Author Archives: Robert Elgie

Jörg Michael Dostal – South Korea: New President Moon Jae-in Promotes Constitutional Reform

This is  guest post by Jörg Michael Dostal, Associate Professor in the Graduate School of Public Administration, Seoul National University, Korea.

Introduction: The ‘Imperial Presidency’

There is consensus in writings about South Korean politics (subsequently referred to as Korea) suggesting that the country’s ‘imperial presidency’ constitutes the major power centre. In the Korean context, the term ‘imperial’ is used to signify that the institution of the presidency, namely the president and his/her presidential office, enjoy dominance over the other political institutions, such as the prime minister (appointed by the president and approved by parliament), ministries and other state agencies. In the relationship between the presidency and Korea’s parliament (the National Assembly), the president also exercises strong direct and indirect control over legislation, via his right to appoint the state council (the government) which can put forward legislation and his ability to directly issue presidential decrees. Although parliament performs the role of principal legislator and must agree on the annual national budget as submitted by the executive branch headed by the president, its supervisory role is much diminished if the president’s party holds a parliamentary majority. In addition, the Korean president controls foreign policy-making, the state security institutions and the national military. Thus, in the Korean context the term ‘imperial presidency’ suggests the president’s concurrent control of domestic and foreign policy-making for which the current Korean Constitution of 1987 provides the enabling framework [1].

The Korean use of the term therefore differs from Arthur Schlesinger Jr.’s famous description of the US ‘imperial presidency’ that hinted at ‘executive excess’, namely offences against the balance of power as outlined in the US Constitution, such as presidential foreign policy-making based on inner circle decision-making without the involvement of Congress – e.g. the presidencies of Richard Nixon and George W. Bush. In the Korean case, the 1987 Constitution in fact facilitates presidential dominance and would require amendments in order to create a more balanced political system.

Korea’s Constitutional History

Overall, Korea’s political and constitutional history since 1948 can be divided into the periods of authoritarian rule – strongmen backed up by the military – between 1948 and 1987, briefly punctuated between 1960 and 1961 by a parliamentary republic, and the period since the transition to democracy in 1987. The earlier authoritarian periods are referred to as the First and the Third to Fifth Republics. The Second Republic, lasting for less than a year between 1960 and 1961, was Korea’s first effort at democratic governance while the current democratic Korea is referred to as the Sixth Republic. The first Korean Constitution was issued in 1948 and is partially influenced by the US example, although sections about the rights of the individual and the people as the source of all political authority have been ignored under the authoritarian regimes.

The 1948 Constitution has been amended nine times and revised four times, most recently in 1987. The earlier revisions mostly concerned procedural issues such as how the president should be elected and the duration of his time in office. The major past event in this respect was the 1972 ‘Yushin Constitution’ that facilitated the continuation of the rule of President Park Chung-hee for an unlimited number of six-year terms that came to an end due to his assassination in 1979. All constitutional provisions between 1948 and 1960 and from 1961 to 1987 were fictitious in providing a thin veneer of façade democracy while unchecked presidential power was always the dominant element in the authoritarian system.

Because of this, the most crucial constitutional amendment was the latest one dating from 1987 that provided for the competitive direct election of the president by the people in a single round plurality vote for a non-renewable five-year term in office. Since then, six presidents have entered and left office in five-year spells with the exception of the last one, Park Geun-hye (the daughter of former president Park Chung-hee). Her term in office started in 2013 and came to an end due to a citizens’ protest movement that took off in the autumn of 2016 in reaction to revelations about her abuse of office, namely allowing her confidante Choi Soon-sil to collect ‘donations’ from chaebols (Korean business conglomerates) for ‘foundations’, i.e. monies were extracted in exchange for influence paddling. This revelation, currently still under investigation alongside other charges, resulted in her impeachment by the National Assembly on 9 December 2016, a decision that was upheld by the Constitutional Court on 10 March 2017, ending her presidency. She was subsequently, on 30 March 2017, arrested to facilitate ongoing investigations by the prosecutor, and her arrest was extended for another six-month period on 13 October 2017.

Constitutional Reform

The new liberal President Moon Jae-in of the Democratic Party of Korea, elected on 9 May 2017, has announced that he intends to push for constitutional changes to reform the political system to uproot ‘deep-rooted irregularities accumulated over the last nine years’ [2]. He has further specified that he expects such changes to be subject to a popular referendum to be run concurrently with the next local government election that is scheduled for the July of 2018.

Significantly, talk about constitutional reform has been something of an evergreen in recent Korean politics. There was debate about reform under the last four presidencies, namely the ones led by the liberals Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003), Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) and the conservatives Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013) and Park Geun-hye (2013-2017). These debates focused on reforming the presidency in a way that would strengthen other political institutions, perhaps in exchange for removing the single-term limit on the presidency to make the system conform with the US example allowing for two consecutive four-year terms in office. In this context, the most commonly voiced reform scenarios concerned semi-presidentialism (dividing authority between domestic and foreign policy-making and handing the former to the prime minister), or strengthening of the role of the National Assembly vis-à-vis the president. However, these debates were somehow academic and/or journalistic in the sense that other countries and their systems were presented to a Korean audience that took note, but was still not strongly committed to any particular reform course. No action was taken.

However, the new President Moon is more strongly committed to constitutional reform in comparison to his predecessors, and his high popular approval rates backed up by a narrow majority of liberal forces in the National Assembly (his own party holds 121 out of 299 seats in parliament while another liberal parties hold 40 seats) makes for a more enabling reform environment. Yet the liberal camp is short of the required two-third majority in parliament that is necessary to pass a constitutional reform bill, which would in turn enable the president to submit such proposal to a popular referendum next year. In other words, President Moon needs cooperation from at least some conservatives to find enough votes in parliament to ensure passage [3]. If this is in fact possible is currently an entirely open question. After all, the normal behavioural pattern of liberals and conservatives in Korea has been all-out confrontation rather than cooperation.

Nevertheless, thirty years after the last constitutional reform that issued in democracy in 1987, another round of reform appears at least plausible. But what are we to expect? In terms of potential reform scenarios, the options include the already mentioned semi-presidentialism, although this idea has so far not triggered much support. Other conceivable changes would concern the relationship between the presidency and the ensemble of the other political institutions mentioned in the 1987 Constitution, making the former less ‘imperial’ and strengthening the latter. For example, the presidential office that is currently made up of presidential appointees and controls the other institutions could hand over some powers to other actors. Another option would be to make the political system less centralised, by expanding the decision-making power of local governments. One could also think of efforts to change the way the legislature is elected, by changing the voting system from the currently dominant plurality system to a system that expands proportional representation. Such change would have the potential to transform the party system and could perhaps overcome the current patterns of political behaviour that is mostly based on personal loyalties to individual leaders and regionalism rather than political programmes and ideology.

The Future of Korean Democracy

Any constitutional reform scenario ultimately poses hard questions about the actual state of the country’s democratic capabilities. While the current mainstream view is the optimistic assertion that the unseating of Park Geun-hye, due to the popular protests in 2016 and 2017 with millions of participants in peaceful street rallies, has proven the resilience of democratic values and popular engagement in Korea, this view has not been universally shared. One observer has suggested that Koreans in all socio-economic groups mostly prefer paternalistic leadership over liberal democracy. The author further holds that ‘socioeconomic modernization has failed to emancipate the people from illiberal norms’, arguing that the ‘internalization of norms promoting hierarchism, collectivism, conformism, and [cultural] monism in social life … [promote] affinity for paternalistic autocracy’. These assertions, based on data from the 2015 Asian Barometer Korean survey, point back to the problem of the relationship between Confucian values and pluralist democracy [4].

In a similar vein, the current writer has suggested that Korean democracy suffers from clashes between constitutional, Confucian and hyper-capitalistic norms and values. Such competition produces a permanent state of flux; each of the three normative orientations have moments of dominance. As a result, interpersonal trust is low, which facilitates a highly competitive individualism taking advantage of weak institutional checks and balances. Any reform path would require overcoming the ‘winner-takes-all’ mentality in order to consolidate institutions of political participation based on deliberation and coalition-building [5].

The reality of Korean democracy is that there has been limited progress in terms of strengthening of formal institutions. Namely, the chaebols and their economic interests have always dominated the political agenda, while civil society actors have been weakly institutionalised and usually powerless. In turn, political parties also display little by way of an internal life beyond the leader-follower relationship. This spills over into the way the parties conduct parliamentary business. If institutions other than the presidency are expected to acquire a larger role in the future, their capabilities would have to be strengthened from the bottom up as much as from the top down.

Clearly, one of the paradoxes of President Moon’s plan of making the presidency surrender some of its power in favour of other institutions is that the current system would still demand him to assume leadership on devolving such power. This is necessary because the other potential actor of devolution, namely parliament, might be gridlocked if liberals and conservatives fail to agree on joined-up reform. In case of failure, President Moon could have a second shot at constitutional reform in 2020 when the next national parliamentary elections are due and the liberals could theoretically gain a two-thirds majority enabling them to act without the backing of conservatives. Yet such a surge in a president’s popularity at a later stage of his/her tenure has not happened so far in the post-1987 democratic system. Instead, presidents usually lose some of their previous support in parliament during later stages of their tenure, and their agenda-setting power is subsequently much diminished. Thus, whether the current round of constitutional reform debate is going to produce results is still an open question.

Notes

[1] Yong-duck Jung, The Korean State, Public Administration, and Development: Past, Present and Future Challenges, Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 2014, pp. 67-119.

[2] No stated author, ‘What Moon Jae-in pledged to do as president’, Korea Herald, 10 May 2017, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20170509000521.

[3] Hyo-jin Kim, ‘Constitutional talks may lose steam’, Korea Times, 16 October 2017, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/10/356_237679.html.

[4] Doh-chull Shin, ‘President Park Geun-hye and the Deconsolidation of Liberal Democracy in South Korea: Exploring its Cultural Roots’, Center for the Study of Democracy, UC Irvine, 14 July 2017, pp. 9, 13, https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1t68c47v.

[5] Jörg Michael Dostal, ‘South Korean Presidential Politics Turns Liberal: Transformative Change or Business as Usual?’, The Political Quarterly, 88, 3, 2017: 480-491, http://gspa.snu.ac.kr/sites/gspa.snu.ac.kr/files/Dostal-2017-The_Political_Quarterly%2088%283%29.pdf.

About the author

Jörg Michael Dostal (jmdostal@snu.ac.kr) is an Associate Professor in the Graduate School of Public Administration, Seoul National University, Korea. He teaches comparative politics and has recently published on the politics of Germany, Switzerland, Syria and South Korea. His publications are available here: http://gspa.snu.ac.kr/node/76.

Ketil Fred Hansen – Chad’s President Déby was perfectly safe a year ago: Not so today

This is a guest post by Ketil Fred Hansen, IGIS, University of Stavanger (ketil.f.hansen@uis.no)

Chad’s President, Idriss Déby Itno, is perfectly safe and no-one can challenge his position, I would have argued a year ago. Déby won his fifth presidential election on 10 April 2016 with 60% of the votes, five times more than his closest competitor Saleh Kebzabo (12,8 %). To strengthen the political opposition, the leaders of 31 political parties founded a new coalition “Front de l’Opposition Nouvelle pour l’Alternance et le Changement” (FONAC), on 26 July 2016, selecting Kebzabo as front-runner. However, many Chadians questioned FONAC’s real commitment to alternation. The opposition party leaders were accused of taking personal advantage of their position rather than being actually interested in political change. In fact, very few opposition parties had ever altered their own leader. Thus, both President Déby and the leaders of the opposition shared the same longevity in their functions to the frustration of younger generations.

These frustrated younger generations organized regular rallies in Ndjamena during 2016. Protests against the regime started when “untouchables”, sons of high-ranking civil servants and ministers, gang-raped a 17 year-old schoolgirl in February 2016. The protests gained force as Déby prepared for his fifth presidential re-election in April 2016, and continued when President Déby introduced his “austerity measures” on 31 August. In fact, 2016 was the year of social protest in Chad.

Still, I would have argued that president Déby was perfectly safe and at the height of his power at the end of 2016. Why?

Both the US and France saw President Déby as one of their closest collaborators in the fight against Boko Haram and other terror threats in the Sahel. N’Djamena was the home of France’s Operation Barkham, containing some 3500 troops, at least 3 drones, 20 helicopters and more than 200 armored vehicles. Chad was also the home of the American Special Forces anti-terror training Operation Flintstone in February 2017, as it had been in 2015. Since the close-to-successful coup d’état in February 2008, Déby had re-equipped and re-organized his army, significantly increasing military expenditure from an already high level. In 2013, the Chadian army gained international acclaim after its rapid deployment and brave operational courage against the Islamist insurgents in Mali. Indeed, by 2016 Chad held one of the best-equipped and best-trained armies in Africa. One of Déby’s sons, Mahamat Idriss Déby, headed the presidential guard that contained at least as many well-equipped and well-trained soldiers as the regular army. A year ago, then, neither civilian protests nor any military threat from inside (mutiny) or outside (insurgents), seemed possible.

In addition, President Déby enjoyed a high standing among his peers in Africa. He chaired the the regional G5 Sahel group and was elected Chairman of the African Union for 2016. As a sign of respect and importance, 14 African heads of state were present in N’Djamena when Déby was sworn in as president on 8 August 2016. However, his African peers were not the only ones to count on him. Germany ‘s Chancellor Angela Merkel invited President Déby to Berlin in October last year, promising Chad close to 9 million Euro in humanitarian aid. President Hollande received Déby numerous times in Paris to discuss both military collaboration and humanitarian aid.

No wonder, then, that I would have said that president Déby was perfectly safe a year ago. Not so today.

Several signs can be interpreted as a weakening of Déby’s power grip during 2017.

In January, France granted Hinda Déby, Déby’s favorite wife and Chad’s first lady, and their 5 children French nationality. Why, this sudden demand for French nationality? Rumors about President Déby’s untreatable cancer flourishes in the Chadian capital. Speculations about who would take power in the case of Déby’s death rocketed in N’Djamena, without anyone being able to give a clear answer. Together with Chad’s post-independence history of continuous power struggles, the uncertainty surrounding a presidential power transfer leads to thoughts of a new civil war.

Increasing activities of Chadian rebel movements in Southern Libya/Northern Chad also indicate that Déby’s position is fading. The Front pour l’Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad (FACT) headed by the 53 year-old-always-rebel Mahamat Mahdi Ali, contains some 1500 armed civilians under training. Other Chadian military movements, one headed by former minister now rebel-leader General Mahamat Nouri and another headed by one of President Déby’s nephews, Qatar-based Timan Erdimi, are also training in the same region. The formal closing of the frontier between Chad and Libya, undertaken sometimes by Libya, sometimes by Chad, has not stopped the rebels’ movements. Islamic State, apparently, backs Chadian rebel movements with money and weapons. Believing that Qatar also funds the rebels, on 23 August 2017 President Déby ordered the Qatari embassy in N’Djamena to close down and staff to leave Chad within ten days. A few weeks later, on 24 September, US President Trump included Chad on the list of terror states, banning the arrival of all Chadians on US soil from 1 October. While Chad is, officially, still a US partner in the fight against terror in the Sahel, Washington no longer has confidence in Chadian intelligence. Neither the quality of the information from Chad nor the sincerity of the collaboration are judged satisfactory by the US. Incomprehensible to most Chadians, both among the opposition and Déby’s entourage, the US travel ban has caused rage in N’Djamena; how come Chad, an acclaimed terror fighter, can be punished so severely by its prime benefactor? Both France and the G5 Sahel were puzzled with the US decision. Officially, no one understands the US travel ban. However, one may speculate that the US intelligence has reason to believe the rumors circulating in N’Djamena: President Déby secretly supports Boko Haram because when Boko Haram is still strong and frightening, Déby can act as an acclaimed fighter of terror and only then does the international community need him and will support him diplomatically, militarily and monetarily. No Boko Haram would mean no president Déby, according to these rumors.

Yet, Boko Haram is still active and the rebels in the north not strong enough to pose a serious threat to Déby alone. For the US and the EU, Chad and president Déby represent a stable spot in the midst of a troubled region. Déby has skilfully managed to stay in power for 27 years already. As long as his personal health is good enough and as long as the West needs him in the fight against terror, Déby will stay president in Chad. However, the day when either of these is no longer the case, Chad will turn into a nightmare of violent power struggles.

New publications

Special issue of French Politics on the 2017 Presidential and Legislative Elections in France, Volume 15, Issue 3, September 2017, with contributions from Yves Mény, Catherine Achin and Sandrine Lévêque, Emmanuelle Schön-Quinlivan, Florent Gougou and Simon Persico, Jocelyn Evans and Gilles Ivaldi, Cristina Bucur, and Florent Gougou and Nicolas Sauger. See http://www.palgrave.com/gp/journal/41253/volumes-issues/latest-issue

Martin Carrier, Executive Politics in Semi-presidential European Regimes, 2016, Lexington Books: Lanham, MA.

Manuel Alcántara, Jean Blondel, and Jean-Louis Thiébault (eds.), Presidents and Democracy in Latin America, Routledge, 2017.

Miguel Carreras, ‘Presidential Institutions and Electoral Participation in Concurrent Elections in Latin America’, Political Studies, Online First, DOI 10.1177/0032321717723502.

Michael Novak, Choosing presidents: Symbols of political leadership, 2nd ed., Routledge, 2017.

Joel Moses, ‘Political Rivalry and Conflict in Putin’s Russia’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 69, No. 6, August 2017, pp. 961–988.

Linda L. Fowler, Bryan W. Marshall, ‘Veto-Proof Majorities, Legislative Procedures, and Presidential Decisions, 1981–2008’, Political Research Quarterly, Volume 70, Issue 2, June 2017, pp. 348-362.

Virgílio Afonso da Silva, ‘Book Review: Making Brazil Work: Checking the President in a Multiparty System’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, (2017) 15 (2): 519.

Carlos Pereira, Mariana Batista, Sérgio Praça, and Felix Lopez, ‘ Watchdogs in Our Midst: How Presidents Monitor Coalitions in Brazil’s Multiparty Presidential Regime’, Latin American Politics and Society, Volume 59, Issue 3, Fall 2017, pp. 27–47.

Leonardo Avritzer, ‘The Rousseff impeachment and the crisis of democracy in Brazil’, Critical Policy Studies, Online First,

Direnç Kanol and George Pirishis, ‘The role of voters’ economic evaluations in February 2013 presidential elections in the Republic of Cyprus’, Comparative European Politics, vol. 15, no. 4, June 2017, pp. 518-532.

Jörg Michael Dostal, ‘ South Korean Presidential Politics Turns Liberal: Transformative Change or Business as Usual?’, Political Quarterly, Volume 88, Issue 3, July–September 2017, pp. 480–491.

Loammi Wolf, ‘The Removal from Office of a President: Reflections on Section 89 of the Constitution’ South African Law Journal, Vol. 134, Issue 1 (2017), pp. 1-33.

Mohammad Bashir Mobasher, ‘Electoral Choices, Ethnic Accommodations, and the Consolidation of Coalitions: Critiquing the Runoff Clause of the Afghan Constitution’ Washington International Law Journal, Vol. 26, Issue 3 (June 2017), pp. 413-462.

Talitha Espiritu, Passionate Revolutions: The Media and the Rise and Fall of the Marcos Regime, 2017, Ohio University Press.

Ana L. Mallen and Maria Pilar García-Guadilla, Venezuela’s Polarized Politics: The Paradox of Direct Democracy Under Chávez, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2017.

Lee Savage – How do president’s influence coalition bargaining in semi-presidential systems?

This is a guest post by Lee Savage in the Department of European & International Studies at King’s College London. It is based on his article in European Journal of Political Research.

Presidents in semi-presidential systems usually have a constitutionally prescribed role in the government formation process. Often, this is limited to the ability to appoint either a formateur or candidate for prime minister who will then go on to form a cabinet which must maintain the confidence of the legislature. In some countries, such as Bulgaria and Ireland, even the power to appoint a prime minister is limited by constitutional requirements to select the leader of the largest party in the legislature.

Even though the constitution may define a limited role for presidents role in government formation, they can still exert influence over the cabinet that eventually takes office. Previous research has shown that presidents can influence the composition of the cabinet by increasing the proportion of non-partisan ministers that are appointed. In some circumstances, presidents can also increase the likelihood of a cabinet leaving office prematurely. In new research, I have shown how presidents influence the coalition formation process itself by decreasing the duration of bargaining negotiations.

The duration of the government formation process can have significant consequences for a state. For example, the 541-day bargaining process experienced by Belgium between 2010 and 2011 resulted in the legislature’s failure to pass a budget which, in turn, led to an official rebuke from the European Commission. However, it is notable that there are few examples of protracted coalition bargaining processes in semi-presidential systems. But is this a result of presidential influence, and if so, then how is this influence exerted when cabinet formation is usually the preserve of the legislature in semi-presidential democracies? I argue that the influence of presidents on the duration of coalition bargaining is a result of first, the extent of their constitutional powers and second, their partisanship.

Presidential powers and coalition bargaining

The constitutionally-mandated powers of the president increase their legitimacy to intervene in the government formation process. More powerful presidents are seen as possessing greater legitimacy to act in the eyes of other actors in the process, specifically, the legislative parties. This legitimacy to act decreases the duration of the coalition bargaining process by reducing its complexity. More powerful presidents place implicit limits on the range of governing proposals that are acceptable to all politically relevant actors in the process. Presidents with stronger non-legislative powers, such as the power to appoint the prime minister, dissolve the cabinet, or dissolve the assembly can intervene directly in the process of government formation. The legislative parties will seek to propose a cabinet that is more acceptable to the president and reduce the likelihood that they will use their dissolution powers.

Presidents with stronger legislative powers also reduce the complexity of the bargaining process. Presidents are co-executive actors in semi-presidential systems and will govern alongside the cabinet as both try to satisfy the policy preferences of their voters. Rationally foresighted parties in the legislature will understand this and seek to limit their proposed cabinets to the set that can govern in relative harmony with the president. If a cabinet is appointed that has a completely divergent legislative agenda from that of the president then it increases the likelihood of conflict between the president and the legislature. Presidents can use their powers of veto or delay to disrupt the government legislation, or generally act to impede the cabinet’s legislative agenda as was the case during the period of cohabitation in France between 1986 and 1988.

In sum, when presidents have greater powers the range of potential governments is reduced to the set that will be more likely to be stable and are able to implement its legislative agenda. The chart below shows the effect that presidential powers have on the likelihood that coalition bargaining will end on a given day. At low levels of presidential powers (those that receive a score of 2 on the Shugart-Carey index) the likelihood of coalition bargaining ending sooner is increased by around 50 percentage points in semi-presidential systems. However, when presidents are more powerful (those that receive a score of 8) the likelihood of government formation ending sooner is increased by 120 percentage points.

Simulated marginal effect of semi-presidentialism on the hazard of coalition bargaining ending, conditional on presidential powers.

Note: Results are taken from model three of Table 1. Graph is based on 1,000 simulations.

Presidential partisanship and coalition bargaining

Some studies of semi-presidentialism, particularly those that examine cabinet composition, begin from the premise that the president has both a mandate and preferences that diverge from those of their party. This is apparent in those studies which view the appointment of non-partisan ministers to the cabinet as an indicator of presidential influence. Others have argued that presidents have large incentives to act in a more partisan manner. Party organisations provide campaigning support for presidential candidates and presidents that have a base of support in the legislature are more likely to be able to fulfil the policy preferences of their voters. In some instances, it has been argued that legislative parties in semi-presidential systems have become ‘presidentialised’ with the presidential candidate able to set the agenda for the party as a whole. Following the presidentialisation logic, it can be argued that the president will be more likely to see a cabinet proposal that includes their party as more acceptable than one that doesn’t. Other rationally foresighted parties in the legislature will also concede that such a proposal is more sustainable if it avoids a period of unstable cohabitation.

The complexity of coalition bargaining will therefore be lower when the president’s party holds a stronger bargaining position in the legislature. When the president’s party is a member of a greater proportion of minimal winning coalitions the range of governing proposals that are acceptable to all politically relevant actors is more easily identifiable. Therefore, when the president’s party holds a stronger bargaining position, the duration of coalition bargaining will be reduced.

Simulated marginal effect of semi-presidentialism on the hazard of coalition bargaining ending, conditional on the bargaining power of the president’s party.

Note: Results are taken from model three of Table 1. Graph is based on 1,000 simulations

 

The chart above shows the effect of semi-presidentialism on the duration of coalition bargaining, conditional on the bargaining power of the president’s party which is measured by the Shapley-Shubik Index (the SSI indicates the proportion of minimal winning coalitions in the legislature to which the president’s party is pivotal). As is clear from the chart, the likelihood of coalition bargaining ending sooner rather than later increases along with the bargaining power of the president’s party. To give an example of this relationship, in Poland, the first government to form after the inauguration of the SLD president, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, was an SLD-PSL coalition that took just 12 days to negotiate in 1996. The SLD’s bargaining power was 0.41 on the SSI at the time, meaning that it was a pivotal player in around 41 percent of possible coalitions. Following the 1997 general election, the SLDs bargaining power was reduced to 0.22 and government formation lasted 40 days resulting in the formation of an AWS-UW coalition.

Implications

The results of my research point to the systemic influence of semi-presidentialism on the duration of coalition bargaining. Presidents with greater powers can wield more influence over cabinet formation and other parties in the system adjust their own behaviour and expectations to account for presidential preferences. A further implication of the study is that presidential partisanship matters. Contrary to some studies which assume presidents are almost non-partisan actors, the results presented here indicate that presidents have an interest in seeing their parties succeed and are willing to act to facilitate their success.

Joel C. Moses – President Putin and the 2017 Russian Gubernatorial Elections

This is a guest post by Joel C. Moses, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Iowa State University (jmoses@iastate.edu, jcmoses23@gmail.com)

Elections for 16 Russian governors in the 85 regions of the country were contested on September 10, 2017. They were held in conjunction with nationwide local and regional elections that have taken place annually on the second Sunday of September since 2014.  In 2017, 6,000 races including the 16 for governor would affect 46 million voters, approximately half  the  entire Russian electorate, with 42 political parties registered to participate in one or more of  these races.

President Putin’s ruling political party, United Russia (UR), through its direct association with Putin has a huge monopoly advantage from financial contributions and national media exposure over the three other national parliamentary opposition parties.[i]  With UR winning almost three-fourths of all votes cast nationally in previous annual local-regional September elections, the 16 UR incumbent governors in 2017 counted on mobilizing an ensured turnout of support from the party’s base. The UR political base included state employees pressured to vote as an implicit requirement for their jobs  along with pensioners, students, and military oftentimes compliantly bussed en masse to precincts.

The remaining electorate has lacked equivalent motivation to vote. Many potential voters would only just have returned to work distracted from any campaigning on their August summer holidays or dacha gardening. They would be forced to choose between United Russia and an array of non-competitive party candidates on the ballot intended only to dilute the effect of any anti-UR votes. Low voting turnout in elections has reflected a certain political resignation among many Russian voters outside the UR base that their votes really don’t  matter. Their feeling was that results already were predetermined and if necessary fraudulently reported by regional election commissions to certify victories by the UR candidates.

President Putin suspended all gubernatorial elections in 2005-2011. When they were restored under a 2012 amended federal law, they included a new federally mandated requirement for all regions termed the “municipal filter.” Only candidates with notarized signatures from a minimal percentage of  local municipal deputies and chief executives in their regions from an equivalent minimal percentage of regional locales qualify to be balloted as gubernatorial candidates.

Like governors the previous five years, the 2017 incumbent governors took advantage of this  municipal filter in their regions to disqualify any real competition in Sverdlovsk, Buryatiya, and Sevastopol. They persuaded the overwhelmingly majority UR local deputies not to sign for potentially strong challengers or influenced regional election commissions appointed by the same governors to disallow allegedly invalid signatures. Even pro-Kremlin Russian analysts two weeks before September 10 conceded that only two of the 16 races were even very slightly competitive as a consequence of the municipal filter.[ii]  Russian gubernatorial elections since 2012 have been decided less by outright vote fraud at the polls on the day of the election than the limited choice on the ballot other than incumbents predetermined by the municipal filter  weeks  before the voting itself.

Gubernatorial elections are won by an absolute majority. If no candidate has an absolute majority, the top two finishers in the first round compete to decide the winner in a run-off held two weeks later on Sunday in September. Based on past results since 2012, the prospects for the 16 incumbent governors in 2017 appeared to be very good. A  total 7 gubernatorial elections had   been held annually since 2012. In all 71 races through 2016, the winning incumbent was the official UR nominee 67 times. Their winning margin averaged close to 75% with some achieving victories by 85-95% over all their opponents. The UR-nominated incumbent failed to win the election just once in the only gubernatorial run-off election since 2012 – Irkutsk with the Communist Party candidate winning an upset victory in 2015. The three other non-UR incumbents in Kirov and  Orel in 2014 and Smolensk in 2015 were in effect endorsed by President Putin with United Russia not contesting the races with their own candidates. Five additional UR incumbent governors nominated by Putin also were chosen unanimously by their regional parliaments in 2013 and 2014.[iii]

The 16 governors were slated to run for five-year terms with the allowance to serve not more  than two  terms in the same region since elections were restored in 2012. Yet the 16 scheduled races on September 10 were at least an uncertain political challenge for both the national government and  the incumbent governors. For the national government, Putin’s Russia in the first decade of the century riding high on soaring revenue from oil and gas exports is not Putin’s Russia over the past four years in economic recession with rising unemployment and inflation, drastically falling export earnings, depleted hard-currency reserves, a declining ruble exchange rate, and Western economic sanctions against Putin’s Ukraine aggression. All Russian  governors have been tasked to formulate economic crisis policies resolving the regional effects  of  the country’s national  recession. Adding to the challenge of the economic crisis is rampant official corruption throughout Russia with revenue and resources diverted into bribery, kickbacks, and embezzlement.

To burnish his anti-corruption image, President Putin has used governors as convenient scapegoats for mishandling their own economic situations actually stemming from his own national policy failures. Under provisions of the 2012 amended law on gubernatorial elections, President Putin has the constitutional authority at any time to depose governors for a range of  reasons including his “lack of confidence” in their ability. He has arbitrarily deposed even governors who may just have been elected a previous year. The governors in these 16 regions were appointed by Putin as the acting heads of  their  regions for 2017 under a presidentially granted right to run for election to their offices in the next scheduled September nationwide election.

In his third presidential term since 2012, Putin had replaced 2 of the 85 regions with allegedly incorruptible “outsider” (varyag) governors without any prior association or careers in their regions. Four of the 21 deposed governors  in Komi and Sakhalin in 2015, Kirov in 2016, and  Udmurtiya in 2017 were actually arrested and jailed on charges of bribery and embezzlement.  The problem for governors arises when still in their five-year terms or just appointed acting heads they run for the office. Governors hope by winning a direct election to bank a five-year  mandate with President Putin and their own population before economic conditions get even worse. Like their predecessors, election was the option by the 16 governors in 2017.

For Putin, the 2017 gubernatorial elections had an even more direct personal significance as political theatre. It would be the last nationwide election before the 2018 presidential election.  September 10 was important to have a relatively high voter turnout in regions and a  non-controversial outcome without widespread allegations of dishonest campaigning, election rules violations, and vote fraud by the incumbent governors. A marred election nationally would diminish the legitimacy for Putin’s own subsequent run for a fourth term as president in 2018.  The staged goal for September 10, 2017 was an enthusiastic public endorsement for Putin’s own presidential re-election on March 18, 2018. The election of the 16 whom Putin had appointed acting governors in 2017 was as much a referendum on himself for his 4th term.

Incumbent governors among recently appointed outsiders were less likely to win without dishonest campaigning, election violations, and fraud. More than their predecessors, the 16 faced uncertain campaigns in the few months between their appointments as acting heads by Putin and electoral success in September. Putin had appointed seven the new governors  of  their regions for the first time just from February to April of 2017. They were distrusted by the regional economic-political elites, unfamiliar with the particular nuances of campaigning in their newly assigned regions, and unknown by voters before their appointments. All 16 would have preferred only moderate turnout with a disproportionate UR political base voting and potentially anti-incumbent voters not showing up at the precincts on September 10.

Adding to their liabilities, many of the 16  were technocrats without any prior political experience or elected offices.[iv] They did not debate their opponents in public forums or on regional television over July and August. All 16 campaigned essentially as a public relations outreach of their office as governor. They traveled around their regions issuing policy statements before prearranged audiences to showcase themselves through their internet websites and regional media. Most UR incumbent governors since 2012 had won easily by their close Putin association enhanced since 2014 by the patriotic euphoria in Russia from Putin’s  annexation  of Crimea. The unpredictable factor for the 16 in the run-up to the election on September 10 was  the reaction of voters to the now almost four-year national economic recession.

Despite the uncertainties for the 16 governors and Putin, the results a week ago on September 10 must have seemed reassuring for both.[v] The political base of United Russia held firm for the election. All 16 incumbent governors won with an average victory margin almost exactly the same as governors since 2012 at 74.36%, ranging from 60-64% in four regions to 80-88% in six. The seven new governors just appointed in 2017 were not  disadvantaged with an even higher average victory margin of 77.92%, five between 78 and 88%, and only two marginally competitive at 61 and 68%. The new governor of Marii El just appointed by Putin on April 7 won by a 88% margin over his opponents with a reported 44% of the eligible voters in the region participating.

The election may have fallen short of President Putin’s goal of a large enthusiastic voter turnout as his referendum for 2018. Yet participation in these 16 regions at least was respectably equivalent to past September elections, averaging 39.83% of all their registered voters and only slightly less at 36.42% for the regions headed by his seven newly appointed 2017 governors.  Allegations of rule violations and vote fraud usually require a couple of weeks after an election to be filed with the Central Election Commission and courts, but early reports suggest that a fewer number of complaints will be submitted  than after past elections. As predicted beforehand by analysts in the Russian media, September 10 was a “quiet” election without any major controversies.

Putin soon will announce his intention to run again for president with his national public approval still at 80% or higher despite the economic recession. In retrospect, the election of the 16 incumbent governors only reaffirmed Putin’s seemingly unassailable political authority throughout Russia for his fourth term as president in 2018-24. Putin in Act 4 successfully previewed September 10, 2017.

Notes

[i] Communist Party of  the  Russian Federation, Liberal Democratic Party of  Russia, and A Just Russia.

[ii] Irina Nagornykh, “Munitsipal’nyi  fil’tr slishkom malo propuskaet,” Kommersant, 28 August 2017, at https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3395829.

[iii] Under a 2013 federal amendment, regional parliaments are   allowed to suspend their gubernatorial elections and choose their governor from three candidates nominated by President Putin.  On September 10, the incumbent UR appointed governor of  Adygeya was chosen unanimously under the same provision by its regional parliament.

[iv] Carolina De Stefano, “Kremlin-Governor Relations in the Run-Up to the 2018 Presidential Elections,” Russian Analytical Digest, No. 201 (18 April 2017), pp. 2-6.

[v] Calculations for the final election results and voter turnout are based on totals for each of  the  16 regions compiled by Ivan Sinergiev and Andrei Pertsev, “Gubernatorskie vybory: kto bol’she,” Kommersant, 14 September 2017, at https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3408129.

Matthew Laing and Brendan McCaffrie – The Impossible Leadership Situation: Succeeding as a President of Disjunction

This is a guest post by Matthew Laing of Monash University and Brendan McCaffrie of the University of Canberra. It is based on their recent article in Presidential Studies Quarterly.

American Presidents are often ranked and compared, with a handful of Presidents regularly judged as “great” (eg George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and sometimes Ronald Reagan). However, a wealth of political scholarship now acknowledges that different US Presidents are granted different circumstances that both demand different actions, and grant different opportunities. While these presidents’ greatness does result from their successful actions, it also reflects their circumstances. This blog post, and the article it is based on [1], argues that it is more useful to examine presidents who share a similar political and historical context, and to examine their success in a way that is sensitive to the opportunities and constraints of that context. Furthermore, this allows us to avoid encouraging presidents to follow the expansive styles of these “great” presidents in situations where such actions may be detrimental [2].

This research uses the political time approach to the presidency, developed by Stephen Skowronek [3]. The political time approach defines four types of president, based on their political and historical context. In this research, we examine what success is for Skowronek’s most constrained category of president: the president of disjunction, whose situation Skowronek described as “the impossible leadership situation”. These presidents (John Adams, John Quincy Adams, Franklin Pierce, James Buchanan, Herbert Hoover, and Jimmy Carter) are typically beset by national problems for which the orthodox political and policy thinking has no solutions. Our research argues that while some aspects of success are not available to these presidents, they can succeed by fulfilling a normative need to experiment and find new approaches to solve these problems.

Political Time and Disjunction

Skowronek describes four types of president, defined by their distinct historical contexts and opportunities. Presidents of disjunction take office when the “regime” that has dominated American politics over previous decades is weak. The regime is composed of three main parts, (i) ideas that define political action over a number of decades, such as the ideas of Keynesian economics that defined post-New Deal America, (ii) a coalition of political and societal actors, particularly those in Congress, and interests that together represent a broad range of societal groups such as organised Labor, organisations, business groups, and other elements of civil society, and (iii) institutions of government that act to maintain the regime’s direction. For a president of disjunction, the regime’s weakness is evident in these three characteristics, but especially in the first two: the dominant ideas are failing to solve current problems, but they owe their election to the coalition of politicians and societal actors that have supported those ideas. That coalition is weakening and fracturing as new problems emerge that affect different elements of the coalition in different ways.

These presidents have limited authority to act, as the failure of orthodox ideas divides their coalition of supporters. Disjunctive presidents’ best efforts to solve the nation’s problems often depart from orthodox ideas, upsetting coalition members who have maintained faith in those ideas. Alternatively, these presidents maintain orthodox ideas, upsetting those who no longer believe that orthodox ideas can work in the present circumstances.

Presidents of disjunction usually are publicly perceived as failures, and are replaced by reconstructive presidents such as Franklin D. Roosevelt, who followed the disjunctive Hoover, and instituted the New Deal, and the Keynesian economics that dominated American politics for decades, and Reagan, who followed Jimmy Carter, and whose small government and pro-free market politics endured as Roosevelt’s politics had before. Despite perceptions of their failure, in many ways the presidents of disjunction play an important role within the course of political time, and if they play it effectively they can smooth the transition to the next regime.

Presidential Success and Context

Normative Success

For presidents, success comes in three main forms – normative success, personal success, and partisan regime success. The contention that presidents of disjunction have an important role to play implies that there is a normative aspect to success for presidents, that is, there is a best role for them to play in order to advance the nation. We contend that the most important aspect of the normative role for presidents of disjunction is policy experimentation. When orthodox ideas and policies no longer work, as with the economic situation Hoover faced in the Great Depression, or the stagflation crisis Carter contended with, these presidents face great uncertainty, and need to work pragmatically to discover new policy avenues. Normative success also encompasses the need to maintain the constitution and uphold the ethical requirements of the office.

To differing degrees, both Carter and Hoover experimented with new economic approaches designed to reverse the crises that they faced. Hoover’s creation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) in 1932 was a clear example of how experimentation during disjunction can help the subsequent reconstruction. The RFC made major loans to states, municipalities, and corporations and provided an injection of much needed funds to the failing economy. Hoover attempted a middle-of-the-road approach between orthodoxy and innovation of the type Roosevelt would later pursue. He limited the RFC’s operations, for example, insisting that its funds be for self-liquidating projects. As a result, in 1932 the RFC was not as effective as it might have been as an institution for stimulating the economy. But, Hoover expanded its authority in his last days in office in January 1933 and in its early years it provided much-needed capital to troubled economic sectors. Roosevelt further expanded the RFC, giving it greater funding and a wider scope to issue loans, and it became a key institution of the New Deal. Similar patterns could be observed in Hoover’s creation of, and Roosevelt’s extension of, a range of other measures aimed at defeating the Great Depression. For example, the Relief and Construction Act, Federal Farm Board, and Agricultural Marketing Act all became pillars of the New Deal’s approach to agriculture.

Similarly, Carter displayed greater awareness of the danger of inflation than most Democrats in Congress. In his last two years, he clearly prioritized inflation over unemployment. He felt he was acting pragmatically, and publicly admitted that his administration was trying several anti-inflation measures with no certainty that any would work. Carter’s anti-inflation program emphasized wage restraint to aggressively tackle inflationary pressures, but was hindered by a lack of support from organized labor. Unable to authoritatively suppress wage inflation without further fracturing its coalition, the Carter administration pursued an accord with unions over wages. Although novel, its measures were regularly subverted or ineffective. This situation underscores the conflict between the normative requirement to experiment and its tendency to hasten the demise of the coalition.

Perhaps Carter’s boldest experiment was the appointment of Paul Volcker as chair of the Federal Reserve in 1979. Carter pursued the appointment despite counsel from close advisors that Volcker’s doctrinaire anti-inflation plan would undoubtedly cause a rise in unemployment and seriously jeopardize Carter’s chances of re-election. Volcker’s actions began to ease the stagflation crisis and began the reform and strengthening of the Federal Reserve’s role in the U.S. economy, advancing the monetarist policy agenda without requiring legislative backing. However, this anti-inflationary shift did accelerate Carter’s political demise.

Personal Success

Conversely, presidents of disjunction will likely not receive credit for their successes during their terms. With a divided coalition and an increasingly emboldened opposition, they face a major contest to have each of their actions judged as personally successful by media and the public. Presidents of disjunction are also presented with a trade-off. Actions that fulfil the normative requirement that they experiment with new policy directions are also likely to exacerbate the divisions within the coalition, and end the dominance of the ideas that the coalition has supported.

Furthermore, given the uncertainty of the outcomes of experimental policies, these may fail. Those that do succeed are often seized upon and expanded by a reconstructive successor, who typically receives the popular credit for the new approach. As such disjunctive presidents are rarely credited with great personal success, even though they may have extensive legislative achievements. In fact, both Hoover and Carter compiled impressive lists of legislative achievements, far out-stripping perceptions of their effectiveness. Hoover especially found himself unfairly criticised for adhering to laissez-faire economic practices in the face of the Great Depression, despite many major departures from orthodox economic policy.

Partisan Regime Success

Partisan regime success refers to how presidents interact with the regime, either strengthening or weakening it to situate their parties and ideological coalitions for future achievement. Such success is harder to observe than personal success, but can be more enduring. It usually leads to future success for the president’s party, but as presidents’ actions influence the strength and longevity of the regime, it also has a considerable effect beyond the party and on the nation’s future. Depending on their agreement with, or opposition to, the regime, presidents must advance and update, or attack and discredit regime ideas and institutions, as well as strengthening or weakening the coalition that supports them.

This form of success is very limited for presidents of disjunction. The regime is collapsing during their tenure and this creates societal disruption. As leaders affiliated with the regime, they often have an ideological preference to see it endure, but cannot ensure its survival. However, presidential action is not meaningless within this arena, and the way presidents respond to the crisis of their partisan regime can affect the timeline of the affiliated party’s decline and recovery.

Partisan regime success offers an internal contradiction for presidents of disjunction. By defending the regime, and retaining orthodox approaches to national problems, disjunctive presidents may maintain party authority in the short term. However, they risk marginalizing their party even further as regime ideas are sidelined, exacerbating the severity of electoral defeat and the length of recovery. More experimental presidents are better placed to prepare their partisan coalition for change and prepare the nation for the process of reconstruction, but risk their own authority in the process as regime adherents revolt. The better strategy may in part be dictated by the strength of competing factions and groupings within the coalition. However, there is also an opportunity for presidents to persuade their coalitions of different approaches, acclimatize their coalitions to new ideas, and better position them to adopt a role within the future regime, rather than leaving them entirely outside that regime.

The Three Forms of Success

These three forms are interrelated, but the way they interact varies for the different types of president. For a reconstructive president, each can be mutually reinforcing. These presidents take power at a time when there is general consensus that major change is required, as a result, reconstructive presidents can press for sweeping reforms that act to bolster perceptions of their personal success, while satisfying their newly formed coalitions, and fulfilling a normative need for action. For presidents of disjunction, choosing to pursue either personal or partisan regime success may lead to normative failure; but normative success can also hasten the demise of the regime, and diminish presidents’ personal authority, making personal success less available. We argue that the normative need to experiment offers the opportunity for most success, but that the chances of a disjunctive president receiving personal credit for their achievements are small.

Conclusion

Understanding presidential success differently in different contexts is important not only for analytical purposes. All presidents wish to be considered successful, so public expectations can influence presidential actions. If we judge all presidents by standards appropriate to reconstructive presidents, we encourage them to act in a way that will frequently contribute to their failure and, in doing so, contribute to the popular conception of a heroic presidency, which is near impossible for most presidents to meet. Presidents of disjunction are part of the essential fabric of political time, and in better understanding the ways in which they can succeed, we are engaging in a project that is essential to our understanding of presidents’ capacity to further the public good. Among the greatest challenges this understanding of the presidency presents is the need for presidents to discern their place in political time, and accept that in certain situations they must follow a more constrained path, and limit the scope of their ambitions.

Notes

[1] Matthew Laing and Brendan McCaffrie (2017) ‘The Impossible Leadership Situation? Analyzing Success for Disjunctive Presidents’, Presidential Studies Quarterly, 47 (2): 255-276.

[2] David A. Crockett (2002) The Opposition Presidency, College Station: Texas A&M University Press.

[3] Stephen Skowronek (1997) The Politics Presidents Make, Cambridge Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

New publications

Veronica Anghel, ‘”Why Can’t We Be Friends?” The Coalition Potential of Presidents in Semi-presidential Republics — Insights from Romania’, East European Politics and Societies, First Published 24 Aug 2017.

Thomas Sedelius and Jenny Åberg, ‘Eastern Europe’s semi-presidential regimes’, in Adam Fagan & Petr Kopecky (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of East European Politics, London: Routledge, 2017.

Lee Savage, ‘How and when do presidents influence the duration of coalition bargaining in semi-presidential systems?’, European Journal of Political Research, early view DOI: 10.1111/1475-6765.12227.

Steffen Ganghof, ‘ A new political system model: Semi-parliamentary government’, European Journal of Political Research, early view DOI: 10.1111/1475-6765.12224.

M.A Mohamed Salih, ‘ African Presidentialism Revisited: Between “Big Man Metaphor” and Institutional Politics’, in Said Adejumobi (ed.), Voice and Power in Africa’s Democracy: Institutions, Participation and Accountability, London: Routledge, 2017.

John Gasu, ‘Presidentialism in Ghana: Examining Institutional Effectiveness for Horizontal Accountability between the Legislature and the Executive’, in Said Adejumobi (ed.), Voice and Power in Africa’s Democracy: Institutions, Participation and Accountability, London: Routledge, 2017.

George Kieh, Jr., ‘The Presidency and Democratic Developmentalism in Southern Africa’, in Said Adejumobi (ed.), Voice and Power in Africa’s Democracy: Institutions, Participation and Accountability, London: Routledge, 2017.

Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin, 2017, Brookings Institution Press.

Daniel Treisman (ed.), The New Autocracy: Information, Politics, and Policy in Putin’s Russia, Brookings Institution Press.

Valentina Rita Scotti, ‘Presidentialism in Turkey. A first appraisal of 2017 Constitutional Reform’, Vol 30 No 2 (2017): DPCE Online 2-2017, available at: http://www.dpceonline.it/index.php/dpceonline/issue/view/31

Canan Aslan Akman and Pınar Akçalı, ‘Changing the system through instrumentalizing weak political institutions: the quest for a presidential system in Turkey in historical and comparative perspective’, Turkish Studies, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2017.1347508

The Five Faces of the President: Leadership, Presidentialism, and Public Policy in Brazil, special issue of Policy Studies, vol. 38, no. 7, 2017.

Anibal Francisco Gauna, ‘Revisiting the Issue of Democratic Deterioration in Venezuela, 1974–1998’, Journal of Politics in Latin America, 1/2017: 33-58, available at: http://journals.giga-hamburg.de/index.php/jpla/article/view/2152/1460

Christina Xydias, ‘Citizens, Domestic Institutions, and International Organizations: Recent Financial Crises in Greece and Iceland’, Polity, https://doi.org/10.1086/693452.

Carole Spary – From parliament to president: Symbolic representation and the candidacy of Meira Kumar

This post first appeared on IAPS Dialogue: The Online Magazine of Institute for Asia-Pacific Studies at the University of Nottingham. Thanks to the Director of IAPS, Professor Katharine Adeney, for allowing the repost here

In late June, a collective of 17 opposition parties led by the Indian National Congress Party (Congress) announced Meira Kumar, the former Speaker of the lower house of the Indian Parliament, as its nominee for the election of the President of India, due on 17 July. Prior to this, the governing party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), had announced Ram Nath Kovind, the governor of the north Indian state of Bihar as its nominee. Both are positioned as Dalit leaders, where Dalits are the most marginalised group in India’s unequal caste system. If elected on 20 July, Kumar would not be the first woman or Dalit to become President of India – Pratibha Patil (2007-12) and KR Narayanan (1997-2002), respectively, precede her. But she would become the first Dalit woman President.

Symbolic representation in candidate selection is nothing new for Meira Kumar. As the first woman Speaker in India (2009-2014), she provided her party, the Congress, with an important precedent. However, throughout her presidential campaign, she has rejected the emphasis on her and her rival candidate’s Dalit identity, stressing ideological differences with the governing party. Gender has been absent from the debate, except for the media’s labelling of Kumar as ‘Bihar ki beti’ (Bihar’s daughter) due to her place of birth. The unshakeable focus on identity demonstrates tensions inherent in symbolic representation – while it provides candidates and parties with political capital, candidates find it hard to control the message of who and what they claim to represent, with identity taking precedence over ideas.

Symbolic representation in Indian politics: intersecting identities

Kumar’s election as Speaker in 2009 exemplified complex intersections of gender, class, and caste underpinning debates on women’s under-representation in electoral politics in India and elsewhere. The unanimous election of a woman Speaker compensated for the Congress party’s failure to deliver a manifesto promise on parliamentary gender quotas in their previous term (2004-2009). The additional symbolic capital generated by Kumar’s intersecting identities meant she was chosen above other potential women candidates. Congratulatory speeches by MPs in the Lok Sabha professed the importance of her election for women, especially Dalit women. Kumar acknowledged in a press interview that her election as Speaker sent a positive message to women and Dalits. Sometimes overlooked is the fact Kumar was not the first woman to occupy a senior presiding role in India’s national parliament, that too a woman from an underrepresented group in parliament: Muslim MP Najma Heptulla was Deputy Chair of the upper house (Rajya Sabha) for seventeen years. As a more senior constitutional position, however, the first woman Speaker was an important milestone.

MPs were also optimistic she would represent women’s interests better than her predecessors. anticipating the passage of the long-debated legislation on gender quotas in parliament and state assemblies, which was eventually passed in 2010 during Kumar’s term but only by the upper not the lower house, and had not been introduced in the lower house by the end of Kumar’s term in 2014. Some past Speakers, particularly those who were not from among the ‘somatic norm’ of parliament – predominantly Hindu, upper caste, north Indian, and male – were subjected to similar expectations, like the late Speaker P.A. Sangma (1996-1998) whose election was expected to enable visibility of concerns of the North East.  This ‘burden of representation’ for under-represented groups is rarely placed on dominant-group representatives, at least to the same degree. Some argued, and still do, that Kumar’s privileged upbringing as a daughter of senior political leader, Jagjivan Ram, meant her experiences are unrepresentative of the ‘average’ Dalit woman in India. While this is a valid critique in class terms, we need to consider further the possibilities of the ideal ‘authentic’ representative, and why more attention is paid to Kumar’s supposed ‘inauthenticity’ than representatives from other dominant social groups.

Presidential candidacy and representative claim-making

Meira Kumar’s presidential nomination in 2017 means she again finds herself in the midst of a debate about identity and representation. She has tried to shift focus away from her and her rival candidate’s caste identity, reportedly saying that ‘”When an election to the highest office is being held, the Dalit issue is being raised. Earlier, the capabilities, merits and achievements of the two candidates used to be discussed and no one talked about their caste”. Elsewhere she was quoted as saying: ‘”Do we – Ram Nath Kovind and I — have no other qualities?…”’. In so doing, Kumar attempted to control representative claims. Throughout her presidential campaign she stressed support for secular and democratic values such as freedom of speech, contrasting this with the governing party, criticising a climate of fear and rising casteism and communalism and increasing violence against Dalits and Muslims. She publicly appealed to the electoral college to vote with their conscience.

Consequently, this presidential election has been more confrontational than her Speaker election in 2009, or her earlier diplomatic career. As outgoing Speaker in 2014, Kumar published a volume of her speeches linking her diplomatic career with her experience of parliamentary diplomacy, hosting foreign dignitaries and bilateral delegations, and participating in Inter-Parliamentary Union and the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association activities. As Speaker, she claimed she took care to remain above political preferences, and that her speeches were a ‘reflection of a broader outlook’. These experiences provide a good foundation for presidential office. But her principled campaign focus begs the question of how she will manage this confrontation if elected, given conventional relations between the President and Prime Minister.

Gender issues have been notably absent so far in the campaign; if Kumar has discussed gender explicitly, the media have not covered it prominently, except to label her as  ‘Bihar’s daughter’. Perhaps this is because the symbolic dividend of a second woman President is reduced. Perhaps it is because neither the governing or opposition parties can claim a strong track record on gender issues. Perhaps it is because some of the opposition parties supporting her candidacy had vigorously opposed issues such as the gender quota Bill during Kumar’s term as Speaker. Perhaps it is because the current Speaker is an experienced woman parliamentarian from the BJP. Most plausibly, it is because casteism and communalism are the common denominators on which those parties supporting her can agree, even if in the past these have manifested in gendered forms.

The campaign emphasis on democratic values was a public intervention at a much needed time. Whatever the outcome on 20 July, this election demonstrates once again that representative claims by candidates, their supporters and detractors, about who and what they represent, are vigorously contested, and that identity and symbolic representation are likely to play an important role in electoral politics in India in the future. Is symbolic representation enough? No – precedents are welcome but the substantive transformation for marginalised groups needs to follow. Allrepresentatives, not just those perceived to embody more marginalised identities, need to be held accountable for bringing about the change.

Carole Spary is an Assistant Professor in the School of Politics and International Relations and Deputy Director of the Institute of Asia and Pacific Studies at the University of Nottingham. She tweets at @carolespary . For more on Meira Kumar’s election as first female Speaker in 2009, see the author’s published book chapter on first female Speakers co-authored with Faith Armitage and Rachel Johnson (in Rai and Johnson’s edited collection Democracy in Practice, 2014, Palgrave Macmillan). Image credit: CC by Public.Resource.Org/Flickr.

Yonatan L. Morse – The African State, Presidential Power, and Electoral Authoritarianism in Cameroon

This is a guest post by Yonatan L. Morse, Assistant Professor in Department of Political Science at the University of Connecticut. It is based on his recent article in International Political Science Review.
Africa is a fascinating testing ground for the study of electoral authoritarianism. While not clearly part of the Third Wave of democratization, in the early 1990s the continent was swept by a wave of economic and political reform. However, the continent’s democratic credentials are quite tenuous. There is a strong consensus that alongside a number of democratic success stories like Ghana or Nigeria reside a considerable population of electoral authoritarian regimes. These regimes combine regular elections with undemocratic practices that range from fraud, harassment, censorship, and state violence. Today, several African countries are entering their third decade of electoral authoritarianism.

The persistence of electoral authoritarianism in Africa is puzzling, especially considering the crucial role of the state. In many comparative studies of electoral authoritarianism, the state’s capacity to extract resources via taxation, administer territory, command personnel, and deploy coercive units is seen as paramount. However, African states generally rank low along these measures. Nor do differences in state capacity clearly explain the relative longevity of African electoral authoritarian regimes. Longstanding electoral authoritarian regimes in Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gabon, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe do not have demonstrably more powerful states than short-lived ones in Ghana, or Zambia.

In recent research I argue that the endurance of electoral authoritarianism in Africa can partially be explained by reassessing state capacity in relation to contextual logics of state building. The African state is often referred to as neo-patrimonial. Faced with acute post-independence challenges, foundational leaders stabilized politics by brokering with other elites, who were often representative of politically relevant ethnic blocs. The persistence of this political order required resources, but also marginally more capable states and, importantly, the elevation of presidents as critical actors. I illustrate this with reference to Cameroon, one of Africa’s most resilient electoral authoritarian regimes.

Coercive Capacity and Presidential Power in Cameroon

At independence the state in Cameroon was by no means robust, but it possessed unique advantages compared to other African countries. The colonial territory was bifurcated between the French and British, and neither entity made real investments into a civil administration, tax authority, or traditional military. However, an uprising in French Cameroon (called the UPC Rebellion) compelled the French to create emergency zones and augment Cameroon’s military with a gendarmerie and small intelligence-gathering unit. These innovations proved influential and were bequeathed to Cameroon’s first president, Ahmadou Ahidjo.

Ahidjo used these tools to marginally expand the state’s coercive capacity and to elevate the presidency. By controlling the purse strings and threatening sanction, Ahidjo was able to coax other political parties into a singular entity called the Cameroon National Union (CNU). By 1972, federalism was abolished and Ahidjo stood virtually unchecked as the gatekeeper to state spoils. Throughout his tenure he maintained a careful balance of ethnic and regional interests in public appointment and spending. Other African regimes were built on similar principles, but not many were backed by the same threat of coercion against elites.

Ahidjo’s successor Paul Biya built on this system. Biya retained control over the powers of appointment, and much of Cameroon’s nascent oil wealth was managed for years in a secret account held by the president. Importantly, the orientation of Biya’s coalition was tilted toward his southern co-ethnics, while Ahidjo’s was toward the north. As one observer noted at the time, the essence of the regime relied on the “cohesion of a few important people.” This was not an authoritarian regime rooted in an objectively powerful state, but rather the support of a narrow political elite.

Electoral Authoritarian Resilience in Cameroon

This system came under severe duress prior to Cameroon’s foundational 1992 elections. Economic decline reduced Biya’s capacity to maintain elite support, while social grievances grew in the face of rampant public corruption. Opposition reached its apex during a six-month strike, which was matched by significant state violence. Indicatively, Biya eked by with just 40% of the vote, and the ruling party won just 49% of the seats. There were widespread accusations of fraud and repression by security services, the Ministry of Territorial Administration, and provincial governors.

With Biya’s near-term survival ensured his preeminence as the chief broker stabilized the regime. Biya quickly entered into coalitions with various small parties like the Movement for Defense of the Republic (MDR), the United People’s Congress (UPC), and the National Party for Progress (NPP). By 1997, he had coopted members of the larger National Union for Democracy (NUDP), and elements of the Bamileké community. Installing an Anglo Prime Minister bolstered support from English-speaking regions. Today, Cameroon has the largest cabinet in Africa with over 60 appointed ministers and deputies. Biya has also resisted privatization efforts and controls access to hundreds of patronage positions. Fraud and coercion still impacts elections, but in 2011 Biya won 78% of the vote, and in 2013 the ruling party won 82% of the seats.

Coercion has also helped the regime deter challenges to Biya’s position as president. In 1997 Biya faced two internal challengers – one died of apparent medical complications, while the other was charged with corruption and sentenced to 20 years in prison. In 2008, regime elites revealed their concerns in private that a post-Biya reality would undermine the delicate balance of power. Unsurprisingly, Biya amended the constitution to change term limits to run for election again in 2011. A year later two other likely internal challengers – Marafa Yaya and Ephraim Inoni – were both convicted for embezzlement. State coercion has been used against citizens, but it has a clear role in maintaining the elite coalition.

Much of this builds on Thomas Calleghy’s insight that many African states are “lame leviathans,” meaning they cannot be exploited for massive social and economic projects, but nonetheless provide the necessary scaffolding for patrimonial orders. This holds true during elections too. When electoral authoritarian regimes retain some comparatively basic coercive features that help them keep the president at the apex of political coalition making, they can persist for extended periods of time despite electoral and internal challenges.

Jean-Louis Thiébault – The president and his party: Emmanuel Macron and La République en Marche (LRM)

This is a guest post by Jean-Louis Thiébault, emeritus professor at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Lille, France.

The analysis of the relationship between the president and his party is an essential factor in understanding presidential or semi-presidential systems. The presidential party provides the cadres, activists and supporters who support the presidential candidate of this party in the conquest and the practice of power. During the presidential campaign, it is transformed into a real political machine in the service of a man who is the candidate of the party. The party is transformed into a presidential party if its candidate is elected. It provides the bulk of the ministers nominated by the elected president to form the government, especially if it receives an absolute majority of parliamentary seats. It votes the texts which constitute the essential elements of the presidential program.

But there are two types of presidential parties. Many of them are traditional parties, long present on the political scene. But fewer of them are newly created, especially by a candidate who does not belong to any party and who wishes to have a political machine capable of supporting him in his conquest of power and in the implementation of its policy. This second type of presidential party resembles one of the different types of “personal parties”, analyzed by Mauro Calise from the example of Italy (1). They are subject to complete control by a presidential candidate on the party he has created himself.

The French presidential election of 2017 showed that three of the main candidates, Emmanuel Macron, Jean-Luc Mélenchon and, to a lesser extent, Marine Le Pen, were at the head of a movement that was not a traditional party , but rather a personal party (respectively La République en Marche, La France Insoumise and the Front National). Our analysis takes into account only la République en Marche, which has become a presidential party following the success of Emmanuel Macron in the 2017 presidential election. Pierre Rosanvallon has clearly shown the difference between a traditional party and this new type of party. According to him, a traditional party expresses a social world, territories, a culture. It is a grouping of people who share a certain social or ideological identity. On this basis, its members express opinions that become programs, and choose leaders. The movement acts in reverse: it is a leader who chooses a base. The traditional party relies on the implementation of the classical conception of representative democracy. It is a machine that organizes the representation of a group, while the movement organizes the membership of a leader (2).

The victory of Emmanuel Macron accomplished the trend towards the personalization of the political life that began over a half a century ago. This personalization has long been perceived as a perversion of democracy, particularly in France. In the republican vision, good democracy is impersonal and power must be collegial. In France, ideas, doctrines and programs continued to be a determining criterion. The victory of Emmanuel Macron updates for France an old phenomenon in the United States: the decisive weight of the personality of the candidates in electoral choices. The 1960s saw the advent of a time when the personality of politicians counted infinitely more for voters than the ideas they defended or professed. The election of Emmanuel Macron marks the moment when France joined the ranks of extremely personalized countries.

Pierre Rosanvallon considers that there is a growing phenomenon of personalization and mediatization, but he focuses on another factor. Quoting Thomas Poguntke and Paul D. Webb (The Presidentialization of Politics. A comparative study of modern democracies. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2005) , he insists that the rise of executive power has profoundly changed the relationship to personalization. The 5th Republic is part of this general trend of the presidentialization of democracies, whether or not there is a presidential election. Presidentialization is a new development in Western democracies. Rosanvallon therefore considers that there is a growing personalization phenomenon, but that it corresponds everywhere to an increase in the power of the executive (4).

The notion of a personal party seems preferable to that of movement. But we must go further. Indeed, the victory of Emmanuel Macron led to the transformation of his party La République en Marche into a presidential party. The party is already seeking to institutionalize itself in order to be sustainable. It seeks to acquire status and structures. It seeks an articulation with the parliamentary group (5).

But this type of presidential party is indeed marked not only by the weight of institutions, but also by the personalization and mediatization of political life. The influence of Emmanuel Macron on the party is therefore very strong, not only in the electoral period before the parliamentary elections, but also during the formation of the government. It will certainly continue during the period of implementation of the policies made by the president.

But the main problem in a semi-presidential or presidential regime is the autonomy of the presidential party. The analysis of the relations between Emmanuel Macron and his party leads to the observation that the president closely controls the approach of the party.

The presidential party is often second relative to the president. La République en marche (LRM) party did not intervene in the nomination process, as Emmanuel Macron self-proclaimed himself a candidate in the presidential election. The candidates of the party in the legislative elections were chosen by a commission of investiture, under the close supervision of the president. Yet the party became the first party of France at the legislative elections. Macron benefited from a honeymoon election due to his victory in the presidential election. He thus benefited from the pre-eminence of the presidential election, from the lag of legislative elections in relation to the presidential election, and from the rules of the voting system in force, the first-past-the-post system.

1.) La République en Marche (LRM) party was created by Emmanuel Macron. The party is little more than one-year old. However, since June 11, 2017, it is the biggest party in France. In the run up to the legislative elections, the party already changed its name to become La Republique en Marche (LRM). The creation of this party stemmed from the desire to overcome traditional parties. Emmanuel Macron did not want to make a party in the image of those which  had structured the political landscape for a long time. Members of La République en Marche were registered by simple inscription of their personal data on internet. This new type of digital membership has made it possible to garner a spectacular number of members in a very short time. La République en Marche boasts more than 360,000 members. The main lines of the statutes were set by a national convention on 8 july 2017 before being submitted to a vote of the members before the end of July 2017. They provide for free membership, a collegial leadership, three-year non-renewable terms, and an organization based on autonomous local committees. The collegial leadership was chosen to avoid an over-personalization of the party, because the real leader of this new presidential party is Emmanuel Macron. But if membership remains free, only the members of LRM with a certain seniority will be able to vote during the consultations of the party (6). Party leaders want to benefit from the windfall of public party funding to transform the party, where the bulk of the budget would be spent on training activists and leading the debate and not just running costs. For example, they want to set up a system for tracing, recruiting and training new talent. It does not want to be satisfied with a kind of internal self-selection like the traditional parties (7).

2.) The party did not intervene in a nomination process because Emmanuel Macron self-proclaimed himself a candidate for the presidential election. In the recent presidential elections, the traditional parties (RPR-UMP and PS) existed before their candidates. In 2017, Emmanuel Macron created his own political party. He announced his candidacy for the presidential election on November 16, 2016. For several months prior to the announcement, Emmanuel Macron had been preparing for the presidential election of spring 2017, including on April 6, 2016 the creation of his party, the so-called En Marche! Emmanuel Macron placed himself at the center of the political spectrum and wanted to win voters in his name. With his party claiming to be “neither left nor right”, Emmanuel Macron said that he was outside traditional political parties, at a time when many voters were wary of these parties.

3.) The candidates of the party in the legislative elections were chosen by a commission under the supervision of the president. Emmanuel Macron set a new milestone in the construction of his party by launching a process to nominate candidates for the parliamentary elections at a press conference on January 19, 2017. A “call for nominations” process was launched. A national commission, composed of nine members of En Marche !, who committed themselves to not being candidates, was set up. The objective was clear: those who want to join the party must decide without delay. Emmanuel Macron said he was ready to welcome the candidatures of parliamentarians of “all republican formations”, socialists, radicals, ecologists, centrists and republicans. On the other hand, he rejected in advance any “agreement of apparatus”, with “any party whatsoever” (8).

4.) The presidential party benefited from a honeymoon election provided by the victory of Emmanuel Macron in the presidential election. Emmanuel Macron fully understood the logic of the political regime of the 5th Republic established in 1958 and completed in 1962 when the election of the president by universal suffrage was instituted by referendum. In the “republican monarchy” that is France, everything proceeds from the double effect of the presidential logic and a parliamentary majority (9). The presidential party benefited from the popularity of the president. To win in the constituencies, Emmanuel Macron bet on his image, his youth, but also on a skillfully staged authority. He relied on a presidential style that stood out from the communication of his two predecessors. The president’s party therefore benefited greatly from the electoral situation resulting from the presidential election. No opposition parties were able to form a coherent bloc against it. The LRM candidates won by default, because in most constituencies there was no active coordination against them. With different opponents in different constituencies, belonging to different political parties, there was no reason not to expect a big LRM majority (10).

Emmanuel Macron succeeded in occupying the central space and accommodating the heirs of centrism, but also appealed to “left-wing and right-wing” voters. The economic liberalism of Emmanuel Macron could attract right-wing voters, while his cultural liberalism was likely to attract left-wing voters (11).

5.) The presidential party enjoyed the pre-eminence of the presidential election. The presidential party benefited from the pre-eminence of the presidential election over the legislative elections. The victory of La République en Marche (LRM) was the result of the organization of honeymoon legislative elections. French voters did not deceive themselves and gave the president the means of presiding and the government those of governing. The legislative election campaign was not block against block, project against project, but was organised around the dynamic instituted by Emmanuel Macron. None of the three existing opposition parties was regarded by the public as a credible alternative. More than a vote of adhesion, voters made a vote of consistency (12).

Whenever legislative elections take place in the wake of the presidential election, the elected presidents (François Mitterrand in 1981, Jacques Chirac in 2002, Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007 and François Hollande in 2012) their party gained an absolute majority. The only counter-example was 1988 when the PS was forced to rely on the PC or the centrists. Since 2002, and the reversal of the electoral calendar, legislative elections confirm the presidential election. The need to give a majority to the president has never been so strongly felt. It is a real novelty: a political party that was not established managed to win the legislative elections (13).

6.) The presidential party benefited from the majority-plurality system, established in 1958 for legislative elections. LRM benefited from the amplifying effect of this electoral system in legislative elections. While LRM candidates won 32 per cent of the votes cast in the first round, the presidential party secured 308 seats in the National Assembly, at the end of the second round.

The objective of the two-round majority system is to secure a stable parliamentary majority and to provide the president with the means to implement his policy. The 2017 legislative elections have once again fulfilled this objective. The majority is amplified this year by the central position of LRM on the political chessboard.

7.) The presidential party did not intervene in the choice of the prime minister and the members of the government. The choice of the prime minister and the ministers is a choice of the president. The nomination of Edouard Philippe (LR) for the post of prime minister showed the desire to invent a « right-wing and left-wing » dual executive. Edouard Philippe’s appointment is an unprecedented move since, unlike all his predecessors, the new head of government is neither a close political relative, nor a faithful supporter, nor even an ally of the same party as the president. By appealing to the mayor of Le Havre, who claims to be from the right when he comes from the left, Emmanuel Macron invented a completely new executive dyarchy. The formation of the first and second government confirmed his determination to shake up the rules of the political game. With the exception of the first government of Michel Debré under the 5th Republic, it is unprecedented to see men and women from opposing political parties assembled in the same government. The departure of four prominent ministers (Richard Ferrand, Francois Bayrou, Marielle de Sarnez and Syvie Goulart), under a judicial procedure, led Emmanuel Macron to choose ministers who were mostly unknown to public opinion. They are technocrats without large political support or they were young members coming from La République en Marche (LRM), totally faithful. The promise to give prominence to civil society figures was met: half of the members of the first government and seventeen in the second. But the president and the prime minister had to agree on one key point: the number of ministries reserved to right-wing ministers. The prime minister’s political relatives set their conditions for participating in government (14).

8.) The presidential party intervenes little in the organization of the parliamentary majority. The president intends to organize the parliamentary majority. LRM has a large majority in the National Assembly, with 308/577 elected deputies. Candidates were elected because of the presidential label. But it was difficult for Macron not to meet the demands of his centrist MODEM allies (42 elected MPs) and about 20 members of the Republican (LR) party, who announced their willingness to form an independent group with the eighteen deputies of The Union of Independent Democrats (IDU). This new parliamentary group is expected to approach some 50 members.

The president actively participates in the selection of key positions, even if the formal decision does not belong to him: the presidency of the National Assembly, the presidencies of the parliamentary committees, and especially the presidency of the LRM group. Emmanuel Macron keeps an attentive, if not active, eye on the choice of the holder of the post of president of the National Assembly, who is the fourth personage of the state in order of protocol. He pleaded for the installation of a woman as president of the National Assembly. But he made the choice of experience by supporting the candidacy of François de Rugy. His knowledge of the institution (he was vice-president of the National Assembly during the last parliamentary term) made him appear to be the only candidate likely to organize the parliamentary work without being overwhelmed by the leaders of the opposition. In the aftermath of the second round of legislative elections, Emmanuel Macron asked Richard Ferrand to leave his post as Minister of Territorial Cohesion to take up the presidency of the LRM group in the National Assembly. By sending Richard Ferrand to the Assembly, Emmanuel Macron appointed one of his political relatives and the first of the faithful. The election was held on June 24, 2017, at a meeting of all LRM members. Richard Ferrand was the only candidate and he was elected unanimously, with two abstentions.

9.) The presidential party does not intervene in the choice of the holders of the administrative posts of the administration. During the first two months of his five-year term, Emmanuel Macron intends to change or, on the contrary, to confirm “all the executive positions in the public service ». Unprecedented in the history of the Fifth Republic, the approach evokes the “spoil system” in force in the United States. These are the “250 posts, filled in the council of ministers”. Emmanuel Macron intends to give full value to the traditional system of revocation “ad nutum” of the so-called “government’s discretionary” jobs, relying on the loyalty of the senior officials in the ministries who draft laws, implementing decrees and interpretative circulars (15).

Conclusion

The new party, la République en Marche, created by Emmanuel Macron, is not only a personal party, but it became a presidential party following the presidential victory of its founder. It is currently in a process of being institutionalized. This is the result of the impact of the institutions of the 5th Republic. They lead to the president’s hold on his party. But the personality of Emmanuel Macron, his style of government, and his ideas are also essential factors to be taken into account in order to understand the president’s close control over the party.

Notes

(1) Mauro Calise, Il partito personale : I due corpi del leader. Bari : Editori Laterza, nuova edizione 2010 ; Mauro Calise, “The personal party: An analytical framework” , Italian Political Science Review, Vol. 45, no. 3, 2015, 301-315.

(2) Pierre Rosanvallon (interview with Saïd Mahrane), « La nouvelle géographie politique », Le Point, 18 mai 2017 ; see also Michel Offerlé, « Les partis meurent longtemps », Le Monde, 31 mai 2017 ; Enrico Letta, « La victoire des mouvements sur les partis », Le Monde, 10 mai 2017).

(3) Thomas Poguntke and Paul D. Webb, The presidentialization of politics. A comparative study of modern democracies. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2005.

(4) Pierre Rosanvallon (interview with Gérard Courtois), « Droite-gauche. Histoire d’un clivage », Le Monde, 17 juin 2017 ; Pierre Rosanvallon (interview with Béatrice Bouniol), « La refondation démocratique est la clé du quinquennat », La Croix, 9 mai 2017.

(5) Marc Lazar, « La République en Marche aura-t-elle un destin à l’italienne ? », Le Figaro, 26 juin 2017.

(6) Cédric Pietralunga, « Macron s’attelle à la structuration de son parti », Le Monde, 9-10 juillet 2017 ; Christine Ollivier, « Edouard Philippe fait la leçon aux Marcheurs », Journal du Dimanche, 9 juillet 2017.

(7) François-Xavier Bourmaud, « Comment le mouvement entame sa mue pour incarner le premier parti de France », Le Figaro, 13 juin 2017).

(8) Patrick Roger, « Emmanuel Macron lance un appel à candidatures pour les législatives » Le Monde, 19 janvier 2017.

(9) Françoise Fressoz, “Macron et la logique de la Ve République”, Le Monde, 13 juin 2017.

(10) Matthew S. Shugart, “France 2017: Round 4 (Honeymoon elections and presidentialization matter !)”, Fruits and Votes blog, june 18, 2017; Matthew S. Shugart, “France 2017: Honeymoon election time !)”, Fruits and Votes blog, june 11, 2017.

(11) Pascal Perrineau, « Aux sources idéologiques et politiques du macronisme », Le Figaro, 14 juin 2017.

(12) Guillaume Tabard, ” Les raisons d’un vote probable de confirmation “, Le Figaro, 10-11 juin 2017.

(13) Nicolas Rousselier, (interview with Pierre Steinmetz et Maël Thierry), « Une majorité presque encombrante pour le vainqueur », L’Obs, 15 juin 2017 ; Nicolas Rousselier (interview with Patrick Roger), « Le présidentialisme se retrouve plus gagnant que jamais », Le Monde, 4-5-6 juin 2017 ; Nicolas Rousselier (interview with Emmanuel Berretta), « Macron peut-il ubériser la Ve République ? », Le Point, 11 mai 2017.

(14) Bastien Bonnefous, Matthieu Goar et Solenn de Royer, « Onze secondes pour fracturer la droite », Le Monde, 17 mai 2017 ;

(15) Bertrand Bissuel, « Le président veut ‘mettre sous tension’ les hauts cadres de l’Etat », Le Monde, 17 mai 2015

References

Emmanuel Macron’s books and articles.

Emmanuel Macron, Révolution. Paris : XO, novembre 2016, 270p.

Macron par Macron. Paris : Editions de l’Aube, collection Le 1 en livre, mars 2017, 152p.

Emmanuel Macron, « Le devoir de rester fidèles », préface à l’ouvrage de Jean-Paul Huchon, C’était Rocard. Paris : Editions de l’Archipel, 2017.

« Macron, un philosophe en politique », Le 1, 6 juillet 2015.

Emmanuel Macron, « Les labyrinthes du politique », Le Monde, 27 mai 2017.

Emmanuel Macron, « Le monde et l’Europe ont besoin de la France », Le Monde, 27 mai 2017 (Text of the investiture speech at the Elysee Palace).

Emmanuel Macron, « Tous les ans, je reviendrai devant vous pour vous rendre compte », Le Monde, 5 juillet 2017 (Text of the speech before the Congress meeting in Versailles).

Emmanuel Macron, (interview with Nicolas Domenach, Bruno-Roger Petit, Maurice Szafran et Pierre-Henri de Menthon), « Macron ne croit pas au ‘président normal, cela déstabilise les Français’ », « Face au système politique, ‘ma volonté de trangression est forte’ », « Gare à la ‘République qui devient une machine à créer du communautarisme’ », Challenge, 16 octobre 2016.

Emmanuel Macron (interview with Etienne Lefebvre, Nicolas Barré, Dominique Seux, Grégoire Poussielgue, Renaud Honoré), «Mon projet économique », Les Echos, 23 avril 2017.

Emmanuel Macron (interview with Bastien Bonnefous, Nicolas Chapuis, Cédric Pietralunga et Solenn de Royer), «Je ne prétends pas être un président normal », Le Monde, 3 avril 2017.

Emmanuel Macron, (interview with Arthur Berdah, François-Xavier Bourmaud, Marcelo Westfreid, Alexis Brézet), « Je veux réconcilier les Français », Le Figaro, 28 avril 2017.

Books and articles on Emmanuel Macron

François Bazin, Rien ne s’est passé comme prévu. Les cinq années qui ont fait Macron. Paris : Robert Laffont, 2017, 489p.

François-Xavier Bourmaud, Emmanuel Macron. Les coulisses d’une victoire. Paris : L’Archipel, 2017, 288p

Marc Endeweld, L’ambigu Monsieur Macron. Paris : Flammarion, 2017, 336p.

Anne Fulda, Emmanuel Macron. Un jeune homme si parfait. Paris : Plon, 2017, 288p.

Nicolas Prissette, Emmanuel Macron. Le président inattendu. Paris : First, 2017, 240p.

Soazig Quéméner et Alexandre Duyck, L’irrésistible ascension d’Emmanuel Macron. Paris : Flammarion, 2017, 304p

Raphaëlle Bacqué et Ariane Chemin, « Macron, le nouvel âge du pouvoir », Le Monde, 9 mai 2017

Bruno Cautres, « Ce qui fait Macron », Le Monde, 8 avril 2017

Charlotte Chaffanjon, « La fabrique d’un chef », Le Point, 11 mai 2017.

Elie Cohen, Gérard Grunberg, « L’avènement d’Emmanuel Macron : crise de système ou accident industriel ? »Telos.eu, 19 juin 2017

Gérard Courtois, « Emmanuel Macron, une philosophie du pouvoir », Le Monde, 27 mai 2017.

Jean Garrigues, « Le vainqueur du 7 mai restaure le mythe de l’homme providentiel », Le Monde, 14-15 mai 2017.

Arthur Goldhammer, « Macron’s part wins a parliamentary majority », Foreign Affairs, june 18, 2017.

Jacques Julliard, « Le macronisme, un néo-gaullisme ? », Le Figaro, 6 juin 2017 .

Bruno Palier (interview with Frédéric Joignot), « A la scandinave ? Pas vraiment », Le Monde, 8 avril 2017.

Pascal Perrineau, « Aux sources idéologiques et politiques du macronisme », Le Figaro, 14 juin 2017.

Serge Raffy, « La prise de l’Elysée », L’Obs, 11 mai 2017.

Philippe Raynaud (interview with Eugénie Bastié), « Le chef de l’Etat a compris les erreurs de ses prédécesseurs », Le Figaro, 19 mai 2017.

Nicolas Truong, « Petite philosophie du macronisme », Le Monde, 16 mai 2017