Author Archives: Veronica Anghel

Semi-presidentialism – Can presidents influence coalition outcomes?

This post is based on my article ’Why Can’t We Be Friends?’ The Coalition Potential of Presidents in Semi-Presidential Republics—Insights from Romania” in East European Politics and Societies.

The research article published by East European Politics and Societies sought to investigate the basis of the power of presidents to shape coalitions in semi-presidential systems, using the case of Romania. The findings put forward by the article contribute to the weakening of the theory that semi-presidential systems are inherently affected by a process of growing presidentialization.

Throughout my study of coalition governments more generally, the question about the potential systematic influence of presidents in their formation and evolution has often risen. To know who has the upper hand and the final say in the process of government formation is of chief importance to the students of political institutions. However, previous research on coalitions rarely addressed the topic related to the powers of the president, with recent findings claiming that in European democracies presidents have a substantial ability to induce their preferred governments. The case of Romania disputes these claims and shows that the mechanisms of a multiparty regime mostly limit the president’s exclusive bargaining advantage to nominating the prime minister and then, much as in a parliamentary democracy, render him or her dependent on the coalition potential of his or her own party.

President Klaus Iohannis, prime minister Mihai Tudose and Liviu Dragnea, chairman of the dominant party in the coalition, the Social Democrat Party (PSD) (2017). Although a ‘friendly’ government is not always in the president’s cards, more often than not, he finds himself dancing to their tune.

Romania is a young, consolidating, semi-presidential European democracy and a fertile ground for the presidentialization of politics, according to the measures proposed by previous research. Samuels and Shugart use the Romanian presidential elections of 2004 to open their 2010 seminal volume and highlight influence of presidents on government formation in semi-presidential republics: “The results of the direct presidential election thus not only took government formation out of the hands of the largest parliamentary party and the largest parliamentary coalition, but also served to break a pre-election agreement, altering the partisan balance of forces that parliamentary coalitions and parliamentary elections had established.”(p.2)[1]

Nevertheless, an in-depth, qualitative investigation of the same case generated surprising insights by showing this outcome to be rather the exception than the rule and entails certain conditions to be met. Overall, the study shows that when the president and prime minister (or a plausible designate prime minister of a presidentially “unfriendly” majority) enter a competition to shape a coalition in this institutional format, they enter as equals. The weight of their supporting parties makes the difference in deciding the winner.

Methodologically, the article supports the need for more in-depth qualitative study of such matters, mostly since there are insufficient accounts for the informal aspects of presidential authority in government formation. Ignoring such aspects, which we can only uncover through elite interviews, could lead to incomplete results.  Although there are limitations linked to respondents’ subjectivity when asked about the direct involvement of the president in off-the-record negotiations for government formation, including accounts of first hand participants is a valuable addition to our understanding. The article relies heavily on semi-structured discussions with prime –ministers, ministers or important witnesses at sensitive moments linked to the role of the president in coalition formation.

Firstly, the article makes a distinction between cases when coalition cabinets and presidents were in a situation of partnership (whether the president and the prime minister were from the same party or not) and cases of coalition cabinets and presidents in a situation of conflict (Table 1). It proceeds with a selection of a case where the president played an important role in government formation and could make use of his prerogative to name the prime minister from his loyal party, which thus became a formateur, and compared it with one where he could not (Romania has only had male presidents). The conditions to induce a preferred government are highlighted with the case of the 2004 parliamentary elections and the active involvement of president Traian Băsescu in government formation. In contrast, while maintaining the same actors and the same institutional design, the analysis goes on to show a different situation following the 2012 elections.Finally, it emphasises how, all things considered, the coalition appeal of the party behind the president makes the final difference in government formation, regardless of his or her exclusive prerogative to name the prime minister.

The implications of this study go beyond uncovering the dynamics of coalition formation in Romania. The study shows that although a president could find within the semi-presidential system the institutional incentives to try to increase his or her influence in government formation, he or she remains firmly limited by the coalition potential of his or her party, regardless of context-driven peaks of increased informal authority. It also argues that in choosing cases for a comparative analysis of coalition formation and administration, there is reason to go beyond a differentiation between semi-presidential and parliamentary regimes.

Notes

[1] David Samuels and Matthew Shugart, Presidents, Parties and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of Power Affects Party Organization and Behaviour (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 2

Romania – The Judicial System and the Role of the President

 

Corruption has been a significant point of disorder and discontent for post-communist party systems and their societies. The case of Romania’s anti-corruption fight is significant for various reasons. It was commonly regarded as the ‘laggard’ of the countries that sought EU membership during the 2004/2007 enlargements[i] and became a subject of post-accession conditionality through the operationalisation of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM). Through this mechanism, the European Commission (EC) continues to monitor the progress made in the fields of judicial reform and corruption to this day. Since then, the Romanian National Anti-Corruption Agency (DNA) has made remarkable achievements in targeting high level corruption and claims an impressive record of ongoing investigations. However, the last EC anti-corruption report evaluates the overall national efforts as ‘inconsistent’. In early 2017, the government’s plans to decriminalise official misconduct and commute sentences for some non-violent criminal convictions stirred the largest anti-government protests since 1989, with president Klaus Iohannis siding with the protesters. A Joint Statement of EC President Juncker and First Vice-President Timmermans was also released, stating that ‘the fight against corruption needs to be advanced, not undone’. The Social-Democrat Party (PSD) led coalition government backed down, despite having a solid majority in the parliament that could have supported their plans.

In this tense societal environment coupled with a general suspicion of politicians’ conduct for all things related to the judicial branch, any new reforms announced by the Ministry of Justice incite controversies and concerns. This is certainly the case with the amendments introduced into public debate by the Minister of Justice in August 2017. Some international actors question the amendments and some NGOs have perceived them as a new attempt to impede the progress made so far. The amendments would eliminate the president from the procedure to appoint the general prosecutor, the chief prosecutor of the DNA (and their deputies) and the chief prosecutor of the Organised Crime and Terrorism Investigation Agency (DIICOT). Currently, these are appointed by the president, following a proposal from the Ministry of Justice with the consent of the Superior Council of Magistracy (CSM).

The current procedure requires a consensus among the political elites of the executive and the judiciary branches, the latter being represented by the CSM. The legislative branch is not directly included in the present nominating scheme or in the proposed future one.

Among other propositions, the reform also includes the transfer of the Institution of the Judiciary Inspection of the CSM under the Ministry of Justice and supplementary requirements from magistrates for career advancement. And yet, debates have centred on the effect of eliminating the president from the aforementioned key appointments. The motivations behind the concerns are political, based on recent history, as well as institutional, based on concerns regarding the balance of powers.

Firstly, as anti-corruption is a high-stakes issue for national security and democratic consolidation, the maintenance of a balance of powers in appointing key figures of the judiciary system is significant. The Romanian president is directly elected – a fact which could provide him or her with the necessary authority to be involved in all strategic issues that affect the country. On this issue, one line of argumentation considers that the current arrangement of appointments answers to all branches of power, with the elected president being regarded as a substitute for the legislative branch. The opposite argument goes that it is the government, through the Ministry of Justice, who represents the elected parliament. This is where the legitimacy to make these appointments lies and there is no need for the interference of the president. Though incongruously, there is no reform alternative that directly includes the parliament in the said nominations.

Secondly, the role of the president in the anti-corruption fight is very much dependent on recent Romanian history and public perception. Politicizing corruption has shown to be advantageous in political campaigns for some types of parties[ii] and Romanian parties have also used the anti-corruption rhetoric as a source of popular legitimation even before EU accession. President Traian Băsescu (2004 – 2014), together with his Liberal Democrat Party (PDL), spearheaded the anti-corruption discourse and turned it into a successful campaign strategy in 2004. This was mainly directed against the incumbent PSD (2000 – 2004) and continued to be the top priority during his first presidential mandate which overlapped the pre-accession period. During his second mandate, an alliance between PSD and the National Liberal Party (PNL) led to his impeachment (2012) and an internationally resounding political crisis. It was a difficult moment for the whole society but it allowed the president to emphasize his image as the champion of the anti-corruption fight. The institution of the president came to be perceived as a bulwark against any abuse from the government or a legislative majority. President Iohannis continued to use the anti-corruption discourse as a main pillar of his political campaign in 2014. During the current debates, he expressed his own concerns related to the changes made, claiming in a FB post that Romania is witnessing an abuse against the rule of law and the independence of the judicial system.

Finally, the argument “if it’s not broken, why fix it?” carries its own weight. The progress made by the DNA and the other institutions in question is objectively measurable. Why should there be any changes in their organisation? The president has a say in matters of national security. One could argue that the weakening of the state through corruption is part of national security. On the other hand, the Constitution does not provide a role for the president on this particular matter and parliament could be considered within its rights to debate and vote laws proposed by the government.

In the end, any amendments would still reach the presidential desk for promulgation. And the president still has to sign off on his own elimination from this process. The return from the parliamentary summer holiday has coincided with heated debates over checks and balances and building elite consensus.


[i] See Pridham, Geoffrey (2007) ‘Romania and EU Membership in Comparative Perspective: A Post- Accession Compliance Problem? – The Case of Political Conditionality’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society 8(2), pp. 168 – 188

 

[ii] See Bågenholm, Andreas and Charron, Nicholas (2014), “Do politics in Europe benefit from politicising corruption?”, West European Politics 37(5), pp. 903-931.