Finland – Troubled times for the left and the unions

Following the long reign of President Urho Kekkonen (1956-1981), Finnish voters elected three social democratic heads of state into office between 1982 and 2012. Four years ago this succession of left-wing presidents came to an end when Sauli Niinistö, the candidate of the conservative the National Coalition, was elected with a comfortable margin. Niiinistö enjoys strong support among the electorate, and he is a clear favourite should he seek another term in the next presidential elections scheduled for January 2018.

This change reflects a broader and much more important trend in Finnish politics: the gradual decline of the left-wing parties and their close partners, the trade unions. The 2015 elections to the Eduskunta, the unicameral national legislature, were disastrous for the left. The Social Democratic Party finished fourth with 16.5 % of the vote, its worst-ever performance in Eduskunta elections, while the more radical left party, the Left Alliance, managed 7.1 % of the vote. The collective vote share of the leftist parties has declined dramatically in recent decades. Whereas Social Democrats and the predecessor of Left Alliance, the Finnish People’s Democratic Union, won over 45 % of the vote between them in all but one election between 1945 and 1966 (when they won together 48.3 % of the vote), by 2015 the electoral strength of the left had decreased to 23.6 %. After the 1966-1970 electoral period the centre-right parties have held the majority of Eduskunta seats. The prospect of a government consisting of only left-wing parties has not been realistic for several decades, and all cabinets formed after the 2003 elections have been led by centre-right parties.

The dilemma facing the left, and particularly the Social Democrats, is of course typical for centre-left parties across Europe. At its core are two interlinked questions: whether to defend traditional leftist economic goals or endorse more market-friendly policies, and who the party represents. The Social Democrats have definitely moved to the right since the 1990s, and this has frustrated many of its left-leaning supporters. Such frustrations surfaced in spring 2014 when the party elected its current leader, with Antti Rinne beating narrowly the incumbent party chair Jutta Urpilainen. Rinne was very much the ‘trade union candidate’, and his victory was interpreted by many as reflecting a yearning on the part of the rank-and-file for a return to more leftist politics after two decades during which the party has, both voluntarily and under strong external and budgetary constraints, embraced more market-friendly policies.

The Left Alliance is in a largely similar situation. Bringing together a variety of leftists and former communists, the party is internally divided on the left–right dimension, with the party leadership advocating ‘green left’ ideological moderation, while the working class voters more closely linked to trade unions oppose such centrist moves. The entry of the Green League, who won 8.5 % of the vote in the 2015 election, offers partial compensation, but the party is quite centrist and itself refuses to be categorized as a left-wing party. Nonetheless, following the 2015 elections party chair Ville Niinistö lamented the decline of the left as the Social Democrats and Left Alliance share many of the values or concerns of the Greens, especially fight against poverty and in moral questions such as gender-neutral marriages. The Greens are in many ways sympathetic towards trade unions, but the party is obviously rooted in the environmental movement and associated interest groups whose policies often are at odds with trade union interests. The Greens perhaps also view trade unions as old-fashioned and too hierarchical.

The rise of populism further complicates the situation. The three core parties of recent decades – Social Democrats, the Centre Party and the National Coalition – have largely held on to their vote shares, but the rise of the Finns Party means that Finland now has four quite equally-sized large parties. Hence the traditional left-wing parties are competing for the working class vote with the Finns Party. In particular, there is no party offering a natural home to the people employed in the large services sector which includes a wide variety of occupational groups ranging from waitresses, teachers, and sales personnel to nurses. While the Finns Party is not organizationally strong inside the main blue-collar confederation SAK (the Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions), in terms of party choice the Finns was the largest party inside SAK in the 2015 elections. Moreover, in 2015 SAK members were more likely to identify with the Finns Party than with either of the two traditional leftist parties.

The vanishing electoral strength of left-wing parties means serious trouble for trade unions, whose influence has largely depended on especially the Social Democrats leading or being at least a partner in the ruling coalition. In comparative studies Finland is usually ranked as having one of the most corporatist systems of governance. The main employers’ organization, the Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK), decided unilaterally to abandon tripartite collective wage talks in 2007 when Finland was governed by a centre-right coalition. However, since 2011 centralized wage agreements have been re-introduced, no doubt thanks to the fact that Social Democrats re-entered the government after the 2011 elections. While the system of collective wage talks is not as comprehensive as before, many labour market agreements and laws are effectively decided in tripartite negotiations between the employers’ federations, the trade unions, and the government. Trade union density has also risen over the decades, reaching its peak during the severe recession of the early 1990s, and over 70 % of the workforce now belongs to unions. When left-wing parties are not in the government, trade unions are immediately hurt. This is again very much the case now under the current Centre-led government, which together with EK has forcefully argued that centralized wage talks are incompatible with competitiveness and economic growth.

Overall, leftist parties and the unions are increasingly on the defensive in Finland, with initiatives and discourse of the centre-right parties and business interests dominating the agenda. The global and European uncertainty together with serious domestic fiscal challenges have brought about increasing criticism of leftist economic solutions. Whereas from the 1960s onwards leftist parties and the unions were often behind important and popular socio-economic reforms, today they mainly focus on defending the status quo. The current economic climate, including large national public debt and the associated need to cut public expenditure, is far from ideal for advocating traditional left-wing policies and the situation is unlikely to change in the next few years or at least not before the next Eduskunta elections scheduled for 2019.

Peru – Former President Ollanta Humala to be Included in Campaign Financing Investigation

Once again, I return to the issue of corruption scandals at the level of the executive office. It was announced last week that a public prosecutor would be including Ollanta Humala, the former Peruvian president who finished his five-year term on the 28th of July this year, in a long and ongoing investigation into campaign financing and electoral donations. This investigation had up till now largely centred around Humala’s wife and former first lady, Nadine Heredia.

The investigation of the prosecutor, Germán Juárez, revolves around money raised by Ollanta Humala to fund his presidential election campaigns in 2006 and 2011. There has long been allegations that Heredia, as President of the Partido Nacionalista Peruano, received and hid donations from the former Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez, and a number of Brazilian construction companies, which were then used to finance the campaigns of her left-leaning husband. Only this year, Heredia was prohibited from leaving Peru as investigations continue. For Humala, this latest announcement is significant because as of July this year, he can no longer enjoy presidential immunity, although activities during his presidency are still protected. However, such immunity does not apply to activities during the 2006 election.

This investigation is partly a product of Humala’s own admissions, when he stated that Heredia was only doing what she was ordered to do by Humala, as head of the party, but it also stems from information supposedly contained in a number of notebooks owned by Nadine Heredia, which were given to public prosecutors by former party members. These notebooks are alleged to document millions in campaign donations that remained unreported and which were funneled through personal bank accounts. The prosecutor has asked the judiciary for access to Humala’s domestic and international banking and tax records from his time in office, currently protected by Peruvian law. Ollanta Humala denies all of these allegations and claims that they are the product of political opportunism.

I keep coming back to this topic, but why do we often witness so many corruption scandals related to the highest political office across the region? The allegations against former president Humala, would appear to echo the explanation of Kurt Weyland; he argued that the last two decades have seen the emergence of personalistic leaders who have sought to bypass established political parties in order to reach “the people” through direct and often televised appeals. This can build a new loyal following, but it is also expensive and for these outsiders, the incentive to engage in ‘irregular’ campaign financing to boost coffers which cannot be filled through traditional party and donor networks, is often quite large.[1] Humala is the prototypical outsider. He was a former army officer who rose to prominence during the 2006 elections when he was somewhat scathing of exiting political elites. He only established his political party in 2005, the year before his first electoral bid.

Of course, it is also possible that we are not necessarily witnessing an increase in corruption scandals at the executive level, but rather an increase in the ability of judiciaries across the region to hold current and former presidents to account.

[1] Kurt Weyland. 1998. The Politics of Corruption in Latin America. Journal of Democracy 9 (2): 108-121.

Are you with Milo or not? Parliamentary elections in Montenegro

Parliamentary elections are readily perceived as a new beginning. Not so in Montenegro. In the last years the dominant figure in Montenegrin politics was one person: Milo Đukanović. Unlike any other politician in this region, he remained on the forefront of political decision-making for now 25 years and switched between being prime minister and president. His political career and his ideological adaptation mirror the development of the country since the end of communist rule.

Once again this parliamentary election was not about new ideas or a vision for Montenegro. It was a medley of a struggle for survival by the ruling elite, accusations of election fraud by the opposition, and pressure by external actors (namely EU, NATO and Russia). The overarching question was rather simple, carry on as before or choose a new path? Based on these introductory remarks, I will in the following post, briefly describe how Milo Đukanović shaped the course of his country in the last 25 years, the specifics of the 2016 campaign and election and its consequences for the country.

To give you the executive summary of the election: Đukanović’s party won the election but without securing the absolute majority in parliament.

Milo Đukanović has and had formative influence on the democratic practice, the political process and the development of the society in Montenegro. His political career started after the end of communist rule and in the beginning he was a close ally of Slobodan Milosevic. He served as Prime Minister from 1991-1998, from 2003-2006, from 2008-2010 and since 2012. In between he was President of the Republic from 1998-2003 (Prime Minister Montenegro 2016). His personal dominance was not clearly evident right from the beginning. Contrary to Croatia or Serbia, Montenegro was dominated by a so-called ruling oligarchy (Vukicević and Vujovic 2012, 56). Members of this oligarchy were e.g. Momir Bulatovic, Svetozar Marovic and most certainly also Milo Đukanović(see Banovic 2016). Đukanovićremained the dominant force since then and has changed his political allies and orientation that “(t)oday, he’s a leading voice for EU and NATO integration” (Rujevic 2016).

The campaign for the 2016 parliamentary elections was consequently described as choice between two directions: 1) EU membership with NATO Integration and thus a clear orientation towards the West or 2) to become once again a “Russian Colony”, as Đukanovićdramatically put it in one of his pre-election rallies (see for reports e.g. Deutsche Welle 2016). This harsh contrast provides a clear choice that does not necessarily exist beyond the electoral campaign and the blurry lines of everyday politics. And even more importantly, it diverts the attention of the citizens.

The way towards the West and the possible accession of NATO is a difficult topic for Montenegro: (U)p until 1997, Montenegro shared Serbia’s fate under the authoritarian Miloševićregime“( Banovic 2016, 290, see also Vujadinović 2002, 14).
 This fate included also the shared experience of the NATO bombings on the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Hence, neither the economic development in Montenegro nor the level of corruption were an important topic in the campaign as one would expect. One further reason for this obvious neglect of a serious evaluation of the political development of Montenegro is the division among oppositional forces. A 3% threshold is necessary to gain parliamentary representation and 34 parties (RFE/RL 2016) were competing in this parliamentary election.

Within this context, on October 17, Montenegro elected a new parliament. The arrest of allegedly Serbian paramilitaries on election day was only one of various events that arguably influenced the election. Some of these event, like the arrest, looked from the outside sometimes as propaganda moves by the government to gain support for its course toward the West. On an important side note: Serbian influence on Montenegrin politics is a very sensible topic and as author I would like to make it clear that any assessment of the substance of these motivations behind the arrests is not possible. It is also not clear if this event influenced the election substantially. Several polls – although I could not confirm their reliability – were already showing a significant lead for Đukanović’s Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS, Demokratska Partija Socijalista Crne Gore) over the last few months. This expectation was confirmed on Sunday with a 41% majority, which will result in 36 seats in parliament (RFE/RL 2016) for DPS. This result forces the DPS to form a coalition government and include one of the opposition forces to gain the absolute majority in the 81-seat parliament.

But the opposition is reluctant to accept the results of the election and questions its fairness. They accuse government that the arrests in the morning of the Election Day were made merely for propaganda. Another serious issue – that goes right to the core of democratic elections and free speech – was the blocking of Viber and What’sApp on Election Day. This was also part of the concerns described by the OECD observation team. This team declared that the 2016 parliamentary election was “held in a competitive environment and fundamental freedoms were generally respected” (Stojanovic 2016). But members of the observation team – foremost Marietje Schaake (member of EU parliament) criticized the limitation of freedom of speech by blocking main tools to communicate (Stojanovic 2016). As the official report of the OECD will only be published in a few weeks, it remains unclear how substantiated the claims of electoral manipulation are. But, one thing is for sure; these claims will not make the coalition building for Đukanovićand the DPS easier.


Banović, Damir (2016): Montenegro, in: Fruhstorfer, Anna, and Michael Hein (eds): Constitutional Politics in Central and Eastern Europe, 289-306.

Deutsche Welle (2016): Montenegro’s longtime ruler faces ballot test (October 16), in: [last accessed October 18, 2016]

RFE/RL (2016): Montenegro’s Opposition Refuses To Recognize Pro-West Party’s Election Win (October 16), in: [last accessed October 18, 2016]

Rujevic, Nemanja (2016): Election in Montenegro: For Milo, against Milo (October 14), in: Deutsche Welle, [last accessed October 18, 2016]

Prime Minister Montenegro (2016): Prime Minister of Montenegro Milo Djukanovic – Biography, in: [last accessed October 16, 2016.]

Stojanovic, Dusan (2016): WhatsApp, Viber blocked during Montenegro election day (October 17), in: [last accessed October 19, 2016]

Vujadinović, Dragica. 2002. “Predgovor.” In Između autoritarizma i demokratije. Edited by Edited by Dragica Vujadinović, Veljak Lino, Vladimir Goati and Vladimir Pavićević, 9–17. Beograd: Cedet.

Vukičević, Boris, and Vujović, Zlatko (2012): Ustavni i političkopravni okvir parlamenta u Crnoj Gori 1989–2012, in: Demokratske performance parlamenata Srbije, Bosne i Hercegovine i Crne Gore. Edited by Slaviša Orlović, 55–76. Podgorica/Beograd/Sarajevo: Faculty for Political Sciencies in Belgrade, Sarajevo Open Centre and Faculty for Political Sciencies in Podgorica.

Farida Jalalzai – Women Presidents of Latin America: Beyond Family Ties?

This is a guest post by Farida Jalalzai, the Hannah Atkins Endowed Chair and Associate Professor of Political Science at Oklahoma State University

In his article “On Election Day, Latin America Willingly Trades Machismo for Female Clout” New York Times contributor Simon Romero asserts “Up and down the Americas, with the notable exception of the United States, women are soaring into the highest political realms” (Romero 2013). In exploring this development making headlines, my book, Women Presidents of Latin America: Beyond Family Ties? (Routledge 2016) analyzes four recent women presidents also known as presidentas: Michelle Bachelet (Chile, 2006-2010; 2014-), Cristina Fernández (Argentina, 2007-2015), Laura Chinchilla (Costa Rica, 2010-2014) and Dilma Rousseff (Brazil, 2011-2016).  Given the powers presidentialism affords presidents, women’s increasing tendency to play these very strong political roles present a puzzle.  Since institutional factors account heavily for women’s success and presidentialism appears the most difficult system for women to break through (Jalalzai 2013), how can we explain women’s ability to gain the presidency in Latin America?  Historically, women leaders in presidential systems (particularly women directly elected by the public) were generally limited to relatives of male leaders and this proved to be a personal factor linking women presidents worldwide, including those from Latin America. With the election of Michelle Bachelet in Chile, these traditional patterns appeared to be shifting.  What conditions, therefore, allowed for a broadening of routes, beyond family ties, for women in Latin America?  While an important question, I was also interested in the larger implications the election of powerful women posed. Once in office, do the presidentas make positive changes on behalf of women? My findings were primarily based on responses derived from over 60 elite interviews conducted between 2011 and 2014 in these countries. Respondents included political elites and experts of diverse partisan leanings such as cabinet ministers, legislators, party leaders, consultants from think tanks and academics, and a sitting president (Chinchilla)..  I supplemented interviews with data from public opinion polls, media and scholarly analyses, and information from governmental and non-governmental organizations.

In addressing my first question, I found that all presidentas benefitted from centralized and exclusive presidential nomination procedures (see also Hinojosa 2012). Not only were they essentially handpicked by their predecessors, their publics’ were largely supportive of the outgoing president’s policies.  While benefitting from continuity, with the exception of Fernández (as the former first lady, the only political wife in the group) they did not enjoy top placement or independent bases within their parties.  As such, their nominations were perceived as somewhat surprising and occasionally met with party resistance.  Yet, their outsider statuses likely explain why they were viewed as appropriate successors in the first place.  Critically, Chinchilla, Bachelet, and Rousseff also campaigned on how they would change the face of politics.  The combined approach of change and stability proved fruitful.

Regarding their impact, I examined three types of potential effects of their leadership on women:

  1. Appointing more women to political offices
  2. Positively influencing levels of political engagement and participation, political orientations, and support for women in politics among the general public
  3. Supporting policies on behalf of women

Throughout, I compared women to their male predecessors.  Because of their strong ties to the outgoing presidents, we might have expected the presidentas to behave fairly similarly.  Yet, as women, they may have done more to empower women than their male counterparts. My analysis identified mixed evidence.   While presidents Bachelet and Rousseff prioritized appointing more women than did their male counterparts, this did not seem to hold true for either Chinchilla or Fernández. In analyzing data from representative surveys and from my interviews, findings confirmed key differences between the presidentas.  More positive shifts in public opinion and participation were linked to Rousseff’s presidency (my book only covered her first term—it does did not account her cataclysmic fall from grace and subsequent impeachment) while Bachelet’s showed little consistent or significant effects.  In interviews, respondents easily identified positive influences Rousseff’s and Bachelet’s presidencies offered.  In contrast, both the representative surveys and interviews concerning Chinchilla and Fernández regularly indicated backsliding.  Support for women’s policies proved most prevalent in Bachelet’s presidencies.  Rousseff, to a lesser degree, also made women’s issues an important part of her first term.  While many programs were extensions of Lula’s, Rousseff added more depth to existing programs.  She also connected seemingly gender neutral policies to women, particularly poor women.  We see little prioritization of women’s issues, in contrast, during Fernández’s and Chinchilla’s presidencies, affirming the variability in positive effects of presidentas on women.

Three years after the article quoted above was published, another journalist for the New York Times, Jonathan Gilbert, posed the following question: “What has happened to the powerful women of South America?”  The previous fervor had given way to disappointment as the presidentas analyzed here encountered plummeting approval ratings, much of which is related to economic travails, and nearly all were ensnared in corruption scandals. While this book suggested mixed effects of women presidents, I wonder if women face greater scrutiny for their lackluster performances or alleged engagement in inappropriate behavior. These remain open questions, but ones worth pursuing in future investigations as enhanced scrutiny shapes women’s abilities to exercise power generally and behalf of women specifically. These questions will be even more salient with the United States on the brink of electing its first woman president. As Hillary Clinton is a former First Lady, her path to power is not very puzzling.  Still, no doubt this historic moment will soon give way to investigations regarding what Clinton’s presidency offers women and whether she too receives undue scrutiny because of her gender.


Gilbert, Jonathan. “South America’s Powerful Women Are Embattled. Is Gender a Factor?” The New York Times. May 14, 2016.

Hinojosa, Magda. 2012. Selecting Women, Electing Women: Political Representation and Candidate Selection in Latin America. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

Jalalzai, Farida. 2016. Women Presidents of Latin America: Beyond Family Ties? New York: Routledge Press.

Jalalzai, Farida. 2013.  Shattered, Cracked or Firmly Intact? Women and the Executive Glass Ceiling Worldwide.  New York: Oxford University Press.

Romero, Simon. “On Election Day, Latin America Willingly Trades Machismo for Female Clout.” The New York Times. December 14, 2013.

Farida Jalalzai is the Hannah Atkins Endowed Chair and Associate Professor of Political Science. Dr. Jalalzai’s research analyzes the representation and behavior of women and minorities in politics and the role of gender in the political arena. Her work focuses on women national leaders. Her first book Shattered, Cracked and Firmly Intact: Women and the Executive Glass Ceiling Worldwide (Oxford University Press 2013, updated paperback 2016) offers a comprehensive analysis of women, gender, and national leadership positions. Her second book, Women Presidents of Latin America: Beyond Family Ties?  (Routledge 2016) examines several case studies of the behavior of women national leaders including presidents Laura Chinchilla (Costa Rica), President Dilma Rousseff (Brazil), Cristina Fernández (Argentina). Her current projects include a co-edited volume “Measuring Women’s Political Empowerment Worldwide” (with Amy C. Alexander and Catherine Bolzendahl, under contrast at Palgrave) a co-authored book Senhora Presidenta: Women’s Representation in Brazil during Dilma Rousseff’s Presidency (with Pedro dos Santos), and  “Blood is Thicker than Water: Family Ties to Political Power Worldwide,” a global analysis of the prevalence of family connections among executive political office holders (with Meg Rincker).

Palau – Women’s Representation and the Presidential Primary

On 29 September, Palau held its presidential primary race to determine which two candidates will face off against each other when the country goes to the polls on 1 November. Four candidates contested the primary election: incumbent President Tommy Remengesau Jr.; incumbent Vice-President Antonio Bells; former Vice-President and incumbent Senator Sandra Pierantozzi; and incumbent Senator Surangel Whipps Jr. In the primary, favourite Remengesau led with 49 per cent of votes cast, followed by Whipps with 39 per cent; Pierantozzi and Bells were eliminated.

With two challengers eliminated, the presidential contest is now between two brothers-in-law, as Whipps is married to Remengeseau’s sister. Remengeseau noted that it was unusual for such close relatives to be contesting against each other: “It’s certainly not in our culture, and it’s very unusual because if you follow our culture you are not supposed to be running against a family member.” Yet, while it may be unusual, it is certainly not unprecedented. Pierantozzi initially won the vice-presidency after contesting against her nephew, and commentator Bernadette Carreon noted its inevitability in small island politics: “It’s a small nation, everyone is related to each other, so I think it’s just the way it is.” Going into the 1 November election having collected around half of the primary votes cast, Remengesau appears the favourite to win.

This year has been a milestone for women’s political representation in Micronesia and the wider Pacific. In January, Hilda Heine of the Marshall Islands became the first female head of government in the Pacific Islands region when she won the presidency. In March, long-serving member of the Samoan Parliament Fiame Naomi Mata’afa became the country’s (and Polynesia’s) first female Deputy Prime Minister. Palau is at the bottom of the world’s league table in terms of women’s representation, with no women in its lower house, although there are three female Senators in its upper house.

The 2016 primary election marked the second attempt at the presidency for Pierantozzi, who came third in the 2012 primary with 18 per cent of the vote. She is a well-known figure in Palauan politics, having previously served as Vice-President from 2001 to 2005. In her 2016 presidential bid, Pierantozzi highlighted economic growth as a key election issue. She also stressed the importance of increasing the number of women in Palau politics. While the presidential election will be an all-male affair – Pierantozzi again came third, although her vote share of 9 per cent was half of what she had received in 2012 – she was hopeful of women’s representation increasing in November in the House and Senate. Women make up a quarter of the 24 candidates contesting for the 13-seat Senate, and among the 33 candidates for the 16 House of Delegates seats, there are six women contesting five seats (including one running unopposed). While the highest glass ceiling for women in Palau won’t be cracked at this election, there is promise that the Senate and House of Delegates contests will result in real gains for women’s representation in the country.

Zambia – President Lungu accused of authoritarian backsliding

On Wednesday 5 October, the Zambian police announced that they had arrested two of the main leaders of the United Party for National Development (UPND). This was not the first timer either party president Hakainde Hichilema or vice president Geoffrey Bwalya Mwamba have been arrested – indeed Mwamba, popularly known as GBM, was detained earlier this year during a particularly heated election campaign. Zambians could therefore be forgiven for having a sense of déjà vu, as even the charges were similar to those that have been brought against opposition leaders in the past: sedition and unlawful assembly.

However, in other ways the recent arrests represent a worrying new development in Zambian politics. Following controversial presidential elections that were marked by long delays and accusations of electoral malpractice, relations between the government and opposition have hit a recent low. On the one hand, Hichilema has refused to accept the official verdict, and has described the court proceedings that ratified it as a sham. On the other hand, President Edgar Lungu has shown no signs of being ready to adopt the conciliatory and inclusive stance required to build bridges and legitimate his government.

As a result, the tense political atmosphere is likely to continue, as is the game of brinkmanship between leaders on different sides of the country’s political divide. Instead of bring treated with respect, Hakainde and Mwamba have alleged that after their arrest they were denied the food, water, bedding, and warm clothing brought by their legal team. However, instead of persuading opposition leaders to give up the fight, their current difficulties appear to have hardened their resolve. For example, in a recent statement, Lungu explained that “… we are telling Lungu and his disputed regime that we shall not stop moving around the country to meet our structures and greet our people“.

In the past, charges against opposition leaders have typically been dropped quickly. However, although Hichilema was subsequently released on bail, having pleaded not guilty, it appears that the state may push ahead with prosecution in this instance. While this would have the benefit of distracting the opposition from campaigning against Lungu’s election, it would also further alienate opposition supporters and may become a sticking point in Zambia’s negotiations with the International Monetary Fund – which has said that it is ready to pursue a $1.2 billion rescue package for the country’s ailing economy, but wants to see evidence that the president is willing to enact political and economic reforms.

William J. Crotty – Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton and a Nasty U.S. Second Presidential Debate

This is a guest post by William J. Crotty, Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr. Chair in Public Life and Emeritus Professor of Political Science, at Northeastern University

The second of the presidential debates proved to be explosive. There was speculation that given the events that had preceded it, it might well determine the election’s outcome.

The Town Hall debate, the format used, turned out, as promised, to be an angry, contentious, even embarrassing series of exchanges built primarily around character attacks from both Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton. There was a policy component but the differences, and claims as to their effectiveness, were so extreme and the arguments over effectiveness so unrelenting that it was unclear whether either candidate succeeded in making their point. This debate was centered on personal behavior.

Hillary Clinton was seen by Donald Trump as the problem; an insider who, along with her allies, made the mess (as he saw it) of the country that he had vowed to “make great again.” Clinton was a symbol of the status quo, a candidate committed to continuing things much as they were, allowing for a few incremental changes and little more. Appealing to his party’s base (and some Republican officeholders) that appear to hate Hillary Clinton (this was said publicly), Trump referred to her as a “lying Hillary,” “cheating Hillary,” and, at one point, the “devil.” This in a presidential election.

Trump continually, as he had throughout the campaign, made accusations against women and, in particular, a former Miss Universe who he felt was “overweight”; the disabled, other Republicans, John McCain (a loser because a winner does not get captured, a reference to McCain’s five years as a prisoner of war in a Hanoi prison during the Vietnam War); and post-debate, Paul Ryan, the Speaker of the House and the highest ranking Republican in the nation (a “very weak and ineffective leader”); a Muslim family that lost a son in Iraq (and in fairness had criticized Trump in an appearance at the Democratic National Convention); the “weak” in general (he promised to be a “strong man” president and made it clear he admired Putin and Russia); and so on. During the debate, he also said he would put Hillary Clinton in jail if elected, a Third World moment resented by many. All in all, it was among the most contentious of debates (there have been others) in American political history.

The run-up to the Town Hall meeting served to ensure that what was to follow would be acrimonious, to an extent few had ever encountered. Two events immediately prior to the Town Hall meeting ensured it would be explosive. First, and seemingly striking at the heart of the Trump campaign, the New York Times released a series of tax records  in a story detailing Trump’s staggering business losses (casinos, worldwide real estate holding, gold courses, an airline, a yacht he had valued at $100 million, and so on) in the 1980 to the mid-1990s. The article reported that Trump had lost almost a billion dollars ($916 million) in 1995.  In addition it was claimed that he likely had paid no taxes for the following 18 years.  He would have been drawing on a provision of the tax code that allowed such write-offs for business failures of this nature for corporate and real estate investments. The financial institutions and individual investors took catastrophic losses. At least three business bankruptcies ensued.

Trump came out from it all comfortably. He personally lost little to any money.  The major financers of his holdings decided that rather than force Trump into personal bankruptcy, it better served their interests to put him on a retainer ($450,000/month)1 and to pay him for the use of his name (believed to be a marketing draw for other investors). Also he was to manage a number of the hotels and casinos, for which he received an additional fee. He did lose the airline and the yacht and he was not to own the buildings and developments, then or in the future, with his name on them.2

Trump’s response was that he was a good businessman and took advantage of the tax code to advance his own interests. He claimed to know it better than anyone else and had no apologies. The investors should have done the same.

The financial interests that took over the Trump empire saw him as a poor businessman but a great salesman, a set of skills he was using to good effort in the election. The entire financial mess served not to hurt Trump with his supporters. He continued to claim he was a great businessman who would use his proven ability to make America great again. The issue came up in the second debate but Trump dismissed it and again there appeared to be little harm done to his campaign.

The second explosion in the period between the first and second debates, if anything, was even more of a shock. For years, Trump had been accused of denigrating women and seeing them only in terms of their physical appearance. In the days following the first debate, he continued his accusations as to the looks and made charges in crude terms about a former Miss Universe. These included tweets sent between 3:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m. further attacking the woman. Odd as this was, it was soon overshadowed by the release of a decade-old tape by the Washington Post which captured Trump talking about women on his way to taping a TV soap opera. In it he told of kissing them as he pleased, groping their private parts and being on them (this is not pleasant) like a “bitch.” Married women were fair game to Trump.3

The reaction to the video was instantaneous. Hillary Clinton called it “horrific” and others followed with similar comments. There were calls for Trump to resign his position or be replaced as the head of the ticket (almost impossible to do). His reaction was that the words [spoken on the video] “don’t reflect who I am,” that the video was a decade old, that he was embarrassed by it. He appeared to give what was seen as a partial apology4, repeatedly then and afterwards referred to it as “locker room” talk and said that while his were only words Bill Clinton has acted on his impulses and he promised to make Clinton’s predatory behavior a campaign issue, a threat he kept.5

Going into the debate speculation centered on whether Trump would apologize as many of his supporters wanted, withdraw from the race or continue to fight and campaign. The answer came soon enough. In the afternoon preceding the debate, Trump held a press conference with four women, three of whom claimed to have been targets for predatory assaults by Bill Clinton. One woman said she had been raped by Clinton. The fourth woman claimed to have been raped when she was 12 years old and that Hillary Clinton represented the rapist in court proceedings. This was true. Clinton had been appointed by the sitting judge who would not let her withdraw. Trump threatened to take the four women into the debate, which he did.

Trump was far from contrite in the Town Hall meeting. He aggressively and repeatedly attacked Hillary Clinton, even walking the stage and appearing to stalk her while she spoke to the audience. He would stand behind her and make gestures disapproving of her remarks. As promised he ripped into Bill Clinton for his behavior.

Hillary Clinton refused to get into discussing her husband’s affairs. She said she would take the high road and attempted to stay on message, although frequently responding to Trump’s charges and interruptions. Trump had further argued that the video tape was a diversion from the more important issues of the campaign. The approach succeeded. The debate turned to a series of policy differences between the candidates, argued with the intensity and anger with which the questions had been addressed.  All in all, it was a hostile, volatile and ugly series of exchanges unlike any in modern memory.

In the aftermath of the debate, Hillary Clinton was praised, Trump criticized. Clinton was seen, as in the first debate, as making the more effective presentations. However when the polls came out, Trump had actually increased his support among Republicans to 89 percent. He also cut into Clinton’s national lead in some of the polls.

The Republican party was in turmoil and there was talk off a “civil war” in party ranks. It was party leaders and officeholders against the party’s base which supported Trump. Trump seemed unmoved and in fact promised a meaner, more provocative, more Far Right campaign to come. One thing the debate did establish was that with one month to go, Trump was in it to the bitter end and the chances were it would not be pleasant.


1. Russ Buettner and Charles V. Bagli, “How Donald Trump Bankrupted His Atlantic City Casinos, but Still Earned Millions.” New York Times. June 12, 2016, P. A1.

2. David Barstow, Susanne Craig, Ross Buettner and Megan Twohey, “Donald Trump Tax Records Show He Could Have Avoided Taxes for Nearly Two Decades, The Times Found.” New York Times. October 1, 2016. P. A1.

3. “Donald Trump’s Latest Comments About Women Are So Disturbing They Can’t Be Printed.” Fortune. October 7, 2016 Accessed October 12, 2016 at:

4. Maggie Haberman, “Donald Trump’s Apology That Wasn’t.” New York Times. October 8, 2016.

5. Jeremy W. Peters, “Trump Campaign Tried to Seat Bill Clinton’s Accusers in V.I.P. Box.” October 10, 2016. Accessed October 12, 2016 at:

Joel K. Goldstein – The U.S. Vice Presidency and Presidential Power

This is a guest post by Joel K. Goldstein, Vincent C. Immel Professor of Law at Saint Louis University School of Law

The American vice presidency has had a complicated relationship with the concept of presidential power.  The complication traces both to the dynamic nature of the vice presidency over time and its multi-faceted relationship to presidential power in virtually any period.  The second office has changed dramatically in recent decades, especially during the last 40 years, as I recount in my new book, The White House Vice Presidency: The Path to Significance, Mondale to Biden (Kansas, 2016)Yet even that very positive development has not removed intricacies inherent in the relationship of the second office to presidential power.

The vice presidency was created for instrumental reasons related to filling the presidency so it could exercise its constitutional power.  Fearing that parochial attachments would obstruct the election of a national president after George Washington, the framers gave each elector two votes for president with the constraint that no more than one vote could be cast for someone from the elector’s state.  The existence of the vice presidency would, the farmers hoped, discourage strategic voting by attaching a consequence to the second votes.  The office was an expedient to allow selection of a president, a prerequisite to the exercise of presidential power.  But the design failed to anticipate the development of national political parties which disrupted the framers’ plan.  Accordingly, the original electoral system lasted for only 15 years until the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution installed the current arrangement by which electors vote separately for the two offices.

During that first decade and one-half and long beyond, the vice presidency was given two formal duties which reflected an anomalous relationship to presidential power.  The vice president’s ongoing duty was to preside over the Senate and to break tie votes in that body.  As such, the vice president, as president of the Senate, was a legislative officer and accordingly part of the system of separation of powers and checks and balances that the framers thought would prevent the concentration and abuse of power, presidential and otherwise.  Yet the vice president was also made the first presidential successor who would discharge the “powers and duties” of the presidency in case the president died, resigned, was removed or was disabled.  Whereas the vice president’s ongoing duty made him adverse to presidential power, his contingent role made him heir to those very powers.  The former provided little power, the latter, all the executive power the Constitution conferred, a reality captured by the insight of the first vice president, John Adams, who said, “I am vice president.  In this I am nothing.  But I may be everything.”

The reality Adams described essentially lasted through the first 35 vice presidents, through and including the tenure of Alben Barkley (1949-1953).  With few exceptions, vice presidents spent most of their professional time performing their duty to preside over the Senate.  Seven of the 35 succeeded to the presidency following the death of their predecessor (two later vice presidents succeeded presidents who did not complete their terms due to death or resignation) and became “everything”; but while vice president, they and the others were closer to nothing, at least with respect to their relationship to presidential power.

The growth of presidential power associated with the New Deal and World War II changed the vice presidency, a development I described in my first book on the office, The Modern American Vice Presidency: The Transformation of a Political Institution (Princeton, 1982).  That growth allowed presidential nominees to select their running mates beginning in the 1940s, thereby associating the two officers politically.  It made the qualifications and preparation of the first successor more material especially given the advent of the nuclear age and the Cold War.  The president was expected to respond to more domestic and international issues.  These developments drew the vice president into the executive branch beginning especially with the vice presidency of Richard M. Nixon.  Nixon and his next five successors, through and including Nelson A. Rockefeller (1974-1977), headed executive branch commissions, engaged in foreign travel and performed other political chores for the administrations.

Although these vice presidents moved from the legislative to the executive branch, as vice presidents they remained somewhat peripheral to presidential power.  When President Dwight D. Eisenhower was asked at an August, 1960 press conference to name an idea Nixon had contributed to the administration, he famously responded, “If you give me a week, I might think of one. I don’t remember,” a devastating answer for Nixon whose presidential campaign messaging was predicated on the superior experience he had gained at Eisenhower’s side.  More than a decade and one-half later, Rockefeller disparaged the second office as “simply standby equipment,” a description that suggested that it remained “nothing” or lose to it absent a succession.

Three institutional barriers kept these vice presidents from getting too close to presidential power even as they entered the executive branch.  Presidents hesitated to give vice presidents significant duties since the vice president was the one subordinate the president could not remove until the term ended.  The vice president’s successor function role inhibited close relations between the two as presidents suspected the motives and loyalty of someone whose ambitions would be realized by their own demise.  Finally, presidents lacked a vision for how to make the vice president significant.

The vice presidency made its most significant institutional advance during the vice presidency of Walter F. Mondale (1977-1981) as the office moved to the center of the presidency.  It did so, in part, because Mondale was able to circumvent or remove the barriers that had kept earlier vice presidents separate from presidential power.  In essence, Mondale proposed, and President Jimmy Carter embraced, a new vision of the vice president as a close presidential adviser and trouble-shooter who would have no ongoing portfolio.  Carter, who was disposed to elevating the office, gave Mondale the resources to make success possible—regular and extensive access to Carter in private and group sessions, access to the information Carter received, staff support and involvement of Mondale’s staff in White House operations, and visible presidential support for Mondale, through word and deed.  Carter gave Mondale a prize West Wing office symbolizing his importance and facilitating his involvement.  This new vision and accompanying resources gave Mondale an ongoing role as part of Carter’s inner circle and as someone who could handle presidential level missions, at home and abroad.

The presence of a significant, ongoing role allowed Mondale to circumvent the barrier the contingent, successor role had presented.  The new vision presented Mondale as part of the effort to make the Carter administration succeed, not as someone standing by to succeed the president.  Avoidance of portfolios coupled with Mondale’s investment in Carter’s success and their mutual trust made the vice president’s possession of a fixed term a less imposing barrier.

The Mondale vice presidency succeeded even as Carter’s presidency was rejected in the 1980 election.  It created a workable model for vice presidential contributions, what I have called the White House vice presidency, and expectations of vice-presidential involvement.  Carter’s and Mondale’s successors, beginning with Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, adopted the Mondale model and this new institutional vision and its associated resources have now lasted for the last 40 years across six administrations, three from each major political party.  To be sure, vice-presidential influence has varied and different vice presidents have emphasized different aspects of the job.  And some have abandoned Mondale’s aversion to portfolios and have assumed some specific portfolios generally involving interdepartmental matters.  Yet all have served as general presidential advisers and trouble-shooters with access and information.

This new institution makes the vice presidency a much more consequential office than it has been for most of American history.   Yet it continues the office’s ambivalent relationship to presidential power even as it introduces entirely new considerations into the analysis.  In an important sense, the White House vice presidency expands presidential capacity by helping presidents deal with an increasingly challenging international and domestic arena.  The president needs help, not simply from staff assistants, but from high-level, politically attuned officers who can provide politically sensitive advice and handle assignments that need attention at the most senior levels.  By empowering the vice president, the president creates a surrogate who can pinch hit for him in discharging highly significant matters.

The advising role of the White House vice presidency reflects the complicated relationship of the office to presidential power.  The presence of the vice president as a senior presidential adviser, as the “last person in the room” in Joe Biden’s formulation, contributes to the exercise of presidential power by giving the president the counsel of a senior politician who largely shares his perspective and interests.  That role also, in a sense, creates an additional informal check of sorts on presidential power.  It can be used as a means to make certain the president has a full range of advice before making decisions as Mondale, George H.W. Bush and Biden among others did.  It also can introduce someone in the inner circle who can tell the president things they do not want to hear and which others may shy away from saying.  Here the vice president’s fixed term and stature provides some security that some others may not feel.  Of course, vice presidents remain dependent on presidents but presidents now also rely on their first subordinate, to help achieve their political and governmental objectives.

The development of the White House vice presidency has benefitted vice presidents by relieving them from the drudgery and many of the associated frustrations of their office.  Yet its greatest contribution has been enhancing the capacity of the presidency to respond to the demands it faces in a wise and effective manner.

Taiwan – Softly, Softly, The President Navigates DPP and Cross-Strait Relations

Presidents who are not ceremonial executives generally come under scrutiny following the first 100-day honeymoon after inauguration, when the policy horizon is no longer paved with unencumbered goodwill from the electorate, legislator, or international community. President Tsai Ing-wen is no exception. Indeed, as the executive with majority party support of the erstwhile opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the legislature, the first woman elected to the presidency in Taiwan is likely to be closely watched to see if she is able to implement her policy agenda. That such success evaded the former president elected from the DPP, President Chen Shui-bian, whose agenda was stonewalled by the Pan-Blue majority in the legislature, likely compounds interest and attention on President Tsai. Yet, having a legislative-majority support comes with challenges: in particular, China is keeping close watch on if, when, or how the executive and legislature in Taiwan may adopt policies that veer away from the “one China” 1992 consensus. There is, then, much to appreciate in President Tsai’s ability to maintain her steadfastness that balances the demands of some of the core constituencies of the DPP on the one hand, and the demands and pressures of China on the other.

The DPP, like most parties, comprises factions, and a core bloc in the party favours independence. President Tsai’s previous run as presidential candidate for the DPP in 2012 drew on this core, and she lost out to former President Ma Jing-yeou in that race. The second time around in the 2016 elections, President Tsai was careful to apply the lessons learned: she has been steadfast in maintaining a cautiously-worded stance regarding relations with China that acknowledges the importance of the 1992 meeting that gave rise to the “one China” consensus but without explicitly recognising the one China principle.

The moderates in her party support the delicate stance: in the July 2016 party congress, a motion was made to remove the objective of Taiwan independence contained in Article 1 of the party’s charter. The new resolution, if passed, will change Article 1 to read: “. . . it is the party’s objective to establish cross-strait status quo. . .” However, at the same congress, the pro-independence faction also moved to change the country’s official title from the Republic of China to Taiwan, with the reminder that the DPP has legislative majority and control of the executive to effect changes. The second motion was also sent up to the DPP Central Executive Committee for review.

Possibilities such as the second motion are concerning to China, and China’s response has been to tighten the diplomatic screws while calling out President Tsai’s failure to acknowledge the 1992 consensus. There are concerns that China may tighten the economic screws, which will hurt Taiwan’s sluggish economy. As an indication, tourists from China have fallen by 30 percent since President Tsai’s inauguration, and that has made an impact on the tourist industry in Taiwan, as protestors highlight.

It is clear that this is no easy path to trudge: Taiwan’s unique standing in the international community is bound in its relations with China, so that cross-strait relations reverberate onto domestic agenda and the government’s policy-effectiveness. China has been very clear on what it needs to see from President Tsai, in order to maintain ongoing political peace and economic stability. Meanwhile, the electorate is beating the drums for a quick economic turnround, but is also resistant to painful reforms that are likely to be part of the turnaround. How well the President’s softly, softly approach, to the factions in her party, to the electorate, and to China, will clearly be tested thoroughly.

Georgia – Ruling Party Wins A Big Majority In Parliamentary Elections


On October 8, 2016 Georgia held a parliamentary elections to elect 150 MPs using a mixed electoral system. According to this system voters elected 73 MPs in majoritarian, single-seat constituencies, while the remaining 77 seats were distributed proportionally in a closed party-list contest, whereby the party must clear a 5% threshold to win representation. In total, 25 parties and 816 majoritarian candidates contested the election.

Pre-election atmosphere

Despite the high number of parties, the United National Movement (which was the ruling party from 2004-2012) and the Georgian Dream (the ruling party since 2012) remained the front-runners according to all pre-election opinion polls (NDI & IRI polls).

The UNM emphasized renewal and attempted to come out of the shadow of Mikheil Saakashvili. Saakashvili, who is currently serving as governor of Odessa in Ukraine, was the founder of the party and president from 2004-2012.


The founder of the Georgian Dream, Bidzina Ivanishvili, who is now self-described as ‘just a citizen’ , but who for many remains the leader behind the scenes, was closely involved in campaigning through lengthy media appearances.

Until very recently, the electoral campaign was mostly peaceful, save for a few isolated incidents. But as the elections approached, the violence spiked, including the shootout at a campaign event in Gori and the explosion of a UNM MP’s car in the center of Tbilisi.

The “State for the People” party, which was launched by the renowned Georgian opera singer, Paata Burchuladze, just a few months before the elections, was a surprise challenger to the UNM-GD duo. Burchuladze united with several parties in an electoral bloc, including Girchi-New Political Center and Giorgi Vashadze (both of whom had recently split from the UNM). However, the unity vanished just weeks before the election day, leaving many of State for the People candidates out of the elections.

The Free Democrats and The Republicans, so called pro-western and anti-Russian factions of former Georgian Dream coalition decided to run independently.

Lastly, the pro-Russian Democratic Movement led by Nino Burjanadze and the Alliance of Patriots also actively campaigned in the pre-electoral period.


All 3,702 precincts opened at 8am on polling day, including the polling stations abroad. Georgians residing abroad could cast a ballot only if they were registered at a consulate before September 17, 2016 and attending to vote in person on October 8.

Early exit poll results commissioned jointly by public broadcaster, Imedi TV, Maestro TV, and GDS TV showed that the ruling party had won 53.8%, followed by the UNM with 19.5%, with the pro-Russian Alliance of Patriots winning just over the 5% necessary to clear the threshold. The same exit polls showed Free Democrats at 4%; Labor Party at 3.1%; Paata Burchuladze’s State for People at 2.7%; and Republican Party at only 2.7%.

An alternative exit poll was commissioned by the major opposition channel Rustavi 2 TV.  Conducted by GfK and fielded by Tbilisi-based pollster BCG Research, this poll returned a better results for the UNM at 32.74%, less for GD at 39.9%, and the Alliance of Patriots at 5.76%. According to Rustavi 2 exit polls, the Labor Party won 4.21%, Paata Burchuladze’s State for People won 3.25%, the Free Democrats won 3.21%, and Nino Burjanadze’s Democratic Movement won 2.81%.

With the exit polls proving controversial, on October 9 the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), Georgia’s largest election monitoring non-governmental organization, released the results of its parallel vote tabulation (PVT) of proportional, party-list vote. This poll largely coincided with the early official results.

According to its PVT results, the ruling Georgian Dream party won 49.1% of the vote and UNM 26.8%. PVT’s margin of error was calculated at +/- 0.9%. ISFED was not able to determine conclusively whether or not the Alliance of Patriots had cleared the 5% threshold.  They returned the party at 4.9% of the vote, but the margin of error was +/- 0.3%.


Several irregularities and violations were reported and complaints were filed by local and international observer organizations. In a number of precincts the electoral process and counting were interrupted due to the mob raids. Due to these incidents, several district-level results may be annulled.

Official Results

By October 10, Central Election Commission of Georgia has published the following results from all 3,702 precincts for the party-list vote:

Turnout: 51 %

Georgian Dream – 48.65%
UNM – 27.12%
Alliance of Patriots – 5%
Free Democrats – 4.62%

The process was particularly tense for Alliance of Patriots, as the CEC changed the result from 4.99% to 5% several times.

Of the 73 majoritarian constituencies only 22 candidates cleared the 50% threshold necessary for election at the first round, all of them from Georgian Dream. A second round will therefore be held in 51 constituencies, where in most cases Georgian Dream and United National Movement candidates will compete against each other. One of the exceptions is the Gori seat, where the GD and Free Democrats leader, Irakli Alasania, were to be the two main candidates. However, the leader of the Free Democrats has withdrawn from the race and announced that he is leaving politics.

These results will leave most parties outside parliament. The leader of the Democratic Movement, Nino Burjanadze, has said that he does not recognise the results of elections, while the leader of Republicans, David Usupashvili, accepted defeat.

Assesment of the International Observation Missions

The statement released by EU High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini and Commissioner Johannes Hahn assessed the elections as “competitive, well-administered” and said that fundamental freedoms were “generally respected”.

According to the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission, “the calm and open campaign atmosphere was, however, impacted by allegations of unlawful campaigning and some incidents of violence. Election Day generally proceeded in an orderly manner, but tensions increased during the day and several violent altercations took place near and in polling stations. However, voting was assessed positively in almost all polling stations”.

Fear of Constitutional Majority

Georgian Dream is eyeing a constitutional majority in the new parliament if it can win most of the run-off elections. It could win 113 seats in the parliament. A constitutional majority requires the support of three-quarters of the total number of MPs.

Georgian Dream has said that it wishes to initiate several constitutional amendments. Firstly, it wishes to define marriage as the union of a man and woman. Secondly, it has openly declared that the President should be elected by parliament instead of by a popular vote. They also wish to change the procedures for impeaching the president, as well as power to change the electoral system.

With only three parties likely to be represented in parliament, Georgia’s young democracy is about to enter a new cycle that will test its political and democratic stability.