Cote d’Ivoire’s Constitutional Gamble

Today, Côte d’Ivoire President Alassane Ouattara’s cabinet is expected to approve a new draft constitution. The government plans to ask voters to enact it through a referendum at the end of October. While there is broad agreement among political party leaders to revise the current constitution’s conflictual provision that requires both a presidential candidate’s parents to be Ivoirian, Ouattara is expected to go beyond this and propose a new basic law. In his Independence Day speech to the nation, he outlined other major changes, principally the creation of a vice-presidency and of a senate.

A “committee of experts,” composed of renowned jurists, began work on the new text on May 31.  So far, public input has been limited to a series of closed meetings with political, traditional and civil society leaders. Meanwhile, public opinion research indicates that Ivoirians do not consider constitutional reform a top priority. A focus group study carried out by the Platform of Civil Society Organizations for Election Observation in Côte d’Ivoire (POECI) found that citizens would prefer the government address outstanding issues of national reconciliation, unemployment, security and the cost of living. A separate poll confirmed the urgency citizens attach to these issues, and also reported that more Ivoirians support a simple revision of existing provisions, rather than replacing the constitution as the government now plans. According to this research, Ivoirians are not exactly opposed to the president’s reforms, but do question their urgency in light of other priorities.

In the absence of an actual text to debate, talk in Abidjan has focused on the process chosen for producing such an important document and the government’s rush to pass it before legislative elections due by December. The opposition FPI has come out against the project, and a number of civil society organizations have requested that the government postpone the referendum to allow for a more inclusive process and to better inform the public on the subject matter of the vote.

The decision to go beyond the constitutional changes agreed on at Linas-Marcoussis has led to much speculation regarding Ouattara’s motives. The vice-presidency is clearly an attempt to avoid succession controversies, such as the one that followed founding President Félix Houphouët-Boigny’s death in 1993. Some also see it as an attempt by the president to impose a successor and suppress the internal competition between Speaker Guillaume Soro and Interior Minister Hamed Bakayoko.  Ouattara seeks to cement his majority by formalizing the union of his Republican Gathering (RDR) party with its coalition partner Democratic Party (PDCI) into a Houphouëtist (RHDP) party, possibly even  before legislative elections. Leadership quarrels within the alliance now could jeopardize the merger. Should it persist after the legislative elections and the FPI win a significant number of seats, the opposition could even hope to work with RHDP dissenters on close votes in the next National Assembly.

Multiplying institutions could create more opportunities for participation by and reconciliation with the opposition, if done inclusively. However, many observers believe that the opportunity to name a vice-president and a large number of senators will instead be used to provide Ouattara with enough patronage opportunities to keep the RHDP coalition together. Indeed, opposition parties’ objections to the expected changes are twofold: the cost of new institutions, and a charge that they will weaken Ivoirian democracy by subjecting even more of the government to presidential control.  

Ouattara no doubt wants to make changes before the 2020 contest starts to overtake policy issues. A defeat of the referendum seems unlikely given his resounding re-election victory last year. However, should Ivoirians decide that they want a greater voice in reforms, a more inclusive process, or that new institutions should depend less on the presidency, the Ivoirian poll could join the Brexit vote as a case study of the unintended consequences of referenda.

Estonia – Politicians enter uncharted waters as electoral college fails to elect new president

On Saturday 24 September, Estonia entered yet uncharted waters as the electoral college – following three unsuccessful votes in parliament – failed to elect a president. The term of president Toomas Hendrik Ilves, first elected in 2006 and re-elected in 2011, ends on 8 October 2016, so that politicians need to act fast if they want to find a successor in time. As voting now returns to parliament, deputies continue to face the difficulty of finding a candidate that appeals beyond individual parties.

The Estonia Kontserdisaal - meeting place of the Estonian electoral college | photo via visittallinn.ee

The Estonia Kontserdisaal – meeting place of the Estonian electoral college | photo via visittallinn.ee

Estonia is one of the many parliamentary democracies which have chosen to elect their president indirectly. The first democratic presidential election following the country’s independence from the Soviet Union in 1992 was still held under a special system in which the first round was held by popular vote and a runoff between the front-runners took place in parliament. Since 1996 however, the president is elected entirely indirectly. The first three rounds of voting are held in parliament and a candidate needs an absolute majority of 68 votes (i.e. 2/3 of members) in any round to be elected outright. If no candidate is elected during the first two rounds, a runoff is held between the front-runners of the second round, yet the majority requirement remains. If parliament fails to elect a president, the vote passes to an electoral college consisting of all 101 members of parliament and currently 234 representatives of local government councils (the number of electors is based on the size of the municipality and thus varies, yet only few municipalities send more than one elector). In the electoral college, candidates need an absolute majority to be elected; while the participants of the last round in parliament enter the voting in the electoral college automatically, new candidates can also be nominated. If no candidate achieves a majority in the first round, the second round (fifth round overall) is a runoff between the two front-runners.

In the 4 presidential elections between 1996 and 2011 it was necessary to convene the electoral college on all but one occasion (i.e. the re-election of presidents Ilves) as parliament regularly failed to elect a candidate. In 1996 and 2001, the electoral college needed two rounds to elect a new president and only in 2006 a single round was sufficient. The current situation in Estonia is thus both unprecedented and unexpected.

estonian-presidential-election-results-2016_rounds-1-to-5

The first two rounds of voting in parliament were very much dominated by the tactics of two of the governing parties. The Social Democrats (SDE) had very much hoped that Prime Minister Taavi Rõivas (Reform Party – RE) would concede the presidency to them (as the RE had done in the case of president Ilves who was a SDE member at the time of his election). Nevertheless, despite the chance of nominating non-partisan foreign secretary Marina Kaljurand who enjoyed great public support, RE leadership eventually decided to only support SDE candidate, veteran politician and speaker Eiki Nestor, for the first and round and then put forward former Prime Minister and EU commissioner Siim Kallas in the second round, calling on solidarity from its coalition partner. Kallas had already been set to become Prime Minister instead of Rõivas after the resignation of Andrus Ansip in 2014 but withdrew following allegations concerning his time as director of the Estonian Central Bank in the 1990s. It thus seems that Rõivas’ support for Kallas’ candidacy is thus a way to install him in another high-ranking political post – particularly because it was not fully supported by all RE deputies. The third coalition party, Pro Patria and Res Publica (IRL), on the other hand decided to support former Chancellor of Justice Allar Jõks (non-partisan) together with the conservative Free Party (EV). The Centre Party (KE) – the first party to agree on a candidate – somewhat suprisingly did not nominate long-time party leader Edgar Savisaar but its deputy leader and former minister of education Mailis Reps (who is part of a competing faction within the party). While the Conservative People’s Party (ERKE) designated their leader Mart Helme as their candidate, they failed to gather a sufficient number of MPs to support him.

As expected, parties failed to unite in support for any candidate and the number of abstentions and spoiled ballots is very telling – several RE deputies seem to have refrained from supporting SDE candidate Nestor in the first round and Siim Kallas only gained 45 votes (the combined seat share of RE and SDE) in the second round. Very much counting on a transferal of the vote to the electoral college a third of all deputies abstained from voting in the third round of voting making it impossible for either Reps or Kallas to be elected.

seat-distribution-in-the-estonian-electoral-college

The vote in the electoral college brought a number of uncertainties for established parties. First and foremost, almost one third of the 335 electors and thus about half of the local government representatives are not members of parties represented in parliament but were elected on the basis of local/independent electoral lists of varying ideological leaning and coherence. The second uncertainty was created by foreign secretary Marina Kaljurand’s decision to resign from her cabinet post and run for president. Having topped public opinion polls for weeks the decision was a strategically excellent move, yet presented a surprise for public and parties alike. In a poll conducted by public broadcaster ERR, Kaljurand had a narrow lead over other candidates among electors and was thus tipped as one of the favourites who likely to go head to head with Siim Kallas in the second round of voting in the electoral college. Several MPs of other parties (including EKRE) had come out in support for Kaljurand’s candidacy and the SDE decided to support her too instead of nominating Nestor again, increasing her chances even more. Third, in contrast to previous elections a third candidate from the rounds in parliament was renominated – Allar Jõks once again received support from IRL and EV meaning that there was another non-partisan candidate with potentially wider appeal in addition to Kaljurand.

These uncertainties produced a surprising result: four of the five candidates (the EKRE finally managed to get enough supporters to nominate Mart Helme) received almost equal support with only 6 votes difference separating front-runner Kallas and the unexpectedly third-placed Kaljurand. KE candidate Mailis Reps on the other hand did surprisingly well with a strong third place even though it was rumoured that party leader Savisaar had tried to convince fellow party members to vote for Kaljurand instead (a move that shows the great divide between the factions led by Savisaar and Kaljurand within the KE). The second round was then held as a runoff between Kallas and Jõks, yet the college eventually failed to elect a new president. Both fell 30 and 34 votes, respectively, short of the required absolute majority. Electors were apparently surprised by the fact that Jõks and not Kaljurand entered the runoff – the high number of blank ballots (60 + 3 invalid votes) shows both their general dissatisfaction with the choices but also the fact that political competition in Estonia, which has been dominated by the Reform Party for the past decade, is changing. New parties have already entered parliament in the last election and current polls see KE and RE head to head – it is not out of the question that the presidential election fiasco will have consequences for the government and end Rõivas’ premiership or party leadership. An additional factor which played out in the electoral college might be the fact that the local administration reform – which will mean that municipalities are merged and therefore must also trigger a change in the presidential election law – is still contested was far from favourably received. The support from primarily local representatives for non-partisan candidates Kaljurand and Jõks as well as the high number of blank ballots could – if they in fact came from local electors – be a protest against the reform bill.

Parliament will reconvene on 3 October to elect a new president and while it is yet unclear who will run for president, politicians and experts agree that all previous candidates are now metaphorically ‘burned’ and new faces are needed if parties want to save face. In case parties fail to elect a president by the end of Ilves term, this will trigger one of the most complicated stipulations for acting presidents in existence: Speaker Eiki Nestor will take over duties as acting president. For this time, however, he will have to give up both the position of speaker and his seat in parliament – subsequently a replacement deputy must be appointed and sworn in and a new speaker must be elected who will then preside over the next rounds of presidential elections. Irrespective of when a new president is elected, a reform of the presidential election law is now inevitable and will invite calls for a popular election of the president once again.

Azerbaijan – A New Constitutional Reform: Towards a Monarchical Presidency?

On 26 September, citizens of Azerbaijan were called to vote in a constitutional referendum. The constitution, approved in 1995, was already amended in 2002 and 2009. While the current amendments concern numerous topics (including civic liberties and right of assembly), some of them specifically concern the President’s role. It is proposed:

  • To amend Article 101.1 of the current constitution, which would extend the presidential term from 5 to 7 years.
  • To introduce a “First Vice President” and a “Vice President”, chosen and appointed by the president. In the case of the president’s inability to perform his role, the First Vice President would take over. Currently, this “second-in-charge” function is a prerogative of the prime minister
  • To remove the minimum age limit to run for President (currently, it is 35). Similarly, the minimum age for parliamentarian is lowered from 25 to 18.
  • To introduce the right for the President to dissolve the parliament. This is in the event that the parliament votes no confidence to the government twice in a year or refuses the suggested appointees to the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court or the Central Bank’s main board.

In order to maximise the inclusivity of the voting process, polling stations have been established in Azerbaijani embassies. Remarkably, everything is ready in Ankara, Teheran and Riyadh.  However, notwithstanding the vocal support of the ruling party, the opposition has expressed its grave concern over the proposed changes.

While President Ilham Aliyev has not personally commented on the proposed amendments, pro-government voices have openly endorsed them. MP Siyavus Novruzov, who is the deputy executive secretary of the ruling ‘New Azerbaijan Party’, has defined the proposed amendments as necessary to enhance national security and reform of the state administration[1]. Emil Huseynli, head of the ‘Support for Youth Development – Dushunje’, declared that the various changes, including the strengthening of the presidential office, will foster the sustainable development of the country. Referring to the relaxation of the age limits, he commented that: this “will create an opportunity for the political activity of literate, prospective young people.” However, the opposition thinks that this amendment is specifically designed to favour a semi-monarchical transfer of power and, henceforth, that the children of the president would likely be the main beneficiaries of this “political opportunity”. Notably, it has been observed that Heydar Aliyev, the only son[2] of the presidential couple, will be 27 in 2025 (the most likely year for a presidential election). If his father decides to run for the presidential office in 2018 and to step down after that, the young Heydar would be an extremely probable “new” candidate. Other possible scenarios are the election of Heydar to parliament or the appointment of a member of the presidential family as vice-president[3]

In addition to being concerned about the future implication of these changes for the Aliyev family, the opposition is worried about the immediate effects of a “reinforced presidency”. Arif Hajili, the leader of Musavat party, bluntly declared that: “They [the state authorities] are not even able to explain to their citizens why we need these changes to the Constitution. They believe they can create a second North Korea here and rule in the same style[4]. Similarly, the prominent lawyer, Fuad Agayev, commented that: “An analysis of the document indicates that, if adopted, it will have an adverse impact on human rights, civil rights and freedoms, as well as power-sharing”.  This kind of apprehension is also shared by some international observers. Chris Smith, Chairman of the U.S. Helsinki Commission, sent a concerned letter to Ilham Aliyev. At one point, it stated clearly that: “By lengthening presidential terms and expanding presidential authorities, the proposed constitutional changes are susceptible to abuse that would entrench political authority, making it less responsive to the will of the Azerbaijani people.” Lastly, some observers expect the referendum to be rigged.

In September various well attended protest rallies took place in Baku. The main argument is that the only aim of the referendum is to reinforce Aliev’s rule. “No to monarchy!” and “No robbery!” were the main slogans chanted[5]. Additionally, in the attempt to generate an international response, some Human Right Defenders asked to Thorbjørn Jagland, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, to submit the proposed amendments to the Venice Commission[6]. The main points of concern they raised were: the massive empowerment of the presidential office, the authoritarian climate the referendum takes place in, the non-consultation of the parliament, and the absence of public debate[7]. In addition to the Azerbaijani Human Right Defenders, on 5 September the PACE Bureau also asked the Venice Commission to give an urgent opinion.

In response, on 20 September the Venice Commission issued a “Preliminary Opinion on the Draft Modifications to the Constitution”. In the context of widespread concern on different matters, including the repression of dissident opinions, the Venice Commission expressed clear worries about the amendments in relation to the presidency. More specifically, it noted that, back in 2009, the removal of the two-term limit to re-election had already strengthened the power of the president. In the light of that, it said that: “the modification to Article 101 which extends the Presidential mandate for longer than is the European practice, coupled with the previous removal of the two-term limit, concentrates power in the hands of a single person in a manner not compatible with the separation of powers”. In addition, the Venice Commission expressed its concern about the president’s powers to dissolve the parliament, to call early elections, and to appoint a vice-president who, in practical terms, would be an unelected second-in-command.

Even though the voting has yet to be finalised, the rejection of the proposed amendments seems highly unlikely in contemporary Azerbaijan. Henceforth, in the face of domestic and international concern, the presidential office, which is already remarkably strong, will be further reinforced. Unfortunately, this seems to be a prelude to a further consolidation of the authoritarian tendencies in the country.

Notes

[1] BBC Monitoring Trans Caucasus Unit. 2016. ‘Azeri court approves referendum on constitutional change’, 26 July (Retrieved through LexisNexis).

[2] In addition to him, the president has two daughters, Leyla and Arzu.

[3]Turan Information Agency. 2016. ‘It’s time for the United States to act on Azerbaijan’, September 9 (Retrieved through LexisNexis).

[4] Turan Information Agency. 2016. ‘Arif Hajili: Usurpation of Power Will Not Save Aliyev’. 18 September (Retrieved through LexisNexis).

[5] Turan Information Agency. 2016. ‘Jamil Hasanli: Aliyev does not get tired to pervert the Constitution’. September 17 (Retrieved through LexisNexis).

[6] The role of the Venice Commission, with reference to the constitutional referendum in Armenia, has already been discussed in this blog.

[7] Turan Information Agency. 2016. ‘The report of “Musavat” about the referendum campaign’. 5 September (retrieved through LexisNexis).

Guatemala – President Morales under Pressure from Corruption Scandal

Once again, a corruption scandal has affected the executive office in Guatemala. Although the president, former comedian and political outsider, Jimmy Morales, is not directly implicated, his brother, Samuel (Sammy) Everardo Morales and his son, José Manuel Morales Marroquín, have both been placed under investigation by the UN-supported International Commission on Corruption in Guatemala (Comisión Internacional Contra la Impunidad en Guatemala, CICIG) and the Attorney General’s Office. Last week, a Guatemalan judge barred both Sammy Morales and José Manuel from leaving the country.

The alleged offence involves the fabrication of invoices and contracts for goods and services that were never actually supplied and centres upon Fulanos y Menganos, a restaurant in Guatemala city, owned by Congressman Gilmar Othmar Sánchez, who is a representative for Frente de Convergencia Nacional (FCN), Morales’ party. Apparently, Guatemala’s National Property Registry contracted Fulanos y Menganos, together with José Manuel and Sammy Morales, to provide 564 Christmas breakfasts in 2013. A bill was submitted to the Property Registry for 90,000 quetzals for the breakfast (about US$12,000), together with another 90,000 quetzal bill for seating. The breakfast is reported to have never happened. What is more, under public procurement law, three companies must submit formal bids for any contracts below a certain value. To cover his tracks, the President’s son, José Manuel supposedly asked his uncle to provide falsified bids from two other companies, in a competition that Fulanos y Menganos than won. Falsifying documents in this manner is also a crime.

What makes this case particularly noteworthy is the fact that Morales’ election campaign last year railed against the corruption allegations that dogged, and ultimately prematurely ended, the presidency of his predecessor, Otto Pérez Molina. Molina had been accused of involvement in a scheme, know as La Linea, that allowed businesses to evade paying custom charges in return for generous kickbacks.

Morales’ election was symptomatic of the rise of political outsiders and the ‘politics of anti-politics’, which has become something of a recurring feature of the Latin American political landscape. Jimmy Morales, a self-descried ‘common man’ with no prior political experience, spent the last fourteen years starring in a popular TV comedy series with his brother and his election manifesto was only six pages long. In fact, the major and central plank of his entire campaign was opposition to the graft and corruption that was endemic among Guatemalan political elites. His campaign slogan was ‘neither corrupt nor a thief’, so this current episode is particularly embarrassing for the President.

This incident is indicative of corruption scandals that continue to plague executive offices all over the region. For example, aside from the scandal involving Molina, another Guatemalan ex-President, Alfonso Portillo was recently sentenced to five years in prison in the US for taking bribes from Taiwan. In El Salvador, it was announced that evidence had emerging linking former president Francisco Flores to illegal and hidden bank accounts. Argentine Vice-President, Amado Boudou, appeared in court last year to respond to allegations that he illegally halted bankruptcy proceedings against a company that he supposedly had an interest in.

I have written before about the relationship between corruption and the executive office in Latin America. Explanations range from the historical development of the state and Guillermo O’Donnell’s infamous ‘brown areas’, to the lack of transparency during the economic reform process of the 1980s and 1990s, to the combination of presidentialism and the PR electoral system, a variant of which most Latin American countries employ.[1]

More significantly, Kurt Weyland has suggested that a contributing factor to the persistence of populism has been the rise of politicians who appeal to “the masses” via television. Weyland argues: “Over the past 15 years, such personalistic leaders have sought to bypass established political parties and interest groups in order to reach “the people” through direct, most often televised, appeals aimed at building up a loyal following from scratch. Because its methods are costly, the new media-based politics has given ambitious politicians much higher incentives to resort to corruption.”[2]

Jimmy Morales is the proto-typical outsider politician. His campaign, and that of his vice-president, Jafeth Cabrera, was subjected to claims that it benefitted from a donation of half a million dollars from a known drug trafficker.  With this barrage of corruption scandals and with his party, the FCN, holding only 11 of 158 seats in the house, the incentives for the kind of behaviour Weyland described must surely rise. Either way, the Guatemalan President will do well to celebrate a one-year anniversary in office.

[1] See For example, some of the chapters in Walter Little and Eduardo Posada-Carbó (eds.) 1996. Political Corruption in Europe and Latin America. Palgrave Macmillan or Jana Kunicová and Susan Rose-Ackerman. 2005. Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as Constraints on Corruption. British Journal of Political Science, 35: 573-606.

[2] Kurt Weyland. 1998. The Politics of Corruption in Latin America. Journal of Democracy 9 (2): 108-121.

Eugene Huskey – Did Putin Lose by Winning? The September 18 Duma Election

Amid challenging economic conditions, Russian voters went to the polls on Sunday, September 18 to elect the 450 members of the country’s lower house, the Duma. They also cast ballots in seven gubernatorial races, in contests for seats in 39 of 85 regional assemblies, and in a number of local elections. In light of the massive demonstrations that followed the last parliamentary elections, which were widely regarded as fraudulent, and the rise in popularity of certain “non- systemic opposition” leaders, such as Alexei Navalny, this Duma election presented officials in Putin’s administration with a difficult challenge. They needed to portray the election as open and competitive while eliminating pathways to power for Putin’s opponents, guaranteeing a healthy legislative majority for the pro-Putin party, United Russia, and assuring some representation for small parties of the “systemic opposition,” whose continued presence in the Duma offered the illusion of pluralism.

Putin’s administration did seek to eliminate blatant violations of electoral law, and toward that end it installed this spring Ella Pamfilova, the respected human rights activist, as head of the Central Election Commission. However, the Russian political leadership also disqualified insurgent candidates like Navalny, effectively shut down the country’s only independent polling company, and redesigned the rulebook in order to benefit United Russia and the collaborationist parties that make up Russia’s “systemic opposition.” Among the rule changes was the replacement of pure Proportional Representation (PR) voting with a mixed system in which 225 seats would be elected by PR, with winners drawn from regionally-based party lists, while the other 225 seats would be filled by winners in single-member district races.

The return to a mixed voting system, in place in Russia from 1993 through 2003, benefitted United Russia because of the latter’s deep bench and dense support networks in single-member districts (SMDs). In addition, because of the large field of candidates that was typical for these local contests–as well as the “first past the post” method of determining winners in these elections–the United Russia candidates would be able to win many seats in SMDs with a mere plurality of the vote. Furthermore, those drawing the district boundaries took care to gerrymander district lines in order to dilute the influence of voters in large urban centers, who were generally less supportive of the Putin administration than other voters. Finally, the authorities moved up the election from December to September as a further means of suppressing the urban vote. Especially in the bigger and more prosperous cities, many urbanites spend the weekends at their dachas in September, although the cold, damp weather last Sunday probably kept many Russian voters in the city.1

This carefully-designed electoral plan worked well for Putin and his allies–perhaps too well. United Russia improved upon its nationwide PR results from 2011, winning 54 percent of the vote and 62 percent of the seats. This gap between votes received and seats won was even more dramatic in the single-member district races, where United Russia garnered 90 percent of the seats (203 of 225) while receiving only about half of the overall SMD vote. In other words, for United Russia, half of the vote share turned into 76 percent of the parliamentary seats.

screen-shot-2016-09-21-at-21-03-29

The support base underpinning this lopsided result looks even more suspect when one considers the voter participation rate. As the graph below illustrates, well under half of Russians turned out for the September 18 Duma elections, a figure that is almost eight percentage points below the previous low-water mark in participation in Duma elections. Due to the historically low turnout, United Russia received 4 million fewer votes than in 2011, and yet the new mixed voting system allowed the party to capture a record number of seats in the Duma, so many that they acquired a “constitutional majority,” that is, more than two-thirds of the assembly. With such a majority, United Russia can amend the constitution as well as pass legislation without the backing of other parliamentary parties. As Russian political scientist Ekaterina Shul’man observed, in the new parliament “all conflicts will take place inside United Russia rather than in inter-party commissions.”2

screen-shot-2016-09-21-at-21-04-25

Parties from the traditional “systemic opposition” retained their presence in the Duma but at much reduced levels. The Liberal Democrats led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky pulled almost even with the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, with 39 and 42 seats, respectively, while A Just Russia received 23 seats. The three remaining places in the Duma were captured in single- member district races by a member of Rodina [Motherland Party], a member of Civic Platform,

and an independent candidate, Vladislav Reznik, a Putin ally and former United Russia deputy who is under criminal investigation in Spain for his business dealings. For their part, the two leading parties from the Western-oriented “non-systemic opposition,” Yabloko and PARNAS, received together less than three percent of the PR vote nationwide and they were not competitive in any of the single-member contests.

The new correlation of forces in the Russian legislature will simplify the mechanics of governing for Putin but it potentially leave him more exposed politically. The efforts to clean up certain aspects of electoral administration now seem inconsequential compared with the yawning gap between the extent of Putin’s victory and the electoral support behind it. To be sure, single- member district voting is known for manufacturing ruling majorities, but that is usually in countries like Britain where the political system is well-entrenched and markets, courts, and the press serve as effective brakes on the exercise of political power. One cannot help but think that the Kremlin would have preferred a more modest win rather than a crushing victory, especially given the light turnout.

Aware of the system’s vulnerability to criticism in the wake of the vote, Putin’s press secretary, Dmitrii Peskov, and other Kremlin allies rushed to fend off complaints about a low poll, and thus the legitimacy of the election and of the Putin regime itself. Peskov noted that “in the overwhelming majority of European countries turnout is much lower” [than in Russia].3 In fact, in recent years only two of fifty European countries, Kosovo and Romania, have experienced higher levels of voter apathy.4 With less than two years remaining before the next presidential election, Putin now owns the political system even more than in the past, and so it will be difficult to deflect responsibility onto others if economic and social conditions in the country deteriorate before he stands for re-election.

The 2016 Duma elections serve as a reminder that Putin still governs a country with a wide range of intra-elite and elite-mass relations across its 85 regions and republics. One of those territories, Crimea, participated in Duma elections for the first time last Sunday, and predictably Western governments refused to recognize the latest step in the integration of this recently annexed peninsula into the Russian Federation. Although United Russia won a clear victory in the PR voting in Crimea, its candidate in the single-member district race in Sevastopol emerged as the winner with only 33 percent of the vote. And while the turnout in Crimea was in line with national levels, it fell below that seen in the last Ukrainian parliamentary elections, apparently due in part to a boycott of the vote announced by Crimean Tatars.

Russia’s territories continue to reveal enormous variations in turnout for national elections. In earlier elections one might have attributed much of the differential to falsified results–in the 2011 Duma elections United Russia reportedly received 99.5 percent of the vote in Chechnya on a 99.4 percent turnout–but this time even Chechnya reported a more believable turnout figure, just under 85 percent. Turnout above 70 percent in regions like Kemerovo, Tiumen’, and several republics of the northern Caucasus presented a dramatic contrast to participation rates in several territories that just squeaked past the 30 percent level. How to interpret this variation is not straightforward. Although it is tempting to regard low turnout as a sign of disaffection with the regime, it is also linked to the effectiveness and seriousness of efforts by local leaders to get out the vote. As Joel Moses has argued, in some regions where regional elections are taking place at the same time as a national race, a governor or other prominent officials may wish to suppress turnout in order to assure a desirable outcome.5

Through closed communications networks, governors and their allies may seek to mobilize only their most devoted supporters, such as the so-called biudzhetniki–those on the regional or federal payroll, who can generally be relied upon to support the existing political structure in the region. In this sense, the center’s interest in seeing a healthy voter turnout may at times clash with the interests of prominent local elites.6 How well President Putin can manage these and other tensions between the center and periphery will be evident in the next electoral cycle, which begins with gubernatorial and regional assembly elections next fall.

Notes

1 For a discussion of these methods, see Darrell Slider and Nikolai Petrov, “Kremlin Strategy: ‘Just Good Enough” Elections While Maintaining Control,” Russian Analytical Digest, no. 186, 15 July 2016, pp. 2-3. http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities- studies/pdfs/RAD186.pdf
2 Marina Ozerova, “Portret novoi Gosdumy: ‘kollektivnyi Putin’ vmestil 343 deputata,” Moskovskii komsomets, 19 September 2016. http://www.mk.ru/politics/2016/09/19/portret-novoy-gosdumy- kollektivnyy-putin-vmestil-343-deputata.html
3 “Peskov otkazalsia schitat’ iavku na vyborakh nizkoi,” Lenta.ru, 19 September 2016. https://lenta.ru/news/2016/09/19/yavilis/
4 See IDEA, Voter Turnout Database. http://www.idea.int/vt/viewdata.cfm#
5 Personal correspondence.
6 On the political dynamics of multi-tiered elections in Russia, see Velimir Razuvaev, “Mnogosloinye vybory sozdaiut problemy Kremliu,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 13 July 2016. http://www.ng.ru/politics/2016-07- 13/1_vybory.html

André Borges and Ryan Lloyd – Presidential Coattails and Electoral Coordination in Multilevel Elections: Comparative Lessons from Brazil

This is a guest post by André Borges and Ryan Lloyd based on their recent article in Electoral Studies

The literature on presidential coattails has, until now, focused mainly on the role played by presidential elections in shaping national legislative races.  Comparative research has demonstrated that in the presence of a sufficiently low number of candidates running for president, concurrent presidential and lower chamber elections deflate the national party system. Presidentialism, however, is often associated with federal institutions, which should complicate party aggregation by introducing the issue of vertical integration.

In a recent paper (Borges and Lloyd, 2016), we argue that the coattails effect may operate not only “horizontally,” by shaping national legislative elections, but also “vertically,” by shaping elections held at lower levels of government. All else being equal, concurrent national (presidential) and subnational (gubernatorial) elections will foster coordination because parties and voters are aware that the presidency is the most important electoral prize in a presidential regime. No candidate for subnational executive office receives as much media attention or as many campaign contributions as the top presidential contenders do. Voters also recognize the overwhelming importance of the presidency in comparison to other political offices in presidential regimes, and they typically pay more attention to presidential candidates than those running for other offices (Golder, 2006).

Our central claim is that the congruence between national and subnational elections increases when elections are temporally proximate and the effective number of presidential candidates is sufficiently low. On the one hand, parties running for president have strong incentives to coordinate strategies between national and subnational electoral arenas because they are required to mobilize a national majority of the vote to win, which in turn requires coordination with local candidates. On the other hand, parties that lack viable presidential candidates will respond strategically to the deflation of the presidential party system by coalescing around one of the major presidential contenders because supporting third candidates (or not participating in the presidential election) may cost them votes in subnational races.

As coordination efforts are repeated over time and national party divisions are successfully reproduced at the subnational level, voters should respond accordingly and make congruent choices in national and regional elections. This is especially true because party coordination provides an external cue for voters in subnational elections. Given that voting is an information- and time-intensive activity, voters are likely to rely on national policies and national party dynamics as a cognitive heuristic for making decisions about subnational elections (Rodden and Wibbels, 2011). Our second hypothesis is ,therefore, that a presidential coattails effect should exist at the individual-voter level when coordination is effective and leads to vertical party linkage.

We evaluate these hypotheses using district-level data from Brazilian gubernatorial and presidential elections from 1945 to 2010. We complement our time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) analysis by running a series of logit regressions on survey data in order to assess the effects of presidential coattails on Brazilian gubernatorial elections. Our logit regressions use surveys from two electoral periods that were characterized by distinct levels of presidential party fragmentation: 2002 and 2010.

Brazil is an ideal case study for analyzing the effects of presidential elections and federalism on party linkage between levels of government because rules governing presidential and gubernatorial elections were changed relatively recently. From 1945 to 1962, presidential and gubernatorial elections concurred on only a few occasions, and not in all states. Lower-chamber elections concurred at the same time as presidential elections in 1945 and 1950, but not for the two elections immediately afterwards (1955 and 1960). In contrast, all elections to national and state-level posts have occurred concurrently since 1994, thereby greatly increasing the stakes of the presidential race. Given that the major traits of Brazil’s political system (presidentialism, federalism, electoral system and legislation on political parties) have mostly remained constant across these two periods, Brazil’s case allows us to test our first hypothesis with a quasi-experimental design.

Our empirical findings indicate that concurrent elections have a negative effect on dissimilarity as long as the effective number of presidential candidates is sufficiently low. Party system incongruence does decrease when presidential and gubernatorial elections concur, but this effect disappears as fragmentation of the presidential vote at the district level surpasses 2.6.

These results are fully independent from subnational dynamics. Previous work on Brazil claimed that reverse coattails exert a substantial impact on the presidential vote, as presidential candidates depend on the support of state party leaders and their political machines (Samuels, 2003). If this hypothesis were correct, we would expect to see low dissimilarity whenever the main contenders in the presidential race count on the endorsement of subnational party organizations. To control for such effects, we created a dummy variable that indicates whether or not the incumbent governor’s party was a member of either one of the two largest coalitions disputing the presidential race. As a proxy for incumbent parties’ strength at the state level, we included a measure of terms completed in gubernatorial office.  Overall, although subnational party dynamics does have an impact on dissimilarity – the presence of a coalition incumbent governor does decrease dissimilarity, especially for mean levels of continuity in office – this effect pales in comparison with effect of concurrent races.

Our logit analysis of survey data on the 2002 and 2010 elections was supportive of our second hypothesis. Multilevel electoral coordination between parties does indeed seem to be reinforced and reflected in individual-level data, as we find evidence that presidential evaluations have significant effects on the probability that one will vote for that the gubernatorial candidate of the presidential candidate’s coalition. In other words, presidential coattails voting exists at the level of the individual voter in gubernatorial elections.

To ensure that our estimates did not suffer from simultaneity bias because of the possible effects of a reverse coattails effect, we ran several tests. First, we used a bivariate probit model with the same control variables as our normal model, specifying it with the presidential and gubernatorial votes as our joint dependent variables. This specification allowed us to account for a possible correlation between the presidential and gubernatorial votes by not assuming that errors in the two equations were uncorrelated. Even accounting for this potential correlation, the presidential evaluation had a strong, significant effect on the gubernatorial vote for both the Workers’ Party (PT) and the PSDB (Brazilian Social Democratic Party).

Second, we ran a logit model using our individual survey data with votes in second-round gubernatorial elections in 2002 and 2010 as our dependent variable. The advantage of this latter specification is that it allows for the inclusion of controls for voters’ preferences in the gubernatorial election (the first-round vote for governor) that are not simultaneous with the (second-round) vote for president. In the presence of reverse coattails, presidential evaluations would be strongly correlated with the first-round gubernatorial vote and would therefore contribute little to the explanation of the second-round vote for both president and governor. This, however, is not the case: our models show that the first-round vote and presidential evaluations both have significant effects, suggesting that the coattails effect existed even with these controls.

Interestingly, we found that the coattails effect was stronger for PT candidates than for PSDB candidates, which is consistent with our hypothesis. Because the Workers’ Party coordinated its national and regional strategies more effectively, this induced greater congruence in voters’ choices. The PT’s presidential candidate, for instance, faced no internal resistance in either 2002 or 2010, whereas the PSDB dealt with internal leadership disputes in both years. It is therefore plausible that fractiousness in the PSDB led to less effective coordination in 2002 and 2010 in comparison to the PT. Furthermore, these differences cannot be attributed to higher levels of partisanship among PT supporters, as both models control for party identification.

The article presents important contributions for two distinct literatures. First, we develop a novel set of hypotheses building on the literature on vote congruence and second-order elections, that had previously focused almost solely on parliamentary countries. We demonstrate that multilevel electoral coordination in presidential systems has some important peculiarities that had not yet been incorporated into theoretical models. Second, we contribute for research on presidential elections and party systems, by incorporating issues of vertical party linkage and multilevel electoral coordination into the analysis.

Our empirical findings indicate that the choice of electoral rules for electing presidents and governors is key for building effective federal institutions, as long as it may have a relevant impact on the degree of party integration. When parties and party systems are poorly integrated policy coordination across levels of government will be harder to achieve. Although we do not claim that concurrent elections have produced an integrated, nationalized party system in Brazil, as dissimilarity has remained high in the recent democratic period, we believe that, in the absence of vertical simultaneity of elections, the Brazilian party system would likely be much more volatile and unstable. Furthermore, because Brazil is a least-likely case in which extreme multiparty system, decentralized party and electoral institutions, and low levels of party institutionalization all conspire against effective coordination, we expect such effects to be stronger in other, more favorable settings. In any case, our findings suggest that no account of party system formation in multilevel presidential systems will be adequate without an analysis of coordination across national and subnational electoral arenas and related coattail effects.

Bibliography:

Borges, André, and Ryan Lloyd. 2016. “Presidential coattails and electoral coordination in multilevel elections: Comparative lessons from Brazil.” Electoral Studies no. 46:104-114.

Golder, Matt. 2006. “Presidential Coattails and Legislative Fragmentation.” American Journal of Political Science no. 50 (1):34-48.

Rodden, Jonathan, and Erik Wibbels. 2011. “Dual accountability and the nationalization of party competition: Evidence from four federations.” Party Politics no. 17 (5):629-653. doi: 10.1177/1354068810376182.

Samuels, David. 2003. Ambition, federalism, and legislative politics in Brazil. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Presidential or Not, Turkey Is a Competitive Authoritarian Regime

Turkey’s fragile democracy survived the recent coup attempt, but it may not survive the wrath of her defenders. After the most peculiar coup attempt in Turkish history by a fraction in the army on 15 July, a state of emergency has been declared. President Erdoğan accuses Fettullah Gülen of being the main perpetrator behind the coup attempt and believes his religious cult is purposely infiltrating government organisations and the judiciary in order to reshape and control the state. As a result there is a hunt for all Gülenists within all government institutions as well as private institutions having ties with him, such as media and business organisations.

Three newsagents, sixteen tv companies, twenty-three radio stations, forty-five newspapers, fifteen journals, twenty-nine publishing houses were shut down in one emergency decree. Overall 160 media outlets have been closed down. Also fifteen universities, more than 2000 educational institutions, and hospitals run by Gülenists were also closed down by emergency decrees.

Human rights guarantees in the Turkish Constitution and The European Convention on Human Rights have been suspended during the state of emergency. The government under the leadership of President Erdoğan issued several decrees removing over a hundred thousand civil servants, including not only military officers but also teachers, doctors, university deans, lecturers, ministerial staff. Also 2,747 judges and public prosecutors were detained and more than three thousand were suspended from duty including high court judges. None of the civil servants removed from their posts or private institutions shut down by emergency decrees has the right to sue government as those decrees are immune from law suits.

The fight against Gülenists includes also businessmen, who are detained and their property seized for aiding and abetting the terrorist organisation. Not to mention detained journalists and writers, including those who are accused of being members of Gülenist terrorist organisation and supporting the coup attempt and others who are accused of helping Gülenists without being a member. Their political beliefs and standings differ widely. Some support right wing beliefs including political Islam, but some of them are well known liberals such as Ahmet Altan, and his brother Mehmet Altan, or Kemalists like Atilla Taş. The government has been targeting not only Gülenists but also PKK, Peoples Democratic Party (HDP), secularists and leftists. Having declared a state of emergency, President Erdoğan has a free hand to tighten his grip over political life.

Many of civil servants who have been removed from their duties are accused of having links with Fettullah Gülen, but not all of them are Gülenists. Members of left wing unions have also been targeted. A total of 28 elected majors, the majority of whom are members of the pro-Kurdish HDP, have been removed from their posts and replaced by appointed substitutes by the government. No concrete proof is needed for removal even for judges. For instance, the Constitutional Court decided to remove the sitting judges from their posts based on “the belief” established by the majority vote that they have ties with Gülenists. Finally achieving his desire to have total control over judiciary, President Erdoğan also saw all high court judges bowing to him in his new palace at Beştepe recently. President Erdoğan made sure that no judge would stand up against his massive clear out.

After the coup attempt President Erdoğan invited his supporters onto streets for a month, organising political rallies named “democracy watch”. Ironically, members of other religious orders who also support political Islam and infiltrate government institutions like Gülenists played active roles in these street gatherings attacking Alevi’s (another sect of Islam), and secularists for supporting the coup despite the fact that the coup attempt was not supported by political parties, minorities or opposition groups. Opposing the government is almost presented as being treacherous. Mosques also played a major role supporting the government and inviting people hourly to defend Erdoğan and his party in the name of God and the Prophet Muhammed.

It is highly likely that if this coup attempt had been successful it would have caused a bloody internal conflict. The soldiers who attempted it fired the crowd in protest after the President Erdoğan’s call, bombed the Turkish Grand National Assembly, flew F16 fighter jets over Ankara, and killed many people. Such cruel acts of terror are the government’s main justificatory base. However, there are news reports alleging that the accused include leftists, Alevi’s and even atheists. With the legal guaranties of basic rights suspended, no one can be sure if the accused have been really involved in illegal activities or if they will have a fair trial. Many informants voluntarily denounce people for being involved Gülenist movement. Some of the accused people even fail to find lawyers to defend them in the criminal courts. Reports of torture and ill-treatment cases have been on the rise. Even though the state of emergency has been declared for three months, it would not be a surprise if it is extended for a much longer period.

The major question to be asked at this time is whether Turkish democracy has really survived this coup attempt. Is Turkey turning into a competitive authoritarian state? Having declared his will for a strong presidential system and having recently replaced his prime minister Ahmet Davutoğlu with Binali Yıldırım, who was more willing to campaign for presidential system, President Erdoğan may no longer need a new constitution to create the type of presidential system that he longs for. The state of emergency under the current Constitution empowers the President by giving him the authority to lead the cabinet and issue emergency decrees having the force of law without the immediate approval of the legislative. Furthermore, guarantees of basic rights have been suspended under the state of emergency. With the Judiciary being completely out of the way after the post-coup reorganisations Erdoğan’s rule has no checks and balances and no political rival to voice their opposition.

In the light of the current political state, it is hard to call this regime a democracy anymore. The best way to describe it might be “competitive authoritarianism”. This concept has been defined by Levitsky and Way as “a hybrid regime type, with important characteristics of both democracy and authoritarianism” . In addition to the generally accepted four criteria that are famously described by R. Dahl as free and fair competitive elections, full adult suffrage, protection of civil and political liberties especially speech, press, association, absence of nonelected authorities such as military, monarchy that limit elected officials, Levitsky and Way offered an additional fifth criterion: the existence of a reasonably level playing field between incumbents and opposition. In competitive authoritarian regimes, elections may be free, but competition is hardly fair. Often incumbent parties violate basic rights, especially the freedom of speech, press and association. Most importantly there is no level playing field between a ruling party that excessively manipulates state institutions and resources and the opposition. Some of these manipulations are straight up violations of basic rights, but others are more subtle such as de facto control of private media and finances through informal patronage arrangements. Turkey fitted the picture even before the coup attempt.

Now, as an increasingly authoritarian president, Erdoğan has finally established his long-held dream of working without the constraint of the rule of law, and without any threat of losing power. The Turkish press is no longer considered free. Considerable elements of the media are controlled by Erdoğan, and the rest of them are fighting against daily criminal suits, detentions and even closures after the state of emergency has been declared. Free speech is heavily damaged. Opposition parties, especially the pro-Kurdish HDP, have already been under pressure. Many of their MPs’ legislative privileges, which constitutionally prevent criminal procedures without the assembly approval, have recently been lifted by a bizarre constitutional amendment before the coup attempt. All told, following the declaration of a state of emergency, Erdoğan has the opportunity to complete his aim of authoritarian rule.

Leiv Marsteintredet – Mega-elections in the Dominican Republic: Consolidating a dominant party system?

This is a guest post by Leiv Marsteintredet, Associate professor Latin American Studies, University of Oslo, and Comparative Politics, University of Bergen, Twitter: @leivm_academic

The Dominican Republic held what was locally dubbed as a mega-election on May 15, 2016. For the first time since 1994 the country organised local, congressional and presidential elections on the same day. This year the 6.7 million registered voters could go to the polls to elect a president, 222 members of both chambers of Congress, 20 deputies to the Central American Parliament, and around 4,000 new members of municipal councils and mayors. Elections were synchronised in the 2010 Constitution in an attempt to avoid the constant electoral campaigns resulting from midterm elections. The sheer size of the elections combined with outdated electoral laws, poor administration and preparation by the Central Electoral Board made for a chaotic electoral day and counting process. Although the opposition cried fraud and protested several congressional and local results, most observers judged the election as free and fair, but also that the quality of the electoral process and organisation had clearly deteriorated compared to earlier elections.

Dominican voters voted for continuity this year, reelecting the incumbent President Danilo Medina of the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD). Medina won handsomely with 61.7% of the votes over his main opponent Luis Abinader of the newly created Modern Revolutionary Party (PRM), a splinter from the traditional Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD). The PLD also kept its majority control over both chambers of Congress, a majority it has held since 2002. Participation was around 70% in both congressional and presidential elections.

Background and campaign

The Dominican party system is among the least polarised ideologically in Latin America, and electoral campaigns seldom deal with issues and ideology, but rather become conflicts about persons and positions. Instead of campaign promises and programmes, voters mostly see accusations and negative messages, in addition to a series of caravans with politicians touring cities with large followings of all types of vehicles. This year’s campaign was no exception, and the greatest conflicts and controversies over positions occurred within rather than between parties.

Besides a new national security plan presented by Abinader and his security advisor Rudy Guiliani(!), the former mayor of New York, and the first ever presidential candidate debate in the country, which President Danilo Medina declined to participate in, the campaign was relatively uneventful. President Medina has since his election in 2012 been among the most popular presidents in Latin America, and his reelection was never in danger. Medina campaigned on a promise of stability and continuity. Supported by a positive macro-economy, and abundant state and private resources Medina and PLD managed to run an effective campaign. A splintered opposition led by Abinader who lacked charisma and ideas in the confrontation with Medina, never stood a chance to challenge the PLD in the presidential or congressional elections.

The real campaign, however, had already occurred within the political parties. In 2012, when Medina was elected, there was a constitutional ban on immediate presidential reelection.[1] Using his popularity, political capital, and backroom deals, Medina managed in April 2015 to win the support of the Political Committee of the PLD to support a constitutional reform to allow for his immediate reelection. The result surprised many since a constitutional reform would come at the expense of three times former president and undisputed PLD leader Leonel Fernández, who otherwise would have been PLD’s presidential candidate for 2016. At the time, Fernández was already campaigning for the presidency, and he strongly lobbied against the reform. Although a terrible loss for Fernández, who suddenly lost control over the party he had led since 1994, the deep conflict did not split the PLD, and the party’s tradition of maintaining unity prevailed.

The PRD, however, holds a long tradition of splintering after conflicts. The nominally social-democratic PRD is the oldest party in the country, founded in exile during the Trujillo regime in 1937, and has split several times throughout history. The PLD is in fact a splinter party from the PRD, founded in 1973 when Juan Bosch left the party he founded. PRD also experienced serious splits in the late 1980s and in 2004. The most serious splinter, however, occurred in 2013-2014 when the majority of the party left, or was expulsed from, the PRD to found the PRM. The conflict was about the leadership of the PRD, in the hands of the unpopular Miguel Vargas Maldonado since 2009. In 2013 Vargas Maldonado refused to organise a party convention to elect a new president (an election he would most certainly have lost). Vargas Maldonado bunkered in to keep control over the PRD, while the majority of the party’s leaders and followers left to organise the new PRM. While PRM managed to overcome a split over the presidential candidacy, a very weakened PRD ended up supporting Medina’s constitutional reform for immediate reelection, and becoming part of Medina’s electoral coalition. Given the historical enmity between the PRD and the PLD resulting from bad blood from their split in1973, their coalition is historic in Dominican politics. It was also historic that the PRD for the first time since 1974 (and before that since 1962) did not present a presidential candidate.

The split in the PRD thus strengthened the PLD and Medina, and weakened what was left of the opposition. These conflicts in the opposition helped Medina not only win the presidency handsomely, but the PLD won 55.8% of the seats in the Lower Chamber, and 81% of the seats in the Senate, after receiving 41.8% of the votes in the congressional elections. With its allies in Congress, PLD holds a 2/3 majority in the Lower Chamber (127 of 190 seats), and a full 91% of the seats in the Senate.

Towards a dominant party system?

Kenneth Greene defines a dominant party system as a hybrid that combines “meaningful electoral competition with continuous executive and legislative rule by a single party for at least 20 years or at least four consecutive elections”.[2] The PLD has now won the last four presidential elections, and enjoyed a handsome majority in both chambers of Congress since 2002 (also over four elections). According to Greene’s definition, the PLD is on its way to consolidate as a dominant party. The last 12 years have increased the asymmetry in terms of resources, professionalism and expertise between the PLD and the other parties. From the government the PLD has managed to co-opt parts of the opposition, first the Reformist party (PRSC), and now the PRD, and both opposition parties have suffered self-inflicted splits: Thus the PLD has ruled almost unopposed since 2004. Now it is within the party organisation the important decisions are made, not Congress or the presidency. For instance, this July it was the PLD’s Political Committee that selected the leadership of both chambers of Congress a month before the new Congress was sworn in.

PLD’s control over the Senate has enabled the party to select its supporters to all the high courts and autonomous state institutions since the 2010 Constitutional reform, which called for a renewal of these institutions, so that it now dominates all parts of the state. Controversial decisions in the Central Electoral Board, and the other high courts in favour of the PLD and its high-ranking members have served to strengthen the accusations of politicisation of these institutions. The controversies surrounding the 2016 elections is yet another example that the nominally autonomous institutions of the state are slowly deteriorating.

Although the PLD in power has managed to secure growth and macro-economic stability, ruling unopposed is never good for democracy. This year’s election consolidated the PLD’s hold on power and control over what we now can call the PLD-state. The weak opposition, on its hand, is becoming increasingly desperate to gain influence over politics, and has started questioning the democratic merits of the government and state institutions. The question is whether the opposition will win elections before or after the PLD’s uncontrolled power converts into abuse of power and mismanagement. Right now the opposition is fighting an ever-increasing uphill battle.

Notes

[1] This is also a result of the 2010 Constitutional overhaul. The Dominican Republic has changed its presidential reelection rules a total of four times since 1994.

[2] Kenneth F. Greene (2007). Why Dominant Parties Lose. Mexico’s Democratization in Comparative Perspective. (Cambridge University Press): p. 12

Kenya – President Kenyatta forms new party

On 8 September 2016 twelve parties allied to the president formally dissolved themselves to form the Jubilee Party. The new ruling party differs from the previous Jubilee Alliance coalition in that it will have a common leadership hierarchy and will run a single slate of candidates in national and sub-national elections. This promises to give President Uhuru Kenyatta a significant advantage in the upcoming elections and has the potential to transform the dynamics of Kenyan politics.

The Jubilee Party

Although the number of parties that have merged into the Jubilee Party is impressive, it is important to note that many of them are bit-part players, and around half have no legislative representation at all. However, the decision of party leaders to merge is nonetheless significant because it promises to change two key aspects of Kenyan politics.

In the past, there has been a tendency for parties that are members of the same coalition at the presidential level to run candidates against each other at the legislative and county levels. This has caused large coalitions significant problems, as it has often diverted energy and attention away from the contest with rival coalitions at the national level. By forming a common political machine, the Jubilee Party will avoid this kind of internal competition, and will be able to achieve considerable efficiencies in terms of its campaign strategy and finance. Moreover, if the party is a success, it will become the largest political party in Kenya since the days of the one-party state. Charles Hornsby, a well-respected commentator on Kenyan politics, has estimated that a spate of recent defections means that Kenyatta is now supported by around two-thirds of the National Assembly.

Parties that merged to form the Jubilee Party

• The National Alliance
• United Republican Party
• New Ford Kenya
• Alliance Party of Kenya
• National Rainbow Coalition
• United Democratic Forum
• Ford People
• Party of National Unity
• Democratic Party
• The Independent Party
• Chama Cha Uma
• Grand National Union

The Jubilee Party also has the potential to change the way that election campaigns play out. Historically, rival leaders swap coalitions ahead of national polls, trying to maximise the position they can get based on their profile and support base. This process depends on both of the main coalitions – the last three elections have boiled down to a two-horse race – being fragile and weak, such that leaders face few disincentives to leave one alliance and join another.

Typically, the political merry-go-round is triggered by one leader swapping sides, which creates a vacancy that other leaders mobilise to fill, leading to a new vacancy, and so on. Should the Jubilee Party succeed in establishing a strong and stable party, it will mean that leading figures from other coalitions will have nowhere to go, encouraging them to stay put. In other words, Jubilee’s unity may impose a degree of stability on the opposition, curtailing the process of party hopping.

Party primaries

The foregoing analysis raises a critical question: can the Jubilee Party hold together? Forming a political party is far easier that maintaining one. Traditionally, Kenyan parties and coalitions struggle to make it through party primaries because losing candidates defect to run on other tickets. This leads to a proliferation of political parties, intense internal competition at the local level, and diverts attention away from the national campaign. In 2007, for example, it is estimated that Mwai Kibaki’s Party of National Unity lost about 10 legislative seats to the opposition because different leaders allied to Kibaki divided the vote at the constituency level.

President Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto are certainly pulling out all the stops to protect the party from defections. On the one hand, they are said to be deploying a wide range of the carrots and sticks at the party’s disposal, and will both provide funding for the campaigns of those who win the primaries and “soft landings” for those who lose. On the other, new legislation is being introduced that would ban party hopping 90 days before an election and would require the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission to oversee primary polls in a bid to give them greater legitimacy.

This impressive array of informal and formal levers may prove sufficient to keep most leaders within the Jubilee Party in the run up to the 2017 elections, especially given the momentum behind President Kenyatta’s campaign. However, whether it will bind the party in the future is another question. One of the main beneficiaries of these recent developments is Deputy President William Ruto, who faces an uphill battle to replace Kenyatta ahead of the 2022 polls, when term limits will force the president to stand down. The problem Ruto faces is that many of Kenyatta’s supporters do not trust him or wish to see him presiding in State House. Instead, he is viewed by many of the president’s allies as a necessary evil: a partner required to defeat Raila Odinga and the opposition in the short-term, but a dangerous ally and one that is expendable when the threat has passed.

The formation of a stronger ruling party may help Kenyatta to assert his authority, and to line up his backers behind Ruto when the time comes. However, it seems more likely that the Jubilee Party will only survive so long as Kenyatta is there to hold it together, and will begin to come apart at the seams once the succession battle begins to heat up from 2018 onwards.

Croatia – Snap elections that made the moderate leader of the not-so-moderate HDZ the most likely candidate for Prime Minister

 

Dissolution of the Hrvatski sabor

In June 2016 a majority of deputies voted for the dissolution of the Croatian Parliament, which became effective July 15, 2016. This early dissolution came only a few months after the last parliamentary elections in November 2015. Unfortunately this election did not result in a clear majority for any of the two main parties (the nationalist, center-right HDZ and the center-left SDP). It was however expected that the then-ruling SDP and its Prime Minister Zoran Milanović would form the new government with the support of the newly established, and widely seen as independent, platform MOST. Yet, in a very surprising move, MOST formed a coalition government with the conservative HDZ. This coalition forced the SDP into opposition and was led by a widely unknown new Prime Minister Tihomir Orešković (Vlahovic 2016). The brief period of government until the dissolution of parliament in June was strongly influenced by the growing tensions between the main political representatives of MOST and HDZ, in particular between the MOST leadership and Tomislav Karamarko (then deputy prime minister and party leader of HDZ). MOST accused Karamarko of conflicts of interest by engaging into a public discussion of the national oil company (see for more detailed information Matijaca 2016).[1] Although it is widely reported that the calls of MOST for the resignation of Karamarko and thus the enduring conflict between MOST and HDZ were the trigger for the vote of no-confidence by HDZ deputies, the 5-months coalition government was also characterized by a growing gap between the policy interests of these two parties. What followed was an astounding act of self-destruction, the vote of no confidence initiated by the deputies of HDZ against their own prime minister. After the vote of no confidence was initiated and confirmed by a parliamentary majority President Grabar-Kitarović followed the provisions of Art. 104 of the constitution and dissolved the national assembly.[2]

Campaign between Andrej Plenković and Zoran Milanović

After the devastating experience of the 5 months government and the inability to form a new governmental majority the chair of the HDZ, Karamarko, resigned. Karamarko pursued a highly nationalist agenda and was partly responsible for increasing nationalist sentiments in the public discourse. He was succeeded by Andrej Plenković. Plenković pursues a very different agenda and started with the promise to push the HDZ closer to the middle. He was elected by the HDZ party members in July 2016 “in a sign it [HDZ] was distancing itself from ultra-conservative elements” (Byrne 2016). With the new party head of the HDZ, the duel between the two leading politicians – Plenković for the HDZ and Zoran Milanović for the SDP – started. And the campaign was right from the start personalized and at times left decency far behind. It became obvious that Milanović was prepared to fight against Karamarko but failed to find a proper way to campaign against Plenković. Personal insults were in particular made by Milanović against Plenković, one perceived offense against Plenković’s parents was widely reported. However, these personal attacks did not help Milanović, it rather helped HDZ in two ways: First, Plenković behaved differently in public and was thus inspiring more confidence and second, MOST aligned with HDZ in their pursuit to change the political culture in the country (Milekic 2016).

Election and election results

The election was held on September 11, and a total of 151 members of parliament were elected. According to the information provided by the Sabor (the Croatian Parliament) 140 members of parliament are elected in 10 territorial constituencies in Croatia. 3 are elected by Croatian citizens living abroad. 8 seats are reserved for ethnic minorities (Parliament of Croatia 2016). The deputies are elected in a proportional representation system and similar to other countries a 5 % electoral threshold is necessary.

The earlier mentioned rival parties, HDZ and SDP, each formed a party list. HDZ with Andrej Plenković run on the list called “Patriotic Coalition” and Zoran Milanović and the SDP on the list called “Croatia is Growing” (in cooperation with HNS, HSS and HSU).[3] In addition MOST and a number of other parties and coalitions stood for election.

Within this short campaign period between July and September, opinion polls frequently showed a tie between the two main competing parties. Yet, the official election results were different and presented a surprisingly clear winner, Andrej Plenkovic and the HDZ. Upon the report of the State Election Commission HDZ won 61 seats and the People’s Coalition only 54 seats (Milekic 2016a). The most likely option for a coalition will be once again HDZ with MOST – similar to the unsuccessful attempt earlier this year. Petrov, the leader of MOST, which won 13 seats in the National Assembly, obviously has this experience in mind when he announced after the election results were made public: “This time, we don’t expect only promises from them [potential coalition partners], but doing it as well. Parliament must be constituted, realise the conditions, and then only will the government be formed” (Milekic 2016a). The most likely coalition will however also need the support from the minority party representatives as they lack the absolute majority, necessary for example to investiture the government (Art. 111 constitution).

Literature
Byrne, Andrew (2016): Conservative HDZ wins Croatia vote. September 12, in: Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/278002c2-7874-11e6-97ae-647294649b28 (accessed September 12, 2016).
Croatian News Agency (2016): SDP to run in coalition with HNS, HSS and HSU. July 9, in: https://aboutcroatia.net/news/croatia/sdp-run-coalition-hns-hss-and-hsu-28485 (accessed September 10, 2016)
Matijaca, Danni (2016): It’s Official: Tomislav Karamarko Was in a Conflict of Interest. June 15, in: total croatia news, http://www.total-croatia-news.com/item/12461-it-s-official-tomislav-karamarko-was-in-a-conflict-of-interest (accessed September 10, 2016)
Milekic, Sven (2016): SDP Leader’s Tirades Leave Croats Bemused. August 30, in: Balkan Insights, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/leftist-leader-tries-antagonizing-croatia-s-elections-campaign-08-29-2016 (accessed September 12, 2016).
Milekic, Sven (2016a): HDZ Looks to Form Croatia Govt After Surprise Win. September 12, in: Balkan Insights, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/hdz-wins-on-croatia-elections-promises-government-09-12-2016 (accessed September 13, 2016).
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Parliament of Croatia (2016): http://www.sabor.hr/English

[1] Karamarko has over the years faced a broad range of accusations but has politically survived everything thus far.

[2] Grabar-Kitarović’s own term as president is characterized by partisanship towards the HDZ.

[3] Initially Plenković announced that HDZ will not run on the coalition platform. The abbreviations stand for Croatian People’s Party (HNS), the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) and the Croatian Pensioners’ Party (HSU), see Croatian News Agency (2016).