Category Archives: Kenya

Kenya – President Kenyatta faces new challenges as elections loom

The Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta has moved to deal with rising food prices as the campaign ahead of the 2017 general election begins in earnest. Having been accused of “dithering” earlier in the year as the price of unga (maize flour) increased by 500 KSh a month to KSh 4,500 for a 90 kg bag, the government moved to import 29,900 tonnes of Maize in order to reduce prices in early May.

President Kenyatta’s actions reflected growing public dissatisfaction with the rising cost of living and the growing challenge from the political opposition as the August 8 general election draws near. Having enjoyed a big lead in the polls for many months, many commentators felt that the Jubilee Party could secure comfortable victory, especially as the main opposition coalition, the National Super Alliance, appeared to be split on whom to select as its running mate. Along with long-time presidential candidate Raila Odinga, Kalonzo Musyoka and Musalia Mudavadi were said to be determined to emerge as the coalition’s flag bearer.

However, ultimately Odinga managed to pull off a double-win: securing the nomination as NASA presidential candidate and persuading his rivals for the position to back him. In turn, the emergence of a more united opposition has generated much-needed momentum for Odinga, leading to claims that he is once again a viable presidential candidate. One of NASA’s campaign slogans, “10 million strong”, seeks to emphasise this point, referencing the potential support base that Odinga can mobilise if all the communities assumed to be allied to the opposition vote for him – though this is far from a forgone conclusion.

While the most reliable opinion polls suggest that Kenyatta and his Jubilee Party continue to enjoy a healthy lead, the fresh energy within NASA, combined with rising food prices, have worried the Jubilee Alliance. In some of the more recent polls, the confirmation of Odinga’s candidacy has significantly strengthened his performance, and as a result he has moved from the 25/26% a few months ago to around 41% today. Having initially aimed for an overwhelming electoral performance of 60%+ in the presidential poll, Jubilee leaders are now concerned that if Odinga continues to gain ground they may struggle to secure the 50% +1 of the vote required for a first round victory.

Given the excitement within NASA, and the concern within the Jubilee Party, Kenya may be set for a closer and more controversial election than seemed likely a short while ago.

Nic Cheeseman (@fromagehomme) is Professor of Democracy at the University of Birmingham

Presidential Profile – Uhuru Kenyatta, Dynastic politics and the making of a Kenyan president

Presidential Profile

Uhuru Kenyatta. Born 26 October 1961. Inaugurated 9 April 2013.

It would be easy to assume from the fact that 2013 presidential election was won by Uhuru Kenyatta, the son of the country’s founding father and first president, Jomo Kenyatta, that Kenyan politics operates along dynastic lines and that his victory was predetermined. After all, Uhuru, which means freedom in Swahili, was named in honour of the independence struggle and his supporters like to say that he was born in state house and so born to state house – even though this is not actually true. However, the course of Kenyan history rarely runs this smooth, and Uhuru Kenyatta’s rise to power was anything but straightforward. Indeed, after his first run for the presidency ended in an embarrassing defeat his political career looked like it was over before it had really begun.

The rise and fall of Uhuru Kenyatta

Initially, the Kenyatta had appeared to be a plausible candidate to extend the tenure of the Kenya African National Union (KANU), the party that had governed Kenya since independence. In addition to the Kenyatta name he was eloquent and well educated, having been trained at St Mary’s School in Nairobi and Amherst College in the United States. Given his considerable personal wealth and businesses interests and the advantages of incumbency that come from being supported by a semi-authoritarian state, he might have been expected to secure an easy victory.

However, in 2002 Kenyans were ready for change. The decision of the outgoing president, Daniel arap Moi, to select Kenyatta as his successor – disappointing a number of other heavyweight candidates – led to a split in the government and a number of damaging defections. When those who had left the ruling party coalesced with opposition groups under the leadership of Mwai Kibaki, the defeat of the government became feasible. Still, few commentators predicted that Kenyatta would only secure 30% of the vote. Not only did this represent the country’s first transfer of power via the ballot box since independence, it was the worst performance ever recorded by a ruling party candidate.

The defeat was particularly significant for Kenyatta because it undermined his position within his own Kikuyu community. The 2002 campaign was effectively a two horse race between Kenyatta and Mwai Kibaki, a rival Kikuyu leader who had been a mainstay of the one-party state but had defected to lead his own party following the reintroduction of multiparty politics. Kibaki’s victory both nationally and within the Kikuyu heartlands of Central Province confirmed his position as the community’s preeminent political patron.

Kenyatta’s prospects of rising to political prominence also appeared to be hampered by a number of other factors. First, the fact that the outgoing president, Daniel arap Moi, handpicked him to be his successor led to accusations that he was little more than a puppet of old authoritarian networks. Second, his personality and reputation led many commentators to question whether or not he really wanted to be president, and many speculated that he would be happier enjoying his wealth and business interests outside of the political spotlight. Indeed, in some circles Kenyatta was thought of as more of a party animal than a political one. Third, it seemed likely that after Kibaki’s tenure the presidency would need to be rotated outside of the Kikuyu community to one of the ethnic groups yet to occupy State House. Had this come to pass, Kenyatta could have had to wait four presidential terms for another run.

Political rehabilitation

However, everything was to change over the next five years as Kenyatta was gradually rehabilitated within the Kibaki government. This process owed much to the fragmentation of Kibaki’s coalition, which forced him to form new partnerships in order to maintain control of the political landscape. In the process, Kibaki came to rely increasing on the support of Moi – who even began to campaign for his former rival – and Kenyatta. The decision to join forces made sense for both leaders, because it shored up Kibaki’s support, united the Kikuyu community, and enabled Kenyatta to position himself as the heir to Kibaki’s throne.

Thus, on the eve of the genera elections of 2007, Kenyatta was able to address the final rally of Kibaki’s Party of National Unity (PNU) in Uhuru Park and receive one of the most enthusiastic responses of the day. However, even at this stage it was unclear whether Kenyatta was a viable national leader. It was the events of the next four weeks that would open up the pathway to the presidency. Towards the end of the campaign the race was too close to call, but some opinion polls gave the edge to opposition leader Raila Odinga. As the results began to trickle in, Odinga assumed an early lead, with many of his supporters claiming victory before all of the constituencies had been announced.

It was at this point that the electoral process began to fall apart. Delays in the process of counting and declaring results led to fears of government rigging, which were exacerbated by Chairman of the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), Samuel Kivuitu, when he admitted that he did not know where some of his returning officers were or what they were doing. When Kivuitu finally announced that Kibaki had won a narrow victory, and the president was sworn in with desperate haste before the concerns of election monitors and opposition parties could be taken into account, it unleashed a wave of violence in which over 1,000 people lost their lives and 600,000 more were displaced.

The geographic scope of the ethnic clashes was unprecedented, sparking fears of civil war. Although the conflict was ultimately curtailed by the formation of a power sharing government, its aftermath continued to dominate the political agenda for years to come. Significantly, while allies of Odinga such as William Ruto were accused of organizing attacks on communities assumed to have voted for Kibaki, Kenyatta was accused of directing vigilante groups to protect Kikuyus and carry out revenge attacks.

These allegations – which eventually led to Kenyatta being charged with crimes against humanity by the ICC – were expected to be the end of his political career by many Western commentators. Instead, they proved to be just what was required to propel him to the presidency. On the one hand, any doubts that Kenyatta had about the merits of running for the presidency were dispelled by the realisation that only by occupying State House could he fully protect himself from international prosecution. On the other hand, the image of Kenyatta as the protector of vulnerable Kikuyu communities banished any lingering suggestions that he remained a Moi puppet, and earned him a new-found loyalty among one of the country’s largest ethnic groups. In recognition of his growing political prominence, Kenyatta was promoted to the position of Deputy Prime Minister and became an increasingly significant figure as Kibaki began to pull back from public life at the end of his second and final term in office.

The return to State House

Even at this stage it seemed unlikely that Kenyatta would become the country’s next president. Many critics within civil society urged Kenyans not to back a leader charged with crimes against humanity, while international donors warned voters that “choices have consequences”. However, Kenyatta and his advisers skilfully turned these challenges into opportunities. They did so through two key strategies. First, Kenyatta formed a new coalition – the Jubilee Alliance – with William Ruto, bringing together the leaders of the two communities that had engaged in the worst violence of 2007-8. Although surprising, this deal proved to be a masterstroke – together Kenyatta and Ruto commanded a considerable portion of the electorate, and, given their authority among their own ethnic groups, could credibly claim that if they were elected they would be able to prevent further Kikuyu/Kalenjin violence.

Second, the UhuRuto campaign (as it became known) manipulated international criticism to claim that the prosecution of Kenyan leaders at the ICC represented an attack on the country’s sovereignty. In this way, the election campaign, and the struggle against the Court’s proceedings, could be sold as a second liberation struggle. By creating a “siege mentality” within the Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities, Jubilee was able to ensure high turnout, and a first round election victory that was disputed by the opposition but ultimately confirmed by the Supreme Court.

Kenyatta the president

In power, President Kenyatta’s approach has been shaped by his pathway to State House. Most obviously, he began his time in office by pushing back against the International Criminal Court and taking a critical stance towards traditional donors. Indeed, during his first term Kenya played a key role in coordinating African opposition to the Court – accusing it of cherry picking cases Western imperialism – which has gone a long way to undermining its legitimacy. In a similar vein, Kenyatta has gone out of his way to praise foreign partners who preach non-interference, such as China, and to publicly disagree with the United Kingdom and the United States when governments or high commissioners have sought to influence Kenyan affairs.

Perhaps a little less obviously, Kenyatta has modelled his leadership on that of his father, who often sought to position himself above the cut and thrust of everyday political arguments and inter-ethnic competition, relying on allies to fight key battles in order to preserve his reputation as a nationalist leader and founding father. Such an approach also fit well with Uhuru’s own management style, which is not to spend a lot of time getting bogged down in committee meetings and instead to delegate to trusted allies. This has led to criticism of the president’s failure to swiftly replace underperforming Cabinet Secretaries, but it has also enabled the president to deflect blame for the government’s failings on to those around him.

A third way in which Kenyatta’s path to the presidency has shaped his governance style relates to the coalition with which he won the 2013 general elections. While this alliance was a boon during the campaign, it has threatened to be a liability in office. On the one hand, the warm relationship between Kenyatta and Ruto has not prevented constant sniping and tension between their allies. On the other, the demand of both factions to be compensated for their political support has generated fierce competition over spoils, which in turn has made it more difficult to bring corruption under control. Consequently, the amount of graft and waste within the government is alleged to be increasing – although firm figures are inevitably hard to pin down.

In turn, the difficulty of managing the government threatens to undermine some of the main pledges on which President Kenyatta has staked his reputation. During the 2013 election, the Jubilee Alliance advocated a vision of a modern Kenya that would be “digital” and modern. Against this, the opposition were depicted as being “analogue” – old fashioned and out of touch. In line with this, Kenyatta committed himself to major infrastructure projects, including the Lamu Port and Lamu-Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor, a standard gauge railway between Nairobi and Mombasa, and the provision of “one-laptop-per-child”. Like many of the policies put forward under the Jubilee Alliance, these projects share two things in common: they represent major infrastructure initiatives that have great transformative potential, and they generate vast rent-seeking opportunities.

Time will tell whether President Kenyatta’s desire to deliver on his legacy projects will outweigh the pressure to use these initiatives for patronage and clientelistic purposes. It will be embarrassing for the president if he has to go back to the country and ask for a second term – elections are due in August 2017 – without having delivered on his campaign promises from last time round , but guiding major projects to succesful completion is likely to require a more hands-on style than the president had adopted to date.

Kenya – President Kenyatta forms new party

On 8 September 2016 twelve parties allied to the president formally dissolved themselves to form the Jubilee Party. The new ruling party differs from the previous Jubilee Alliance coalition in that it will have a common leadership hierarchy and will run a single slate of candidates in national and sub-national elections. This promises to give President Uhuru Kenyatta a significant advantage in the upcoming elections and has the potential to transform the dynamics of Kenyan politics.

The Jubilee Party

Although the number of parties that have merged into the Jubilee Party is impressive, it is important to note that many of them are bit-part players, and around half have no legislative representation at all. However, the decision of party leaders to merge is nonetheless significant because it promises to change two key aspects of Kenyan politics.

In the past, there has been a tendency for parties that are members of the same coalition at the presidential level to run candidates against each other at the legislative and county levels. This has caused large coalitions significant problems, as it has often diverted energy and attention away from the contest with rival coalitions at the national level. By forming a common political machine, the Jubilee Party will avoid this kind of internal competition, and will be able to achieve considerable efficiencies in terms of its campaign strategy and finance. Moreover, if the party is a success, it will become the largest political party in Kenya since the days of the one-party state. Charles Hornsby, a well-respected commentator on Kenyan politics, has estimated that a spate of recent defections means that Kenyatta is now supported by around two-thirds of the National Assembly.

Parties that merged to form the Jubilee Party

• The National Alliance
• United Republican Party
• New Ford Kenya
• Alliance Party of Kenya
• National Rainbow Coalition
• United Democratic Forum
• Ford People
• Party of National Unity
• Democratic Party
• The Independent Party
• Chama Cha Uma
• Grand National Union

The Jubilee Party also has the potential to change the way that election campaigns play out. Historically, rival leaders swap coalitions ahead of national polls, trying to maximise the position they can get based on their profile and support base. This process depends on both of the main coalitions – the last three elections have boiled down to a two-horse race – being fragile and weak, such that leaders face few disincentives to leave one alliance and join another.

Typically, the political merry-go-round is triggered by one leader swapping sides, which creates a vacancy that other leaders mobilise to fill, leading to a new vacancy, and so on. Should the Jubilee Party succeed in establishing a strong and stable party, it will mean that leading figures from other coalitions will have nowhere to go, encouraging them to stay put. In other words, Jubilee’s unity may impose a degree of stability on the opposition, curtailing the process of party hopping.

Party primaries

The foregoing analysis raises a critical question: can the Jubilee Party hold together? Forming a political party is far easier that maintaining one. Traditionally, Kenyan parties and coalitions struggle to make it through party primaries because losing candidates defect to run on other tickets. This leads to a proliferation of political parties, intense internal competition at the local level, and diverts attention away from the national campaign. In 2007, for example, it is estimated that Mwai Kibaki’s Party of National Unity lost about 10 legislative seats to the opposition because different leaders allied to Kibaki divided the vote at the constituency level.

President Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto are certainly pulling out all the stops to protect the party from defections. On the one hand, they are said to be deploying a wide range of the carrots and sticks at the party’s disposal, and will both provide funding for the campaigns of those who win the primaries and “soft landings” for those who lose. On the other, new legislation is being introduced that would ban party hopping 90 days before an election and would require the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission to oversee primary polls in a bid to give them greater legitimacy.

This impressive array of informal and formal levers may prove sufficient to keep most leaders within the Jubilee Party in the run up to the 2017 elections, especially given the momentum behind President Kenyatta’s campaign. However, whether it will bind the party in the future is another question. One of the main beneficiaries of these recent developments is Deputy President William Ruto, who faces an uphill battle to replace Kenyatta ahead of the 2022 polls, when term limits will force the president to stand down. The problem Ruto faces is that many of Kenyatta’s supporters do not trust him or wish to see him presiding in State House. Instead, he is viewed by many of the president’s allies as a necessary evil: a partner required to defeat Raila Odinga and the opposition in the short-term, but a dangerous ally and one that is expendable when the threat has passed.

The formation of a stronger ruling party may help Kenyatta to assert his authority, and to line up his backers behind Ruto when the time comes. However, it seems more likely that the Jubilee Party will only survive so long as Kenyatta is there to hold it together, and will begin to come apart at the seams once the succession battle begins to heat up from 2018 onwards.

Kenya – President Kenyatta and the battle over the electoral commission

President Uhuru Kenyatta is not a leader inclined to sacrifice his allies in return for an easy life. Indeed, personal loyalty has been one of the trademarks of his time in office. When faced with calls to replace the Cabinet Secretaries (Ministers) responsible for national security following the government’s poor response to the Westgate terrorist attack, he held firm despite widespread domestic and international criticism. He has also remained loyal to Deputy President William Ruto, despite the fact that many people from Kenyatta’s Kikuyu community would like to see his Kalenjin running mate sidelined now that the threat of prosecution at the International Criminal Court – which is what initially brought the two men together – has ended.

What is not clear, however, is whether this is a commendable trait born of a deep personal commitment to friends and colleagues, or a stubbornness that means that he fails to respond effectively to institutional and individual weaknesses. There are certainly a number of instances in which President Kenyatta’s refusal to compromise appear to have had more to do with what is politically expedient than friendship. Take the example of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC). Despite failing to effectively manage the 2013 election and having presided over a body that has been found to have suffered from widespread corruption (procurement scams were rife in the interim IEBC that preceded the current Commission), Chairman Ahmed Issack Hassan is still in place.

In May, with the next general elections 16 months away, the lack of reform of the IEBC became a target for mass opposition protests organized by the Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD). These weekly events led to considerable unrest in downtown Nairobi and also in Kisumu and Siaya. The response of the state was brutal: in Nairobi police have been recorded beating and stamping on isolated protestors who were lying face down at the time. In Kisumu and Siaya, the police used live rounds, resulting in the deaths of at least three people. In turn, the violent repression of the protests – in contravention of the Bill of Rights in the 2010 constitution – has led to a further polarization of the political debate.

In defending his position, President Kenyatta has fallen back – as he often does – on the need to follow and protect the rule of law. On this account, the opposition protests are unruly and a threat to national unity: they therefore do not constitute a legitimate way in which to force a change in the composition of the electoral commission, and merit a hardline response.

However, despite this stance Kenyatta and other leaders within the Jubilee Alliance agreed to open negotiations with CORD leader Raila Odinga towards the end of May. This move appears to have been driven by two developments. First, the opposition announced that it would postpone its protests for two weeks to make space for national dialogue. Second, CORD’s tactics appear to have significantly increased the pressure on the government – from donors, local businessmen, and civil society – to find an inclusive solution to the problem of the IEBC.

So far, the talks – and a parallel process running in parliament through the Justice and Legal Affairs Committee – have yielded some progress. There is now an agreement that the next set of Commissioners will be appointed by a committee that will feature two representatives selected by the government, two by the opposition, and a further three who will be appointed by the Public Service Committee. At the same time, the deadline for election petitions to be submitted has been increased from 14 to 30 days. This is important, because it makes it more likely that the opposition will be able to put together a viable case, and hence more likely that they will pursue their complaints through the courts rather than on the streets.

However, so far there has been no agreement on the most important issue: whether the Chair and other figures who presided over the 2013 debacle will be replaced ahead of the 2017 elections. This is the critical issue in terms of rebuilding the trust of the opposition in the electoral process. If President Kenyatta’s reputation is anything to go by, this is likely to be a compromise that he will resist as long as he can. Which means that further opposition protests and urban unrest cannot be ruled out.

Africa – Presidential term limits and the third term tragedy

Africa is currently in the middle of a third term crisis. As presidents come up against the presidential term-limits included in many multi-party constitutions, a significant number are refusing to leave power gracefully. Instead, a number of leaders have sought to secure a third term. So far, this trend has taken in countries as otherwise diverse as Burkina Faso, Burundi, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and now, it seems, the Democratic Republic of Congo.

In most cases, they have tried to do so through official channels, in other words by changing the law or appealing to the judiciary, rather than simply suspending the constitution and ruling by fiat. One reason for this is that there is strong domestic and international support for presidential term limits. Afrobarometer data suggests that typically over two-thirds of Africans support term limits, although there is considerable variation, with a high of 90% in Benin and a low of 44% in Algeria. As a result, leaders feel compelled to tread carefully, and to legitimise their strategies by pursuing them through formal channels.

Yet despite this, attempts to secure a third term have often triggered political unrest and in some cases widespread civil conflict. In both Burkina Faso and Burundi, efforts by unpopular presidents to stay in power come what may triggered mass protests and ultimately (very different forms of) military intervention. At the time of going to press, a further crisis appears to be brewing in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where the President, Joseph Kabila, looks set to pursue an unconstitutional third term in office. On Thursday 5 May, the former Governor of Katanga, Moise Katumbi, announced that he would be contesting the presidency as the candidate of the three main opposition parties. Just hours later he tweeted that the president – his former ally – had sent the police force to surround his house and that he had appealed to the United Nations mission in the country to protect him. Unconfirmed local reports later suggested that it was only the intervention of UN soldiers that prevented Katumbi’s detention.

If so, the DRC has had a lucky escape. Opposition supporters have already been involved in violent clashes with the security forces in protest against the prospect of a prolonged Kabila presidency. The arrest of Katumbi would raise the political temperature yet further, increasing the prospects for conflict in the coming months. As allegations and rumours circulate unhindered, the threat of a broader political rupture becomes ever more likely.

The growing number of third term tragedies on the continent raises three important questions. First, when do presidents seek a third term and when do they not? Second, when are they successful? Third, when are a president’s attempts to serve a third term most likely to result in political conflict?

Should I stay or should I go

Despite the recent headlines it is important to remember that considerably more presidents have respected term limits than have broken them. For every Uganda there is a Zambia, for every Burundi there is a South Africa, for every Rwanda there is a Kenya. There are a number of factors that appear to encourage presidents to seek third terms. First, the quality of democracy matters. Presidents in less democratic states who face weaker institutional checks and balances are more likely to try and break – or at least change – the rules. Good recent examples include Congo-Brazzaville and Djibouti.

Second, it is more feasible for presidents who govern countries that are more politically and economically independent from western influence to ignore international protests. As a result, leaders who enjoy greater international leverage because their countries feature valuable natural resources or are of considerable geo-strategic importance, try to secure a third term much more frequently than those that are much more dependent on Western trade. This is one of the reasons that President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, a country that recently found large oil reserves and is a key ally of United States in the war-on-terror, is able to stay in power indefinitely.

Third, presidents who enjoy greater political control are more likely to judge that it is possible to secure a third term, and hence more likely to risk pursuing one. Political control comes through two main routes: the ruling party and the security forces. Presidents are far more likely to try and secure third terms in dominant-party states in which the ruling party secures over 60% of seats in the legislature, such as Namibia and Rwanda, and when they have tight control over the army and police, as in Djibouti and Uganda. Under these conditions, it is often possible to both change the constitution through the legislature and silence any opposition to this strategy.

You can’t always get what you want

Of course, presidents do not always get it right and a number of third term bids have been unsuccessful. In countries such as Nigeria and Zambia, presidents failed in part because they could not take their own parties with them. As a result, they struggled to pass the necessary legislation, and, facing strong opposition from civil society groups and other parties, abandoned their plans. Rather than undermining democracy, this process can actually give it a short in the arm, and deter future presidents from pursuing similar strategies.

However, unsuccessful attempts to stay in power can also have far more problematic consequences. In Burkina Faso and Burundi, leaders overestimated their political control and underestimated the strength of opposition. As a result, they struggled to push through their third term ambitions. In Burundi, for example, President Nkurunziza lost a critical vote in the legislature to change the law, which forced him to put pressure on the judiciary to interpret the constitution in a way that would allow him to stand again. Although the Supreme Court ultimately ruled in his favour, it was immediately apparent that it only did so as a result of high levels of intimidation, further undermining the president’s credibility. As a result, the verdict did little to dampen opposition protests against his actions.

Limited political control undermined the position of President Nkurudiza in a second way. In the midst of the public protests in May 2015, a group of army officers launched a coup attempt. Although it appears to have been a poorly coordinated effort and was eventually put down, the mutiny demonstrated the lack of unity within the armed forces, and the potential for the president’s limited control over the security forces to contribute to political instability.

The bigger they are the harder they fall

To date, presidential term limits have not tended to be the source of major political conflict when presidents have either a) been willing to give up on their ambitions in the face of widespread opposition (Nigeria, Zambia) or b) have enjoyed the political control needed to be able to force through their will with relatively little resistance (Uganda, Rwanda). The “problem category”, for want of a better term, is those cases in which conditions are not favourable to a third term bid but leaders try and force one through regardless.

In turn, this is most likely to happen in states in which presidents have most to gain from staying in office, and most to lose by giving up power. Good proxies for the benefits of office are the level of corruption and the presence of valuable natural resources, the combination of which can make a leader extremely wealthy. A decent proxy for the costs of leaving power is whether a country has a history of political violence, which tends to decrease the level of trust between rival leaders, and increase the potential that the head of state will be prosecuted for human rights violations when they step down.

This is not great news for the DRC, which is a highly corrupt resource rich state with a history of political conflict. Unless President Kabila bucks the continental pattern, he is unlikely to step down voluntarily. And if he proves to be willing to risk everything to stay in power, sending the police to surround Katumbi’s house is likely to be only the tip of the iceberg.

@fromagehomme

President Kenyatta’s Anti-Corruption Drive Falters

President Uhuru Kenyatta has pledged to reduce corruption in Kenya in a bid to promote economic growth. But following an initial burst of activity in which Kenyatta first announced that new technology would be used to remove “ghost workers” from the government pay roll and later moved to suspend a number of politicians suspected of corrupt activities, the government has little progress to show for all its fine words.

Worse still, in late May the president’s “clean credentials” were called in to question when he moved to suspend the Chairman and five officials of the Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission (EACC) – the very body whose recommendations had initially led Kenyatta to demand that 175 officials accused of fraud step down so that they could be investigated.

Opposition leader Raila Odinga seized on the announcement to argue that the president’s anti-corruption “crusade” was little more than a smokescreen, designed to create the necessary cover for the president to protect his core allies. The conspiracy theory put forward by Odinga also crossed the mind of many journalists, who wondered whether the strong support that Kenyatta initially offered to the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission was intended to create the impression that the new government was taking graft seriously, so that it would be easier for Kenyatta to remove genuine reformers from power at a later stage.

Kenyatta’s decision to remove both the chairman and the deputy chairwoman of the EACC came after MPs voted to sanction them, ironically accusing the EACC leadership of the abuse of office. Although it is clear that the EACC has made a number of errors, its biggest mistake appears to have been one of strategy rather than one of moral judgement: by taking on so many leaders at the same time, anti-corruption officials effectively inspired the emergence of an “anti-reform” alliance within the legislature. Put simply, too many MPs had something to lose from allowing the EACC to continue with its work.

The president’s apparently contradictory positions – on the one hand, supporting the EACC’s investigation, while on the other sacking senior EACC officials, has left the government’s anti-corruption efforts in disarray. It has also called into question the capacity of the president to deliver clear and decisive leadership in this area – a complaint that increasingly threatens to characterise his time in office.

Kenya – President seeks to manage inter-branch conflict

The new Kenyan political system, introduced under the 2010 constitution, paved the way for a complex web of checks and balances between newly created branches of government. On the one hand, 47 counties were created, complete with their own assemblies and directly elected Governors. These units have often seen themselves as being in conflict with the national government over resources and political power. On the other hand, the new constitution resurrected the Senate, transforming Kenya into a bi-cameral system for the first time since the 1960s. Almost immediately, Senators began to battle for supremacy and control over development funds with the Members of Parliament that populate the lower house – the National Assembly.

At times, this competition has worked to the advantage of the Jubilee Alliance government. Internecine struggles at the county level have served to deflect a range of political actors from the failings of the central government – for example over terrorism and the provision of national security. This has been a valuable distraction for the government, which has struggled to stem the flow of attacks by the radical Islamic movement al Shabaab. It has also taken other stories off the front pages, such as the allegations that police in the north-eastern county of Garissa flogged a group of young people with a rubber house and later posted the pictures on Facebook – not the best way to win hearts and minds in an increasingly divided society.

But in some cases the battles between Governors, Senators and MPs have also proved to be an embarrassing distraction. In a recent spat, the National Assembly supported the Division of Revenue Act, which effectively ‘hived off Sh 1 billion from the Senate’s oversight funds to give to counties’. As a result, the total allocation of government revenue to the counties in 2015/2016 is estimated to be Sh 207.84 billion, or 37%. Senators responded by criticising MPs and threatening to veto legislation of particular concern to the National Assembly. In the resulting debate the importance of key national priorities, such as infrastructure and security, were lost.

Similar tensions rose to the surface during a visit by President Uhuru Kenyatta to Nandi this week. In a speech delivered prior to the president’s own remarks, the Senate Majority Leader, Professor Kindiki, sought to impress on Kenyatta the need to restrain MPs, arguing that ‘The National Assembly should stop undermining the Senate by cutting its budget. We are not going to be frustrated and intimidated’. However, to Kindiki’s surprise, the president was not in the mood to humour his complaints. Instead, Kenyatta told those present to work more closely with rival leaders rather than issuing ‘meaningless threats’. Clearly frustrated by what he had heard, Kenyatta continued ‘The war of words between the Senate, governors and the National Assembly is uncalled for in the country. Leaders should stick to their mandate but not come here and issue threats to fellow elected leaders. The country must be governed through order.’

Kenyatta’s focus on order is nothing new. Kenya has long been governed by leaders who have bought into what Attieno Odhiambo called the ‘ideology of order’. The precise formulation of this set of ideas has changed over time, but is characterised by the tendency of leaders to legitimise their authority on the basis that they generate order, and the associated claim that to some extent it is appropriate to compromise human rights and civil liberties in the pursuit of this goal. However, while President Kenyatta has often referenced the importance of order, insecurity and political infighting have undermined the confidence of many Kenyans in his ability to provide political stability.

In response, the president has made a number of moves designed to foster domestic political unity, which he sees as a perquisite for stability. To this end, the Jubilee Alliance, which contested the 2013 elections as a coalition of two different parties, has been transformed into the Jubilee Alliance Party (JAP), and has pledged to run just one candidate for each elected position. This stands in stark contrast to previous practice, in which Kenyan coalition partners have frequently run candidates against each other for legislative positions, often dividing the vote. Along with Vice President William Ruto’s pledge not to support Kenyatta in the next presidential campaign, this move was designed to foster the impression that the government is rock solid.

However, there is a long way to go until the next election, and there are a number of issues around which the JAP may struggle to maintain unity, most notably a number of seats in which both wings of the party will claim that their candidates should be given priority. Already, efforts to run a common candidate in a legislative by-election, and to create a stronger political structure at the local level, have been hampered by in-fighting between members of Ruto’s United Republican Party (URP) and Kenyatta’s The National Alliance (TNA). Should the JAP fall apart, the president’s claim to be the provider of order and unity would become even harder to sustain.

President Kenyatta escapes ICC prosecution in Kenya

It has been an eventful few weeks for Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, whose case at International Criminal Court was dropped on 5 December 2014. However, Deputy President William Ruto still has charges to answer at The Hague, leaving the president in a difficult position domestically.

The collapse of the Kenyatta trial did not come as a surprise. Commentators have been discussing the weakness of the ICC’s case against Kenyatta for some time. It was always a case based on limited evidence, and therefore heavily reliant on a small number of key witnesses. Many of those witnesses have now recanted their statements, in part because of the absence of an effective and independent witness protection programme to safeguard key informants. Combined with the refusal of the Kenyan government to hand over important evidence, this undermined the prosecution’s case from the very start. According to Human Rights Watch, the Kenyan government had acted as a roadblock “impairing the search for truth”.

As early as December 2013, the ICC’s Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda told the Court that she did not have the necessary evidence to prove Kenyatta’s guilt. She was given more time to procure it, but because the ICC has no investigatory capacity within Kenya this search was doomed to failure. On 8 October 8 2014, the Prosecutor was forced to admit that she had no new evidence that would tip the balance against the president. She was informed by the judges of the ICC Trial Chamber that while they would not support Kenyatta’s application to terminate proceedings there and then, she must find the evidence or request the judges to withdraw the case.

When the evidence was not forthcoming, it became inevitable the case would be withdrawn. Bensouda made one final attempt to have it indefinitely adjourned, so that proceedings could be reopened in the event that new evidence came to light, but this was rejected by the Chamber, who criticized the Prosecutor for failing to ask for evidence that she later claimed was essential earlier in the trial. For many, the collapse of the Kenyatta case is just the latest in a long line of ICC failings that demonstrate the inability of senior lawyers to understand the political context within which they operate.

President Kenyatta was reportedly “excited” and “relieved” at the news. Having always denied the charges, he said that he felt “vindicated” and that his “conscience was absolutely clear”. However, Kenya’s Deputy President, William Ruto, remains on trial. The Ruto case has always been thought to be stronger than the Kenyatta case, in part because it relies on a broader range of evidence and so is less vulnerable to the intimidation or bribery of a small number of witnesses. President Kenyatta is hoping that this case, too, will be dismissed, quipping “one case down, two more to go” on Twitter.

He may get his way. Many commentators remain skeptical about the strength of the Ruto case, especially now that the Trial Chamber has effectively rewarded the Kenyan government for its failure to comply with the Prosecutor’s requests by halting the proceedings against Kenyatta. But the short-term divergent trajectories of the two cases may cause domestic problems for the president. In many ways President Uhuru Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, and Deputy President William Ruto, a Kalenjin, are unlikely bedfellows. Their charges at the ICC relate to allegedly organizing violence on different sides of the 2007/8 ethnic clashes, and many members of their communities are deeply suspicious about their coalition, which is best conceptualized as a marriage of convenience. Although Kenyatta and Ruto managed to successfully bring their supporters together behind their “Jubilee Alliance” during the 2013 election campaign – thus pacifying the often volatile Rift Valley region, home to a Kalenjin majority and a Kikuyu minority – radicals on both sides have called for an end to the pact.

This tension places the president in a tricky position. Unless he campaigns hard to ensure that the charges against Ruto are also dropped, the Deputy President’s supporters will accuse him of conspiring to use the ICC to remove their man – and his potential rival – from the Kenyan political landscape. But if the president does work hard to ensure Ruto’s freedom, he will frustrate many of his own advisers, who fear that unless the Deputy President is removed he will one day succeed Kenyatta to State House, undermining their access to power. Squaring this circle while keeping his ruling coalition together will be one of the most difficult challenges facing the president in the early months of 2013.

Kenya – President Kenyatta introduces anti-corruption measures in Kenya

Following a series of major corruption controversies, the Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta announced a new anti-corruption drive earlier this month. On 1 September, Kenyatta launched a new scheme to biometrically register all civil servants in a bid to end the phenomenon of “ghost workers” – dead or non-existent workers who nonetheless draw government salaries. According to a government audit, such scams currently cost the government around $1 million a month.

President Kenyatta also announced the launch of a new website, www.president.go.ke/report-corruption, which enables ordinary Kenyans to upload evidence of corruption “directly” to the president. Through the site, Kenyans can anonymously share videos, documents and photos. The President has said that he hopes that these measures will encourage Kenyans to speak out about the corruption that they experience in their everyday lives. At present, Transparency International estimate that only about 3% of Kenyans do so.

The new measures were introduced after embarrassing corruption scandals undermined progress on two of the government’s flagship projects: the provision of one laptop to every child, and the construction of a Standard Gauge railway linking Nairobi and Mombasa. However, commentators have questioned how effective the new measures will be.

Given that most Kenyans do not report corruption, and the government has a poor track record of impartially investigating corruption allegations, it is unclear whether the opportunity to upload evidence “directly” to the president will prove to be attractive to a skeptical audience. Critics have accused the president of “window dressing”, pointing out that there is already considerable evidence of wrongdoing in the “one laptop” and “Standard Gauge railway” projects and yet little action has been taken.

Moreover, although “ghost workers” represent a significant drain on government resources, the most economically damaging form of corruption occurs through other processes, most notably import/export scams and procurement deals. Biometric registration and the launch of a new website are unlikely to impact significantly on this elite corruption, which typically involves a small number of individuals operating behind closed doors and takes some time to make it into the public eye.

Kenya – President Kenyatta embroiled in terrorism controversy

On 18 June, Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta shocked domestic and international observers by claiming that a spate of terrorist attacks were not organized by the radical Islamic group al-shabaab, but were in fact the work of “local political networks”. Critics alleged that the President is seeking to manipulate terrorist activities in order to delegitimize and intimidate his domestic political opponents.

The crisis began on 15-17 June, when the coastal town of Mpeketoni was attacked twice in quick succession, leading to the death of over 60 people. The violence was particularly shocking for two reasons. First, it represented the largest loss of life terrorism in Kenya since the Westgate mall siege of 21 September 2014. Second, the failure of the security services to prevent the second raid – which took place just a day after the first – highlighted the inadequacy of the country’s anti-terror operation.

Al-Shabaab quickly claimed responsibility for the attacks. Sheikh Abdiasis Abu Musab, the spokesman for al-shabaab’s military operations, told Reuters that “We raided villages around Mpeketoni again last night” in retaliation for the presence of Kenyan troops in Somalia. Ominously, he concluded “Our operations in Kenya will continue.” International media and Kenyan citizens quickly accepted this version of events, which made President Kenyatta’s subsequent denial of al-shabaab involvement all the more surprising.

According to President Kenyatta, the attacks were “well planned, orchestrated and politically motivated ethnic violence against a Kenyan community, with the intention of profiling and evicting them for political reasons … This therefore was not an al-shabaab attack … Evidence indicates that local political networks were involved in the planning and execution of a heinous crime”. Although he did not say it explicitly, the President was suggesting that the attack was a deliberate attempt to drive out members of his own Kikuyu ethnic group from the coast.

Historically, there has consistently been considerable tension on the coast between groups such as the Somalis and the Oromos, coastal groups that support the secessionist Mombasa Revolutionary Council (MRC), and “upcountry” Kenyans who have settled at the coast and taken some of the best land. These tensions intensified during the 2013 general election, when “coastal” candidates feared that they might be defeated by rivals who received much of their support from “upcountry” voters. The government’s recent decision to extend land titles, and land politics in general, has further exacerbated divisions in some areas, because “some locals see the Kikuyus as interlopers, who have become rich after the government gave them land.”

Given that Mpeketoni is a predominantly Kikuyu town, and most of the people who died in the first attack were Kikuyu, President Kenyatta’s comments were not entirely without foundation. Moreover, his statement resonated with the concerns of many members of his community. Following election-related violence of the 1990s and 2008, when Kikuyus were targeted by other ethnic groups, the community is understandably unsettled by any attack that appears to deliberately pick out Kikuyu victims.

However, while inter-communal tensions clearly exist, and may have motivated some Kenyans to participate in the Mpeketoni attack, the President has provided no evidence for his assertion that the attacks were planned by local political networks. What seems more likely is that the impetus and planning for the attack came from al-shabaab, with some assistance from local actors. If this is correct, it raises the question of why the President would seek to deflect the blame from al-shabaab – Kenya’s number one enemy.

According to opposition leaders, the answer is that President Kenyatta is seeking to manipulate the terrorist attacks in order to undermine the position of opposition parties. Following a period of self-imposed exile in the United States, Kenyatta’s main rival, Raila Odinga, recently returned to Kenya. Even since, relations between Kenyatta’s government and Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) have deteriorated. Having failed to persuade the government to openly engage with his party over the numerous problems that marred the 2013 general elections, the ODM has embarked on a campaign of non-violent direct action. Most significantly, Odinga took the bold move of announcing that a rally would take place on 7 July – Saba Saba – a day that Kenyans associate with the mass protests against authoritarian rule that ultimately paved the way for the reintroduction of multiparty politics.

Despite government claims that this was an unsuitable time to call for mass protests, Odinga indicated he was determined to take his supporters to the streets unless Kenyatta responded to his demand for national dialogue by 6 July. In response, government officials warned that if Cord leaders do hold a rally they will do so “at their own risk”; a thinly veiled threat that harsh treatment would be meted out to anyone seen to threaten law and order. Ultimately, the 7 July rally did go ahead thereby providing an opportunity for Odinga to reveal a new 13-point reform agenda specifically targeting what he sees as the executive overreach of the Jubilee government. The attendance was neither particularly impressive nor embarrassing, and so has not radically changed the momentum of opposition politics. Despite some provocation, the police demonstrated considerable restraint, which helped to prevent an escalation of the protest.

Amidst this atmosphere of accusation and counter-accusation, opposition leaders claim that President Kenyatta’s attempts to draw a connection between terrorist attacks and “local political networks” is motivated by his desire to solidify his own position in the face of sustained criticism. If Kenyans can be persuaded that opposition parties represent a genuine security risk, it will be far easier to ban their activities and intimidate their leaders. However, while this strategy may play well with the President’s supporters, many of whom do not trust the ODM and have a strong antipathy to Odinga, it has served to further alienate his opponents and a number of prominent international donors, which is likely to further undermine the prospects for peace and political stability.