Monthly Archives: October 2016

Erik Herron – Ukraine: Presidential Appointments and the Central Electoral Commission

This is a guest post by Erik Herron, the Eberly Family Professor of Political Science at West Virginia University

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How important are presidential appointments to the exercise of presidential power in transitional societies? This blog entry presents a brief discussion of the implications for presidential influence over non-cabinet posts, using an example from a single country still struggling with democratic consolidation: Ukraine.

As Doyle and Elgie (2016) have noted, efforts to gauge presidential power vary substantially. Some studies emphasize subsets of presidential decision-making authority rather than a full range of powers, others focus on statutory or constitutional authority rather than practical manifestations of power [1]. Canonical measures of presidential power, like Shugart and Carey (1992), note the importance of presidential authority over cabinet appointments [2]. While decisions on cabinet posts can be critical for stable and successful governance, appointments outside the cabinet can have a significant impact on a president’s ability to lead.

In Ukraine, appointments to the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) – the body overseeing election administration – have exerted an extraordinarily important role on the outcomes of presidential, parliamentary, and local elections. As this blog post is being composed, Ukrainian politicians are engaged in an intense debate over who will occupy seats on the CEC and the president’s team is playing a large role.

Ukraine’s CEC is regulated by the Law on the Central Electoral Commission. The commission is composed of fifteen members who are approved by the parliament upon recommendation by the president. Appointments are associated with partisan affiliations; the president is supposed to take the proposals of political parties into account during the appointment process [3]. The CEC has extensive powers over the electoral process, including the responsibility for interpreting and implementing legal provisions, forming electoral districts, managing the voter registry, and certifying the results. The CEC, and its subordinate District Electoral Commissions (DECs) and Precinct Electoral Commissions (PECs), are at the center of battles to influence election outcomes.

The importance of these administrative units became especially clear in 2004. Ukraine’s semi-authoritarian president, Leonid Kuchma, was restrained by term-limits from seeking the presidency for a third consecutive time. Instead of altering the rules, Kuchma abided by them but selected a preferred successor: Viktor Yanukovych. A growing opposition to the Kuchma regime rallied behind the strongest challenger: Viktor Yushchenko. The election campaign featured strong allegations of fraud and intimidation, including the poisoning of Yushchenko with dioxin. Yanukovych and Yushchenko were the strongest first-round competitors and faced off in the second round on November 21, 2004 [4].

Evidence of widespread fraud tarnished the second round, with accusations of ballot box stuffing and intimidation in PECs, alteration of records in DECs, and the improper announcement of falsified results by the CEC. Millions of Ukrainian citizens protested and thousands set up camp in the center of the capital city. After negotiations and a decision by the Supreme Court invalidating the second round, a re-vote was held and Yushchenko was declared the winner.

While many accounts of the “Orange Revolution” rightly emphasize the role of citizen mobilization and protests in challenging the regime, the events leading up to it also show the critical role that election administration can play in determining outcomes, especially in societies where the rule of law and democratic principles are not firmly embedded.

Research that I have conducted with colleagues about election administration underscores the importance of these bureaucratic posts in Ukraine (e.g., Boyko, Herron, and Sverdan 2014; Boyko and Herron 2015; Herron, Boyko and Thunberg Forthcoming) [5]. Figure 1 compiles the outcomes from several of our studies and shows how control of local commissions – PECs – is associated with election results. The figure displays the coefficients and standard errors showing how control of officers on a commission is associated with variation in the results. All of the models treat the performance of party/candidate i in polling station j as the dependent variable (i.e., the proportion of the vote received), but the independent variables vary. In many cases, parties or candidates have an associated “bonus” in precincts where they control commissions.

Figure 1. Comparison of Commission Officer Effects, 2010-2014

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The figure shows that major competitors in 2012 and 2014 benefited from having their co-partisans present in officer positions; these candidates or parties performed better, on average, where their allies held officer posts. However, in the 2010 presidential election, the “benefit” was generally absent. The rules regarding the composition of commissions differed in 2010 and required a balance of forces: Viktor Yanukovych and Yuliya Tymoshenko, the main rivals for the presidential post, had equal numbers of commissioners and officers on each commission in the second round. While the findings on this table are preliminary and should be interpreted with caution, they generate two important possibilities for understanding the value of appointments. First, the results suggest that for some parties, controlling commissions can generate electoral benefits. This finding illustrates the value to presidents in controlling appointments, even for ancillary posts. Second, the findings suggest that when partisan appointees are balanced, the effects of controlling commissions dissipate.

The current struggle over appointments to Ukraine’s CEC takes place in a context where the ostensibly independent CEC and its subordinate units have been politicized. The current president, Petro Poroshenko, has maintained a hard negotiating stance over CEC appointments. The simultaneous end of all members’ terms provides the president with an opportunity to populate the commission with allies, potentially to his co-partisans’ benefit in future elections. The CEC’s power over election administration extends the influence of its decisions down to the front-lines. In close elections, this control could prove to be decisive and a powerful weapon in a president’s partisan arsenal. While non-cabinet appointments are not primary indicators of presidential power, they can be valuable tools to shore up presidential authority.

Notes

[1] Doyle, David and Robert Elgie. 2016 “Maximizing the Reliability of Cross-National Measures of Presidential Power.” British Journal of Political Science. 46(4): 731-741.

[2] Shugart, Matthew Soberg and John Carey. 1992. Presidents and Assemblies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[3] Brian Mefford’s detailed blog post (http://www.brianmefford.net/ukraine-update-920-cec-reform-recommendations/) reviews current and proposed members of the CEC and proposes reforms to the CEC law. Mefford notes that vague language in the law permits the president to adopt a hard stance in terms of negotiations. He also notes that past CEC membership has represented the parties in parliament

[4] I served as an international election observer during the second round and witnessed efforts to manipulate results in favor of Yanukovych by local electoral commissions.

[5] Boyko, Nazar and Erik S. Herron. 2015. “The Effects of Technical Parties and Partisan Election Management Bodies on Voting Outcomes.” Electoral Studies. 40 (December): 23-33; Boyko, Nazar, Erik S. Herron, and Roman Sverdan. 2014. “Administration and Management of Ukraine’s 2014 Presidential Election: A Systematic and Spatial Analysis.” Eurasian Geography and Economics. 55 (3): 286-306; Herron, Erik S., Nazar Boyko, and Michael Thunberg. Forthcoming. “Serving Two Masters: Professionalization Vs. Corruption in Ukraine’s Election Administration.” Governance.

Tanzania – The long arm of the law in Magufuli’s Tanzania

Last March, after appointing a fresh cohort of 26 Regional Commissioners, President Magufuli offered some sobering advice to his new appointees: “You have the authority to jail people for up to 48 hours. Lock them up so that they learn how to respect you.” He then added, “Don’t be afraid to make decisions. It’s better you take decisions. Even if they are bad, they can be adjusted later.”

Six months on, the President’s instructions have not gone unheeded. Reports of apparent abuses perpetrated by both Regional and District Commissions keep multiplying. While not necessarily breaking the law, Commissions are making the most of the 48-hour rule, which Magufuli referenced. Enshrined in clause 15(2) of the 1997 Regional Administration Act, it stipulates that a Commissioner can order that any individual be put in custody without a charge for as long as two days if deemed likely to “disturb the public tranquillity.”

Commissioners are using these powers to “discipline” public servants and politicians, primarily local councillors. In one district, the Commissioner jailed two high ranking district officials for 12 hours, accusing them of failing to find funds to pay city street cleaners, as per the Commissioner’s orders. In another district, the Commissioner ordered the arrest of four local councillors from Tanzania’s leading opposition party, CHADEMA. The district council chairman—among those arrested—spent the night in jail. The Commissioner’s explanation: “Those [councillors] were messing up my visits to see the wananchi [people] and undermining government development efforts.”

These heavy-handed interventions—and the reasons invoked to justify them—raise questions about the precise responsibilities of a Regional or District Commissioner, beyond presumably preserving “public tranquillity.” According to the above-mentioned Regional Administration Act, District Commissioners are the “principal representatives of the government” within their area and, as such, “all the executive functions of Government […] shall be exercised by or through” them. They are responsible for maintaining “law and order,” for overseeing the implementation of government policies and, crucially, for “assisting” local government authorities, including by “ensuring compliance by all persons and authorities with appropriate Government decisions […].”

Whatever the circumstances, Commissioners clearly enjoy wide-ranging authority. Under President Magufuli, however, they are increasingly using the full breadth of their (loosely defined) legal powers. They are emerging as the local exponents of the President’s “Hapa kazi tu” agenda, justifying apparent excesses by invoking the developmental value of their work. Hence their actions against allegedly non-performing public servants and, most especially, their efforts to clip the wings of local councils and their elected members.

Councillors from the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party have not been spared, also facing sanctions and arrests. But the bulk of the Commissioners’ interventions target opposition politicians and opposition-controlled councils. The most flagrant case is in Tanzania’s third largest city, Arusha, where the city council is under CHADEMA control. The District Commissioner, later promoted to Regional Commissioner, has been embroiled in an ongoing dispute with councillors for months after first announcing a drastic cut in their allowances and subsequently interfering with decisions made by the council. Tensions have also escalated between the Commissioner, Mrisho Gambo, and the Arusha city MP, Godbless Lema, also from CHADEMA. Lema has repeatedly accused Gambo of taking credit for development projects.

Top opposition leaders predictably condemn the Commissioners’ actions, and the apparent encouragement coming from the President. What is less clear is how leaders within Magufuli’s own party view Commissioners’ actions, and their growing prominence. On the one hand, many of Magufuli’s Commissioners are CCM politicians who lost out in the most recent elections. As such, they are themselves close to—or else part and parcel of—the ruling party. On the other hand, though, the Commissioners’ actions seem to pre-empt or substitute a development campaign led by the party itself, through its various structures. Under Magufuli’s predecessor—Jakaya Kikwete—, the CCM Secretary General undertook an energetic national tour aimed at restoring people’s faith in the party and its poverty-fighting agenda. That focus and vitality is currently absent from CCM, which if anything, appears temporarily paralyzed.

Magufuli, now party chairman, continues to warn fellow CCM leaders of a coming anti-corruption drive whilst promising a “new CCM” at public events. In the meantime, the President appears much more comfortable working with his appointees. As Commissioner Gambo faced increasingly sharp criticism in Arusha, it was Magufuli who called him personally on the phone to express his continued support.

Craig Allen Smith – Navigating the Home Stretch of the 2016 American Presidential Campaign

This is a guest post by Craig Allen Smith, Professor Emeritus, North Carolina State University

Having witnessed the referenda on Scotland’s independence and Brexit, world attention is now on the 2016 American presidential campaign.  The torrent of social media and non-stop news updates provide a disconcerting blend of information, misinformation, and trivia.  This is the first of two posts designed to provide a framework for interpreting those data points, headlines, tweets, and predictions (the second will appear after the election).  Today’s post discusses the procedural requirements that generate strategic challenges for candidates and suggests ways for observers (foreign and domestic) to understand  the campaign.

The Framework

In Presidential Campaign Communication, 2nd ed. I suggested that we view American presidential campaigns as a national conversation among three sets of participants: Citizens, Campaigners, and a greek chorus of Reporters (Smith, 2015). Their “trialogue” unfolds in four functional stages — Surfacing, Nominating, Consolidating, and Electing — each of which has “instrumental objectives” for advancement to the next. Thus the first strategic question is, “What must one do to advance?”

The instrumental objectives require the accumulation of “victory units” that include votes, volunteers, publicity, and money. Those resources are unequally dispersed; some have money to donate, some have time to volunteer, and some are more likely to vote than others.  Thus the second strategic question is, “Who holds the resources one needs for victory units?”

Candidates begin with no victory units and proceed to accumulate them through “rhetorical transactions” with those who have the desired resources. They trade words and symbolic actions for attention, campaign resources, and votes much as comedians trade jokes for laughs or buskers sing favorite songs to attract contributions. Thus the third strategic question is, “What need be said for candidates and audiences to complete their rhetorical transactions?” Those questions can help us to understand the current campaign.

“What must one do to advance?”

By 1 February 2016 the Surfacing stage had defined the campaign by rhetorically constituting the rules, issue publics, news habits, and candidacies (Smith 2016). The candidates who surfaced moved into the Nominating stage where they competed in state level party contests (primary elections, caucuses, or conventions) to win commitments from a majority of their national party’s convention delegates. Nominating led to the Consolidating stage when Donald Trump secured a majority of Republican delegates on 26 May and when Hillary Clinton secured a majority of Democratic delegates on 7 June. Both nominating campaigns had so fragmented their parties that both nominees had many fences to mend by the end of their national party conventions.

The Electing stage began with the nomination acceptance addresses that concluded the conventions (Trump’s on 21 July and Clinton’s on 28 July). It is crucial to understand that American presidential elections hinge not on the national popular vote but on electoral votes. Each state and the District of Columbia has a number of electors equal to its number of U.S. senators and Representatives. When votes are counted on election day the candidate with a plurality of votes in each state wins its electors (except for Maine and Nebraska, which award their electors by congressional districts).

Therefore, the strategic challenge for each candidate is to secure a plurality of voters in a combination of states that yield 270 electoral votes (a majority of the 538 electors). Remember that Vice-president Al Gore won the 2000 national popular vote but lost the electoral vote to George W. Bush whereas Bill Clinton twice won more than 68% of the electoral votes without polling 50% of the popular vote. Unfortunately, too many American pollsters focus on the largely meaningless popular vote. Daily they report polls of 45%-43% and the like without considering electoral strength.  This misleads many Citizens, Reporters, and even some candidates.

The proper way to track the candidates’ progress during the Electing stage is to follow state level polls that show which candidates lead which states by how much. When those polls suggest margins in excess of the margin for error, one can infer the candidate likely to win those electoral votes.  The inconclusive state polls identify the “battleground states” that can be won by the candidate who invests wisely their campaign resources.

Three excellent web sites daily update state polls and project electoral votes— electoral-vote.com, 270towin.com, and Nate Silver’s 538.com. All three sites average recent state polls and allocate electoral votes accordingly. Especially informative is electoral-vote.com because it includes the “tipping point” at which each candidate would win an electoral majority.

To appreciate the difference between national and state polls, let is consider the 18 October reports. The average of national polls put Clinton ahead by 3% (within the statistical margin for error) suggesting a popular vote both too close to call and —  Mr. Gore might remind us — meaningless.  But that day’s state polls showed Clinton surpassing the 270 electoral vote tipping point by winning every state where she then led Trump by 5% or more; Trump needed to win every state where he was within 6% of Clinton.  A week later the October 24th average of national polls showed Trump ahead by 1% whereas the tipping point still showed Clinton needing to win only the states where she led by 5%.

During the recent week Trump alleged repeatedly that the election is “rigged” and declined to commit himself to the outcome of the election. Perhaps he was reasoning that the Founders had rigged the election by creating the Electoral College, or perhaps he simply failed to understand the process. This week he is and is alleging that the polls are also rigged against him by dishonest media companies. Until we learn that a cabal of pollsters intentionally engaged in flawed polling it seems more reasonable to suspect that the politically inexperienced Trump has been seduced by his supporters’ cheers.

In short, national popularity is a good but indirect predictor of the presidential election because Americans are not electing the President of the People, we are voting to decide how our states will elect the next President of the United States.

“Who holds the resources one needs for victory units?”

Candidates need to win states, but which states do they need? Theoretically, the election should hinge on the eight battleground states where state polls report margins less than 5%.  But with two weeks to go Clinton leads by 5% or more in 23 states and DC with a total of 279 electoral votes and need not win any of those eight states. Unless she loses Pennsylvania (which voted for Barack Obama by margins of 10% and 5% and where she leads by 5%) or other states where she has even larger leads she need not win any of the eight battleground states.

State polls currently show Trump leading by 5% or more in 19 states with only 117 electoral votes, which explains why Trump needs those polls to be rigged, wrong, transient, or poorly related to voting. How could Trump win? From the October 25th Electoral-Vote.com tipping point site we can infer that Trump’s need for 270 electoral votes requires him to win (1) every state that he leads by 5% for 117 electoral votes, (2) every state that he leads by less than 5% (South Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, Texas, and Ohio) for an additional 87 electoral votes, (3) every state that currently favors Clinton by less than 5% (Arizona, North Carolina, and Florida) for another 61 electoral votes, and (4) Pennsylvania and Nevada, where he trails by 5% and 6%, respectively. Therefore Trump’s first strategic priority must be to dramatically alter the situations in Pennsylvania and Nevada; unless he does so — or dramatically wins even stronger Clinton states with at least 11 electoral votes —he will lose.

If Trump can solve that problem he will also need to win Florida and Ohio (which Obama won by averages of 1.5% and 4%, respectively) and North Carolina (which Obama won by 1% then  lost by 2%). He currently leads Ohio by 2% but trails in Florida by 4% and North Carolina by 2%, all of which are within the margin for error and could conceivably vote for Clinton.

Five other battleground states voted for the previous Republican nominees, John McCain and Mitt Romney, by substantial margins. Their average margins of victory were 14% in Texas, 12.5% in Mississippi, 9.5% in South Carolina, 9% in Arizona, and 7% in Georgia.  But Trump currently trails Arizona by 1% (-10%) and his leads in the other four states are considerably smaller than were theirs: 3% in Texas (-11%) and Mississippi (-6.5%), 4% in South Carolina (-5.5%), and 3% in Georgia (-4%).

In short, Clinton need only win Pennsylvania (+5%) or Florida (+4%) to surpass 270 electoral votes; Trump can only win the presidency by winning every state where the current polls show him trailing by 5% or less. Of course, it is possible that Trump could win both Pennsylvania and Florida, but he would still be short of victory unless he also won all of the other battleground states.

“Who needs me to say what before granting me their resources?”

As the election nears, candidates need two resources: support and votes. It is one thing to entice citizens to prefer you over your opponent, and it is quite another matter to entice your supporters to vote. The last American presidential election in which 60% of those eligible voted was 1968. Put differently, for nearly half a century more than 40% of eligible American citizens have declined to cast a vote for president

Ideally, we might hope for rational policy discussions and uplifting talk to unify citizens behind their next president. But presidential campaigns are less a search for consensus than a push toward preference. Points of difference are exaggerated whenever possible to heighten contrast. This cycle saw Trump defeat sixteen other Republican candidates as Clinton outlasted Bernie Sanders. Many of those who supported the nominees’ adversaries have been reluctant to transfer their support to the nominees, such that many of the rhetorical transactions have amounted to attacks on the opposition. Clinton and Trump have attacked one another as unfit for the office. We rarely hear of undecided citizens who like both candidates. The polls discussed above suggest that the national aggregate preferences are roughly equal, but that electorally important states prefer Clinton.

For several months Trump has needed to expand his appeal, but he has been slow to do so. Instead he has repeated the themes that appeal to his base of support, even attacking Republicans such as McCain and Romney, and House Speaker Paul Ryan. He seems to expect that his attacks on Clinton will expand his support, but the polls discussed above provide little evidence of success.

But the ultimate question is, then, who will vote? The closing effort to “get out the vote” (GOTV) is crucial. Barack Obama’s GOTV efforts resulted in historic vote totals. The Clinton campaign has invested heavily in similar efforts, suggesting that the Trump campaign will need to perform even better if their votes are to exceed their state polls.

But Trump has raised less money than Clinton and has been slow to develop a GOTV operation. electoral-vote.com reported that “The Democrats have 5,100 paid staffers in the battleground states. The Republicans have 1,400.”  Trump has said all along that he speaks for those who have been excluded or who have seen little reason to vote. But those people, by definition, offer unreliable votes. They may well vote in record numbers, but Democrats are providing 3.6 times the guidance to potential voters about polling places, hours, and transportation.

Earlier in the campaign some Trump advisors apparently reasoned that winning the Republican nomination would commit the Republican Party to do their GOTV work for them. That could work in Republican strongholds, but many of Trump’s supporters dislike establishment Republicans nearly as much as they dislike Democrats. Indeed, the national polls suggest that Trump is doing well in states that he is sure to win while floundering in the battleground states. Wary of Trump, Republicans have turned their resources to “down ballot” races for the Senate, congressional seats, and governorships.

So the question is, what does Trump say to entice irregular voters who dislike both parties to vote? One wonders why his supporters would be more likely to vote if the election is “rigged” as he has been contending. On the other hand, the Clinton campaign must overcome the complacency that derives from their supporters’  confidence. They are increasingly responding that their supporters should provide an overwhelming landslide to undermine doubts and to provide her with Senate and perhaps congressional majorities.

Conclusions

I have suggested the the American presidential campaign is a national conversation in which the nominees face three strategic questions: What must one do to advance?, Who holds the resources one needs for victory units?, and “What need be said for candidates and audiences to complete their rhetorical transactions?

For Hillary Clinton to advance to the presidency she needs her supporters (and Trump’s opponents) to vote. She has thousands of GOTV workers in the battleground states to help convert the state poll percentages into votes, and if she does so she will win states providing more than the 270 electoral votes.

Donald Trump has a narrow path to the presidency. He needs to win every state in which he trails by 6% or less but he is running well behind his Republican predecessors in several of them. Trump urgently needs to cut into Clinton’s leads in Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Florida to put them in play. Thus he needs to broaden his appeal but has been reluctant to do so. He then needs to generate a far greater turnout rate than Clinton in order to win battleground states where his polls lag, but he has assembled an anemic GOTV force. In the next post we will see how well the candidates performed.

Reference List

Smith, C. A. (2015). Presidential campaign communication (2nd ed.) Cambridge: Polity.

Smith, C. A. (2016, 20 April). The Surfacing Stage of the 2016 American Presidential Campaign: A Status Report. presidential-power.com.

Lithuania – A surprise victory of the Union of Peasants and Greens

This is a guest post by Dr Raimondas Ibenskas, Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Southampton. raimondas-isbenskas

The second round of the Lithuanian general election on the 23rd of October resulted in a surprise victory of the Lithuanian Peasant and Greens Union. Having received only one seat in the previous election in 2012, this party scored 56 seats (40% of the total) in the Lithuanian parliament Seimas. Its victory notwithstanding, the party faces a challenge of forming a majority government. Neither the Social Democrats, the leading party in the outgoing centre-left government, nor the main opposition party, the conservative Homeland Union, seem to be keen on joining the coalition government with the Peasants and Greens.

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Another major surprise of the election was the poor performance of the incumbent parties. The Social Democrats, despite leading in opinion polls throughout their term, came only distant third in the election after the Peasants and Greens and the Homeland Union, while the Labour Party was diminished from 29 seats in 2012 to 2 in 2016. The electoral decline of the Order and Justice party was more modest, although the party came perilously close to not reaching the 5 percent electoral threshold required for obtaining representation through the PR tier of the electoral system. The electoral losses of government parties could at least partially be attributed to multiple corruption scandals related to some of their politicians. They have also likely been hurt by the major welfare reform implemented shortly before the election. The liberalization of labour relations in the new labour code adopted as part of the reform was negatively perceived by the electorate and openly opposed by trade unions.

The Union of Peasants and Greens was the main beneficiary of this dissatisfaction. The party existed as a minor political force since the early 1990s and was a government coalition partner in 2004-2008. In the 2008 and 2012 parliamentary elections it did not cross the 5 percent electoral threshold, but some of its candidates were elected in single member districts. Despite its name, and somewhat similarly to the coalition between agrarian and green parties in Latvia, the party is socially conservative. On the economic dimension, it can be placed to the left of the centre, thus providing an attractive alternative for the supporters of centre-left government parties. Somewhat ironically, the party is led by one of the wealthiest people in Lithuania Ramūnas Karbauskis, an owner of the Agrokoncernas Group, which was worth an estimated 55 million Euros in 2016. Although elected as an MP, Karbauskis ruled out the possibility of becoming Prime Minister by arguing that his knowledge of foreign languages was insufficient for this position.

Two factors played a crucial role in propelling the Peasants and Greens to the position of the strongest party in Lithuania.  First, they managed to attract popular independent Saulius Skvernelis, a Police Commissioner General in 2011-2014 and Minister of Interior in 2014-2016. Although delegated by the Order and Justice Party, he kept his distance from this party and declared in March 2016 that he would be running in the parliamentary election with the Peasants and Greens. Although he did not formally join the party, he was its most visible leader during the election campaign, obtained the highest share of individual preference votes in the PR tier and also won a seat in a single member district in the capital city of Vilnius. While the addition of Skvernelis and several other prominent politicians or personalities provided the party with the image of newness, it may also lead to internal divisions and conflicts. A sign of the things to come was the indication from Karbauskis after the election that his party’s nominee for Prime Minister’s position may not necessarily be Skvernelis, as generally stated during the election campaign; an MEP and long-term insider of the party Bronis Ropė was put forward as an equally likely candidate.

Second, the Peasants and Greens also benefited from the mixed electoral system of Lithuania. Although they gained only 19 seats in the PR tier, thus coming only close second to the Homeland Union, 37 out of 42 of their single member district candidates won seats in the second round of the election (including 2 candidates that ran as independents in their single member districts but were on the party’s list). Being perceived as an attractive second choice for the supporters of most other parties, the Peasant and Green candidates had an advantage over the two major parties – the Homeland Union and the Social Democrats – that did well in the majoritarian tier of the electoral system in most previous elections.

In the aftermath of the election the latter two parties were indicated as potential coalition partners by the Greens and Peasants. Although a coalition with either of them would be a majority one, the Social Democrats may prefer to stay in opposition following their defeat while the Homeland Union insists that any coalition should also include their long-term partner Liberal Movement. The latter, being both economically and socially liberal, and having recently experienced a major corruption scandal involving its former leader, has been ruled out as a coalition partner by Karbauskis. Karbauskis also repeatedly excluded the possibility of the cooperation with the ideologically quite similar Order and Justice party by considering the latter as tainted by corruption allegations. A coalition with the Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania – Christian Families Alliance would be more feasible, but it would not provide the Peasants and Greens with parliamentary majority. Finally, a single-party minority government of the Peasants and Greens is another possibility, although it was considered as unlikely by some observers.

The strategic situation in parliament therefore suggests that government formation will be an arduous process with an uncertain outcome. Additionally, the Peasants and Greens will have to deal with President Dalia Grybauskaitė, who in 2012 did not shy away from an (unsuccessful) attempt to prevent the inclusion of the Labour Party in the coalition government. Grybauskaitė, although formally independent, is also quite close to centre-right parties, especially the Homeland Union. Although after her first post-election meeting with Karbauskis and Skvernelis she declared that the responsibility for forming a majority coalition government falls on the Peasants and Greens and that she will not initiate “artificial” coalitions, she also indicated that she will actively shape the selection of ministers. The Peasants and Greens only need to look at the experience of the Labour Party, whose multiple ministerial candidates were rejected by President after the 2012 election, to know that this may prove as an important challenge to putting together a new government.

Raimondas Ibenskas is a Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Southampton. His research interests lie in the field of comparative politics with a specific focus on political parties and party systems. The main strand of his research examines key, yet under-studied aspects of instability of political parties, such as party splits, mergers, and electoral coalitions, in both Western and Eastern Europe.

Victor Araújo, Thiago Silva, and Marcelo Vieira – New Perspectives on Executive Decision-Making Processes in Presidential Systems

This is a guest post by Victor Araújo, Thiago Silva, and Marcelo Vieira. It is based on their paper ‘Measuring Presidential Dominance over Cabinets in Presidential Systems: Constitutional Design and Power Sharing’ that was recently published in the Brazilian Political Science Review

araujosilvavieira-illustrativepicture

The third wave of democratization approaches its 40th anniversary in Latin America in 2018. The process started with the Ecuadorian Constitution of 1978, promulgated after the withdrawal of the military power in the previous year. Like Ecuador, most Latin American countries opted for a presidential system of government in their new journey for consolidation of a democratic political regime.

From the late 1970s to the late 1980s, comparativists wrote extensively on the contrast between presidential and parliamentary systems, rushing to conclusions and predictions about the undesirable institutional choices of Latin American democracies. In the search for predictions, assumptions were taken as evidence and black boxes remained intact, undermining our ability to understand the real differences and similarities between systems of government, particularly among presidential systems.

The different criteria suggested by the literature of the 1980s and 1990s for the definition of presidential and parliamentary systems are well known. However, it is worth mentioning one aspect of it here developed by Arend Lijphart and sustained by Giovanni Sartori. For these authors, the executive power in presidential systems has a sole character: being the head of government and the head of the state, the president would be the only relevant actor in the executive decision-making process in these systems. The idea is that the president derives a dominant role in the executive decision-making process from its discretionary powers of selection and ministerial removal, in a context in which his/her tenure is independent from parliamentary confidence. The premise suggested by Lijphart, taken for granted by scholars of systems of government, is that the vertical nature of presidential cabinets contrasts with the horizontal character of most parliamentary cabinets (i.e., primus inter pares cabinets in Sartori’s definition).

In a recent article published in the Brazilian Political Science Review, we challenge the studies mentioned above, arguing that the assumption of a vertical executive decision-making process in presidential systems underrates variations that may exist regarding the degree of dominance exercised by the chief executive over cabinets. Although conventionally characterized as a non-collegial decision-making process, led by the president, we reveal that the sole executive of presidential systems is not a distinctive feature of this system of government. Instead of analyzing the process of executive decision-making in parliamentary and presidential democracies dichotomously—based on collegial and non-collegial processes, respectively—we should, as suggested by Vercesi (2012) evaluate the possibility that the power sharing of the executive decision-making process systems varies continuously across systems of government.

Building on this idea, our study develops an index to help scholars analyze how powerful the president is vis-à-vis cabinet members, according to specific constitutional rules that verticalize or horizontalize the executive decision-making process in presidential democracies. More precisely, we created a summation index of codified constitutional rules regarding executive powers raging from 0 to 5, with a value of 0 indicating the absence of presidential dominance over cabinets, and the value of 5 indicating the absolute dominance of the president over cabinets.

araujosilvavieira-figure1

As we can see in Figure 1, our index reveals significant variation of presidential dominance over cabinets in Latin America presidential constitutions. We inferred at least three clear standards. Presidential democracies can have: a decentralized (e.g. Bolivia, Argentina and Uruguay), a shared (e.g. Chile, Colombia and Costa Rica), or a centralized (e.g. Brazil, Mexico and Panama) executive decision-making process. In sum, the executive decision-making processes in presidential systems are not necessarily vertical, and the presidential powers over ministers are not necessarily unrestricted or unbounded.

These results have important implications for the literature on comparative politics comparing systems of government. First, our study strengthens the argument suggested by Elgie (1997) that the power sharing within executive decision-making processes should be evaluated empirically and not assumed by scholars. Our results for Latin America reveal that, regarding executive decision-making process, there are more similarities between different systems of governments than conventionally assumed by the literature. In another study, by analyzing more than 50 countries we also show that the degree of dominance of the chief executive in presidential and parliamentary democracies can be very similar.

Second, our study reveals that the costs of presidential decision-making may vary depending on other factors such as institutional rules that restrict the “selection” or “removal” of ministers, a dimension not systematically explored in the literature yet. A more careful analysis of this topic could explore, for example, how ministerial survival rates can be affected by constitutional rules that determine the distribution of authority among the members of the cabinet.

Third, our findings can lead to exploration of new topics such as ministers as veto players in presidential systems. In contexts where the president depends on the consent of ministers to be able to propose policies, the stability of the coalition might depend on the chief executive considering the preferences of the parties of different ministers. We could ask, for example, how pivotal are minister’s parties in maintaining the presidential coalition in the legislature.

Fourth, given that the distribution of resources for policy-making in the cabinet is directly related to the degree of influence the parties can exert on the composition of the coalition, our results encourage scholars to investigate what preferences are being expressed in the policy-making process, instead of assuming that policies express only the preference or the agenda of the president.

In sum, the results from our study on how powerful the president is vis-à-vis cabinet members lead us to ask several new questions and hypotheses worthy of further empirical investigation, such as: How powerful are the ministers in presidential systems? How can cabinet veto players affect ministers reshuffle and cabinet survival? How does the distribution of authority between the chief executive and cabinet members affect the content of the executive policy agenda?

Contributors

Victor Araújo is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of São Paulo, Brazil.
E-mail: victor.asaraujo@usp.br
Website: http://www.victor-araujo.com

Thiago Silva is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at Texas A&M University, United States.
E-mail: nsthiago@tamu.edu
Website: http://people.tamu.edu/~nsthiago

Marcelo Vieira is a Professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the Federal University of Espírito Santo, Brazil.
E-mail: mmarvieira@gmail.com

Finland – Troubled times for the left and the unions

Following the long reign of President Urho Kekkonen (1956-1981), Finnish voters elected three social democratic heads of state into office between 1982 and 2012. Four years ago this succession of left-wing presidents came to an end when Sauli Niinistö, the candidate of the conservative the National Coalition, was elected with a comfortable margin. Niiinistö enjoys strong support among the electorate, and he is a clear favourite should he seek another term in the next presidential elections scheduled for January 2018.

This change reflects a broader and much more important trend in Finnish politics: the gradual decline of the left-wing parties and their close partners, the trade unions. The 2015 elections to the Eduskunta, the unicameral national legislature, were disastrous for the left. The Social Democratic Party finished fourth with 16.5 % of the vote, its worst-ever performance in Eduskunta elections, while the more radical left party, the Left Alliance, managed 7.1 % of the vote. The collective vote share of the leftist parties has declined dramatically in recent decades. Whereas Social Democrats and the predecessor of Left Alliance, the Finnish People’s Democratic Union, won over 45 % of the vote between them in all but one election between 1945 and 1966 (when they won together 48.3 % of the vote), by 2015 the electoral strength of the left had decreased to 23.6 %. After the 1966-1970 electoral period the centre-right parties have held the majority of Eduskunta seats. The prospect of a government consisting of only left-wing parties has not been realistic for several decades, and all cabinets formed after the 2003 elections have been led by centre-right parties.

The dilemma facing the left, and particularly the Social Democrats, is of course typical for centre-left parties across Europe. At its core are two interlinked questions: whether to defend traditional leftist economic goals or endorse more market-friendly policies, and who the party represents. The Social Democrats have definitely moved to the right since the 1990s, and this has frustrated many of its left-leaning supporters. Such frustrations surfaced in spring 2014 when the party elected its current leader, with Antti Rinne beating narrowly the incumbent party chair Jutta Urpilainen. Rinne was very much the ‘trade union candidate’, and his victory was interpreted by many as reflecting a yearning on the part of the rank-and-file for a return to more leftist politics after two decades during which the party has, both voluntarily and under strong external and budgetary constraints, embraced more market-friendly policies.

The Left Alliance is in a largely similar situation. Bringing together a variety of leftists and former communists, the party is internally divided on the left–right dimension, with the party leadership advocating ‘green left’ ideological moderation, while the working class voters more closely linked to trade unions oppose such centrist moves. The entry of the Green League, who won 8.5 % of the vote in the 2015 election, offers partial compensation, but the party is quite centrist and itself refuses to be categorized as a left-wing party. Nonetheless, following the 2015 elections party chair Ville Niinistö lamented the decline of the left as the Social Democrats and Left Alliance share many of the values or concerns of the Greens, especially fight against poverty and in moral questions such as gender-neutral marriages. The Greens are in many ways sympathetic towards trade unions, but the party is obviously rooted in the environmental movement and associated interest groups whose policies often are at odds with trade union interests. The Greens perhaps also view trade unions as old-fashioned and too hierarchical.

The rise of populism further complicates the situation. The three core parties of recent decades – Social Democrats, the Centre Party and the National Coalition – have largely held on to their vote shares, but the rise of the Finns Party means that Finland now has four quite equally-sized large parties. Hence the traditional left-wing parties are competing for the working class vote with the Finns Party. In particular, there is no party offering a natural home to the people employed in the large services sector which includes a wide variety of occupational groups ranging from waitresses, teachers, and sales personnel to nurses. While the Finns Party is not organizationally strong inside the main blue-collar confederation SAK (the Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions), in terms of party choice the Finns was the largest party inside SAK in the 2015 elections. Moreover, in 2015 SAK members were more likely to identify with the Finns Party than with either of the two traditional leftist parties.

The vanishing electoral strength of left-wing parties means serious trouble for trade unions, whose influence has largely depended on especially the Social Democrats leading or being at least a partner in the ruling coalition. In comparative studies Finland is usually ranked as having one of the most corporatist systems of governance. The main employers’ organization, the Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK), decided unilaterally to abandon tripartite collective wage talks in 2007 when Finland was governed by a centre-right coalition. However, since 2011 centralized wage agreements have been re-introduced, no doubt thanks to the fact that Social Democrats re-entered the government after the 2011 elections. While the system of collective wage talks is not as comprehensive as before, many labour market agreements and laws are effectively decided in tripartite negotiations between the employers’ federations, the trade unions, and the government. Trade union density has also risen over the decades, reaching its peak during the severe recession of the early 1990s, and over 70 % of the workforce now belongs to unions. When left-wing parties are not in the government, trade unions are immediately hurt. This is again very much the case now under the current Centre-led government, which together with EK has forcefully argued that centralized wage talks are incompatible with competitiveness and economic growth.

Overall, leftist parties and the unions are increasingly on the defensive in Finland, with initiatives and discourse of the centre-right parties and business interests dominating the agenda. The global and European uncertainty together with serious domestic fiscal challenges have brought about increasing criticism of leftist economic solutions. Whereas from the 1960s onwards leftist parties and the unions were often behind important and popular socio-economic reforms, today they mainly focus on defending the status quo. The current economic climate, including large national public debt and the associated need to cut public expenditure, is far from ideal for advocating traditional left-wing policies and the situation is unlikely to change in the next few years or at least not before the next Eduskunta elections scheduled for 2019.

Peru – Former President Ollanta Humala to be Included in Campaign Financing Investigation

Once again, I return to the issue of corruption scandals at the level of the executive office. It was announced last week that a public prosecutor would be including Ollanta Humala, the former Peruvian president who finished his five-year term on the 28th of July this year, in a long and ongoing investigation into campaign financing and electoral donations. This investigation had up till now largely centred around Humala’s wife and former first lady, Nadine Heredia.

The investigation of the prosecutor, Germán Juárez, revolves around money raised by Ollanta Humala to fund his presidential election campaigns in 2006 and 2011. There has long been allegations that Heredia, as President of the Partido Nacionalista Peruano, received and hid donations from the former Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez, and a number of Brazilian construction companies, which were then used to finance the campaigns of her left-leaning husband. Only this year, Heredia was prohibited from leaving Peru as investigations continue. For Humala, this latest announcement is significant because as of July this year, he can no longer enjoy presidential immunity, although activities during his presidency are still protected. However, such immunity does not apply to activities during the 2006 election.

This investigation is partly a product of Humala’s own admissions, when he stated that Heredia was only doing what she was ordered to do by Humala, as head of the party, but it also stems from information supposedly contained in a number of notebooks owned by Nadine Heredia, which were given to public prosecutors by former party members. These notebooks are alleged to document millions in campaign donations that remained unreported and which were funneled through personal bank accounts. The prosecutor has asked the judiciary for access to Humala’s domestic and international banking and tax records from his time in office, currently protected by Peruvian law. Ollanta Humala denies all of these allegations and claims that they are the product of political opportunism.

I keep coming back to this topic, but why do we often witness so many corruption scandals related to the highest political office across the region? The allegations against former president Humala, would appear to echo the explanation of Kurt Weyland; he argued that the last two decades have seen the emergence of personalistic leaders who have sought to bypass established political parties in order to reach “the people” through direct and often televised appeals. This can build a new loyal following, but it is also expensive and for these outsiders, the incentive to engage in ‘irregular’ campaign financing to boost coffers which cannot be filled through traditional party and donor networks, is often quite large.[1] Humala is the prototypical outsider. He was a former army officer who rose to prominence during the 2006 elections when he was somewhat scathing of exiting political elites. He only established his political party in 2005, the year before his first electoral bid.

Of course, it is also possible that we are not necessarily witnessing an increase in corruption scandals at the executive level, but rather an increase in the ability of judiciaries across the region to hold current and former presidents to account.

[1] Kurt Weyland. 1998. The Politics of Corruption in Latin America. Journal of Democracy 9 (2): 108-121.

Are you with Milo or not? Parliamentary elections in Montenegro

Parliamentary elections are readily perceived as a new beginning. Not so in Montenegro. In the last years the dominant figure in Montenegrin politics was one person: Milo Đukanović. Unlike any other politician in this region, he remained on the forefront of political decision-making for now 25 years and switched between being prime minister and president. His political career and his ideological adaptation mirror the development of the country since the end of communist rule.

Once again this parliamentary election was not about new ideas or a vision for Montenegro. It was a medley of a struggle for survival by the ruling elite, accusations of election fraud by the opposition, and pressure by external actors (namely EU, NATO and Russia). The overarching question was rather simple, carry on as before or choose a new path? Based on these introductory remarks, I will in the following post, briefly describe how Milo Đukanović shaped the course of his country in the last 25 years, the specifics of the 2016 campaign and election and its consequences for the country.

To give you the executive summary of the election: Đukanović’s party won the election but without securing the absolute majority in parliament.

Milo Đukanović has and had formative influence on the democratic practice, the political process and the development of the society in Montenegro. His political career started after the end of communist rule and in the beginning he was a close ally of Slobodan Milosevic. He served as Prime Minister from 1991-1998, from 2003-2006, from 2008-2010 and since 2012. In between he was President of the Republic from 1998-2003 (Prime Minister Montenegro 2016). His personal dominance was not clearly evident right from the beginning. Contrary to Croatia or Serbia, Montenegro was dominated by a so-called ruling oligarchy (Vukicević and Vujovic 2012, 56). Members of this oligarchy were e.g. Momir Bulatovic, Svetozar Marovic and most certainly also Milo Đukanović(see Banovic 2016). Đukanovićremained the dominant force since then and has changed his political allies and orientation that “(t)oday, he’s a leading voice for EU and NATO integration” (Rujevic 2016).

The campaign for the 2016 parliamentary elections was consequently described as choice between two directions: 1) EU membership with NATO Integration and thus a clear orientation towards the West or 2) to become once again a “Russian Colony”, as Đukanovićdramatically put it in one of his pre-election rallies (see for reports e.g. Deutsche Welle 2016). This harsh contrast provides a clear choice that does not necessarily exist beyond the electoral campaign and the blurry lines of everyday politics. And even more importantly, it diverts the attention of the citizens.

The way towards the West and the possible accession of NATO is a difficult topic for Montenegro: (U)p until 1997, Montenegro shared Serbia’s fate under the authoritarian Miloševićregime“( Banovic 2016, 290, see also Vujadinović 2002, 14).
 This fate included also the shared experience of the NATO bombings on the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Hence, neither the economic development in Montenegro nor the level of corruption were an important topic in the campaign as one would expect. One further reason for this obvious neglect of a serious evaluation of the political development of Montenegro is the division among oppositional forces. A 3% threshold is necessary to gain parliamentary representation and 34 parties (RFE/RL 2016) were competing in this parliamentary election.

Within this context, on October 17, Montenegro elected a new parliament. The arrest of allegedly Serbian paramilitaries on election day was only one of various events that arguably influenced the election. Some of these event, like the arrest, looked from the outside sometimes as propaganda moves by the government to gain support for its course toward the West. On an important side note: Serbian influence on Montenegrin politics is a very sensible topic and as author I would like to make it clear that any assessment of the substance of these motivations behind the arrests is not possible. It is also not clear if this event influenced the election substantially. Several polls – although I could not confirm their reliability – were already showing a significant lead for Đukanović’s Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS, Demokratska Partija Socijalista Crne Gore) over the last few months. This expectation was confirmed on Sunday with a 41% majority, which will result in 36 seats in parliament (RFE/RL 2016) for DPS. This result forces the DPS to form a coalition government and include one of the opposition forces to gain the absolute majority in the 81-seat parliament.

But the opposition is reluctant to accept the results of the election and questions its fairness. They accuse government that the arrests in the morning of the Election Day were made merely for propaganda. Another serious issue – that goes right to the core of democratic elections and free speech – was the blocking of Viber and What’sApp on Election Day. This was also part of the concerns described by the OECD observation team. This team declared that the 2016 parliamentary election was “held in a competitive environment and fundamental freedoms were generally respected” (Stojanovic 2016). But members of the observation team – foremost Marietje Schaake (member of EU parliament) criticized the limitation of freedom of speech by blocking main tools to communicate (Stojanovic 2016). As the official report of the OECD will only be published in a few weeks, it remains unclear how substantiated the claims of electoral manipulation are. But, one thing is for sure; these claims will not make the coalition building for Đukanovićand the DPS easier.

References

Banović, Damir (2016): Montenegro, in: Fruhstorfer, Anna, and Michael Hein (eds): Constitutional Politics in Central and Eastern Europe, 289-306.

Deutsche Welle (2016): Montenegro’s longtime ruler faces ballot test (October 16), in: http://www.dw.com/en/montenegros-longtime-ruler-faces-ballot-test/a-36052927 [last accessed October 18, 2016]

RFE/RL (2016): Montenegro’s Opposition Refuses To Recognize Pro-West Party’s Election Win (October 16), in: http://www.rferl.org/a/montenegro-russia-west/28056584.html [last accessed October 18, 2016]

Rujevic, Nemanja (2016): Election in Montenegro: For Milo, against Milo (October 14), in: Deutsche Welle, http://www.dw.com/en/election-in-montenegro-for-milo-against-milo/a-36045962 [last accessed October 18, 2016]

Prime Minister Montenegro (2016): Prime Minister of Montenegro Milo Djukanovic – Biography, in: http://www.predsjednik.gov.me/en/primeminister/Prime_Minister_s_biography [last accessed October 16, 2016.]

Stojanovic, Dusan (2016): WhatsApp, Viber blocked during Montenegro election day (October 17), in: http://www.sfchronicle.com/news/world/article/Opposition-claims-major-irregularities-in-9975486.php [last accessed October 19, 2016]

Vujadinović, Dragica. 2002. “Predgovor.” In Između autoritarizma i demokratije. Edited by Edited by Dragica Vujadinović, Veljak Lino, Vladimir Goati and Vladimir Pavićević, 9–17. Beograd: Cedet.

Vukičević, Boris, and Vujović, Zlatko (2012): Ustavni i političkopravni okvir parlamenta u Crnoj Gori 1989–2012, in: Demokratske performance parlamenata Srbije, Bosne i Hercegovine i Crne Gore. Edited by Slaviša Orlović, 55–76. Podgorica/Beograd/Sarajevo: Faculty for Political Sciencies in Belgrade, Sarajevo Open Centre and Faculty for Political Sciencies in Podgorica.

Farida Jalalzai – Women Presidents of Latin America: Beyond Family Ties?

This is a guest post by Farida Jalalzai, the Hannah Atkins Endowed Chair and Associate Professor of Political Science at Oklahoma State University

In his article “On Election Day, Latin America Willingly Trades Machismo for Female Clout” New York Times contributor Simon Romero asserts “Up and down the Americas, with the notable exception of the United States, women are soaring into the highest political realms” (Romero 2013). In exploring this development making headlines, my book, Women Presidents of Latin America: Beyond Family Ties? (Routledge 2016) analyzes four recent women presidents also known as presidentas: Michelle Bachelet (Chile, 2006-2010; 2014-), Cristina Fernández (Argentina, 2007-2015), Laura Chinchilla (Costa Rica, 2010-2014) and Dilma Rousseff (Brazil, 2011-2016).  Given the powers presidentialism affords presidents, women’s increasing tendency to play these very strong political roles present a puzzle.  Since institutional factors account heavily for women’s success and presidentialism appears the most difficult system for women to break through (Jalalzai 2013), how can we explain women’s ability to gain the presidency in Latin America?  Historically, women leaders in presidential systems (particularly women directly elected by the public) were generally limited to relatives of male leaders and this proved to be a personal factor linking women presidents worldwide, including those from Latin America. With the election of Michelle Bachelet in Chile, these traditional patterns appeared to be shifting.  What conditions, therefore, allowed for a broadening of routes, beyond family ties, for women in Latin America?  While an important question, I was also interested in the larger implications the election of powerful women posed. Once in office, do the presidentas make positive changes on behalf of women? My findings were primarily based on responses derived from over 60 elite interviews conducted between 2011 and 2014 in these countries. Respondents included political elites and experts of diverse partisan leanings such as cabinet ministers, legislators, party leaders, consultants from think tanks and academics, and a sitting president (Chinchilla)..  I supplemented interviews with data from public opinion polls, media and scholarly analyses, and information from governmental and non-governmental organizations.

In addressing my first question, I found that all presidentas benefitted from centralized and exclusive presidential nomination procedures (see also Hinojosa 2012). Not only were they essentially handpicked by their predecessors, their publics’ were largely supportive of the outgoing president’s policies.  While benefitting from continuity, with the exception of Fernández (as the former first lady, the only political wife in the group) they did not enjoy top placement or independent bases within their parties.  As such, their nominations were perceived as somewhat surprising and occasionally met with party resistance.  Yet, their outsider statuses likely explain why they were viewed as appropriate successors in the first place.  Critically, Chinchilla, Bachelet, and Rousseff also campaigned on how they would change the face of politics.  The combined approach of change and stability proved fruitful.

Regarding their impact, I examined three types of potential effects of their leadership on women:

  1. Appointing more women to political offices
  2. Positively influencing levels of political engagement and participation, political orientations, and support for women in politics among the general public
  3. Supporting policies on behalf of women

Throughout, I compared women to their male predecessors.  Because of their strong ties to the outgoing presidents, we might have expected the presidentas to behave fairly similarly.  Yet, as women, they may have done more to empower women than their male counterparts. My analysis identified mixed evidence.   While presidents Bachelet and Rousseff prioritized appointing more women than did their male counterparts, this did not seem to hold true for either Chinchilla or Fernández. In analyzing data from representative surveys and from my interviews, findings confirmed key differences between the presidentas.  More positive shifts in public opinion and participation were linked to Rousseff’s presidency (my book only covered her first term—it does did not account her cataclysmic fall from grace and subsequent impeachment) while Bachelet’s showed little consistent or significant effects.  In interviews, respondents easily identified positive influences Rousseff’s and Bachelet’s presidencies offered.  In contrast, both the representative surveys and interviews concerning Chinchilla and Fernández regularly indicated backsliding.  Support for women’s policies proved most prevalent in Bachelet’s presidencies.  Rousseff, to a lesser degree, also made women’s issues an important part of her first term.  While many programs were extensions of Lula’s, Rousseff added more depth to existing programs.  She also connected seemingly gender neutral policies to women, particularly poor women.  We see little prioritization of women’s issues, in contrast, during Fernández’s and Chinchilla’s presidencies, affirming the variability in positive effects of presidentas on women.

Three years after the article quoted above was published, another journalist for the New York Times, Jonathan Gilbert, posed the following question: “What has happened to the powerful women of South America?”  The previous fervor had given way to disappointment as the presidentas analyzed here encountered plummeting approval ratings, much of which is related to economic travails, and nearly all were ensnared in corruption scandals. While this book suggested mixed effects of women presidents, I wonder if women face greater scrutiny for their lackluster performances or alleged engagement in inappropriate behavior. These remain open questions, but ones worth pursuing in future investigations as enhanced scrutiny shapes women’s abilities to exercise power generally and behalf of women specifically. These questions will be even more salient with the United States on the brink of electing its first woman president. As Hillary Clinton is a former First Lady, her path to power is not very puzzling.  Still, no doubt this historic moment will soon give way to investigations regarding what Clinton’s presidency offers women and whether she too receives undue scrutiny because of her gender.

References

Gilbert, Jonathan. “South America’s Powerful Women Are Embattled. Is Gender a Factor?” The New York Times. May 14, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/15/world/americas/dilma-rousseff-michelle-bachelet-cristina-fernandez-de-kirchner.html?_r=0

Hinojosa, Magda. 2012. Selecting Women, Electing Women: Political Representation and Candidate Selection in Latin America. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

Jalalzai, Farida. 2016. Women Presidents of Latin America: Beyond Family Ties? New York: Routledge Press.

Jalalzai, Farida. 2013.  Shattered, Cracked or Firmly Intact? Women and the Executive Glass Ceiling Worldwide.  New York: Oxford University Press.

Romero, Simon. “On Election Day, Latin America Willingly Trades Machismo for Female Clout.” The New York Times. December 14, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/15/world/americas/on-election-day-latin-america-willingly-trades-machismo-for-female-clout.html?_r=0

Farida Jalalzai is the Hannah Atkins Endowed Chair and Associate Professor of Political Science. Dr. Jalalzai’s research analyzes the representation and behavior of women and minorities in politics and the role of gender in the political arena. Her work focuses on women national leaders. Her first book Shattered, Cracked and Firmly Intact: Women and the Executive Glass Ceiling Worldwide (Oxford University Press 2013, updated paperback 2016) offers a comprehensive analysis of women, gender, and national leadership positions. Her second book, Women Presidents of Latin America: Beyond Family Ties?  (Routledge 2016) examines several case studies of the behavior of women national leaders including presidents Laura Chinchilla (Costa Rica), President Dilma Rousseff (Brazil), Cristina Fernández (Argentina). Her current projects include a co-edited volume “Measuring Women’s Political Empowerment Worldwide” (with Amy C. Alexander and Catherine Bolzendahl, under contrast at Palgrave) a co-authored book Senhora Presidenta: Women’s Representation in Brazil during Dilma Rousseff’s Presidency (with Pedro dos Santos), and  “Blood is Thicker than Water: Family Ties to Political Power Worldwide,” a global analysis of the prevalence of family connections among executive political office holders (with Meg Rincker).

Palau – Women’s Representation and the Presidential Primary

On 29 September, Palau held its presidential primary race to determine which two candidates will face off against each other when the country goes to the polls on 1 November. Four candidates contested the primary election: incumbent President Tommy Remengesau Jr.; incumbent Vice-President Antonio Bells; former Vice-President and incumbent Senator Sandra Pierantozzi; and incumbent Senator Surangel Whipps Jr. In the primary, favourite Remengesau led with 49 per cent of votes cast, followed by Whipps with 39 per cent; Pierantozzi and Bells were eliminated.

With two challengers eliminated, the presidential contest is now between two brothers-in-law, as Whipps is married to Remengeseau’s sister. Remengeseau noted that it was unusual for such close relatives to be contesting against each other: “It’s certainly not in our culture, and it’s very unusual because if you follow our culture you are not supposed to be running against a family member.” Yet, while it may be unusual, it is certainly not unprecedented. Pierantozzi initially won the vice-presidency after contesting against her nephew, and commentator Bernadette Carreon noted its inevitability in small island politics: “It’s a small nation, everyone is related to each other, so I think it’s just the way it is.” Going into the 1 November election having collected around half of the primary votes cast, Remengesau appears the favourite to win.

This year has been a milestone for women’s political representation in Micronesia and the wider Pacific. In January, Hilda Heine of the Marshall Islands became the first female head of government in the Pacific Islands region when she won the presidency. In March, long-serving member of the Samoan Parliament Fiame Naomi Mata’afa became the country’s (and Polynesia’s) first female Deputy Prime Minister. Palau is at the bottom of the world’s league table in terms of women’s representation, with no women in its lower house, although there are three female Senators in its upper house.

The 2016 primary election marked the second attempt at the presidency for Pierantozzi, who came third in the 2012 primary with 18 per cent of the vote. She is a well-known figure in Palauan politics, having previously served as Vice-President from 2001 to 2005. In her 2016 presidential bid, Pierantozzi highlighted economic growth as a key election issue. She also stressed the importance of increasing the number of women in Palau politics. While the presidential election will be an all-male affair – Pierantozzi again came third, although her vote share of 9 per cent was half of what she had received in 2012 – she was hopeful of women’s representation increasing in November in the House and Senate. Women make up a quarter of the 24 candidates contesting for the 13-seat Senate, and among the 33 candidates for the 16 House of Delegates seats, there are six women contesting five seats (including one running unopposed). While the highest glass ceiling for women in Palau won’t be cracked at this election, there is promise that the Senate and House of Delegates contests will result in real gains for women’s representation in the country.