Category Archives: Azerbaijan

Armenia – Is International Goodwill a Form of Soft Power? Some Insights from the South Caucasus

In September 2016, referring to the parliamentary elections due to be held in the spring of 2017, President Serzh Sargsyan of Armenia declared that: “I am sure that all these measures will contribute to raising public confidence in electoral process and ensure that we meet international standards for free and fair elections. Parliamentary elections will be held in our country in several months. The Republic of Armenia will send invitations to all partners for their participation in international monitoring missions[1]”. Even though political leaders do not always implement this kind of declaration, the recent Armenian record gives some backing to the credibility of the statement.

Armenia is not a consolidated democracy, as clearly stated by “Freedom House-Nations in Transit” 2016 report. In 2016 (like in the previous years) Armenia is classed as a semi-consolidated authoritarian regime. In particular, with reference to electoral processes, it is considered that the level of local self-governance remains insufficient. Looking at the executive level, some observers and members of the opposition have criticised the recent constitutional reform[2]. According to them, rather than being aimed at the greater good of the country, the reform represents a tool to extend President Sargsyan position in power. Additionally, corruption remains pervasive. In spite of these and other shortcomings, in recent times Armenia has often searched for international advice and approval before implementing major reforms. Relevant examples of that are the forthcoming parliamentary elections, as hinted at the beginning of the post, and the recent constitutional reform (approved by referendum on December 2015).

International observers have been formally invited to monitor the forthcoming parliamentary election, scheduled for April 2, 2017. More precisely, on January 19, Arsen Babayan, Head of the Information Department of the Armenian National Assembly, declared that four international organisations have been invited: the Council of Europe, PACE, OSCE, and CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly[3]. Such a move was widely expected. Remarkably, in anticipation of a formal invitation from the Armenian authorities, in the past months, the OSCE/ODIHR conducted a “Need Assessment Mission report”, which involved consultations with both institutional and civic actors. As a result, the deployment of 24 long-term observers and 250 short-term observers has been recommended. Additionally, the Armenian government has been cooperating with international donors towards the enhancement of electoral capabilities and transparency. For example, after some talks, the Government and the EU delegation in Armenia agreed on the funding and purchasing of cameras to be placed in the polling stations. Additionally, a program for the timely acquisition of voter identification technologies has been coordinated by UNDP and funded by the EU, the USA, Germany, and Great Britain[4].

This search for the cooperation and, more indirectly, the approval of the international community (especially EU and the US) is not new. As already dealt with in this blog, in July 2015, before submitting the text of the new constitution to the voters, the Armenian authorities asked the Venice Commission (the advisory body of the Council of Europe specialised in constitutional law matters) for an advisory legal opinion. Following the opinion, the draft of the constitutional reform was amended accordingly. This cooperative attitude is diametrically opposed to the hyper-assertive behaviour of neighbouring (and arch-enemy) Azerbaijan. Notably, in November 2016, the Azerbaijani Constitution was modified by referendum. On that occasion, the government in Baku, despite of severe criticism from the opposition, refrained from asking for any external advisory opinion on the draft. Notwithstanding the lack of a formal invitation, but in response to a request from several human rights defenders, the Venice Commission issued an urgent preliminary opinion on the draft (which was not formally discussed by the Azerbaijani authorities), highlighting concerns on matters like civil liberties and over-empowerment of the presidency.

Armenia has nothing specific to gain from being a “good international citizen”. In spite of its membership in the Russian-sponsored Collective Security Treaty Organizations (CSTO) and the Eurasian Union (EEU), Armenia seems to be on remarkably good terms with the EU. Notably, even though no specific dates have been announced yet, Yerevan and Brussels are concluding the negotiation of an agreement to deepen economic and political ties. This is happening roughly three years after a Armenian u-turn. More precisely, in September 2013, after the sudden withdrawal of Yerevan from Association Agreement (AA) talks with the EU, it was made clear that Armenia was not eligible for any alternative form of association. This did not prevent Armenian officials, including the President, from making frequent comments about the desire for cooperation with Brussels[5]. The ongoing search for another form of association seems to have helped the Armenian cause, as shown by the current ongoing negotiations.

In short, Armenia is making successful use of its soft power (i.e. persuading others to do something without resorting to coercion). Notably Yerevan, in spite of its binding ties with Russia, has convinced the EU of the importance of not abandoning its “willing child”. Even though it would be superficial and dismissive to ascribe this outcome solely to Armenia’s “good international attitude”, it is safe to say that it has played some role.

If this hypothesis is correct, it can allow us to make sense of soft-power strategies implemented by extra-European states[6]. In particular, it can help us to understand why mega-events, such as sporting competitions, have limited power in seducing an external (Western) audience. As Nye points out, “The best propaganda is not propaganda”. This refers to the mediocre outcomes of Russian and Chinese soft-power strategies, which project a government-crafted message that, ultimately, is not credible[7]. A similar point can be made about neighbouring Azerbaijan, which for years has implemented an (expensive) state-sponsored public diplomacy strategy, involving both grand events and a carefully planned official narrative. In spite of the effort, during the “European Games” of 2015 the international spotlight was on political prisoners rather than on the brand-new stadiums[8].  At things stand, Baku seems to have acknowledged the limited effectivity of the strategy.

In summary, Armenia, notwithstanding its binding ties with Russia, has been successful in portraying itself as an eager partner of the EU. In addition, both before the recent constitutional reform and the forthcoming parliamentary election, external advice and approval have been proactively sought. This is in sharp contrast to the Azerbaijani strategy, which until recently was more focused on grand events rather than on initiatives and reforms that were geared towards external observers[9].  Going beyond these cases, these observations may be relevant to the broader understanding of soft-power tools. While the limits of building stadiums seems have been realised now, more attention should be paid to “international goodwill”.

This research was supported by a FP7/Marie Curie ITN action. Grant agreement N°: 316825

Notes

[1] ARMINFO News Agency. 2016. “Armenia’s President: Armenia’s new government’s task is to give new impetus to development of economy”, September 17 (retrieved through LexisNexis).

[2] This blog has analysed the Armenian constitutional reform, including the public debate around it, in the following dates: November 30, 2016; December 9, 2015; September 13, 2015.

[3] ARMINFO News Agency. 2017. “Arsen Babayan: 4 international organizations invited to observe parliamentary elections in Armenia”, January 19.

[4] ARMINFO News Agency. 2017. “Negotiations continue on installing video cameras in polling stations in Armenia, Switalski says”, January 24.

[5] Loda, C., 2016, May. Perception of the EU in Armenia: A View from the Government and Society. In Caucasus, the EU and Russia-Triangular Cooperation? (pp. 131-152). Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG.

[6] Providing a detailed account of the Armenian geopolitical membership may be daunting. Even though the country is geographically much closer to Teheran than to Brussels, the Armenian political narrative has consistently emphasised the belonging of the country to the European-Christian civilisation.

[7] Nye, J.S. 2013. “What China and Russia Don’t Get About Soft Power”, National Herald Tribune, May 2 (Retrieved through LexisNexis).

[8] Loda, C. 2016. “Azerbaijan, Foreign Policy and Public Diplomacy”. Irish Studies in International Affairs, 1-17. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3318/isia.2016.27.7.

[9] Also in the case of Azerbaijan, the targeted audience is the western one. For a more detailed analysis, see: Loda, Azerbaijan, Foreign Policy and Public Diplomacy.

Azerbaijan – A New Constitutional Reform: Towards a Monarchical Presidency?

On 26 September, citizens of Azerbaijan were called to vote in a constitutional referendum. The constitution, approved in 1995, was already amended in 2002 and 2009. While the current amendments concern numerous topics (including civic liberties and right of assembly), some of them specifically concern the President’s role. It is proposed:

  • To amend Article 101.1 of the current constitution, which would extend the presidential term from 5 to 7 years.
  • To introduce a “First Vice President” and a “Vice President”, chosen and appointed by the president. In the case of the president’s inability to perform his role, the First Vice President would take over. Currently, this “second-in-charge” function is a prerogative of the prime minister
  • To remove the minimum age limit to run for President (currently, it is 35). Similarly, the minimum age for parliamentarian is lowered from 25 to 18.
  • To introduce the right for the President to dissolve the parliament. This is in the event that the parliament votes no confidence to the government twice in a year or refuses the suggested appointees to the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court or the Central Bank’s main board.

In order to maximise the inclusivity of the voting process, polling stations have been established in Azerbaijani embassies. Remarkably, everything is ready in Ankara, Teheran and Riyadh.  However, notwithstanding the vocal support of the ruling party, the opposition has expressed its grave concern over the proposed changes.

While President Ilham Aliyev has not personally commented on the proposed amendments, pro-government voices have openly endorsed them. MP Siyavus Novruzov, who is the deputy executive secretary of the ruling ‘New Azerbaijan Party’, has defined the proposed amendments as necessary to enhance national security and reform of the state administration[1]. Emil Huseynli, head of the ‘Support for Youth Development – Dushunje’, declared that the various changes, including the strengthening of the presidential office, will foster the sustainable development of the country. Referring to the relaxation of the age limits, he commented that: this “will create an opportunity for the political activity of literate, prospective young people.” However, the opposition thinks that this amendment is specifically designed to favour a semi-monarchical transfer of power and, henceforth, that the children of the president would likely be the main beneficiaries of this “political opportunity”. Notably, it has been observed that Heydar Aliyev, the only son[2] of the presidential couple, will be 27 in 2025 (the most likely year for a presidential election). If his father decides to run for the presidential office in 2018 and to step down after that, the young Heydar would be an extremely probable “new” candidate. Other possible scenarios are the election of Heydar to parliament or the appointment of a member of the presidential family as vice-president[3]

In addition to being concerned about the future implication of these changes for the Aliyev family, the opposition is worried about the immediate effects of a “reinforced presidency”. Arif Hajili, the leader of Musavat party, bluntly declared that: “They [the state authorities] are not even able to explain to their citizens why we need these changes to the Constitution. They believe they can create a second North Korea here and rule in the same style[4]. Similarly, the prominent lawyer, Fuad Agayev, commented that: “An analysis of the document indicates that, if adopted, it will have an adverse impact on human rights, civil rights and freedoms, as well as power-sharing”.  This kind of apprehension is also shared by some international observers. Chris Smith, Chairman of the U.S. Helsinki Commission, sent a concerned letter to Ilham Aliyev. At one point, it stated clearly that: “By lengthening presidential terms and expanding presidential authorities, the proposed constitutional changes are susceptible to abuse that would entrench political authority, making it less responsive to the will of the Azerbaijani people.” Lastly, some observers expect the referendum to be rigged.

In September various well attended protest rallies took place in Baku. The main argument is that the only aim of the referendum is to reinforce Aliev’s rule. “No to monarchy!” and “No robbery!” were the main slogans chanted[5]. Additionally, in the attempt to generate an international response, some Human Right Defenders asked to Thorbjørn Jagland, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, to submit the proposed amendments to the Venice Commission[6]. The main points of concern they raised were: the massive empowerment of the presidential office, the authoritarian climate the referendum takes place in, the non-consultation of the parliament, and the absence of public debate[7]. In addition to the Azerbaijani Human Right Defenders, on 5 September the PACE Bureau also asked the Venice Commission to give an urgent opinion.

In response, on 20 September the Venice Commission issued a “Preliminary Opinion on the Draft Modifications to the Constitution”. In the context of widespread concern on different matters, including the repression of dissident opinions, the Venice Commission expressed clear worries about the amendments in relation to the presidency. More specifically, it noted that, back in 2009, the removal of the two-term limit to re-election had already strengthened the power of the president. In the light of that, it said that: “the modification to Article 101 which extends the Presidential mandate for longer than is the European practice, coupled with the previous removal of the two-term limit, concentrates power in the hands of a single person in a manner not compatible with the separation of powers”. In addition, the Venice Commission expressed its concern about the president’s powers to dissolve the parliament, to call early elections, and to appoint a vice-president who, in practical terms, would be an unelected second-in-command.

Even though the voting has yet to be finalised, the rejection of the proposed amendments seems highly unlikely in contemporary Azerbaijan. Henceforth, in the face of domestic and international concern, the presidential office, which is already remarkably strong, will be further reinforced. Unfortunately, this seems to be a prelude to a further consolidation of the authoritarian tendencies in the country.

Notes

[1] BBC Monitoring Trans Caucasus Unit. 2016. ‘Azeri court approves referendum on constitutional change’, 26 July (Retrieved through LexisNexis).

[2] In addition to him, the president has two daughters, Leyla and Arzu.

[3]Turan Information Agency. 2016. ‘It’s time for the United States to act on Azerbaijan’, September 9 (Retrieved through LexisNexis).

[4] Turan Information Agency. 2016. ‘Arif Hajili: Usurpation of Power Will Not Save Aliyev’. 18 September (Retrieved through LexisNexis).

[5] Turan Information Agency. 2016. ‘Jamil Hasanli: Aliyev does not get tired to pervert the Constitution’. September 17 (Retrieved through LexisNexis).

[6] The role of the Venice Commission, with reference to the constitutional referendum in Armenia, has already been discussed in this blog.

[7] Turan Information Agency. 2016. ‘The report of “Musavat” about the referendum campaign’. 5 September (retrieved through LexisNexis).

Azerbaijan – F1 and the limits of public diplomacy

From 17-19 June, the Formula One Grand Prix took place in Baku. In contrast to the “European Games” in 2015, the race received limited attention from governmental actors and the Azerbaijani media. Two explanations are possible. The first lies in the changed domestic circumstances. Given the global low energy price and its dramatic setback on citizens’ life standards, politicians deemed it inappropriate to focus too much attention on such frivolous spending. The second lies in the disappointing international reception to last year’s “European Games”.

President Ilham Aliyev, who is known for his interest in sports events, kept an unexpectedly low profile before, during and after the F1 race. Even though he and his wife, Mehriban Aliyeva, attended the opening ceremony and presented the trophies at the end, in the preceding months, Mr Aliyev almost never mentioned this event[1]. For example, on 16 June, the day before the race, the most high-profile remark to Parliament came from Ali Hasanov, the president’s aide for public and political affairs. This is in contrast with the attention paid the “European Games”. On that occasion, the President personally inaugurated most of the sports facilities and did not miss a chance to voice his enthusiasm. At the award ceremony, he used phrases like: “These Games united our people even more, instilled a sense of pride in us – just look at what we are capable of accomplishing!”. One year on, the quest for attention seems to have been dimmed. We can see this in the media coverage of the event too where studies reveal that the Formula One race received considerably less attention[2]).

The first explanation for this change lies in domestic conditions and the dramatic drop in energy prices. As already analysed in this blog,  Azerbaijan faced a devaluation of its currency at the beginning of the year, which has led to the dissatisfaction of its citizens. In the following months, the local Manat has remained extremely weak and unemployment has risen. This situation does not seem temporary and a mix of recession and high inflation is likely for the next two years[3]. With the exception of those who managed to rent out their balconies to view proceedings, the race, which placed an additional burden on the shrinking state budget, does not seem to have brought any particular benefits to the population. That said, the decline in living standards does not seem to have affected the Aliyev family. In April, the four-day-war in Nagorno-Karabakh caught most the public attention, but at the same time the leaked “Panama Papers” revealed that Leyla and Arzu Aliyeva, daughters of the President, held a 56 per cent stake in the development of a profitable gold mine. Given this situation, any undue emphasis on the F1 race, when most citizens are struggling to make ends meet, could have easily sounded like “let them eat cake”.

The second explanation, which complements the first one, is that, after the European Games, Azerbaijan had an abrupt awakening about the limits of public diplomacy. Even though President Aliyev recently declared that: “The first European Games (…) were very successful”, very few heads of European states (namely Bulgaria, Luxemburg, San Marino and Monaco) flew to Baku to attend them. Most politicians simply declined the invitation. However, a day before the inauguration ceremony, the German Bundestag, on the grounds of human right violations, prohibited high-ranking state officials from attending the event.  Additionally, in spite of some official claims about the influx of tourists (without providing any numbers), international arrivals were probably below expectations. In addition to this disappointing international attendance, few international reporters focused on the competition. Instead, most of the international press wrote about the country’s human rights record, rather than about the brand-new infrastructures. Notably, The Washington Post criticised the pop-singer Lady Gaga for performing at the opening ceremony, while some human rights defenders were held in jail[4]. Even though presidential speeches never mentioned these facts, domestic actors observed the limited PR effect of this initiative. For example, Emil Huseynli, chairperson of the `Support for youth development’, declared that the cold reception to the games was part of a global smear campaign against Azerbaijan. Additionally, some Azerbaijani news sources reported that some Youth Groups protested against the fact that, according to them, the European Parliament politicised the Games “as a way of putting pressure on Azerbaijan”. In short, it soon became apparent that instead of boosting the international reputation of the country, the Games put the spotlight on undesired topics.

In conclusion, a year ago Azerbaijan seemed a confident actor, determined to win over the international community by means of a well-funded public diplomacy campaign. However, the changed economic circumstances, together with the lessons learned about the limited efficacy of this strategy, seem to have brought about a partial reconsideration of this strategy.

Notes

[1] Looking at the English version of the official Website of the President of Azerbaijan, this event has been only mentioned, along with numerous other points, in occasion of the opening of Azerbaijani-German Economic Forum in Berlin.

[2] Translated into English by BBC Monitoring.

[3] BMI Research. 2016. “Stagflation To Persist”, Business Monitor Online, March 10 (Retrieved through LexisNexis).

[4] “Blinders in Azerbaijan”. 2015. The Washington Post, August 9 (retrieved through Lexis Nexis).ze

Weaker Presidents, Better Semi-presidentialism?

9781137387806

Sophia Moestrup and I have just published another edited volume on semi-presidentialism. This time the focus is on Semi-presidentialism in the Caucasus and Central Asia. There are contributions from Alex Baturo on vertical power in the post-Soviet space, Alexander Markarov on Armenia, Jody LaPorte on Azerbaijan, Malkhaz Nakashidze on Georgia, Dmitry Nurumov and Vasil Vashchanka on Kazakhstan, and Matto Fumagalli on Kyrgyzstan. Sophia and I contribute two chapters. The first addresses some misconceptions about the notion of semi-presidentlaism, such as the idea that semi-presidential regimes must have quite powerful presidents but never very powerful or very weak presidents, and also that autocracies cannot be semi-presidential – they can, not least because semi-presidential regimes do not have to comprise only countries with quite powerful presidents. Our second chapter sums up the contributions to to the volume and argues that weaker presidents make for better semi-presidentialism. This is a brief summary of this second chapter.

The main attraction of institutional analysis is that it has the potential to generate better political outcomes. Given the assumption that institutions matter, we may be able to craft them so as to mitigate or even eradicate some of the negative outcomes that would otherwise be caused by the behaviour of political actors. We wish to draw one institutional policy recommendation from this book. All else equal, countries with weaker presidents are likely to experience better outcomes than countries with stronger presidents.

There is evidence from Armenia, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan that weaker presidents have been associated with better outcomes. In Kyrgyzstan the decline in the president’s constitutional powers has been dramatic. That said, the shift to a weak president is relatively new, dating back to 2010. Kyrgyzstan also has a history of democratic reversals. So, we should avoid any definitive judgement at this early stage. More than that, the shift occurred in the context of the collapse of the previous regime and the desire on the part of the constitution builders to trammel the power of the presidency, which was seen as one of the main obstacles to democratic consolidation under the previous regime. This suggests that any positive effects of the weak presidency may be endogenous to the choice of the new institutional framework. All the same, we note that the early period of the new constitutional framework has been marked by less presidential posturing, less executive/legislative conflict, and, for now at least, less democratic backsliding. These are positive signs.

In Armenia, the decline in presidential power has been less dramatic. The president’s constitutional powers were never as great as the other countries in the region. Moreover, even after the passage of the 2005 reforms, the president still enjoyed some not inconsiderable constitutional powers. What is more, as in Kyrgyzstan, the context in which the president’s powers were reduced in 2005 means that we have to take account of the problem of endogenous institutional choice. Further still, Armenia remains a hybrid democratic regime in which there is plenty of political competition, but where democratic procedures have been manipulated to the advantage of incumbent power holders, although perhaps less so in the most recent elections than previously. In this context, we have to be careful about any lessons that we might we wish to draw from the Armenian case. Even so, we might benefit from thinking counterfactually. What would be the situation if there were now a super-president in Armenia? Would the situation be worse? We cannot know. Yet, we do know that in practice there was a form of super-presidentialism after the passage of the 1995 constitution. We can also confidently claim that this period marked the low point of democratic performance in Armenia to date. Armenia has not experienced a weak presidency, but it has experienced very strong presidents. It is not unreasonable to conclude by comparing the experience of the 1995-2005 super-presidency and the post-2005 period that the latter was less problematic.

By far the strongest evidence, though, comes from Georgia. Here, there were two periods when the problem of endogenous institutional choice was at least partly offset because of a dramatic change in the political context. In the first period there was a very strong president. In the second period, there was a very weak president. In this latter case, it is tempting to think in terms of quasi-experimental conditions. In the same historical, cultural, economic, and social context, there was an institutional treatment, namely the move to a weak presidency. The result has been much better political performance. The period of cohabitation under the previous president-parliamentary form of semi-presidentialism was marked by intense president/prime ministerial conflict as well as conflict between the president and the government and legislature generally. By contrast, the recent period under the weak presidency and a premier-presidential form of government has, to date, been characterized by much calmer relations. Indeed, this latter period is doubly interesting because the president distanced himself from his former political allies immediately after his election. The resulting situation should not be classed as a period of cohabitation, but it is certainly not a period where the president’s loyalty to the ruling party has quashed, perhaps artificially, any political competition within the executive branch. While there have been major disagreements between the president and the government, they have not become regime threatening. Indeed, arguably, post-2013 president/government relations in Georgia resemble those in countries like the Czech Republic or Slovakia where weak but directly elected presidents act as a counterweight to the government, but where there are no serious attempts to assume real presidential power.

If we are right to conclude that weaker presidents are better presidents, then we also wish to assert that the party system is an important intervening variable, as indicated above. It is perhaps no coincidence that in Georgia there has been a solid parliamentary majority since 2013. In other words, the president has not had the opportunity to try to offset his weak constitutional powers by building an alternative and potentially destabilizing pro-presidential coalition within the legislature. We might add that there has also been a relatively stable legislative majority in Kyrgyzstan since the 2010 reforms. Again, the president has not had the incentive to craft a majority that is personally loyal to him and that often requires the distribution of state resources in a geographically skewed and perhaps even corrupt way. In Armenia, by contrast, presidents have not always enjoyed a parliamentary majority and have been forced to forge coalitions in the legislature. This perhaps helps to account for the continued presence of a patronage president in a way that harms the rational functioning of the regime and democratic performance. Indeed, the recent constitutional reform that will introduce a parliamentary system after the next electoral contests might confirm this suspicion. The introduction of a parliamentary system and a weak president should be a positive development on the basis of our logic, but it may merely be a way of maintaining patronage politics in the context of an uninstitutionalized party system.

So, we acknowledge that many economic, social, and political factors affect political performance. We also believe that the party system is a particularly important variable for determining the practice of presidential politics. Even so, we claim that political performance is likely to be better when presidents have fewer powers. This suggests that constitution makers should consider the benefits of reforms that reduce the power of their presidency. We are aware that our conclusion assumes that institutions matter and, therefore, is susceptible to the problem of endogenous institutional choice, but we would like to address the endogeneity problem by arguing that even endogenously chosen weak presidents are better than endogenously chosen strong presidents. In other words, we believe that there are benefits to be gained from the endogenous selection of weak presidents. We should endeavour to create the conditions for decision makers to calculate that their system would benefit from a weak presidency. Fundamentally, if we are right that weak presidents bring benefits, we are unconcerned whether this outcome comes about endogenously or exogenously. That said, even if institutions are chosen endogenously, political actors still have to interpret the institutions with which they are faced. At some point, the economic, social, or political context is likely to change. At that point, if not before, institutions may have at least a partly exogenous impact. In those circumstances, it is better to have a weak presidency in place than a strong one. In other words, we would encourage upstream efforts to create the conditions for a constitutionally weak president. We believe that there are benefits to be gained from a system in which actors are willing to work without the presence of a super-president and that these benefits are likely to be both endogenous to institutional choice and at some point exogenous too.

We wish to make one final point. We promote the idea of a weak presidency, but we also wish to promote a weak presidency in the context of a wider constitutional and political system in which there is a genuine separation of powers and checks and balances. For example, we are not convinced that there are benefits to be gained from replacing a system in which there is a super-president and a weak prime minister by one where there is a weak president and a super-prime minister. This merely shifts the problem. It does not replace it. And it may characterise what is about to happen in Armenia. Let us express this point differently. We are not opposed to weak but directly elected presidents. As we argue in our introduction to the volume, semi-presidential constitutions are consistent with both very strong and very weak presidents. We prefer the latter. Let us make the same point in another way. We do not believe that parliamentarism with a weak but indirectly elected president is necessarily a guarantee of better political performance if there are no checks on the prime minister in the parliamentary system.

To sum up, we are happy to recommend a directly elected president as long as the president’s powers are weak and are exercised in the context of a system in which power is not concentrated in any political actor.

Armenia: recognizing Karabakh? The Armenian debate and the reaction from Azerbaijan

In the aftermath of the “4 Days War” in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armenian President, Serzh Sarkisian, declared that, in the case of resumed hostilities, his country would recognize the de facto Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. One month after, a bill titled “On recognition of Republic Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh]”, submitted by two opposition MPs, was approved by the Government and presented to the Parliament for discussion. Nevertheless, both political and media actors have bee equivocal about the suitability of the unilateral recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh. From the Azerbaijani side, it is remarkable the limited attention this event was given. In particular, President Ilham Aliyev, who in the past adopted a warmongering narrative, has not commented on this specific development.

Following the cease fire in 1994, Nagorno-Karabakh consolidated itself as a de facto state after a bloody war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Currently, its statehood remains completely unrecognized given that not even its Armenian patron has taken a formal stance in that direction. This choice has been mostly motivated by the commitment not to spoil the mediation effort of the Minsk Group, which is the OSCE group in charge of facilitating a resolution of the stalemate. For example, speaking to the representatives of the mass media in March 2013 President Sarkisian declared: “What will the citizens of NK and Armenia gain today if independence of NKR is recognized? (…) How dangerous will such a decision for the people of Nagorno-Karabakh be? (…) It means a slap in the face not only for the other side but also for the Co­chairs [of the Minsk Group]”. In brief, it is argued that recognizing Nagorno-Karabak would lead only to new troubles in the absence of tangible benefits. This position was widely shared by the Armenian political spectrum as demonstrated by the rejection of the various pro-recognition bills proposed by “Heritage Party”. However, in 2010 International Crisis Group pointed out that, in the case of resumption of full-scale hostilities, the de facto state may be recognized and a pact of mutual defense with Nagorno-Karabakh may be signed. After April 2016, political actors had to deal seriously with these issues.

“If military actions were to continue and escalate on a larger scale, the Republic of Armenia would recognize the independence of Nagorno Karabakh. With these words, on the 4th of April, President Sarkisian hinted at the possibility of formal recognition. However, after the end of the armed hostilities, no further declaration in this direction came from the Presidential office. By contrast, some actors in the opposition considered the time ripe to bring forward this issue again. = That translated into a bill called “On recognition of Republic Artsakh,” proposed by the opposition PMs Zaruhi Postanjyan (Heritage party) and Hrant Bagratyan (Armenian National Congress). On the 5th of May the Armenian government approved it for parliamentary discussion within 30 days. As expected, this triggered a debate not only in Armenia but also abroad.

Although most external powers did not openly comment on this decision, Russian officials manifested their opposition. Remarkably, at the beginning of May, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lavrov, spoke against unilateral recognition. It is reasonable to say that the Russian stance may have influenced the public debate. At the moment, politicians from both the government and the opposition are adopting a prudent attitude. Prime Minister Abrahamian said that, with Azerbaijan respecting the cease-fire, there is no need to rush into recognition. Similarly, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Edward Nalbandian, reassured external powers saying that: “The conclusion of the Government does not imply an endorsement of that initiative. (… ) [In that event], the President of the Republic of Armenia, would inform his partners in advance and, first of all, the heads of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries”. This moderate position is also shared by the bulk of the opposition. Armen Rustamyan, the leader of the ARF faction in parliament, declared that recognition should not be unilateral, but instead in line with the Minsk Framework. Similarly, a few days previously, former President Ter-Petrosyan stated that a premature recognition of Karabakh would irremediably jeopardize the effort of the Minsk group. Turning to the media debate, most Armenian newspapers agree that an early recognition would harm the interest and the long-terms goals of the country[1].

Given the sensitivity of the issue, Baku may be expected to react to such a move. However, it = composed behaviour adopted by Azerbaijan has taken observers by surprise. This is in striking contrast to the previously assertive narrative. Whereas in the past President Aliyev continuously reaffirmed the military strength of his country and the commitment to the re-conquest of the lost lands, recently his declarations seem more conciliatory and less in favor of resuming hostilities. Consistent with that, the reaction to the possible recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh has remained contained. Hikmet Hajiyev, the Foreign Ministry’s acting spokesperson, declared that: “By recognizing the separatist regime formed in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, Yerevan will put an end to the Minsk peace process and should this happen, the Minsk Group will possess no negotiating mandate”[2] Thus, no explicit declaration came from the President and the media debate remained limited. Speculating on the reasons behind that, it can be hypothesized that the country, which has been severely hit by the drop in oil prices, may be reconsidering its extra-assertive attitude and narrative of the previous years. The liberation of prominent political prisoners in the past months has already been read in this vein.

In sum, even though probably it will not have an immediate follow up, the Armenian debate on the recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh is relevant not only for Yerevan but also for Baku. Thus, the fact that Armenia is acting cautiously makes new attempts of mediation possible. On 16th of May, the two presidents will meet in Vienna even though, given their irreconcilable positions, expectations for a breakthrough run low[3].

Notes

[1] “Armenian press say Karabakh recognition matter of time, but not now”, BBC Monitoring Trans Caucasus Unit, May 10, (2016).

[2] Russia & CIS General Newswire, “Recognition of Karabakh independence by Yerevan to derail OSCE Minsk group’s mediation efforts – Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry”, May 3, (2016).

[3] “Armenian press skeptical about “favorable” outcome of meeting with Azerbaijan”, BBC Monitoring Trans Caucasus Unit, May 14, (2016).

 

Azerbaijan – Fall in oil price, economic crisis and possible political consequences

The drop in the global oil price represents a cold shower for the oil-producing economies. In 2008 a barrel cost $140, whereas in January 2016 it is now down to $30. The Middle-Eastern dynamics, first and foremost the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the previously-sanctioned Iran, do not suggest a quick reversal of this trend. In light of that, the oil-rich economies have had to review their budget allocations and growth forecasts. Azerbaijan is no exception in this regard.

If we compare the first presidential speeches of 2015 and 2016, President Ilham Aliyev seems extremely aware of the trend affecting the country. In 2015, reviewing the economic performance of the past year, Mr. Aliyev proudly said: “Our main economic indicators for 2014 are very positive. I can say that perhaps they are the highest in the world”. By contrast, at the beginning of 2016 the president had to admit that: “The development which was observed in previous years has not been achieved. That was not possible, because, as I have already noted, the price of oil has fallen 3-4 times”.

The drop in oil prices is not purely an economic issue. Indeed, this dynamic may have strong repercussions on the political system, which is dominated by the president. Remarkably, Azerbaijan is by far the wealthiest country in the South Caucasus. According to CIA Factbook, in 2014 the GDP Per Capita was $17,800. In comparison, Georgia’s and Armenia’s was $9,200 and $8,200 respectively. Azerbaijan is also the most authoritarian of the three countries. In fact, according to the Freedom House, the country is Not Free. These data are relevant because various analyses point to a link between oil wealth and the authoritarian regime in the country. More precisely, Farid Guliyev[1] considers that the oil revenue, managed by a State Oil saving Fund, has benefited and expanded a patronage network and ultimately has fostered the stability of the ruling regime. Similarly Jody La Porte[2] considers oil wealth to have promoted elite cohesion and economic prosperity. These circumstances have made it possible to effectively marginalise existing and potential opposition movements[3].

Over the years, the huge energy revenues have triggered a dynamic which often characterises oil-producing states: rentierism. Azerbaijan can be considered a rentier state since the bulk of the state budget is made up of oil and gas dividends instead of taxes. In fact, given the abundance of energy resources and the positive global energy trend (for producing states), oil and gas were the main economic focus of the country. The CIA Factbook data shows that energy commodities constitute 90% of national exports, which, in turn, compose 43.3% of the state GDP. Even if the Azerbaijani president has periodically mentioned the importance of boosting the non-oil sector, various experts seemed skeptical about the practical application of that. Farid Guliyev, analyzing the phenomenon, observes that it has mainly concretized in the form of pharaonic infrastructures, carried out by elites’ cronies and payed for by oil money[4]. Similarly in summer 2015 another local expert, under condition of anonymity, called this emphasis on the development of the non-oil sector as an empty litany: many words and no concrete actions.

This rentierism, in the absence of abundant oil revenues, does not seem sustainable anymore. Suddenly, diversification has become a top priority and the declarations about it no longer sound like an empty statement: the poor state of the local finances requires something to be done. Looking at the steps taken, the stabilization of the currency seems the main targeted area. That has been made urgent by the decision taken by the Central Bank on 21 December to unpeg the Manat (which is the local currency) from the Dollar and let the currency fluctuate. This happened only after half of the hard-currency national reserves were used up in a desperate attempt to postpone the inevitable. As a result, in a few days the Manat lost one third of its value.

The devaluation of the local currency has been feared for a long time. From mid-November, hard currency was available only in banks, tourist facilities and airports. In fact, almost everybody expected it to happen in the immediate aftermath of the European games in summer 2015. Not only citizens but also banks considered this possibility extremely realistic and started to grant loans in dollars. Radio Free Europe has reported the story of a desperate debtor who explained how, no matter insistent he was, he could not obtain a loan in the local currency. Even if it was expected, the devaluation hit  many citizens hard, seeing prices rocketing up in few hours and their life-time savings shrinking. In reaction, protests took place in various cities and in some cases resulted in clashes with the police and arrests. At the moment, measures taken to mitigate the monetary shock include: the imposition of limits on foreign currency outflows and the introduction of a 20 per cent currency tax aimed at discouraging direct investments or real estate purchases abroad[5]. Additionally, the president has recently approved some poverty-reduction measures. Among them, some pensions will be increased by ten per cent. In the next months new welfare provisions, such as scholarships and extra-employment benefits, will be probably introduced.

Considering these circumstances the state budget for 2016 has been revised and now forecasts factor in the oil price at $25 per barrel instead of $50. Additionally, the presidential office plans to grant fiscal advantages to investors who will diversify the economy. For example, for seven years entrepreneurs who import equipment in Azerbaijan not only will not pay taxes but also will have only half of their income taxed[6]. However, even if almost everybody talks openly of the economic difficulties, the new circumstances will not end tout court the willingness of the country to host international grand events. For example, the organization of the Formula One Grand Prix, scheduled for June 2016, will not be affected by any new measure.

In light of these elements, it is worth looking at how the president frames the issue. On January 2016 the website of the World Economic Forum published an article authored by Mr. Aliyev. On that occasion, consistent with what he had said in previous days (and which is reported at the top of this post), Ilham Alieyv admitted that global trends were not favorable to the structure of the Azerbaijani economy. However, he declared that the government was doing everything in its power to mitigate the negative circumstances. He also added that, in spite of the low oil price, Azerbaijan is still crucial in providing energy security to Europe. Thus, the authorities are actively managing the things they have control over. The next weeks and months will show the response of the population. There is no obvious development. Even if the Azerbaijani establishment is perfectly in control of its security forces, some nervousness among top elites can reasonably be expected. As Thomas de Waal masterfully put it: “The public, it seems, can forgive an authoritarian government almost anything except a falling standard of living”.

Notes

[1] Guliyev, Farid. “Oil and Political Stability in Azerbaijan: The Role of Policy Learning.” Caucasus Analytcal Digest 47 (2013)

[2] LaPorte, Jody. “Hidden in Plain Sight: Political Opposition and Hegemonic Authoritarianism in Azerbaijan.” Post-Soviet Affairs 31, no. 4 (2015): 339-366.

[3]The oil revenue does not only affect domestic policies but also foreign policy strategies.  In this regard, the ESI Think Tank coined the term “Caviar Diplomacy”, which refers to the Azerbaijani strategy of winning over Western public figures in exchange for precious gifts.

[4] Guliyev, Farid. “‘After Us, the Deluge’: Oil Windfalls, State Elites and the Elusive Quest for Economic Diversification in Azerbaijan.” Caucasus Analytical Digest 69 (2015).

[5] AAP Newsfeed. “CIS: Azerbaijan imposes currency controls.” January 19, 2016.

[6] “New law excepts some Azeri entrepreneurs from tax for seven years”, BBC Monitoring Trans Caucasus Unit (2016), January 19.

 

Azerbaijan – In the aftermath of the Parliamentary Election

On 1 November a parliamentary election was held in Azerbaijan. A total of 767 candidates competed for 125 seats. As largely predicted, the ruling New Azerbaijan (Yeni Azerbaijan) party won the vast majority of seats in the Milli Majilis.

Azerbaijan election results:

YAP- 69 seats
Loyal non-partisan – 40
Other pro-govt – 16

Incumbent reelection rate – 80%

These figures confirm that, as always in the recent history of the country, President Aliyev will be able to count on a huge parliamentarian majority. This element will further reinforce the preponderance of the executive over the legislature. According to official figures, turnout was over 50 per cent.

The electoral campaign, which lasted 23 days, was plagued by controversy.

The campaign started the 8th of October and closed the morning of the 31st, exactly 24 hours before the opening of the polling stations. The Central Electoral Committee, chaired by Mr Mazahir Panahov, was responsible for setting the formal rules of the competition. The national media gave great preponderance to the provisions taken to enhance transparency and inclusiveness, such as the installation of cameras in the polling stations, the streaming on-line of the voting process, the printing of the ballot papers and the placement of ramps for disabled voters. Furthermore, the importance of involving the international media was stressed so as not to cast any shadow on the electoral process.

In spite of these praiseworthy measures, some other points seemed to restrict the national debate. For example, candidates had to be extremely accurate in filling their candidacy forms since mistakes could lead them to being excluded from the competition. Additionally, campaigning tools and venues were regulated in detail. Candidates were not allowed to put up any promotional material on buildings and monuments or to openly criticize the government. Furthermore, only media located in Azerbaijan and approved for state legislation could be used for promotional purposes.

The opposition was also concerned by the economic barriers to access media outlets. In fact, differently from previous parliamentary elections, free airtime was not given to parties presenting candidates in fewer than 60 constituencies. In practical terms, only the New Azerbaijan Party (which declined) would have been entitled to that. It resulted in the Azerbaijani public Television ITV (İctimai Televiziya) costing paid airtime at the colossal sum of 3540 Manat per minute. This provision was criticised as setting unequal conditions for independent candidates. Mr Panahov backed this provision saying, first, that it was due to economic difficulties (even though ITV is fully subsidized by the state)[1] and, second, that it was nonsensical to grant national coverage to parties that were eligible to stand in only some constituencies. He also pointed out the availability of other campaign tools such as: “Meeting directly with voters, preparation and distribution of campaign materials and paid election airtime in media outlets, including media outlets operating across the country.” However, the opposition forces complained that campaign restrictions, together with the unaffordable cost for the election-related advertisements, severely hindered the substantial competitiveness of the campaign.

Another point that raised some questions was the absence of the OSCE/ODIHR monitoring mission. Even though the election was observed by 365 international observers from 36 different organizations, OSCE/ODIHR was not among them. The inability of reaching an agreement on the appropriate number of observers was the main reason behind this forfeit. In its “Needs Assessment Mission Report” (31 August 2015), OSCE/ODIHR recommended the secondment of 30 long-term observers and 350 short-term ones from OSCE-participating states. The Azerbaijani authorities dismissed this request as unacceptable. As a result of this controversy, on the 11th of September ODIHR Director Michael George Link announced, through a press release on the official web site, that: “due to restrictions imposed by the Azerbaijani authorities“, ODIHR had decided to withdraw from observing the election. The Azerbaijani authorities described this choice as a unilateral move and invited the group not to comment further.  More specifically, Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov said that the ODIHR’s proposal to send around 400 observers was disproportionate for a country of 9.5 millions. Ramiz Mahdiyev, the head of Azerbaijani Presidential Administration, backed this position and added, in terms of comparison, that 700 observers were recently sent in Ukraine, where the population was 45 million[2]. The top official Ali Hasanov stated that OSCE/ODIHR has been generally biased toward Azerbaijan. By contrast, Rebecca Vincent, a former US diplomat currently coordinating “Sports for Rights”, an international campaign raising awareness on Human Rights in Azerbaijan, observed that “This election is taking place with no credible international observers”:

This is not the first time the OSCE/ODIHR’s actions in Azerbaijan have been plagued by controversy. In the presidential election of 2013, it was the only group to unequivocally assess the election as rigged. By contrast, authoritative bodies such as PACE (the monitoring mission of the Council of Europe) endorsed the elections as free and fair. Investigating the reasons behind this dramatic discrepancy, the ESI Think Thank argued that some enthusiastic rapporteurs had long-standing personal connections with the Azerbaijani elites and that, by virtue of these ties, in the past they enjoyed fully-funded trips to Baku and generous gifts (which is where the name “Caviar Diplomacy” comes from). The ESI report had great resonance and triggered angry reactions from the Azerbaijani establishment.

The aforementioned electoral controversies lead some opposition parties to announce their intention to boycott the elections (even if individual candidates still decided to run). The Republican Alternative party (REAL) also said it would not recognize the results. It was also proposed to postpone or re-hold the ballot. Remarkably, REAL, whose leader Ilgar Mammedov has been in jail since March 2014, suggested first working to ensure the conditions for a free and fair environment (release of political prisoners, free airtime, etc) and then to repeat the election in 2016. Similarly, the Musavat party asked to reschedule the election and to restore democracy in the country.

Looking at the actual conduct of the election, the National Council of Democratic Forces (NCDF, a platform of opposition parties) said that, in spite of the official claims, the turnout was no higher than 10 per cent and that the result was unrepresentative of the popular will. On the same note, the pro-opposition Turan Information press reported cases of carousel voting and ballot stuffing. Similar comments were made by independent Azerbaijani observers. By contrast, various international observers said that the election were free and fair. Among them the PACE Election Observation, the Bulgarian delegation, observers from Kyrgyzstan and Latvia and the CIS mission.

[1] “Candidates will not get time on OTV” (2015, 09 October), Turan Information Agency (Retrieved through Lexis Nexis).

[2] “Senior Azeri official accuses Europe of double standards” (2015, November 1) BBC Monitoring Trans Caucasus Unit (Retrieved through Lexis Nexis).

Chiara Loda – Public Diplomacy and Intransigency in Domestic Affairs: The Azerbaijani Model and its Limits

This is a guest post by Chiara Loda is Marie Curie ITN “Post-Soviet Tensions” Fellow at Dublin City University

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Azerbaijan is mainly known for being a South-Caucasian country blessed by energy resources. Currently, some of its oil is directly shipped to Turkey through the BTC pipeline and in the coming years the TANAP and TAP pipelines will connect the Azerbaijani gas reserves to Europe. In addition to enhancing the country’s energy strategy, in recent years President Ilham Aliyev has been personally committed to devising and implementing a successful public diplomacy policy. Multilateral forums, sport events and international partnerships are only some of the tools designed to win international sympathy. These actions are not simply aimed at mere prestige. Instead, making the international audience more sympathetic to the Azerbaijani position with regard to the Nagorno Karabakh confict is the main aim of public diplomacy. In spite of those efforts, though, the presence of political prisoners, a policy which is denied by the establishment but which is asserted by organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, often brings international criticism to Baku.

The Eurovision Song contest, hosted in Baku in 2012, clearly showed how much Ilham Aliyev wanted the event to be memorable. Together with his wife Mehriban Aliyeva (who was the Chairperson of the Organizing Committee), President Aliyev actively participated in the preparation of the event. On that occasion, the state budget pledged $721 million to the project ($ 277 million was devoted solely to the construction of the new concert hall). This is a gigantic amount when we think that another oil-producer, Norway, which hosted the same contest in 2010, spent only $37 million. On this occasion, the president, facing international pressure, agreed to set free some political opponents. Even if some observers lamented the fact that new political arrests were made shortly after the end of the contest, the leadership did still wish to avoid negative media coverage during the event.

With time passing, those signs of goodwill have become less and less frequent and the attempt to enhance the international visibility of the country is no longer accompanied by efforts to find a point of compromise with international demands. More than that, external observations about freedom of speech and individual human rights are now often harshly dismissed as meddling in domestic affairs. This uncompromising attitude was clear during the address by President Aliyev at the Summer Session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (Strasbourg, 24 June 2014). After the speech, the members of the Assembly were invited to ask questions. Mr McNamara, from the socialist group, asked about political prisoners in the country. He was given the following answer: “There are no political prisoners in Azerbaijan. All of what Mr McNamara has said is based on false information or his biased approach to our country”.

The first ever European Games, hosted in Baku in June 2015, sum up new situation as a whole: the desire to host grand events and the inflexible resistance to external pressure. In 2012, after being rejected as a candidate country for the Olympic Games in 2020, Azerbaijan was the only country to volunteer to host the newly-established European Games in 2015. After securing the bid, President Aliyev constantly demonstrated his interest in the success of the event by visiting the newly inaugurated facilities almost every month and by often mentioning the importance of the event for the country. For this event too, his wife, Mehriban, chaired the organizing committee.

In addition to spending significant sums on infrastructure and promotional activities (the inauguration event alone, which was attended by no less than Lady Gaga, cost $100 million), the organizers volunteered to cover the travel and lodging expenses of all the foreign delegations, including the Armenian one. Additionally, the city was polished up for the event. Weddings and funerals in the capital were suspended for the month of June. In Baku, a few days before the games, almost everybody was complaining about the closed traffic lanes, the inflexibility of the traffic police, and the exorbitant costs of the events.

Given this massive effort, some personalities in Azerbaijani society expected the president to pardon some high-profile jailed dissidents. That would have sheltered the country from some criticism. Instead, the aforementioned attempts to impress visitors were not matched by other signs of goodwill and, in spite of international organizations and media outlets calling for the release of political prisoners, no action was taken. Remarkably, nobody was even pardoned by the president on the 28th of May, which is the Azerbaijani republic day, even such an amnesty almost always occurs each year on this day.

Even if domestic dissent was not widely voiced, the Azerbaijani intelligentsia seemed highly perplexed by this contradictory approach. A local scholar, interviewed a few days before the games, revealed his scepticism. According to him, governing elites failed to realize that all the Western reporters would have mentioned in their articles not only the magnificence of the stadiums but also the issue of political prisoners. Another prominent figure said bluntly (on condition of anonymity) that keeping people in jail only makes them popular and that this obstinacy on the domestic front is directly hindering the national energy strategy.

The media coverage seemed to confirm those worries. Media outlets such as the BBC and the NY Times, writing about Azerbaijan on the day of the opening of the games, did not hide their concern for the mixed human rights record of the country. In addition, on the same day (12th of June) the German Bundestag adopted a resolution which linked the Azerbaijani presidential elections in 2013 with the deterioration in rights. On the state TV Channel, AZTV,  Mr. Aliyev condemned the perceived attempt by Germany to set global normative standards.

The international reaction to the games (which were attended by only a few heads of state) constitutes a lesson not only for the Azerbaijani establishment but also for future emulators. Public diplomacy efforts are likely to be severely undermined by intransigency on domestic affairs. Ilham Aliyev, a strong proponent of this model, now has to rethink the cost-benefit ratio. Time will tell if the country will become more responsive to international requests, if only symbolicly, or if the closed nature of the regime will be reinforced. The challenges presented by the drop of the global oil prices, together with the possible return of Iran to the energy market, are additional factors that further complicate this equation.

Chiara Loda is Marie Curie ITN “Post-Soviet Tensions” Fellow at Dublin City University. Currently she is based in the South Caucasian region where she is conducting extensive fieldwork. This research was supported by a Marie Curie Initial Training Network within the 7th European Community Framework Programme (grant no: 316825).

Azerbaijan – President Aliyev re-elected for a third term

Azerbaijan held its presidential election on Wednesday. President Ilham Aliyev was aiming to be elected for a third term, the two-term presidential term limit having been abolished in a March 2009 referendum. Unsurprisingly, President Aliyev topped the poll.

The Azerbaijan news agency is reporting the following official figures:

  • Ilham Aliyev – 84.55%
  • Jamil Hasanli – 5.53%
  • Igbal Aghazadeh 2.40%
  • Gudrat Hasanguliyev – 1.99%
  • Zahid Oruj – 1.45%
  • Ilyas Ismayilov – 1.07%
  • Araz Alizadeh – 0.87%
  • Faraj Guliyev – 0.86%
  • Hafiz Hajiyev – 0.66%
  • Sardar Mammadov – 0.61%

The OSCE has been critical of the electoral process. The preliminary report states that the election “election was undermined by limitations on the freedoms of expression, assembly, and association that did not guarantee a level playing field for candidates. Continued allegations of candidate and voter intimidation and a restrictive media environment marred the campaign. Significant problems were observed throughout all stages of election day processes and underscored the serious nature of the shortcomings that need to be addressed in order for Azerbaijan to fully meet its OSCE commitments for genuine and democratic elections.”

One story that has been used to confirm this interpretation was a seemingly official announcement of President Aliyev’s victory the day before the election took place. The presidency developed a special election app to cover the election. However, one subscriber claimed to have taken a picture on the app announcing the president’s victory in advance of the poll.

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It should be noted that the app underestimated the president’s vote quite considerably and in any event there was little doubt that President Aliyev would be re-elected with a landslide.

Legislative elections are scheduled for 2015.