisations to work through and shows limited interest in getting involved in political negotiations. In the absence of such a dependable, strong party and after his institutionally granted moment of nominating the PM, the president only preserves little, localised effect on the governance of the state.

Government stability, but to what end?

Once in place, there is reason to believe in an enhanced life-expectancy for the PSD – ALDE government, as they tick all the needed boxes: controlling a legislative majority; low ideological dissent among cabinet members; a reduced fragmentation in the party system, limited to the opposition; a favourable institutional design (no formal presidential powers for government breakup and no informal authority to the same end in the absence of a strong presidential agenda support party). The legislative support agreement signed with the UDMR is only the icing on a quite stable cake.[viii]

All in all, the soon to be invested cabinet provides some positive signs on the front of government stability. A new episode of negotiating with the president is clearly not desired by the PSD leadership, enough to assume that both the government composition and the would-be PSD PM are here to stay. Even so, one must take into account that so far, Romanian cabinets have had an average lifespan of about one year.

With the presidential elections three years from now and some projects that have the incentives for consensus building among institutions on the way (the 2018 100 years anniversary since the unification of Romanian historic territories and the 2019 EU Romanian Presidency) a time of silence could descend on the otherwise loud politics of the Eastern European state. But stability to what end? It is in the hands of the opposition parties now to make sure that the silence they endorse is not a free hand offered to the PSD to roam unhindered through the realm.

Along similar lines, should Sevil Shheideh be invested as PM, her gender, ethnicity (Tatar – Turkish) and religion (Muslim) will lead to a confrontation of the Romanian nation’s xenophobic, misogynistic streaks. On the one hand, this is a positive, as the PSD would have to eliminate such elements from their own speech. On the negative side, the PNL will enhance theirs. All in all, having these issues steal the political show would only deviate attention from the actual worries related to a PSD one dominant party government: the continuity of the processes to consolidate democratic institutions through the limitation of informality and the independence of the justice system. These are not irreversible projects and stability for stability’s sake in the absence of an articulated opposition on policy issues might prove detrimental for the quality of democracy in the long run.

Notes

[i]  http://infogr.am/_/5sQoCfE3K4ndWwGlQsbO

[ii] Romanian Constitution, Article 103 http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?den=act2_2&par1=3#t3c3s0sba103

[iii]http://www.romaniajournal.ro/president-iohannis-i-wont-designate-a-criminally-prosecuted-or-convicted-person-as-pm/

[iv] http://www.romaniajournal.ro/psd-proposes-woman-of-turkish-origin-as-prime-minister-liviu-dragnea-says-it-will-be-their-only-proposal/

[v] In 2004, parliamentary elections were won by a PSD+PC political alliance which had signed a pre-electoral coalition agreement, but their candidate failed to also secure the presidency. The winner, Traian Basescu, made use of his institutionally enhanced coalition potential to break PC from the PSD and join the runner up political alliance made up of his support Democrat Party (PD) and PNL.

[vi] PSD – ALDE Coalition Agreement (in Romanian) http://www.alde.ro/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/PROTOCOL-Coalitie-guvernare-PSD-ALDE_19.12.2016.pdf

[vii] http://www.romaniajournal.ro/liberals-wont-forward-any-proposal-for-the-pm-seat/

[viii] Legislative support agreement (in Romanian) http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-politic-21486638-udmr-semant-acordul-sustinere-parlamentara-coalitia-psd-alde.htm

Giorgio Comai – The presidential election in Transnistria

This is a guest post by Giorgio Comai, Marie Curie ITN “Post-Soviet Tensions” fellow at Dublin City University

The presidential election that took place on 11 December 2016 in Transnistria, a de facto independent state within the internationally recognised borders of Moldova, ended with the resounding victory of the speaker of parliament, Vadim Krasnoselski (62,3%), over the incumbent president, Yevgeny Shevchuk (27,38%), the candidate of the Communist party, Oleg Khorzhan (3,17%), and others (including 3,4% who voted “against all”, which is formally one of the options given on the ballot). According to official data published by the local electoral commission, voter turnout reached 60,1% (corresponding to 252,659 voters), which is higher than both at the 2015 parliamentary election (47%) and at the previous presidential election in 2011 (58,88%).[1] There was, thus, no need for a second round, and Krasnoselski officially took office after an inauguration ceremony on 16 December.

The outcome was largely in line with the results of parliamentary elections in 2015 and with expectations on the eve of the vote. Krasnoselski was seen as the favourite thanks to his good connections in Moscow, strong support from Transnistria’s main economic actor (the Sheriff holding), and the economic uncertainty that has characterised Shevchuk’s rule.[2] Yet, the incumbent Shevchuk did fight to win the vote until the end, in an increasingly polarised context that at least in part explains the high turnout. Formally, the transition has been smooth so far, with a candidate winning a clear mandate, the electoral commission declaring him the president, and both the incumbent Shevchuk and the first Transnistria president, Igor Smirnov, being present at the inauguration ceremony.

Ensuring a smooth transition

An article published by the Russian newspaper “Kommersant” highlights the key role of Russian observers in defusing possible tensions, including remaining in contact with both of the main candidates on election day. Two days after the vote, Shevchuk flew to Moscow “invited by the Russian side” – as a concise press release put it – to hold a number of working meetings, where presumably he received instructions about how to ensure a smooth transition and was given reassurances about his own future.[3] On the same day, he signed a decree anticipating the inauguration ceremony to 16 December (a decree issued just a few hours earlier scheduled the inauguration on 27 December).

In his first meeting with journalists as president elect, Krasnoselski stated he would not take revenge on those working in the state media and security services who took sides with Shevchuk before the vote.  His words of reassurance should be seen in light of his commitment to keep stability in Transnistria during this period of transition. The fallout from the elections in the state media, the security services and other state institutions remains however to be seen, and in all likelihood there will be significant changes, in particular in senior positions. Immediate dismissals include the director of Transnistria’s public broadcaster, the head of the investigative committee, the republican prosecutor, as well as the head of Transnistria’s national bank.[4] The new configuration of power also implies that Transnistrian residents will have very little chance to hear any criticism of state institutions in the coming years, since both the Sheriff-owned TSV channel and the public broadcaster are due to support Kransoselski and the new government.

Developments

Krasnoselski’s victory puts an end to the institutional deadlock between president and parliament that stalled much needed reforms, in particular in relation to the ongoing currency crisis. After ensuring a strong majority in parliament at the 2015 vote,[5] the interest group around the Sheriff holding can now celebrate the victory of its candidate at the presidential election. In the short term, the renewed harmony between parliament, president, Sheriff, and Moscow is due to open the way for pragmatic solutions to long-standing problems that were hostage of the pre-electoral season. The newly installed government led by Aleksandr Martynov comes with a number of initiatives aimed at improving the economic situation in the territory.[6] But ultimately, Krasnoselski is not coming to power with fundamentally new recipes for enhancing Transnistria’s economy, or with a new foreign policy course.

When Shevchuk was elected five years ago, he was hailed as a reformist and there were even some hopes of an enhanced dialogue with Chişinău. No such hopes come with Krasnoselski. In line with his predecessor, Krasnoselski supports Transnistria’s integration (and eventual unification) with Russia. In spite of the monolithically pro-Russian rhetoric that characterised his campaign, however, he will also have to take a pragmatic stance and take all efforts needed to keep Transnistria’s export routes towards the West open. Limited room for manoeuvre is ultimately a defining characteristic of politics in de facto states, and in the next five years newly elected Krasnoselski will inevitably have to adapt to circumstances and external developments to keep Transnistria afloat.

Notes

[1]    An evaluation of voter turnout should take in consideration the fact that a significant share of Transnistria’s population effectively lives and works abroad (local scholars estimate that migrant workers make up about 20-33% percent of Transnistria’s population), and that it was not possible to vote from outside the territory.

[2]    See the previous post, The upcoming presidential election in Transnistria, for more background information.

[3]    In spite of accusations of corruption, also the first president of Transnistria Igor Smirnov has never been prosecuted after he has been voted out of office in 2011. He has been able to live in Tiraspol since then and has mostly remained out of public life (until the latest electoral campaign, during which he supported Krasnoselski), living – as he put it – the life of a pensioner. It seems likely that at least in the short term the younger Shevchuk will have the chance to spend more time with his wife Nina Shtanski (former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Transnistria) and their daughter.

[4]    The new head of the Transnistrian Republican Bank was until his nomination a senior manager in Sheriff-owned AgropromBank.

[5]    The well known connections between Sheriff and current members of parliament have also been recently highlighted by a report by a group of investigative journalists; in fact, 15 out of 43 members of the Transnistrian parliament are currently employed by Sheriff in managerial positions.

[6]    For a closer analysis of the economic issues the new government has to face, see Andrey Devyatkov’s analysis on Lact (18 December 2016).

South Korea – Impeachment of the President: Critical Citizens and Political Will

On December 9, 2016, the South Korean legislature voted 234 to 56 (with two abstentions and seven invalid votes) to impeach the sitting president, Park Geun-hye. Two-thirds of the legislature – or 200 votes – is required for impeachment to succeed. The opposition and independents added to only 172 votes, so that at least 28 members of the Saenuri Party would have to cross the aisle in order for impeachment to pass. As late as December 2, 2016, it was unclear that there would be enough votes for impeachment: President Park’s offer to resign on November 29 threw a wrench in discussions between the three opposition parties, and within the Saenuri party. Yet, in a week, bolstered by the large and growing protests against the President Park, the opposition pulled together to pass the impeachment vote, the second successful impeachment of a sitting president since Korea’s democratization in 1987. The successful vote, then, offers a useful study of the opposition in the legislature, and the role of the opposition in the electorate in delivering the necessary political will.

The opposition in the legislature comprises three political parties – the main opposition Minjoo Party with 123 seats, the People’s Party with 38 seats, and the Justice Party with 6 seats – and independents; it also includes the non-Park members of the Saenuri Party. The Minjoo Party and the People’s Party had fractured from the former opposition New Politics Alliance for Democracy (NPAD); among the independents, some are disgruntled members of the NPAD while some are the disenfranchised members of the Saenuri Party who left following the candidate-nomination fights for general elections in April, 2016. Among the opposition, then, political hostility reigned high, so that the camaraderie that led to the fragile agreement between the three opposition parties cracked easily, such as when Minjoo Chair Choo Mi-ae attempted to broker a deal for the president’s resignation.

In the Saenuri Party, the non-Park faction had suffered a series of crippling setbacks in standoffs with the President that were generally resolved in favour of the President since 2015.[i] Indeed, even following the surprising electoral trouncing that led the ruling party to lose its majority in the legislature, the non-Park members were stymied in their efforts to build – or revive – a viable alternative to the pro-Park faction. Still, in this political crisis, non-Park members rallied to constitute 12 members of the crisis management council – it includes former chair of the Saenuri Party, Representative Kim Moo-sung, and former floor leader, Representative Yoo Seung-min – to bring party members into supporting impeachment. But, the strength of the President Park’s advocates in the party must be noted: even with the President’s impeachment, the new floor leaders of the Saenuri Party are from the pro-Park faction.

But for the united and expanding opposition in the electorate, the tenuous union of the opposition in the legislature may have crumbled in the face of further compromises from the executive. Critical citizens – citizens who question government authority or adopt unconventional participation, including protests, to influence government policies – have consistently battled to keep their concerns on the political agenda in South Korea.[2] This is no mean feat, given the discord among the opposition in the legislature, and notwithstanding concessions and compromises from the executive. Their steadfastness – hitting a record two million in weekly protests since October – buttressed the resolve of the opposition parties in the legislature, and likely convinced wavering members of the Saenuri Party to support the non-Park vote for impeachment.

Indeed, many predict that this opposition in the electorate will be critical in swaying the mostly-conservative Constitutional Court, which will have the final say in the impeachment process. Six Constitutional Court justices must support impeachment before the President is removed from office; the quorum for binding vote is seven. The Court has 180 days to decide on the impeachment; however, two of the nine justices are scheduled to retire in March 2017, which increases the odds that six of the remaining seven will vote to support impeachment. Still, the opinions of the justices will be made public; this, together with the strong public will against the President, may deliver the impeachment.

———-

[i] O. Fiona Yap, 2016. “South Korea in 2015: Battling to Set the Stage for Elections.” Asian Survey vol 56 no 1: 78-86

[2] See Norris, P. (2002). Democratic Phoenix. Political Activism Worldwide. New Social Movements, Protest Politics and the Internet: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Kim, S. (2010). Public trust in government in Japan and South Korea: Does the rise of critical citizens matter? Public administration review, 70(5), 801-810; Sander, T. H., & Putnam, R. D. (2010). Still bowling alone?: The post-9/11 split. Journal of Democracy, 21(1), 9-16.

 

 

New publications – Books

Anna Fruhstorfer and Michael Hein (eds.), Constitutional Politics in Central and Eastern Europe: From Post-Socialist Transition to the Reform of Political Systems, Springer, 2016.

Guy Burton and Ted Goertzel, Presidential Leadership in the Americas since Independence, Lanham, Lexington Books.

Serap Gur, Presidentialism in Turkey: Instability and Change, Routledge, 2017.

Jiunn-rong Yeh, The Constitution of Taiwan: A Contextual Analysis, Hart, 2016.

Bianca Selejan-Gutan, The Constitution of Romania: A Contextual Analysis, Hart, 2016.

Vincenzo Lippolis and Giulio M. Salerno, La presidenza più lunga: I poteri del capo dello Stato e la Costituzione, Il Mulino, 2016.

Mauro Volpi (ed.), Istituzioni e sistema politico in Italia: bilancio di un ventennio, Il Mulino, 2015, two chapters on the president.

Elaine C. Kamarck, Why Presidents Fail: And How They Can Succeed Again, Brookings.

Tevi Troy, Shall We Wake The President? Two Centuries of Disaster Management From the Oval Office, Lyons Press.

Robert Strauss, Worst. President. Ever. James Buchanan, the POTUS Ratings Game, and the Legacy of the Least of the Lesser Presidents, Lyons Press.

Bruce Miroff, Presidents on Political Ground: Leaders in Action and What They Face, University Press of Kansas.

Steven E. Schier (ed.), Debating the Obama Presidency, Rowman and Littlefield, 2016.

Michael Nelson, Barbara A. Perry, and Russell L. Riley (eds.), 42: Inside the Presidency of Bill Clinton, Cornell University Press, 2016.

Presidents, Policy Compromise and Legislative Success

This post is based on a paper by Christian Arnold, David Doyle and Nina Wiesehomeier that is forthcoming in the Journal of Politics.

Presidents play a central role in legislative activity in Latin America. Previous research highlights that some form of ideological compromise on behalf of the president is vital to sustain successful legislative coalitions. Yet, primarily due to the lack of a firm empirical basis on which to measure such presidential give-and-take, the extent to which presidents make use of such policy compromise, and under what conditions this is a viable strategy, remains unknown.

One of the primary obstacles towards a better understanding of these dynamics has been – to date – the difficulty of deriving reliable comparable estimates of the policy compromise of presidents over time. We collected ‘State of the Union’ addresses for 73 Latin American presidents between 1980 and 2014 and we used the Wordfish algorithm (Slapin and Proksch 2008) to provide a position for each one of these presidents, for each year, on the main latent political dimension. The heatmap below illustrates these positions. Each country’s time series reports standardized z-scores and progresses from the earliest speech available in our sample on the left to the most recent observation on the right. The shading of the cells reflect the estimated ideal-point; more negative values are shown in darker shading, increasingly becoming lighter with more positive values. Note that absolute positions can only be compared within a country. Cross country comparisons are only possible for presidential movements, because standardisation per country expresses movements relative to the stretching of the respective main political dimension.

Executives in Colombia, Costa Rica, Uruguay and also Venezuela all display consistent and stable political views. In contrast, in Argentina, Chile and Mexico, the presidents’ movements appear to trend over time. The remaining countries demonstrate a high mobility of presidents along the latent issue dimension.

With this cross-national time-series, we can explore to what extent presidents engage in policy compromise, and under what conditions this is a viable strategy. Our central finding is relatively straightforward. We show that the president does not adopt a static policy position across her term. Rather, the president, if she wishes to pursue a statutory legislative agenda, will respond to shifting dynamics in the house. Specifically, we suggest that when the position of the median party changes, the president will shift her policy position in the same direction. Of course, the degree to which a president is willing to compromise will depend on a number of conditioning variables; specifically, the president’s non-statutory power, her government status and her ability to offset the need for compromise with increased material transfers (see the figure below). At high levels of executive power, and when the president has access to large amounts of discretionary funds to use as pork, she will compromise less in response to changes in the median party position. We also demonstrate that when the president compromises her position in response to the median party in this manner, a president will enjoy a higher rate of success for her legislative initiatives than were she not to do so.

We think our results have some important implications.  Presidents in Latin America are not always the inflexible and imperial leaders as previously characterized by Juan Linz. However, they also show that under certain circumstances they can be, in particular, in minority situations. In short, institutional variation among separation of power systems will condition the degree of harmony between the executive and legislative branch. The flip side of the coin is of course that presidents are willing to compromise given the right institutional incentives. Our results show that a president can influence the interbranch relationship with signals of policy compromise. Our results on policy compromise are indicative of this inter-branch legislative dynamic that helps the president to build and maintain coalitions, and pass legislation in the house.

Eugene Huskey – Plebiscitarianism and Constitution-Making: The December 11, 2016 Referendum in Kyrgyzstan

In a referendum that generated fierce opposition from critics of Kyrgyzstani President Almazbek Atambaev, voters approved 26 revisions to Kyrgyzstan’s constitution on December 11, 2016.[i]  It was the seventh constitutional plebiscite since the adoption of the country’s original post-communist constitution in May 1993, making Kyrgyzstan the regional leader in employing the referendum to change its basic law.[ii]  Sunday’s constitutional referendum was paired with voting for local assembly elections in Kyrgyzstan’s 21 cities, elections that gave a plurality of seats to candidates from President Atambaev’s party, the Social Democrats.

With only a year remaining in his single, six-year term, President Atambaev had presented the amendments to the nation as a means of “idiot-proofing” the Constitution, that is, introducing further safeguards to ensure that the office of the presidency would not be abused by his successors.[iii]  Many elements in the country’s political class and civil society, however, found his explanations unconvincing.  In an unprecedented move, Atambaev’s former colleagues in the Interim Government of 2010–among them former President Roza Otunbaeva and Omurbek Tekebaev, the de facto father of the 2010 Constitution–signed a collective letter condemning any attempt to revise the constitution before 2020, the date set by the Interim Government for the earliest constitutional revisions. President Atambaev responded almost immediately to the letter with an intemperate speech, the harshest of his presidency, which accused his former colleagues of spreading “malicious lies.” He then reminded them that they could be held to account legally for their misdeeds in office six years earlier.  He concluded by assuring the nation that he had no intention of seeking any formal political post after his departure from the presidency in 2017.[iv]

Besides regarding the plebiscite as premature, many critics of the President objected to specific amendments proposed to the Constitution.  Some revisions strengthen the powers of the prime minister vis-a-vis president and parliament by granting the head of government the sole authority to remove ministers as well as local and regional heads of administration.  The prime minister and his deputy will also be able to retain their seats in parliament.  Previously the prime minister and deputy prime minister had had to relinquish their parliamentary seats on assuming executive office.  The referendum included only one seemingly innocuous revision to the presidency itself—changing the name of the presidential defense council to the security council.  Given the existing authority of Kyrgyzstan’s president, which is based largely on his direct popular mandate and his appointment and oversight of the power ministers, the enhancement of the prime minister’s office should produce more complex challenges of cohabitation than had existed heretofore.

Another basket of constitutional amendments sought to increase the stability of the Government in a country that had seen six prime ministers in the first six years of what had been touted as a “parliamentary republic.”  In order to leave a ruling coalition, the revised constitution will now require two-thirds of a party’s deputies to approve the rupture in a written ballot.  Although this amendment and some others were reasonable responses to the inefficiencies that plagued the current system, many critics viewed the enhancing of the prime minister’s role as a means of preparing a landing place for President Atambaev or a Social Democratic politician who would be under his influence.

In order to win support for the referendum from moral traditionalists and ethnic Kyrgyz nationalists, whose ranks often overlap, President Atambaev and his supporters included several amendments that responded to the rising populist tide in the post-communist world and beyond.  This effort included a reworking of Article 1 of the 2010 Constitution, which contained a simple, one-sentence statement of the country’s basic principles, notably the state’s secular, law-based, and democratic character.  The proposed alternative had nine separate points, several of which echoed nativist and socially conservative trends in Russia.  Among the country’s “highest values” in the newly-revised Constitution are “love of country,” “the development of the national [Kyrgyz] language and culture,” and, perhaps most worrying for the opposition, “a respectful attitude toward the country’s history,” a phrase that the Russian authorities have used to condemn domestic and foreign critics and that the Kyrgyzstani government could potentially employ to silence unpopular interpretations of events such as the inter-ethnic violence in Osh in 2010. The constitutional revisions also included an explicit ban on gay marriage.

As part of an ongoing backlash against international criticism of the Kyrgyzstani government’s handling of the violence between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in Osh, President Atambaev included among the constitutional amendments a revision to Article 41.  That article had allowed citizens of Kyrgyzstan to appeal to international human rights bodies if they believed their rights had been violated.  If the international tribunal upheld their complaints, the Kyrgyzstani government was obligated to restore their rights or compensate them for damages.  In the runup to the referendum, President Atambaev had been openly critical of the decision of the UN’s Committee on Human Rights, which called on the government of Kyrgyzstan to free an ethnic Uzbek condemned to life imprisonment.[v]

Constitutional Referendums in Kyrgyzstan[vi]

Although the proposed constitutional amendments were approved by an almost 80 percent Yes vote (see table above), this result was a record low for Kyrgyzstan.  Moreover, only 42 percent of the population turned out to the polls on a day when both the referendum and local elections were on the ballot.  Thus, only slightly more than a third of eligible voters in Kyrgyzstan voted for the constitutional revisions.  Turnout was especially low (28%) in the southern city of Osh, where almost half of the population is ethnic Uzbek.  Taken together with the historically low turnout, a tally of invalid ballots that reached five percent suggests a considerable measure of popular discontent with President Atambaev’s decision to revise the 2010 Constitution,[vii] especially given the herculean—and in some cases inappropriate—efforts of the President’s team to get voters to the polls to support the referendum.[viii]  As Omurbek Tekebaev observed, Atambaev’s political protegees had every reason to go to the mat for him in getting out the Yes vote, recognizing that if the referendum failed, he may have followed the example of de Gaulle and resigned from office, in which case their own futures would have been uncertain.[ix]

The passing of the referendum and the results of local elections will be discouraging reminders to opposition-minded forces in Kyrgyzstan that President Atambaev and his Social Democratic Party appear to be consolidating their hold on the government and the state.[x]  In recent years, a frustrated opposition has organized two popular rebellions that unseated presidents—in 2005 and 2010—but in those cases the ruling elite was divided along North-South lines, and so the opposition was able to tap into regional resentment.  No such easily identified source of political support exists today for the political opposition, and therefore taking to the streets for anything more than symbolic protests would not seem to be an option.  Those who stayed home on election day, or spoiled their ballots, are unlikely to form an easily mobilized force to counter the rise of the Social Democrats as the country’s dominant—if not yet hegemonic—party.  The question now is whether the constitutional revisions to governing institutions will provide the promised efficiencies without undermining the political pluralism that has distinguished Kyrgyzstan from its authoritarian neighbors.

Notes

[i] The amendments were presented to voters as a single package, and so only a Yes or No vote on the entire array of proposed revisions was possible.

[ii] For a comparison of constitution-making in post-communist countries, see Anna Fruhstorfer and Michael Hein, Constitutional Politics in Central and Eastern Europe: From Post-Socialist Transition to the Reform of Political Systems (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2016).

[iii] Eugene Huskey, Kyrgyzstan – President Atambaev Seeks to “Idiot-Proof” the Constitution by Reducing the Power of the Presidency, Presidential Power Blog, 21 January 2016. http://presidential-power.com/?p=4352  This post discusses some of the changes to the legal system included in the constitutional revisions, which are allegedly designed to root out corruption in the judiciary but will certainly lead to greater executive control of the courts.  For other changes see Bruce Pannier, “What’s in Kyrgyzstan’s Constitutional Referendum?” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 8 December 2016.  http://www.rferl.org/a/kyrgyzstan-constitutional-referendum-whats-at-stake/28164053.html

[iv] Anna Kapushchenko, “Atambaev raskritikoval Otunbaevu i eks-ministrov za nedovol’stvo popravkami k Konstitutsiiu,” Kloop Media, August 31, 2016. http://kloop.kg/blog/2016/08/31/atambaev-raskritikoval-otunbaevu-i-eks-ministrov-iz-za-popravok-v-konstitutsiyu-glavnoe/  In the middle of President Atambaev’s speech, which was given on Independence Day on Bishkek’s main square, former President Otunbaeva demonstratively walked off the stage to protest Atambaev’s attacks on her and other members of the Interim Government.

[v] See United Nations Human Rights Committee, Views Adopted by the Committee under Article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol concerning communication No. 2231/2012,  CCPR/C/116/D/2231/2012, 11 May 2016.

[vi] Tat’iana Kudriavtseva, “Kak v Kyrgyzstane khodili na referendumy po konstitutsii,” 24.kg, 12 December 2016.  http://24kg.org/obschestvo/41447_kak_v_kyirgyizstane_hodili_na_referendumyi_po_konstitutsii/  The table of referendum results provided in this article, based on information from the Central Election Commission, mistakenly includes a 75 percent Yes vote for the 2007 referendum, but that is the percentage of eligible voters, not those actually voting, which is the method used for other years in the table.

[vii] The head of the Central Election Commission admitted to being surprised by the high percentage of invalid ballots and suggested that the sensitivity of the new electronic counting machines could have been at fault.  “Glava Tsentral’noi izbiratel’noi komissii rasskazala, chto ee udivilo na referendume,” Sputnik Kyrgyzstana, 12 December 2016.  http://ru.sputnik.kg/politics/20161212/1030753631/mnogo-nedejstvitelnyh-byulletenej-dlya-nas-neozhidannost.html The recent introduction of biometric identification for voters, which required citizens to get finger-printed, was one reason for the lower turnout rate.  A significant share of Kyrgyzstani voters had not gone in for biometric registration before the referendum, and even some who did register did not find their biometric registration on record at the voting precinct.  “Institut ombudsmena vyiavil nekotorye narusheniia izbiratel’nogo prava na vyborakh nakanune,” Akipress.org, 12 December 2016.  http://kg.akipress.org/news:1350601?from=kgnews&place=newstopic

[viii] There were reports, for example, of teachers employed by the state serving as “get out the vote” teams for the Yes camp.

[ix] “Omurbek Tekebaev: ‘Atambaev sposoben na postupki.  Esli referendum ne proidet, on uidet, kak de Goll’’,” Novye litsa, 29 October 2016.  http://www.nlkg.kg/ru/interview/omurbek-tekebaev-atambaev-sposoben-na-postupki-esli-referendum-ne-projdet_-on-ujdet_-kak-de-goll-

[x] In the weeks before the referendum,the Ata Meken Party’s criticism of the proposed constitutional changes led to the collapse of the ruling coalition and the effective expulsion of Ata-Meken from its ranks.  “Koalitsiia: Ushli, chtoby vernut’sia…no bez ‘Ata Mekena’,” KirTag, 25 October 2016.  http://kyrtag.kg/standpoint/koalitsiya-ushli-chtoby-vernutsya-no-bez-atamekena-/

Ghana – President Mahama accepts election defeat

On Friday 9 December, President John Mahama of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) called his rival, Nana Akufo Addo of the New Patriotic Party (NPP), to concede defeat in the presidential election. Mahama’s defeat was comprehensive: he recorded the lowest vote share of any sitting president since the return of multiparty politics in 1992 (44%), and in the legislative elections his political party was reduced to around 105 of the 275 seats on offer (some results TBC). His defeat also made history in another way: he is the only sitting president to have lost an election in Ghana. All previous transfers of power occurred in open-seat polls, in which the sitting president had stood down as a result of presidential term-limits, and the ruling party was hampered by having to run a new candidate.

Does this mean that President Mahama will go down as one of the country’s least successful presidents? Not necessarily. Despite the disappointing result, few commentators believe that the NDC ran a bad campaign. The party focussed on its strengths and spoke about issues that were of interest to voters. Moreover, the general attitude towards Mahama among ordinary Ghanaians appears to be that he did not have the tools that the country required, but was a relatively benign leader. This perception, of course, will now be reinforced by the fact that he was willing to concede defeat, and did so before the official results had been announced by the electoral commission.

This raises the question of why the opposition won the election so comprehensively. Two factors seem to explain this. First, a period of sustained economic difficulties has hurt living standards, and has resulted in high levels of youth unemployment. In turn, this has encouraged Ghanaians to look for economic change – something that is promised by the NPP. While some of the country’s economic difficulties reflect global trends beyond its control, such as the slump in oil prices, the government’s handling of the crisis has been widely criticised, undermining the NDC’s claim that it was the party best placed to ensure economic revival.

Second, a number of high profile corruption scandals involving figures around the president enabled the opposition to argue that Ghana’s economic woes can not be fully explained by external factors, and are instead rooted in the dysfunctionality of the ruling party itself. This narrative appears to have been effective, particularly among younger voters. A nationally representative survey conducted by the author in December 2015 found that while many do not blame the president for what has happened in the country, a majority of people did not trust Mahama (56%), and that even in the NDC’s heartlands 41% of people had no trust, or only a little trust, in the executive.

Taken together, these developments strongly favoured the NPP. However, they played out in different ways across the country. In the NPP’s heartlands, there was stronger support for Nana Akufo Addo – who in the past has suffered from a lower turnout in Ashanti areas than his NPP predecessor John Kufour, in part because although both leaders belong to the Akan group, Kufour is an Ashanti while Akufo Addo is an Akyem. By contrast, in the NDC’s core areas the NPP did not secure that many more votes, but did persuade traditional Mahama supporters to stay at home. The resulting decline in turnout – up to 18% in some areas – significantly undermined the ruling party’s prospects. In swing areas the picture was different again, with the NDC holding on to some legislative seats but losing the presidential vote in a number of constituencies in Cape Coast, and winning the presidential vote but losing seats in others.

All eyes will now turn to the President Elect, Nana Akufo Addo, a trained economist and lawyer. Known for his probity and for not suffering fools gladly, the new occupier of Flagstaff House will begin his term in office with two big things in his favour. First, he enjoys a strong mandate and a dominant majority in parliament. Second, economic growth is projected to pick up to around 5% this year, from 4% in 2015.

However, he also faces a number of significant challenges. Although a clear majority of Ghanaians voted for him, it is often said that Akufo Addo is not well liked by his fellow countrymen – a fact that some NPP supporters have cited as the reason for his electoral defeats in 2008 and 2012. His brusque manner and elitist tone have meant that at times the new president has struggled to connect to the electorate. In this regard, it does not help that many voters can still remember the charismatic leadership of ex-President J. J. Rawlings, nicknamed “Junior Jesus” due to his charismatic persona and ability to generate great fervour among his supporters.

Akufo Addo’s lack of a human touch come back to haunt him at the next election if he is unable to deliver on his campaign promises. The 2016 elections are an important reminder that Ghanaians are now willing to vote out leaders who do not meet their expectations, incumbents or otherwise. Given this, it is particularly significant that in his desperation to grasp what was probably his final opportunity to win the presidency, Akufo Addo significantly overpromised. In addition the standard pledges to provide jobs and kick-start economic growth, the NPP made a specific set of high profile commitments that it may come to regret. These include creating an annual $1 million development fund for every constituency, and building a factory in every district.

Given that the country has 275 constituencies, and 216 districts, this effectively commits the new government to between $350 and $500 million of expenditure before it has even begun. Many critics have claimed that there is no way that the ruling party will be able to fund these promises, and that even if it can it will struggle to build 216 factories in four years. If this is true, and a difficult global context stymies economic recovery more generally, then the new president will be forced to fall back on his personal authority and the strength of his arguments. Should this come to pass, it may not be long before we start to hear talk of an NDC resurgence.

Romania – Social Democrats’ landslide victory in parliamentary election brings about another spell of cohabitation

 

One year after country-wide anti-corruption protests forced Victor Ponta’s Social-Democratic government out of office, the PSD won a landslide victory in the general election held on December 11. The Social-Democrats have topped the polls in each general election held since 1990 and formed the government each time a centre-right coalition was too weak or too divided to coalesce around a common leader. This time, though, their historic 46% of the vote might bring along an outright parliamentary majority – a first in Romania’s post-communist electoral history – after the redistribution of unallocated mandates. However, despite the clear election results, a political crisis might still be looming on the horizon. During the electoral campaign, President Iohannis vowed not to nominate a convicted politician as prime minister, a situation which includes the PSD leader, Liviu Dragnea, who received a two-year probation sentence for electoral fraud earlier this year.

Election results

The Social-Democrats are followed by President Iohannis’ National Liberal Party (PNL) with a distant 20%. Since the local elections held in June, the party has lost about 10% of the voters’ preferences. The election outcome is all the more disappointing for the PNL, as one year ago the party could count on 35% of the public support according to opinion polls. However, instead of calling early election when the PSD government was ousted, President Iohannis chose to appoint a technocratic government led by former commissioner Dacian Cioloş. Some of the PNL’s eroding support was captured by the Save Romania Union (USR), a new anti-corruption party set up only six months ago, which won around 9% of the vote.

Apart from the Hungarian minority party (UDMR), two new parties also managed to cross the 5% national threshold: the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), which is the merger between a PNL faction and the Conservative Party (PC) led by former prime minister Călin Popescu Tăriceanu; and former President Băsescu’s Popular Movement Party (PMP), which broke away from the Liberal Democratic Party (PDL) in 2013 (the other PDL faction merged with PNL in 2014 and supported Klaus Iohannis as a common candidate in the 2014 presidential election).

None of the 44 independent candidates who stood for election across the country’s 42 constituencies managed to obtain an electoral mandate. A couple of newly-formed ethno-nationalist parties also run unsuccessfully, proving that xenophobia and far-right extremism have not found fertile ground in Romania. That said, the election winners were able to capitalise on growing anti-EU sentiments. Turnout to vote was just 39.5%, the lowest on record since 1990. The full allocation of seats in the two parliamentary chambers is yet to be determined.

Chamber of Deputies (330 seats)
Party % Vote share %Vote change
Social Democratic Party (PSD) 45.55 +9.14
National Liberal Party (PNL) 20.04 -4.23
Union Save Romania (USR) 8.83 New
Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) 6.19 +1.82
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE) 5.62 New
People’s Movement Party (PMP) 5.34 New
United Romania Party (PRU) 2.79 New
Greater Romania Party (PRM) 1.05 -0.2
Ecology Party 0.91 +0.12
Our Alliance Romania (ANR) 0.87 New
Senate (136 seats)
Party % Vote share % Vote change
Social Democratic Party (PSD) 45.71 +12.19
National Liberal Party (PNL) 20.42 -7.99
Union Save Romania (USR) 8.88 New
Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) 6.25 +1.14
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE) 6.0 New
People’s Movement Party (PMP) 5.64 New
United Romania Party (PRU) 2.95 New
Greater Romania Party (PRM) 1.18 -0.29
Ecology Party 1.1 +0.31
Our Alliance Romania (ANR) 0.95 New

The electoral campaign

Several factors contributed to the PSD’s stunning victory. The new electoral legislation, as well as the laws on political parties and campaign financing adopted by the parliament in 2015 played a significant role. A previous post discussed the change in electoral rules, from the mixed-member system used in the 2008 and 2012 elections to the closed-list proportional system with moderately low-magnitude districts, which was employed until 2004. The new law on party financing capped campaign budgets for individual candidates to 60 gross average salaries, severely restricted the range of electioneering activities – such as street advertising and the dissemination of electoral gifts – and increased the parties’ dependence on state budget for campaign spending. These regulations favoured the two big parties, the PSD and the PNL, and limited the ability of newer parties to make themselves known outside the big cities. Under these circumstances, door-to-door canvassing and online campaigning became an essential part of campaign strategies. These techniques were also skilfully used by USR, due to its strong ties with civil society and its popularity among educated voters who are more likely to use the internet for political information.

The depersonalisation of the electoral campaign was another factor that enhanced the Social-Democrats’ chances (or at least prevented them from haemorrhaging support as in 2014, when the centre-right electorate mobilised against Victor Ponta and handed over the presidency to Klaus Iohannis). The campaign lacked the usual debates between party leaders and PM candidates and the clash of political programmes and policy proposals. Learning the lesson of the 2014 presidential election, the PSD refrained from making any nominations for prime minister, although everything pointed to its current leader, Liviu Dragnea, as the party’s first choice for the PM post. As Dragnea received a two-year probation sentence for electoral fraud earlier this year, his endorsement for the prime ministership ahead of the election would have been an easy target for the centre-right parties, which campaigned on an anti-corruption platform.

On their side, PNL and USR chose to associate themselves with the record of the technocratic government, praising its efficiency in the reform of central and local public administration. Both parties tried to lure PM Cioloş into their ranks. When the premier turned down their offer, the two parties ended up endorsing his political platform and nominating him for a second term as head of government. The move backfired for two reasons. On the one hand, it showed that PNL is still in search of leaders for top national positions, a weakness that also cost the party the defeat in the race for the mayor of Bucharest in the June contest. In fact, PM Cioloş was reluctant to even take part actively in the campaign. On the other hand, it allowed the PSD to associate the centre-right parties with the mishaps of the Cioloş government and its refusal to consent to populist public spending measures passed by the PSD parliamentarians in the eve of the electoral campaign. Moreover, just a few days before the general election, PSD presented plans for next year’s budget, which included proposals for a national reindustrialisation programme and consistent wage increases for public sector employees. This generous stance on boosting social spending and tax cuts was contrasted with PM Cioloş’ firm position on containing the budget deficit, despite Romania’s GDP growth by 6% this year.

Although President Iohannis refrained from getting too involved in the campaign, he did make three notable interventions. First, he tried to force PM Cioloş into joining the PNL ranks by announcing that he would not appoint an independent prime minister after the December poll. Faced with the premier’s refusal to join a political party, the president backed down saying that Cioloş could in fact continue in office if political parties endorsed him for a second mandate. The second time President Iohannis showed off his constitutional role in PM appointment, he ruled out designating a criminally prosecuted or convicted politician, regardless of that person’s parliamentary support. Then, less than a fortnight before the election, he prohibited officials with a criminal record to take party in the formal celebrations organised for Romania’s National Day on December 1. As a result, several high-ranking PSD and ALDE politicians, including Liviu Dragnea and former PM Popescu-Tăriceanu, were denied access to high-visibility events organised by the Presidency. Arguably, these interventions anticipated the President’s intention to make active use of his formal powers in government formation and to prevent the PSD leader from taking over as prime minister.

Towards a new government and another period of cohabitation

Although the allocation of seats has not been officially announced yet, the Social-Democrats and their smaller ally ALDE are likely to reach a sizeable majority. Consequently, the PSD will be granted the first chance in nominating a new prime minister candidate. While so far no official proposals have been made, senior PSD figures have strongly endorsed their party leader for this role. However, not only has President Iohannis vowed to deny appointment to convicted politicians, but a 2001 law also forbids convicted persons to be appointed to government posts. Nevertheless, PSD insists that constitutional provisions, according to which the president must appoint a candidate for the PM post following consultations with the party holding the absolute majority in Parliament, should take precedence in this case. As Liviu Dragnea is unlikely to allow a political rival to capitalise on his electoral success, the conditions for a new constitutional crisis seem in place. Its resolution might once again depend on the decision of the Constitutional Court, or, as several PSD members suggested, could lead to another attempt to impeach the president.

Either way, Romania seems headed towards a new period of cohabitation. It will be interesting to see what role President Iohannis will choose to play in this situation. Will he attempt to become the leader of the opposition, like Traian Băsescu in 2007 and 2012? So far there have been few signs of the president’s willingness to take an active role in the confrontation with political parties. That said, the presidential elections scheduled for 2017 could provide a strong enough incentive to capitalise on the eventual eroding popularity of the centre-left government.

Turkey – Constitutional Reform Package Proposing a Presidential System is Presented to Parliament

Turkey’s President Erdoğan is closer than ever to realising his long held dream of introducing a presidential system after receiving the backing of Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) in parliament. Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) secured a deal on a constitutional reform package that would create a strong executive presidency. The proposal was introduced to the Grand National Assembly on the 9th of December, signed by 316 AKP MPs. According to the current Constitution, the proposal needs at least 330 “yes” votes of 550 members of parliament in order to be submited to referendum. The AKP would only need 14 more votes if all of its members vote “yes” in a secret ballot voting. The MHP currently has 39 members in the Parliament. Even though some of the MHP MPs announced that they would vote “no” to the presidential system, the Leader of MHP, Devlet Bahçeli, is likely to secure the needed 14 votes.

The constitutional reform package replaces the semi-presidential system with a single executive. The president is given very important executive and legislative powers, like vetoing legislation, having the sole authority to prepare and present the budget to the parliament for a simple “yes” or “no” vote, issuing decrees with the force of law where there is no legislation on the matter, declaring a state of emergency and issuing emergency decrees. Ordinary decrees are not able to regulate individual and political rights and freedoms or issues where the constitution openly necessitates legislative rules like taxation. It means that social and economic rights would be able to be regulated by presidential decrees. The authority to issue decrees with the force of law would empower presidents such that under certain political conditions presidents may bypass legislative organs. This authority also differentiates the US model from the Latin American type of presidentialism (Cheibub– Elkins, Ginsburg : 2011).

According to the agreed proposal, the president may also call a referendum on constitutional amendments, dissolve the legislative assembly, appoint and remove all ministers and bureaucrats at will, regulate the entire public service by decrees, appoint a majority of the members of Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors, which oversees judges, and public prosecutors, including appointments to Court of Appeal and three quarters of the members of the Council of State. The president would also be able to appoint a majority of members of the Constitutional Court. This type of power of appointment gives the president total control over the judiciary.

Aside from those strong constitutional powers, the proposal proposed concurrent presidential = and legislative elections. It seems that authors of this proposal wish to secure a majority in the parliament for president’s party. Considering that Turkey has a predominant party system (the AKP won all the elections since 2002) and parties are very cohesive, this formula is likely to secure a clear and obedient majority for presidents in the parliament. Even if they were to lose a majority in the parliament, the president could still rule alone with decrees.

Overall. the proposal will result in a weak legislature. The president will have the power to bypass the Grand National Assembly. Even the impeachment process requires a two-thirds majority. That said, if three-fifths of the assembly vote in favour, new concurrent presidential and legislative elections can be held. The same authority, though, is given to the president as well. Clearly, it is easier for the president to make such a decision than a super majority of the assembly. The president could also call upon this power to threaten disobedient assemblies with an unexpected early election and it will only serve to strengthen his political presence in practice. It is worth remembering that the power to dissolve the legislature is very uncommon in presidential constitutions. In Latin America only Uruguay and Venezuela gives power of dissolution to presidents depending on certain conditions and in Africa this power is granted to the presidents of Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Seychelles.

This constitutional reform package promises to create a hyper-presidential system based on by ultra-nationalist and Islamist ideas. Turkey is increasingly turning its back on the Western world and ideals such as liberal democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

A strong presidency is considered to be the sole remedy for all of Turkey’s problems by President Erdogan and his party. Erdogan argues that Turkey will develop much more rapidly under a presidential system. Currently, Erdoğan is ruling the country without any obstacle by way of emergency decrees after the coup attempt in July. According to Freedom House, Turkey has no press freedom and only partial internet freedom. Leaders of the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP), one of the three opposition parties in the parliament, as well as 8 other MPs have been detained. Almost all critical newspapers, radio, and TV stations have been harassed, closed down or threatened in one way or another. Turkey has among the highest number of journalists in jail. The Turkish army is fighting both in Turkey and Syria and news if these actions is often censured. As the state of emergency is extended, political instability is affecting economic situation and pushing Turkey towards an unpredictable future. Yet Erdoğan never gives up on his long held dream of an executive presidency.